OF  THE 

AT 

PRINCETON,   N.  J. 


x>  cj  K  _-vt  i  t»  .X-     t»  !•- 

SAMUEL   AONEW, 


(IF     PHILADELPHIA,    PA. 


J^£ettez. 


foutswcJO  /<J~?£f§5'r, 


( 'ase9 

Shelf. 
Hook, 


SCO    i 


- !  -  mtmrnm  iimwi .  i 


NATURAL    PRINCIPLES 


OF 


RECTITUDE 


NATURAL  PRINCIPLES 

OF 

ECTITUDE, 

FOR    THE 

CONDUCT  OF  MAN 

IN   ALL 

STATES  AND  SITUATIONS  OF  LIFE; 

DEMONSTRATED  AND  EXPLAINED 
IN    A 

SYSTEMATIC  TREATISE 

ON 

MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

COMPREHENDING 

The  Law  of  Nature— Ethics — Natural  Jurifprudence — General 
CEconomy— Politics — and  the  Law  of  Nations. 


By  JOHAN.  DANIEL  UROS,  D.T>, 

?4;r.ifter  of  the  German  Reformed   Church   in  the  City  of  New- York, 

and  Profeffor  of  Moral  Philofophy,  Geography,  and 

Chronology  in  Columbia  College. 


Omnes  lndice  opes  fuperat  mens  confcia  retti. 


NEW-YORK: 

PRINTED    BY    T.   AND    J.   SWORDS, 

Printers  to  the  Faculty  of  Phyfic  of  Columbia  College, 

—  1795.— 


Difintt  of  New-Fork,  fs. 

/""""N  Ti^  *l  remembered,  that  on  the  27th  day  of  Auguit, 
^L.S.J  JL#  in  the  nineteenth  year  of  the  independence  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  the  Reverend  Johan. 
Daniel  Gros,  of  the  faid  diftricl:,  hath  depofited  in  this  office 
the  title  of  a  book,  the  right  whereof  he  claims  as  author,  in 
the  words  following,  to  wit! 

"  Natural  Principles  of  Reclitude,  for  the  Conduft  of  Man  in  all 
tl  States  and  Situations  of  Life ;  dcmonjlrated  and  explained  in  a 
4C  Syjlematic  Treat  if e  on  Moral  Philofophy :  comprehending  the  Law 
tl  of  Nature — Ethics — Natural  fur  if  prudence — General  (Economy — 
*'  Politics — and  the  Law  of  Nations.  By  Johan.  Daniel  Gros,  D.D, 
*c  Minijhr  of  the  German  Reformed  Church  in  the  City  of  New-  Yor£t 
14  and  Profejfjr  of  Moral  Philofophy ,  Geography  and  Chrohology  in 
"  Columbia  College." 

In  conformity  to  the  act  of  the  Gongrefs  of  the  United  States,, 
entitled,  "  An  Aft  for  the  Encouragement  of  Learning,  by 
**  fecuring  the  Copies  of  Maps,  Charts  and  Books  to  the  Authors 
"  and  Proprietors  of  fuch  Copies  during  the  Times  therein 
**  mentioned. " 

ROBERT  TROUP,  Clerk  of  the  Difricl* 


TO    THE 

Regents  of  the  Univerfity  of  the  State  of  New- York, 
To  the  Truftees  of  Columbia  College, 

This  Treatife  is  humbly  dedicated, 
By  their  devoted, 

And  moll  obedient  humble  fervantj 

The  AUTHOR, 


PREFACE. 


JL  HERE  mould  indeed  be  weighty  caufes,  which* 
in  themfelves,  could  juftify  a  pretention  to  the  attention 
of  the  public,  on  the  part  of  a  perfon  who  cannot  but 
be  very  imperfect,  with  regard  to  ftile  and  diction,  in 
the  language  of  a  country  which  has  given  him  the 
title  of  an  adopted  citizen.  New  and  important  truths, 
or  a  new  and  happy  arrangement  of  thole  which  are 
eftabliihed  by  the  reafonings  of  philofophers  and  con- 
firmed by  the  experience  of  the  prefent  as  well  as  for- 
mer ages,  might  perhaps  compenfate  for  a  defedt  of 
elegance  of  ftile,  fo  juftly  efteemed  by  the  public,  and 
fo  eagerly  fought  on  the  part  of  authors,  who,  treating 
on  fubjecls  iuterefting  to  all  ftates  and  conditions  of  men, 
fet  up  for  public  teachers.  The  author  of  this  treatife 
dares  not  arrogate  to  himfelf  merit  on  either  of  thefe 
points.  He  contents  himfelf  with  furniming  the  Stu- 
dents of  Columbia  College,  his  former  and  prefent 
difciples,  with  the  general  traits  of  a  fyflem  which  he 
has  taught  for  a  number  of  years  in  that  feminary  of 
learning,  under  the  aufpices  and  patronage  of  the 
worthy  Truflees  thereof.     He  wifhes  to  fubmit  to  the 

Regents 


Vili  PREFACE. 

Regents  of  the  Univerfity  of  the  flate  of  New- York, 
and,  in  them,  to  the  fathers  of  our  country,  to  whofe 
care  is  intrufted  the  greater!;  object  of  public  concern 
on  the  part  of  rulers  of  ftates  and  nations,  the  educa- 
tion of  youth,  the  cultivation  and  advancement  of  the 
arts  and  fciences,  both  fo  beneficial  and  ornamental  to 
civil  fociety,— the  method  and  fubject-matter  of  his 
labours  as  Teacher,  and  afterwards  Profeflbr  of  Moral 
Fhilofophy  in  the  firft  feat  of  learning  in  this  ftate. 

Very  fenfible  of  his  inability  to  fatisfy  the  great  truft 
repofed  in  him  to  that  degree  of  perfection  fo  defirable 
in  perfons  whofe  province  it  is  to  inftil  into  the  minds 
of  our  youth  thofe  principles  of  morality  and  rectitude 
which  give  them  a  true  and  happy  direction  in  the 
purfuit  of  all  public  and  private  virtues,  and  by  the 
indefatigable  exercife  of  which  they  may  become  emi- 
nently ufeful  to  themfelves,  good  members  of  fociety, 
and  ornaments  to  their  country, — he  is  confident  his 
zeal  to  do  all  in  his  power  for  the  attainment  of  thefe 
important  ends  has  not  been  in  vain*,  and  as  he  is per- 
fuaded  this  will  be  kindly  taken  into  confideration,  fo 
he  trufts  it  will  entitle  him  to  that  liberal  and  generous 
indulgence  which  laudable  and  arduous  attempts  have 
never  yet  failed  to  meet  with  from  the  free  citizens  of 
thefe  happy  ftates. — The  highert  of  his  ambition  is, 
that  an  imputation  of  partiality  may  be  removed  from 
thofe  generous  patrons,  who  have  honoured  a  German 
preacher  with  an  appointment  to  the  Profeflbrfhip  of 


PREFACE.  IX 

Moral  Philofophy. — He  has  confulted,  but  not  in  a 
fervile  manner  followed  authors  of  fame  and  great  au- 
thority— he  has  even  taken  the  liberty  to  differ  from 
them  in  many  points  of  no  fmall  importance — he  lias 
endeavoured  to  eftablifh  the  rights  in  perfons  on  their 
proper  foundation,  the  eternal  principles  of  natural 
juftice  and  equity — he  has  laboured  to  enter  the  fane- 
tuary  of  focial  rights  of  every  defcription,  holding  up 
the  high  detonation  and  dignity  of  man,  following  him 
through  a  variety  of  natural  and  adventitious  ftates— 
he  afferts  man's  unalienable  rights,  under  ail  manner  of 
circumftances,  in  the  various  fituations  of  private  and 
public  life — he  has  endeavoured  to  prove  the  great  ad- 
vantages of  civil  government,  together  with  its  necef- 
fity  for  the  general  happinefs  of  mankind,  pointing 
out  the  grand  natural  rights  and  important  public  duties 
of  rulers  on  earth — he  has  explained  and  fupported,  by 
arguments  founded  in  nature,  the  no  lefs  important 
rights  of  the  ruled,  and  the  abfolute  neceflity  of  a  faith- 
ful performance  of  all  the  public  obligations  which  they 
owe  to  their  country  and  their  magiftrates,  in  order  to 
be  good  citizens  and  a  happy  people. 

His  aim  has  even  been  fo  extenfive  as  to  lay  before 
the  public,  general,  uniform  and  (table  principles  for 
guiding,  in  fome  meafure,  their  fentiments  with  refpect 
to  univerfal  benevolence,  the  neceflity  of  a  faithful  at- 
tention to  duty,  and  the  high  excellency  of  religion  and 
piety.     Infulated  with  regard  to  party  or  connections, 

A  2  his 


X  PREFACE. 

his  whole  attention  has  been  fixed  upon  his  fubject, 
and  the  beft  poffible  manner  to  do  it  juftice.  Under 
thefe  circumftances,  he  thought  the  liberty  to  take 
up  the  tone  of  a  cenfor  no  crime,  but  looked  upon 
candour  as  a  right,  as  an  indifpenfible  duty  in  an  author 
who  has  undertaken  to  teach  the  facred  principles  of 
morality.  Following  reafon  as  his  guide,  he  could  not 
but  fee  its  amicable  and  infeparable  connection  with 
the  facred  caufe  of  religion.  He  thinks  himfelf  justi- 
fiable in  laying  down  as  an  incontrovertible  truth,  that 
reafon  is  religion,  becaufe  rekgion  is  the  greateft  perfection 
of  reafon,  and  gives  it  the  happieft  direction.  If  this  be 
fo,  which  is  evident  from  the  nature  of  man  and  from 
his  natural  relation  to  the  Deity  and  to  the  univerfal 
fociety  of  mankind,  how  mall  we  anfwer  for  the  eager- 
nefs  with  which  certain  publications  are  cried  up,  and 
the  great  avidity  with  which  they  are  bought — publica- 
tions v/hich  furely  are  not  the  falutary  effects  of  the  age, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  the  bitter  and  execrable  fruits  of 
the  rage  of  reafon,  flnce  their  aim  feems^to  be,  were 
it  poffible,  to  fap  the  very  foundation  of -religion? 

The  impartial  public  will  judge,  whether  thefe  great 
objects  are  in  fome  meafure  happily  purfued— whether 
the  well-meant  labours  of  the  author  merit  their  atten- 
tion and  patronage — whether  freedom  of  thought  and 
impartiality  of  judgment  have  been  theconftant  guide 
of  his  refearches  after  truth — whether  the  caufe  of  hu- 
manity or  finifter  motives  have  been  his  object — and, 

whether 


PREFACE.  XI 

whether  the  happinefs  of  mankind  has  been  the  prin- 
cipal end  of  his  labours. 

Were  it,  that  productions  could  gain  credit  from 
the  characters  who  have  given  encouragement  for  their 
appearance  before  the  public,  the  following  treatife 
would  not  be  deftitute  on  this  fcore.  Forbearing  to 
mention  the  names  of  fome  very  refpectable  perfons 
who  will  doubtlefs  fee  this  work,  the  author  cannot 
poflibly  omit  that  of  the  late  patriotic  BARON  DE 
STEUBEN,  his  great  patron  and  friend.  However, 
from  the  author's  own  confcioufnefs  of  his  infufficiency 
with  refpect  to  diction,  the  thought  was  laid  afide;  and, 
had  it  not  been  for  the  friendly  importunities  and  pref- 
fmg  arguments  of  one  *  of  my  worthy  colleagues,  the 
ProfefTors  of  Columbia  College — had  I  not  had  fuffi- 
cient  reafons  for  depending  on  the  afliduous  fupport  of 
my  worthy  pupil  -f  m  the  theological  and  philofophicai 
fciences,  whofe  heart  and  talents  bid  fair  foon  to  give 
him  a  place  among  thofe  who  will  tranfmit  the  truths 
of  found  morality  to  pofterity  not  impaired,  but  im- 
proved, the  publication  of  this  treatife  would  probably 
have  been  left  in  the  world  of  pofTibilities. 

Happy 

*  Dr.  Samuel  L.  Mitciiill,  Profeflor  of  Chemiftry  in 
Columbia  College. 

f  The  Reverend  Philip  Milledoler,  Minifterof  the  Go(- 
pel,  alurrmu-3  of  Columbia  College,  and  a  native  of  the  city  of 
-Vew-York, 


Xll  PREFACE, 

Happy  would  the  author  be,  if  he  mould  find  that 
his  production  meets  the  indulgence  of  the  public,  and 
is  not  thought  unworthy  the  approbation  of  the  good 
and  upright  amongir.  his  fellow  citizens;  but  frill  hap- 
pier, if  he  finds  his  wimes  accomplifhed — if  he  can 
confide,  that  it  contributes  to  the  advancement  of  the 
caufe  of  virtue  and  religion — that  it  becomes  a  mean 
to  inflame  the  American  youth  with  a  true  love  for 
their  country,  with  a  fpirit  of  patriotifm  worthy  their 
great  rights  and  privileges,  as  the  free-born  fons  of  the 
free  and  independent  ftates  of  North- America.  May 
they  know,  efleem,  and  always  make  a  virtuous  ufe  of 
thofe  rights — May  they  be  foremoft  amongft  thofe  who 
ftrictly  adhere  to  all  their  private  and  public  obliga- 
tions— May  they  become  good  men,  good  citizens; 
the  fupporters  of  the  government  of  laws,  the  defen- 
ders of  their  country  -,  refpeclers  of  religion,  and  true 
lovers  of  God,  their  benign  and  univerfal  father  1 

New -York  y  April  10,  1795. 


NO  T  E. 

A  few  errors  have  been  obferved,  but  as  the  author  has  been 
prevented  by  indifpofition  from  attending  to  them,  it  is  expected 
the  reader  will  excufe  their  not  being  particularly  noticed. 

The  tenn  fecial  obligee  is  made  ufe  of  in  a  fenfe  different  from 
the  fignification  it  commonlv  bears  in  law.  Let  it  be  remem- 
bered,  that  thereby  is  underftood  that  party  of  the  focial  con- 
nection upon  whom  the  focial  obligation  is  binding, 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


General  introdufiion, » 

The  various  Jiates  of  Man  which  modify  his  moral 
character, Hid 

Moral  Philofophy  defined  and  dijlinguijhed  into  three 
parts, , 10  and  n 

PART   I. 

Of  Moral  Philofophy,  comprehending  the  Law  of  Nature. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Of  the  aclions  of  Alan,  and  their  morality  or  immorality,     n 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  moral  obligations, 26 

CHAPTER  III. 
Of  moral  law, ^5 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  different  degrees  of  morality  and  immorality  in 
human  conducl, 69 

CHAPTER  V. 
Of  moral  imputation, 02 

PART  II. 

SECTION  I.     Comprehending  Ethics. 
Introduction, 109 

CHAPTER  I. 
Of  cur  duties  to  God,      .     , 1 1 1 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  duties  to  our f elves,      .      . 1 26 

CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  duties  of  humanity  in  general, I  rr 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  duties  of  humanity  which  we  owe  to  others,     .     .   16  r 

CHAPTER 


suit"  CONTENTS. 

Page. 
CHAPTER  V. 

Of  the  duties  of  nccejfity, 178 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the  rights  of  defence  and  war, 188 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Of  the  duties  of  fpeceh, *  205 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Of  pads  and  paditious  rights, 234 

SECTION  II.    Comprehending  Natural  Jurifprudence. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Of  rights  in  things, 253 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  original  mode  of  acquiring  rights  in  things,  efpe- 

cially  the  right  of  property , 260 

CHAPTER  III. 
Of  thofe  modes  of  acquifition  which  may  take  effetT;  during 

the  life  of  the  owner,      .      .     . 27 1 

CHAPTER  IV. 
77ie  derivative  modes  of  acquifition  of  rights  in  things  by 
will  and  tefament,  atid  by  adminijlration  or  inheritance 
ab  inteilato, 277 

SECTION  III.    Comprehending  General  QEconomy. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Of  rights  in  perfons,        283 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  general  laws  of  focicty, 289 

CHAPTER  IK. 

Introduction  to  the  relative  duties  of  Alan  v:hich  flow  from 
the  conjlitutlon  of  the  fexes, 303 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  matrimonial  or  connubial  fociety,     .     .      .  .   315 

CHAPTER  V. 

Of  the  more  fpecific  rights  and  duties  between  hujband 
and  wife, 318 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Of 'the  parental  focicty ,     ....;• 324 

CHAPTER 


CONTENTS.  xv 

Page. 
CHAPTER  VII. 
Of  the  herile  fociety, 331 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Of  the  domefic  fociety, 34.Q 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Of  communities , ,,  344, 

SECTION  IV.     Comprehending  Politics. 
CHAPTER  I. 

Of  the  nature  and  difference  of  civil focieties  or  fates,     .  347 

CHAPTER  II. 
Of  the  origin  of  civil  fociety, org 

CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  different  laws,  rights  and  obligations  which  take 
place  in  civil  fociety,  and  the  different  capacities  and 

characters  of  -the  citizens, 362 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Of  the  invariable  fcope  of  all  public  and  municipal  laws  in 
a  fate,   the  effential  public  rights,  and  the  correlative 
public  obligations  between  the  government  and  the  people,  364 
CHAPTER  V. 
Of  the  fuprcmc  power  or  fovcreignty  in  a  fate,  and  the 
principal  rights  of  fovercignty,     .      ►     .      .      .     .      -371 
CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the  rcfourccs  of  a  fate, 376 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Of  revenue  and  the  a  dm'mif  ration  thereof,     ....  378 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Of  the  public  obligations  and  rights  of  citizens  hi  regard 

to  their  fovereign, 382 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Of  the  different  forms  of  government, 386 

CHAPTER  X. 

Of  the  pcivers  of  government,  and  the  difributicn  cf  them 
in  mixed  governments,        ..........  391 

CHAPTER  XL 

Of  the  fundamental  law  of  the  fate,  and  the  public  meet- 
ings of  the  people,  together  with  the  modes  of  deliberation,  39? 

PART 


xvi  CONTENTS. 

PART  III. 

Of  the  Univerfal  Law  of  Nations. 

Page. 
CHAPTER  I. 

Of  the  univerfal  principles  of  the  law  of 'nations ',  a)id  the 
general  rights  of  national  independence ,      ....  402 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  duties  of  nations  in  general, 407 

CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  duties  of  the  rulers  of  fates  and  nations  with  re- 
fpeft  to  religion  and  public  w or/hip, 409 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  duties  which  fates  or  nations  owe  themj elves ,     .  418 

CHAPTER  V. 

Of  the  duties  which  nations  owe  one  another,     .      •      .  423 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the  natural  rights  of  nations, 425 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Of  the  natural  rights  of  public  fecurity  and  peace,     .     .426 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Of  the  natural  rights  of  defence, 428 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Of  public  waj",     ......«, 439 

CHAPTER  X. 

Of  the  rights  of  the  viclor,     .........  446 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Of  national  inter courfe, i  448 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Of  the  hypothetical  natural  rights  of  nations  with  refpetl 

to  treaties, 451 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Of  the  territory  and  jurifdiffion  of  nations,     .     .     .     .  45  ^ 


INTRODUCTION 


INTRODUCTION, 


IVJlAN  may  be  considered  in  a  variety  of  ftatcs* 
which  modify  his  moral  character,  and  exhibit  general 
rules  for  his  conduct  in  the  purfuit  after  happinefs. 

By  a  ft  ate  of  man,  we  understand  an  asTemblage  of 
certain  determinations  or  affections  inherent  in,  or  re- 
ferable to  his  nature,  and  to  various  relations  in  which 
he  may  ftand  v/ith  refpect  to  other  things. 

There  are  fome  affections  in  man  which  flow  from 
his  eflence,  and  therefore  are  always  inherent;  thefe 
constitute  his  ejfential  ftate,  which  is  conftant  and  un- 
alienable. 

Scholion.—  His  dependence  upon  God,  the  rationality  of  his  na- 
ture, &c. 

There  is  a  variety  of  other  determinations  which 
exhibit  human  nature  under  certain  confiderations,  re- 
lations and  circumftances  •,  thefe,  not  being  always  in- 
herent in  man,  constitute  his  accidental ft 'at es9  which 
are  mutable. 

Sch. — That  man  is  a  citizen,  a  ftranger,  a  magiftrate,  a  fa- 
ther, &c. 

Some  of  thefe  determinations  are  in  man,  others  re- 
fult  from  a  relation  to  other  objects  -7  the  former  con- 
stitute the  internal,  the  latter  the  external  ft  ate  of  man. 
Sch. — A  man  may  be  virtuous,  though  he  be  not  rich;  he  may- 
be admirably  qualified  for  the  fervice  oi  his  country,  and 
B  '    ItiU 


1  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ft  ill  be  unnoticed,  and  vice  verfa.  The  nobleft  mind 
may  be  obfcurcd  under  the  garb  of  poverty — innocence 
bear  the  bill  of  perfecution.  Vice  and  fervility  may 
for  a  while  ride  in  triumph.  Man,  according  to  his  in- 
ternal ftate,  may  be  happy;  in  refpecT:  of  the  external,  he 
may  appear  to  be  miferable  and  wretched. 

If  man  be  confidered  under  determinations  which 
remit  from  the  natural  conflitution  of  his  body  and  the 
natural  frame  of  his  mind,  he  is  faid  to  be  confidered 
Si  his  phyfical  ftate. 

Scli. — A  man  may  be  ftrong  and  vigorous,  briik  and  gay,  or 
weak,  (low,  fullen,  &c. 

Phyfical  ftates  are  in  many  refpects  mutable ;  for  we 
experience,  that  the  conftitution  of  the  body  and  the 
difpofition  of  the  mind  admit  of  great  improvements, 
or,  by  mifmanagement  and  by  various  accidents,  may 
be  rendered  worfe. 

Sch. — To  endeavour  to  know  and  do  all  that  is  conducive  to 
the  well-being  of  foul  and  body,  ought  to  be  the  moll 
principal  concern  of  every  man  who  feels  a  delire  to  be 
feappy.  To  affift  our  fellow  men  in  this  great  work  is 
the  province  both  of  the  phyfician  and  the  moralift,  with 
this  difference,  that  the  latter  refers  all  that  he  finds  in 
and  about  man  to  his  free  agency. 

Man,  reprefonted  as  a  free  agent,  is  confidered  in 

his  moral  ftate. 

The  moral  ftate  of  man  is  either  natural  and  con- 
flant)  or  accidental  and  mutable. 

S:'i, — Man,  as  a  rational  creature,  is  refponfible  for  his  con- 
duct to  him  that  made  him,  where  and  whenever  it  is  in 
his  power  to  exercife  free  agency,  and  in  that  refpect  he 
is  beyond  all  controul  of  human  authority :  but  in  the 
exercife  of  free  agency,  he  may  follow  the  dictates  of 
reafon,  acquire  habits  of  virtue,  be  fenfible  of  his  duty; 
or,  on  the  contrary,  may  conduct  himfelf  in  an  irrational 
manner,  become  more  or  lefs  carelefs  and  abandoned. 

Ill 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  J 

In  refpect  of  moral  agency,  we  muft  well  diftinguim 
the  different  actions  of  which  human  nature  is  capable, 
the  nature  of  moral  actions,  and  their  con/iftency  with 
moral  rectitude. 

We  aft,  if  we  are  the  caufe  of  an  effect,  or  of  the 
contrary. 

Actions,  therefore,  are  dirtinguifhed  into  commiffive 
or  omijjive. 

Sck. — We  may  do  our  duty  or  neglect  it. 

Whether  we  act  by  commiffion  or  by  omiffion,  an 
effect  will  be  produced  in  a  two-fold  way ;  either  that 
we  determine  ourfelves,  or  that  we  are  determined. 

When  we  determine  ourfelves,  an  action  is  faid  to 
be  fpontaneous  -,  if  we  are  determined,  it  is  non-fponta- 
neous. 

Non-fpontaneous  actions  are  either  compulfory  or 
natural. 

In  compulfory  actions  we  are  determined  by  externa! 

force  %  natural  actions  refult  from  the  conftitution  of 

body  and  foul. 

^.—Hunger,  thirft,    fleep,    reprefentations  caufed  by  ob- 
jects, &c. 

Natural  actions,  in  themfelves  neceflary,  may  be 

fpontaneous  in  refpect  of  time,  place,  and  manner  to 

do  them. 

Sch. — We  may  eat  and  drink,  at  an  improper  time  and  place, 
to  excefs,  in  a  decent  or  indecent  manner. 

We  aft  freely,  when  we  act  fpontaneoufly  upon  pre- 
vious confederation. 

We  confider-i  when,  by  an  act  of  our  underftanding, 


MORAL  FHILOSOFHV. 


we  enquire  whether  an  action   ought  to  be  done  or 

emitted. 

Sck. — Irrational  creature?  acl:  fpontaneoufly,  and  often  with 
an  admirable  fagacity ;  but,  being  deftitute  of  underftand- 
ino    thev  cannot  act  freelv. 

O7  •*  J 

An  action  is  faid  to  be  moral,  when  it  is  founded 
in  a  free  action. 

All  free  actions  are  moral,  but  not  all  moral  actions 

free. 

Sck. — Intoxication,  freely  indulged,  with  all  its  concomitants 
and  confequences,  is  criminal,  horrid  and  difguftful :  if 
it  be  intruded  by  deception,  or  forced  upon  a  fellow 
creature  by  compulfion,  it  moves  our  pity  and  meets 
compaffion. 

In  confequence  of  our  actions,  things  which  wrere 
merely  poffible  are  brought  into  exiftence. 

If  it  be  our  defire  to  enquire  into  the  nature  of  mo- 
ral actions,  we  muft  carefully  attend  to  the  ideas  of 
poffibility,  of  neceffity  and  contingency,  in  order  to 
have  a  diftinct  idea  of  liberty,  upon  which  all  that  is 
moral  or  immoral  in  human  conduct  ultimately  de- 
pends. 

In  general,  that  is  faid  to  be  poffible^  which  involves 
no  contradiction. 

What  involves  no  contradiction  in  itfelf,  is  abfolutcly 

pojjible. 

Sch. — The  whole  fyftem  of  the  heavens  may  be  removed  or 
changed;  the  poor  oppreiTed  and  injured. 

What  involves  no  contradiction  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, is  hypotheticdly  pojjible. 

The  circumftances  under  which  a  thing,  poffible  in 
.]fj  may  involve  a  contradiction,  are  our  power  or 

duty ; 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  g 

duty,  therefore,  hypothetical  poffibility  is  diftinguifhed 

into  pbyfical  and  moral. 

A  thing  is  phyfically  poffible,  if  it  does  not  involve 

a  contradiction  with  our  power. 

Sck. — Upon  the  question,  Whether  the  power  of  man,  or  of 
the  whole  human  race,  or  of  all  created  beings  taken  to- 
gether, can  remove  heavenly  bodies,  or  change  their  or- 
der? we  cannot  heiitate  to  declare  fuch  things  utterly 
impoffible. 

Things  are  morally  poffible,  if  they  involve  no  con- 
tradiction with  a  law,  with  our  obligation  and  duty : 
they  are  faid  to  be  rights  and  the  oppofite  to  be  wrong. 

Sch. — It  is  not  morally  poffible  and  right  to  opprefs  and  to  in- 
jure the  poor ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  morally  impoffible 
and  wrong. 

We  call  things  necejfary^  when  the  oppofite  thereof 
is  impoffible. 

If  the  oppofite  of  a  thing  be  impoffible  in  itfelf,  it 

|s  abfolutely  neceffary. 

Sch. — Thus  the  exiftence  of  God,  as  the  firft  caufe  of  all 
things,  is  neceffary;  it  is  alfo  neceflary  that  the  love  of 
fin  be  an  enmity  againft  God. 

If  the  oppofite  of  a  thing  be  impoffible  under  cir- 
cumftances,  it  is  hypothetically  necejj'ary. 

If  the  oppofite  of  a  thing  be  impoffible  in  refpecl;  of 
our  power,  it  is  faid  to  be  phyfically  necejfafy  ;  as,  meat 
and  drink  for  the  fupport  of  life. 

If  the  oppofite  of  a  thing  be  inconfiftent  with  a 
law,  with  our  obligation  and  duty,  it  is  morally  neceffary. 
Sch. — Of  tins  nature  are  all  virtuous  actions.  The  f?ar  of 
God,  the  love  of  our  neighbour,  modefty,  juiiice,  fo- 
briety,  are  not  optional  in  this  fenfe,  that  we  may  omit 
them,  or  do  the  contrary,  confidently  with  the  dignity 
of  human  nature  and  our  dependence  upon  God. 

The 


6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  oppofite  of  neceffity  is  contingency. 

A  thing,  therefore,  is  contingent,  if  the  oppofite 
thereof  be  pofiible,  which  may  be  either  in  itfelf  or 
under  circumftances. 

Hence  contingency  is  likewife  diftinguifhed  into  ab- 
folute  and  hypothetical,  and  the  latter  into  phyjical  and 
moral. 

Sch.  i. — What  is  abfolutely  neceflary,  cannot  be  contingent 
under  anv  circumftances  whatever. 

Sch.  i. — What  is  hypothetically  neceflary,  may  be  abfolutely 
contingent. 

Sch.  3. — What  is  phyfically  contingent,  may  be  morally  ne- 
ceflary. 

Sch.  4. — The  queftion,  therefore,  is,  Whether  a&ions  are  right 
or  wrong?  Not  whether  we  can,  but  whether  we  ought 
to  do,  or  to  omit  them. 

If  by  a  right  we  underftand  a  quality  in  a  perfon,  we 

may  define  it  to  be  a  moral  pombility  of  doing  or 

omitting  certain  actions. 

Sch. — To  order  the  confinement  of  perfons  is  the  right  of  ma- 
giftrates  and  officers  of  government,  exclufi  vely  of  citizens 
of  any  other  defcription;  it  extends  to  diforderly  perfons, 
the  violators,  not  the  peaceable  obfervers  of  the  law. 

As  free  agency  ought  to  be  conducted  according  to 
principles  of  right,  we  may  infer,  that  the  rights  of 
men  are  the  principal  features  in  their  moral  ftate  \ 
for  different  perfons  enjoying  the  fame  rights,  are  in 
the  fame  moral  ftate  -,  and,  on  the  contrary,  perfons 
identically  the  fame,  enjoying  different  rights,  muft 
be  confidered  in  different  moral  ftates. 

Sch.  1. — Men,  by  their  nature  equal,  differ  among  one  another  j 
the  one  is  a  father,  the  other  a  fon,  a  magiftrate,  &c. 

Sch.  2. — Nay,  an  individual  perfon  may  be  father,  fon,  ma- 
gi ilrate.  &c. 

A  perfon 


Moral  philosophy.  7 

A  perfon  veiled  with  rights  is  filled  a  moral  per/on. 

Many  individuals  veiled  with  identical  rights,  consti- 
tute one  moral  perfon ;  as  corporations,  legislatures,  &c. 

By  the  term  nature^  which  in  different  fciences  is 
taken  in  various  fignifications,  we,  in  the  fequel  of  this 
treatife,  underftand  the  efTence  of  things,  and  call  that 
natural,  which  flows  immediately  from  that  efTence. 

The  nature  of  things  is  either  confldered  in  iffelf, 
or  under  circumflances. 

Things  flowing  from  nature  confldered  in  itfelf,  are 
abfolutely  natural \  thofe  which  flow  from  nature  con- 
fldered under  circumflances,  are  hypotbetically  natural. 

Sch.  1. — It  is  the  natural  absolute  right  of  man  not  to  be  fub- 
je6l  to  human  contronl  againft  his  will,  or  independent 
of  an  act:  that  is  founded  therein;  likewife,  to  have  his 
fupport  from  the  produce  of  the  earth — to  enjoy  the  fruit 
of  his  own  labour:  JIavery,  therefore,  is  a  ftate  abfolutely 
unnatural. 

Sch.  2. — But  under  the  hypothefis,  that  we  have  made  choice 
of  laws  and  men,  or  committed  injury  and  damage,  it  is 
naturally  right  that  we  be  controuled  by  thofe  laws  and 
men,  or  make  reparation  by  our  labour  and  property: 
fubjec"tion,  fervitude  and  compulfion  are  therefore  hypo- 
thetically  natural. 

What  is  abfolutely  natural,  is  necejjary%  what  is  hy- 
pothetically  fuch,  is  contingent, 

Sch.  1. — Things  of  a  phyfical  nature,  which  are  naturally  ne- 
ceffary,  cannot,  and  thofe  of  a  moral  nature  ought  not  to  be 
otherwife.  Twice  two  neceflarilv  make  four.  What  is 
right  to  one  man,  is  neceffarily  right  to  another  who  is 
in  the  fame  ftate  and  condition. 

Sch.  2. — But  fuppofe  a  continued  addition  of  two,  the  fum 
naturally  will  increafe  to  fix,  eight,  &c.  As  naturally 
merit  or  demerit  muft  make  a  difference  between  the 
characters  of  perfons,  in  other  refpects  of  the  fame  ftate 

and 


8  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  condition.     The  one  has  a  juft  claim  to  our  appro- 
bation, the  other  deferves  difapprobation  and  cenfure. 

Rights  of  man  may  be  diftinguifhed  in  refpect  of 
the  ft. 'frees  from  which  they  flow  :  thofe  which  flow 
from  his  nature,  are  his  natural  rights  \  thofe  which 
flow  from  other  things,  are  adventitious. 

The  natural  rights  of  man  are  abfolute  or  hypothetical. 

All  men,  having  the  fame  nature,  have  the  fame  ab- 
folute natural  rights  •,  and,  when  they  are  in  the  fame 
circumilances,  their  hypothetical  natural  rights  cannot 
differ. 

ScJi. — AH  men  have  the  fame  abfolute  natural  right  to  have- 
their  fubfiilence  from  the  produce  of  the  earth :  but  as  it 
is  impolfible  that  all  occupy  the  fame  fpot,  and  fubfiftence 
cannot  be  had  if  one  fhould  defcroy  the  work  of  another, 
it  is  natural  that  each  be  entitled  to  make  ufe  of  the  foil 
firft  occupied,  and  having  bellowed  his  labour  upon  it, 
exclufively  to  enjoy  the  fruits  thereof. 

Men,  therefore,  are  in  the  fame  natural  ftate  -,  for 
they  are  veiled  with  the  fame  natural  rights. 

Rights  the  fame,  are  equal. 

Men  naturally,  therefore,  are  in  a  ft  ate  of  equality. 

Men,  in  a  ftate  of  equality,  are  alfo  faid  to  be  in  a 
ft  ate  of  natural  liberty. 

If  man,  in  his  abfolute  natural  ftate,  be  confidered 
in  himfelf,  he  is  reprefented  in  a  ftate  of  folitude;  if 
refpect  is  had  to  other  men  or  creatures,  he  is  confi- 
dered in  the  abfolute  focial  ftate. 

Sch.  i. — In  this  flate,  independent  of  his  will,  man  is  brought 
into  life  a  fellow  creature  of  the  whole  human  race,  a 
member  of  the  univerfal  family  of  the  eternal  father  of 


beir;gs. 


Sch* 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  9 

Sti,  2. — In  treatifes  of  morality  little  is  laid  of  this  abfolutc  fa- 
cial ftate,  though  it  ought  to  be  deemed  a  fabject  of  the 
greateft  importance  and  of  unlimited  extent :  for  what 
can  more  become  the  dignity  of  human  nature,  than  that 
men,  flates,  and  nations  fpread  over  the  face  of  the  earth, 
ihould  coniider  themfelves  and  one  another  as  children  of 
the  fame  gracious  father,  being  not  only  the  work  of  his 
hand,  but  alfo  the  objects  ol[  his  benign  love  and  con- 
tinual care? 

Sch.  3. — How  far  will  this  fubject  extend,  if  it  be  confidered 
that  even  brutes  and  other  things  have  an  abiolute  focial 
daim  upon  the  human  race? 

Befides  this  necejfary  fociety,  of  which  man  cannot, 
and  of  the  duties  of  which  he  ought  not  diveft  himfelf, 
there  is  a  variety  of  others,  where  perfons  voluntarily 
unite  for  obtaining  a  common  end. 

Man,  thus  united  with  others,  is  in  a  foci  at  ftate— 
acquires  adventitious  focial  rights,  and  comes  under 
fbcial  obligations. 

Societies  are  as  various  as  there  may  be  ends  for 

r  which  perfons  unite. 
If  an  union  be  formed  for  propagating  the  fpecies, 
perfons  live  in  the  connubial  or  matrimonial  ftate. 

Sch.  1. — If  that  union  is,  as  it  ought  to  be,  for  the  end  of  edu- 
cating children,  the  matrimonial  ftate  is  lawful,  and  be* 
comes  parental. 

Sch.  2. — In  this  ftate,  parents,  guardians,  &c.  are  veiled  with 
parental  rights ;  children  and  wards,  &c.  are  bound  by 
filial  duties. 

For  the  maintenance  and  education  of  children,  fer~ 
vices  are  required-,  perfons  uniting  for  that  purpofe, 
are  in  the  berile  ftate,  where  matters  and  fervants  have 
their  refpective  rights,  and  come  under  reciprocal 
obligations. 

The  connubial,  parental  and  herile  ftates,  taken  to- 
gether, or  any  tv/o  of  them,  conftitute  the  domeftic  ftate. 

C  From 


IO  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

From  thefe  focieties,  which  are  filled  the  lefs,  may 
be  conceived  an  union  of  families  affociating  for  mutual 
convenience  and  fecurity.  This  is  a  ftep  to  the  greater 
ibcieties,  and  may  be  called  a  community. 

If  a  community  increafes  to  a  confiderable  extent, 
the  common  concerns  cannot  well  be  managed  by  the 
perfonal  deliberation  of  all  the  heads  of  families. 
Convenience,  nay*  nccefiity  will  of  courfe  dictate  a 
delegation  of  will  and  power  of  the  members  to  a  cer- 
tain perfon,  or  number  of  perfons,  for  directing 
things  to  the  common  good  of  all. 

That  focietv,  the  members  of  which  have  tranf- 
ferred  their  will  and  power  to  a  moral  perfon  for  the 
attainment  of  the  felicity  of  all,  is  called  civil. 

Sch. — Civil  focieties,  in  refpect  to  one  another,  are  ftiledjlates. 

Having  given  an  idea  of  the  moft  principal  ftates 
in  which  man  may  be  considered,  and  by  which  his 
natural  rights  tand  duties  are  varioufly  modified,  we 
now  proceed  to  the  definition  of  moral  philolbphy, 
and  will  confider  the  moft  general  contents  of  that 
fcience. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY 

I S  that  fcience  which  gives  rules  for  the  direction 
of  the  will  of  man  in  his  moral  ftate,  or  in  his  purfuic 
after  happinefs. 

This  fcience  is  generally  divided  into  three  parts : 
The  firft  contains  the  law  of  nature,  that  is,  the  na- 
tural and  invariable  principles  of  juftice  and  equity,  by 
which  human  conduct  ought  to  be  regulated. 

The 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  i 

The  fecond  mows  how  thofe  principles  are  to   be 
applied  to  the  various  ftates  of  man. 

The  third  exhibits  the  application  of  thefe  natural 
principles  to  the  ftates  of  the  nations  of  the  earth. 


The  LAW  of  NATURE 

IS  that  fcience  which  treats  of  the  natural  and  in- 
variable principles  of  juflice  and  equity,  by  which 
human  conduct  ought  to  be  regulated. 

It  contains  five  chapters : 

The  flrft  treats  of  human  actions  in  general,  and 
particularly  their  morality  or  immorality. 
The  fecond,  of  moral  obligation. 
The  third,  of  natural  law. 

The  fourth,  of  the  different  degrees  of  morality 
pr  immorality. 

The  fifth,  of  moral  imputation. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Of  the  anions  of  man,  and  their  morality  or  immorality 


M 


AN  is  a  living  creature,  endowed  with  an  organic 
body  and  a  rational  foul. 

Sch.  i. — Living  creatures,  endowed  with  an  organic  body  and 
a  foul,  are  called  animals. 

Sch.  2. — Man  differs  from  other  animals  principally  in  this, 
that  his  foul  is  rational;  according  to  his  animal  nature, 
he  has  numberlefs  determinations  in  common  with  brutes. 

Soul 


12  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Soul  is  defined  to  be  a  power  fufceptible  and  capable 
of  reprefentations. 

The  different  modes  in  which  that  power  exerts  it- 
felf  are  termed  faculties. 

The  faculties  of  the  human  foul  diftinguifh  them- 

felves  into  the  cognofcitive  and  appetitive^  both  of  which 

mud  be  furthermore  diftinguifhed    into  the  inferior 

and  fup  trior. 

Sch. — The  inferior  we  have  in  common  with  brutes ;  by  the; 
fuperior  we  are  elevated  to  the  rank  of  fpirits. 

The  inferior  cognofcitive  faculty  is  that  power  of  the 
human  foul  by  which  we  have  reprefentations  of  ma- 
terial objects.  It  comprehends  fenfation,  imagination 
and  fancy. 

Smfation  is  that  faculty  by  which  we  have  reprefen- 
tations of  material  objects  prefent. 

Sch. — Prefent  here  fignines  any  object  that  ftrikes  our  fenfory 
organs;  thus  a  fixed  ftar,  and  a  diitant  found  which  is 
heard,  are  prefent. 

Imagination  is  that  faculty  by  which  we  have  repre- 
fentations of  material  objects  abfent,  but  which  have 
once  been  wholly  prefent. 

Sch. — We  fee  a  friend,  and  remember  the  city,  with  other  cir* 
cumftances,  where  and  under  which  we  faw  him. 

Fancy  is  that  faculty  by  which  we  form  reprefenta- 
tions of  fuch  abfent  material  objects  as  have  once  been 
prefent  in  part. 

Sch. — We  fancy  a  golden  mountain,  having  had  partial  ideas 
of  gold  arid  of  mountains.  Hence  the  fictions  of  cen- 
taurs, nymphs,  &c. 

There  are  laws  of  fenfation,  imagination,  and  of 
fancy,  by  which  may  be  determined  what  is  necefTary 

in 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


?3 


\n  our  reprefentations,  and  how  far  they  may  be  fpon- 
taneous,  referable  to  our  will,  finful  or  harmlefs. 

Sc/i.  i. — The  law  of  fenfation:  As  foon  as  an  object  has  flruck 
our  fenfory  organ,  the  representation,  or  fpecres  imprefTa, 
is  neceflary:  fenfible  reprefentations  are  therefore  in  our 
power  and  imputable,  a6  far  as  it  was  in  our  pov/er  to 
prevent  objects  affecting  our  organs. 

ScL  2. — The  law  of  imagination  and  fancy :  If  of  two  or  more 
objects  formerly  perceived,  aflbciated  with  or  bearing  a 
fimilitude  the  one  to  the  other,  one  occurs  to  the  mind* 
the  other  or  the  reft  will  of  neceffity  alfo  recur :  imagina- 
tions and  phantoms,  therefore,  will  be  fo  far  in  our  power 
and  imputable,  as  it  has  been  in  our  power  to  hinder  the 
recurrence  of  ideas  formerly  perceived. 

Sc/i.  3. — As  far  as  actions  of  the  mind  flow  from  thefe  laws, 
fo  far  they  muft  be  conftrued  to  be  natural  actions  of  the 
human  foul. 

There  are  alfo  natural  anions  of  our  body,  which 
are  fo  far  neceffary  and  non-fpontaneous  as  they  flow 
from  its  niechanifm  and  the  natural  (late  of  its  fluids. 

The  perceptions  of  the  mind  hitherto  explained, 

have  their  ultimate  caufe  in  fenfation.     Senfible  ideas 

arife  from  mutations,  which  objects  excite  in  the  kn~ 

fory  organs.     There  is,  therefore,  the  ftrictefl:  harmony 

between  the  fenfations  of  our  mind  and  the  mutations 

excited  in  our  organs. 

Sch.  1. — By  this  indiflbluble  union  and  harmony,  foul  and  bo- 
dy conftitute  owtfuppofitum^  tha^  is,  a  complete  incom- 
municable fubflance. 

Cch.  2. — If  fuch  a  fuppolitum  is  intelligent,  it  conftitutes  a 
fhyfical  per  Jon. 

All  mutations  flowing;  from  the  mechanifm  of  the 
body  and  the  natural  frame  of  the  mind,  in  certain 
refpecls,  are  hypothetically  natural;  for  in  divers  pei- 
fons  they  are  different,  nay,  vary  often  in  the  fame  in- 
dividual.    This  difference   is  mod  probably  in  con- 

fequence 


*4  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

fequence  of  their  originating  from  different  fources, 
fome  arifing  in  the  foul,  others  refulting  from  the  body. 

Sch.  i. — The  mind  is  not  always  equally  vigilant,  the  body 
may  be  deranged;  the  ftate  of  childhood  differs  from  that 
of  manhood,  that  of  ficknefs  from  a  ftate  of  health. 

Sch.  2.— Whatever  may  be  the  origin  or  the  qualifying  caufes 
of  thofe  different  mutations,  fo  much  is  certain,  that 
they  affect  the  whole  man,  and  modify  his  phyfical  date, 
that  he  becomes  an  individual  perfon,  difiincl  from  all 
others  in  conftitution,  complexion,  difpofition,  &c. 

Sch,  3. — Natural  mutations  do  not  intereft  the  moralift  any 
farther  than  as  they  affect  or  are  affected  by  fpontaneity, 
inclination  and  will;  as  they  co-operate  or  are  contrary 
to  the  ultimate  end  and  fcope  of  the  efTence  of  man.  His 
enquiry  is,  What  influence  things  have  upon  human  hap- 
pinefs,  whether  they  be  good,  bad  or  indifferent? 

Things  are  conjiftent^  if  their  junction  can  be  ex- 
plained from  a  principle  common  to  all. 

As  far  as  things  are  confident,  they  axtperfecJ. 

Sch.  1. — Every  thing  has  its  efTence  if  the  various  things  in- 
herent therein  are  confident  with  the  fcope  of  that  ef« 
fence,  there  is  a  degree  of  perfection  in  it  commen- 
furate  with  that  confiftency. 

Sch.  2. — A  clock  is  fo  far  perfect  as  the  various  fprings  and 
movements,  and  all  parts,  confpire  to  point  out  time  in  a 
precife  manner;  for  this  is  the  fcope  of  its  efTence. 

Men  cannot  act  but  certain  mutations  will  be  pro- 
duced; they  either  confpire  with  the  fcope  of  their 
eflence,  or  are  inconfiftent  with  it. 

By  actions,  therefore,  man  will  render  his  ftate  per- 
fect or  imperfect. 

What  renders  our  ftate  perfect  is  good,  that  which 
renders  it  imperfect  is  bad. 

Sch. — What  is  not  referable  to  our  ftate  is  indifferent. 

If  our  mind  be  actuated  by  rcprefentations  of  things 
in  reference  to  our  ftate,  we  feel  inclination  or  aver/ion 
m  conformity  to  fuch  reprefentations. 

The 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  appetitive  faculty  of  the  human  foul  in  general 

maybe  defined  that  faculty  by  which  we  feel  an  appetite 

for  things  reprefented  as  good,  and  are  averfe  to  thofe 

which  are  reprefented  as  bad. 

Sch. — Appetite  and  averfion  caufed  by  fenfation,  imagination 
or  fancy,  conftitute  the  inferior  appetitive  faculty ;  but 
if  they  take  rife  in  confequence  of  acts  of  our  nnder- 
flanding,  they  muft  be  confidered  as  exertions  of  the  fu- 
perior ;  they  are  acts  of  the  will. 

Appetite  and  averfion  follow  certain  laws  •,  for  they 
are  indifTolubly  connected  with  the  reprefentations  of 
good  or  evil;  in  our  power,  and  imputable,  if  the  re- 
prefentations be  in  our  power  or  fpontaneous. 

Sch. — Appetites  and  averfions  change  with  our  reprefentations ; 
the  boy  ceafes  to  diilike  the  fchool  if  he  be  made  to  fee 
the  evil  of  idlenefs. 

The  reprefentations  by  fenfation,  imagination  and 
fancy  being  for  the  moil-  part  confufed,  it  follows,  that 
appetite  and  averfion  refulting  from  them,  may  be 
mifplaced  and  improperly  exercifed. 

Sensitive  appetite  and  averfion  have  degrees  m  pro- 
portion as  things  are  reprefented  to  be  good  or  bad 
upon  various  grounds  and  confiderations. 

Sch. — In  confequence  of  this,  appetite  and  averfion  may  chili 
in  refpect  of  one  and  the  fame  object,  or  the  competition 
may  lie  between  different  objects.  In  each  of  thefe  cafes 
the  event  will  be,  that  one  or  the  other  preponderates. 
Or  they  may  refpectively  coincide,  and  caufe  the  affec- 
tions of  the  mind  to  become  ftrong,  turbulent  and  pre- 
dominant. 

Strong  and  predominant  appetites  or  averfions  are 
known  by  the  name  of  paffions. 

Paffions  are  therefore  produced  by  flrong  and  lively 
fenfitive  reprefentations  of  good  or  evil. 


l6  AlORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

Sci, — They  are  diftinguifhed  into  the  agreeable  and  dij'agret°- 
abk,  as  they  have  either  good  or  evil  for  their  object. 

All  pailions  ultimately  reft  upon  thefe  four :  pleafurey 
defire,  pain,  and  fear. 

Pleafure  and  defire  are  the  foundation  of  all  agreeable 
pafilons ;  the  former  arifes  from  a  ftrong  reprefentation 
of  a  good  in  our  pojjeffion,  the  latter  takes  place  when 
there  is  a  great  probability  of  obtaining  a  good  yet  in 
expectation. 

Pain  and  fear,  on  the  contrary,  are  thefources  of  all 
difagreeable  paflions;  the  former  is  caufed  by  the  re- 
prefentation that  we  labour  under  the  preffure  of  a; 
prefent  evil,  the  latter  arifes  from  the  thought  that  an 
evil  hangs  over  our  head. 

ScL — All  other  paffions,  diftinguifhed  in  languages  by  diffe- 
rent names,  are  not  affections  different  in  their  nature, 
but  only  degrees  either  of  pleafure  or  defire,  of  pain  or 
fear;  as,  joy,  anxiety,  defpair,  terror,  mortification,  &c. 

An  habitual  indulgence  of  fenfe  and  paflion  plunges 
us  into. fenfuatity,  and  caufes  propenfity. 

A  kind  of  appetite  and  averfion,  not  founded  upon 
reprefentations  of  the  mind,  is  called  inftinB  \  as,  hun- 
ger, thirft,  &c. 

Experience  evinces,  that  brute9,  in  conformity  to 
their  fenfitive  reprefentations,  alfo  have  their  fenfitive 
appetite  and  averflon,  exercife  indifference,  are  actuated 
by  propenfities  and  by  inftinct.  It  is  likewife  evident 
from  common  obfervation,  that  their  appetites  and 
averfions  are  generally  more  confined  and  infinitely 
better  directed  than  thofe  of  man :  their  paffions  and 
propenfities  are  but  of  the  one  or  the  other  kind,  and 
their  vehemency  keeps  pace  with  an  irritating  caufe, 
or  correfponds  with  the  deftiny,  defence,  or  fupport  of 

their 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  7 

their  exiilence.  Every  thing  indicates  that  fenfe  and 
inftinct  are  given  them  for  their  guide*,  every  thing 
manifefts  infinite  power,  wifdom  and  gOodnefs  in  him 
who  made  them. 

But  it  i9  not  fo  with  man  •,  he  is  prone  to  fenfuality ; 
various  paMlons  obfcure  and  difturb  his  mind,  plunge 
him  into  error,  fin  and  mifery  :  fenfe^  paffions,  in- 
ftinct, therefore,  cannot  have  been  defigned  by  the 
wife  Creator  to  be  the  directors  of  the  ways  of  man. 

.  What  great  caufe  is  there  to  blefs  God  that  he  has 
given  him  another,  a  better  guide  •,  that  he  hath  clothed 
human  nature  with  a  dignity  fuperior  to  all  creatures 
here  on  earth ;  that  he  has  created  his  foul  a  fpirit  ? 
Man  is  not  to  follow  {qi\{q^  but  as  it  is  directed  by  un- 
derftanding  and  reafon;  thefe  are  to  direct  the  fteps  of 
his  feet,  the  defires  of  his  heart — not  to  obey  but  to 
regulate  (mCt  and  paffion. 

This  leads  us  to  treat  of  the  fuperior  faculties  of  the 
human  foul.  Thefe,  as  has  been  faid,  are  diftinguifhed 
into  the  cognofcitive  and  appetitive. 

By  the  fuperior  cognofcitive  faculty  we  are  enabled  to 

form  reprefentations  of  immaterial  objects. 

Sck.  i. — In  order  to  have  an  idea  of  immaterial  objects,  we 
may  only  think  of  the  Jimilitudes  and  differences  which  we 
perceive  when  we  conlider  feveral  objects  with  any  de- 
gree of  attention. 

Sch.  2. — Thefe  fimilitudes  and  differences  are  not  in  one  or 
the  other  of  thofe  objecls,  but  fomething  between  them, 
therefore  fomething  immaterial. 

The  fuperior  cognofcitive  faculty  more  particularly 

comprehends  attention,  reflection,  undentanding,  rea- 

fon,  and  judgment. 

Sch. — The  terms,  under/landing  and  reafon  are  often  ufed  the 
one  for  the  other,  each  expreffing  in  general  the  fuperior 
cognofcitive  faculty. 

D  We 


1%  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

We  have  not  only  a  faculty  to  think,  but  it  Is  in  our 
power  to  dwell  upon  a  thought  or  to  difmifs  it.  The 
faculty  of  continuing  our  thoughts  we  call  attention. 

We  may  attend  to  thoughts,  view  them  as  it  were 
on  different  fides,  enter  into  their  ingredient  parts ; 
that  is,  we  may  continue  our  attention.  The  faculty 
of  continuing  attention  is  reflection. 

By  attending  and  reflecting  upon  objects,  we  will 
difcover  fimilitudes  and  differences  •,  that  is,  we  will 
be  enabled  to  form  diftinft  ideas  of  things.  The  fa- 
culty of  forming  diflinct  ideas  we  call  underftanding 
in  the  reftricted  {^n(c  of  the  term. 

If  we  form  diftinct  Ideas  of  things,  we  mall  dif- 
cover a  connection  of  the  one  with  the  other.  The 
faculty  of  feeing  the  connection  of  things  is  in  parti- 
cular called  reafon. 

Sen.   i.— -By  connexion,    we  underftand  that   conftitution   of 
things,  whereby  the  one  cannot  be  without  the  other. 

Sen.  2. — Thus  caufes  and  effects,  means  and  ends  are  things 
connected. 

We  cannot  fee  fimilitudes  and  differences,  or  con- 
nection in  things,  if  we  do  not  compare  them.  The 
faculty  of  comparing  ideas  is  called  judgment. 

If  our  mind  be  actuated  by  reprefentations  of  our 
underftanding,  we  exercife  the  fuperior  appetitive  fa- 
culty i  that  is,  cur  appetite  and  averfon  will  be  ra- 
tioned. 

Rational  appetite  and  averfion  constitute  what,  in 
the pbilofophicd  fenfe  of  the  word,  is  termed  will. 
Sch.— t-Will  comprehends  both  will  and  refufal. 

The  acts  of  the  will  are  volition  or  nolition. 

In 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHY.  It; 

In  the  exercife  of  volition  or  nolition,  we  may  dif- 
tinguifh  the  following  operations  of  the  mind: 

i.  A  diftinct  idea  of  an  object  is  formed. 

2.  Confequences  mud  be  attended  to,  which  may 
flow  from  the  propofed  object,  and  mew  its  perfec- 
tion or  imperfection. 

3.  The  object  with  thofe  confequences  is  referred 
to  our  ftate,  and  a  concluiion  formed,  whether  the 
object  is  good  or  bad. 

Hence  it  is  evident,  that  the  acts  of  will  cannot  be 
exercifed  without  the  exercife  of  attention,  reflection, 
underftanding,   reafon,  and  judgment. 

Sch. — It  ought  to  be  obferved,  that,  notwithstanding  this, 
anions  are  referred  to  the  will,  and  become  moral,  when 
we  ought  to  have  exercifed  thofe  acls  of  the  underftand- 
ing; that  is,  when  they  wera  in  our  power,  and  we  guilty 
of  inattention. 

Whenever  we  exercife  acts  of  the  will,  there  is 
fomething  from  which  may  be  under  flood  why  we 
rather  will  than  refufe. 

That,  which  thus  determines  our  will,  is  called 
motive. 

As  from  difiinEl  reprefentations  of  good  or  evil  may 
be  underftood  why  an  intelligent  being  mould  chufe 
the  one  and  refufe  the  other,  it  follows,  that  dirtinci 
reprefentations  afford  the  matter  of  motives,  both  for 
volition  and  nolition. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  we  cannot  exercife  any  act 
of  the  will  without  motive. 

ScL  1. — Thofe  who  think  otherwife,  do  not  fufficiently  dif- 
tinguifh  fenfitive  appetite  from  that  which  is  rational. 

Sell.  2. — No  wonder,  that  we  often  appear  to  will  without  ex- 
ercifing  the  fuperior  faculty,  as  we  often  forego  confult- 


20  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

nig  our  imderilanding,  and  only  follow  our  fenfitive  and 
vain  inclinations. 

Sc/i.  3. — Nay,  actions  which  have  been  performed  upon  mo- 
tives may  become  fo  habitual,  that  we  repeat  them  with- 
out thinking  of  the  motive  which  at  flrft  excited  us  to 
a&ion. 

We  may  reprefent  good  and  evil  as  more  or  lefs 
deferable  and  excellent,  or  hurtful  and  pernicious.  One 
motive  is  therefore  more  weighty  and  forcible  than 
another  •,  and  acts  of  the  will  in  confequence  are  dif- 
ferently affected,  and  admit  of  various  degrees  of  re- 
folution. 

Sch.  1. — The  more  motives  confpire,  the  dronger  our  refo- 
lution  will  be. 

Sch.  2. — If  motives  lead  to  that  which  is  flattering  to  our  fen- 
fitive inclinations,  our  refolutions  will  not  only  be  drong, 
but  prompt,  eafy,  and  delightful. 

Sch.  3. — But  good  and  evil  fuggefted  by  our  fenfes  and  ima- 
gination do  not  always  meet  the  approbation  of  our  un- 
derftanding;  the  confequence  is,  that  the  will  comes 
often  into  collifim  with  our  fenfitive  appetite,  and  itsrefq- 
lutions  become  faint,  or  are  entirely  fubverted. 

Sch.  4. — In  fuch  cafes,  motives  ought  to  prevail  over  flatter- 
ing deceitful  appearances ;  our  will  ought  to  maintain  its 
fuperiority ;  man  ought  to  make  a  facrifice  of  fhort-lived 
fenfual  pleafures  for  lading,  nay,  everlading  felicity. 

Strong  and  perfevering  refolutions  of  the  will  are 
acts  of  virtue  or  vice.  They  bear  the  names  of  paf- 
fions  in  a  perfect  analogy  to  thofe  produced  by  ftrong 
and  lively  fenfitive  reprefentations,  but  they  are  really 
different  from  them-,  a  material  diftinction,  therefore, 
in  our  mind  is  neceffary,  if  we  will  not  confound  vir- 
tues with  good  difpofitions,  and  place  black  and  hei- 
nous vices  upon  a  par  with  evil  inclinations  and  pro- 
penfities. 

Sch. — As  rejoicing  in  the  Lord,  hoping  in  God,  fearing  his 
name,  are  excellent  virtues,  fo,  on  the  contrary,  there 

are 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHY.  21 

are  not  more  pernicious  vices  than  rejoicing  in  fin,  def- 
pairing  of  God,  blafpheming  his  name,  &c. 

By  fenfes,  pafTions,  habits,  cufloms  and  examples, 
many  are  tempted  to  judge  that  to  be  good  which  is 
bad,  and  that  bad  which  really  is  good.  Good  and 
evil  is  therefore  to  be  diftinguifhed  into  real  and  ap- 
parent. 

Apparent  good  is  an  evil  reprefented  as  a  good  •,  and 
apparent  evil  is  a  real  good  under  the  falfe  appearance 
of  an  evil. 

Sck  i. — In  the  judgment  of  an  idle  boy  going  to  fchool  is  an 

evil,  but  play  a  defirable  good. 
Sch.  2. — It  requires  the  greateft.  care  and  diligence  to  guard 

againft  falfe  appearances. 

There  are  frequent  occurrences  in  life,  when  feve- 
ral  goods  offer  themfelves,   which  cannot  be  attained 

o  ... 

at  the  fame  time,  but  where  in  chufing  the  one,  we 
mull  deprive  ourfelves  of  the  other.  In  the  fame  man- 
ner evils  may  threaten  us,  which  are  of  that  nature, 
that  in  endeavouring  to  avoid  the  one,  we  muft  meet 
the  other. 

All  we  can  do  in  fuch  cafes  is  to  make  a  true  efli- 
mate  of  the  degrees  of  good  and  of  evil,  in  order  to 
diftinguifh  the  greater  from  the  lefs. 

This  leads  to  the  idea  of  relative  good  and  evil-, 

where  a  lefs  good  chofen  in  preference  to  a  greater,  af- 

fumes  the  quality  of  an  evil,  and  a  lefs  evil  preferred 

to  a  greater  has  the  effect  of  a  good. 

Sch. — Hence  the  rule,  of  two  goods  chufe  the  greateft,  and 
of  two  evils  admit  the  leaft . 

From  the  nature  of  our  foul  it  may  be  proved,  and 
by  daily  experience  we  are  indubitably  convinced,  that 

our 


2  2  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

our  will  is  im perfect,  ftands  in  need  and  is  capable  of 
improvement. 

Our  will  becomes  more  perfect  and  determined 
the  more  we  attain  to  a  diflinct  knowledge  of  things, 
particularly  in  refpect  of  the  good  and  evil  that  may- 
proceed  from  them.  For  the  more  folid  our  know- 
ledge, the  more  powerful  is  the  dominion  of  our  will 
over  the  appearances  of  fenfe,  and  the  allurements  of 
pafiion. 

Our  will  is  not  fubject  to  coaction  or  compulfion,  for 
it  refta  upon  reprefentations  of  our  understanding, 
which  no  human  power  can  controul. 

Sch.  i. — Conviction  and  perfuafion  will  lead  the  will. 

Sch.  i. — By  violent  means  the  will  may  be  affected;  they  may 
obtrude  to  the  intellect  a  companion  between  things  to 
which  it  has  been  averfe,  and  prefent  painful  experiences, 
and  canfe  the  former  to  appear  the  leafl  of  the  two  evils ; 
then  it  is  that  thofe  means  afTume  a  moral  complexion, 
ceafe  to  be  coactions,  and  become  in  a  manner  motives. 

Sch.  3. — However  that  may  be,  no  great  dependence  ought  to 
be  placed  in  means,  which,  for  the  moil  part  only  produce 
fenfitive  inclinations  that  lafl  as  long  as  fear  and  dread 
excite  the  mind,  caufe  involuntary  deceitful  changes, 
and  leave  the  hardened  flubborn  heart  untouched. 

Sen.  4. — Thofe  who  have  the  care  of  education,  of  families, 
&c.  ought  to  confider  that  love  begets  love,  that  tender- 
nefs  creates  attachment.  Government  is  eafy  and  plea- 
fant  when  we  bear  rule  in  the  hearts  of  men. 

Sch.  5. — Brutes,  capable  only  of  fenfitive  inclinations,  may, 
and  often  muft  be  directed  by  force. 

Sch  6. — If  men  a<t  a  brutal  part,  they  have  no  caufe  to  com- 
plain of  feverity  and  violence. 

From  what  has  been  laid,  it  clearly  appears,  that 
ads  of  will  are  fpontaneous,  confequently  acls  of  choice. 

The  faculty  to  determine  ourfelves  to  action  upon 

previous 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  1% 

previous  consideration,  is  called  liberty  \  and  actions 
thus  done  or  omitted,  vlxz  free. 

In  a  free  action  there  muft  be  fpontaneity  in  the 

agent,  contingency  or  room  for  choice   in  refpect  of 

the  action,  and  a  poffibility  of  our  diftinctly  knowing 

its  nature  and  effect  before  the  commiilion  or  omiffion 

thereof. 

Sc/i. — Aftions,  to  which  no  intrinfic  principle  determines  us, 
are  free  from  necefjity\  not  to  be  determined  by  the  autho- 
rity of  another,  is  to  act  free  from  fubjettion;  when  no 
force  compels  us,  we  are  faid  to  be,  free  from  coadicn. 

Moral  actions  are  not  always  free  in  themfelves,  but 

muft  ultimately  depend  upon  or  originate  in  free  action. 

Sc/i. — A  drunkard,  in  a  fit  of  intoxication,  is  not  able  to  ex- 
ercife  his  under/landing;  the  folly,  rudenefs,  &c.  of  his 
conduct,  are  not  free,  being  neceflary  effects  of  a  disor- 
dered brain;  but  they  are  moral,  if  his  will  was  thecaufe 
of  inebriation. 

Moral  actions,  whether  considered  in  themfelves  or 
under  circumftances,  have  their  conferences -,  thefe 
referred  to  the  moral  ftate  of  man  will  either  confift  or 
not  confift  with  the  fcope  of  his  effence,  and  confe- 
quently  render  them  either  good  or  bad. 

If  we  attend  to  the  confequences  of  moral  actions, 
we  confider  them  as  materially  good  or  bad. 

Confequences  flowing  from  actions  confidered  in 
themfelves  cannot  change-,  that  is,  an  action,  as  fuch, 
produces  always  the  fame  effect*,  in  this  cafe,  actions 
materially  good  or  evil  are  neceffarilyfuch. 

Confequences,  that  flow  from  actions  confidered  un- 
der circumftances,  render  them  contingently  good  or  bad; 
that  is,  their  effects,  differ  as  the  nature  of  thofe  cir- 
cumftances are  different, 

Sch. 


2  4-  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.' 


Sch. — Confinement  of  an  innocent,  or  of  a  wicked  dangerous 
perfon,  mult  be  confidered  in  a  very  different  light. 

Hence,  actions  and  their  confequences  being  things 
connected  by  nature,  may,  in  that  point  of  view,  be 
faid  to  be  naturally  good  or  bad. 

Actions  naturally  good  or  bad  may  be  known  by 

reafon  and  experience. 

Scfr, — The  natural  confequences  are  objects  of  experience; 
their  dependence  upon  the  nature  of  actions  and  of  cir- 
cumftances,  comes  under  the  cognizance  of  reafon.  He 
who  knows  the  deleterious  nature  of  poifon,  will  certainly 
condemn  the  wickednefs  of  a  perfon  taking  or  adminifrer- 
ing  it  for  the  horrid  purpofe  of  deftroying  life  or  health. 

Material  good  or  evil  is  infeparable  from  our  ac- 
tions, becaufe  effects  are  infeparably  connected  with 
their  caufes. 

Hitherto  we  have  confined  ourfelves  to  the  confede- 
ration of  what  is  called  the  matter  of  actions ;  but  it  is 
time  we  mould  now  confider  what  it  is  that  gives  to 
moral  action  its  peculiar  form,  and  diftinguifhes  it  from 
all  other  aftions.  Here  the  enquiry  is  not  fo  much 
whether  an  action  has  produced  a  certain  effect,  but 
whether  that  effect  was  intended  by  the  agent. 

Actions  done  with  a  good  intention  are  faid  to  be 
formally  good-,  thofe  proceeding  from  a  contrary  in- 
tention, are  formally  bad. 

Actions  may  be  formally  good,  though  they  be  ma- 
terially bad  ^  and  vice  verfa. 

Sch. — For  inftance  :  a  well  intended  though  unlucky  ampu- 
tation, ending  in  the  lofs  of  life. 

The  confequences  of  moral  actions,  by  which  they 
are  formally  good  or  bad,  conftitute  their  morality  or 
immorality, 

Sch. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  ^5 

u. — If  it  be  our  part  to  determine  what  degree  of  morality 
or  immorality  be  in  a  certain  action,  we  have  to  attend 
to  the  confequences  of  the  action,  and  fee  whether  they 
be  or  be  not  intended.  According  to  the  intention  of  the 
agent  we  pronounce  acftions  attended  by  good  confe- 
quences  moral,  thole  attended  by  bad  conferences  we 
call  immoral. 
Sck.  1. — Thus  we  fee,  that  the  term  moral,  when  applied  to 
human  conduct,  is  taken  both  in  a  general  and  in  a  re- 
ftrieted  nullification  :  according;  to  the  former,  all  intend- 
ed  actions  are  moral;  in  the  reftrifted  fenfe,  thofe  only 
which  are  done  or  omitted  with  a  good  intention. 

Kence  we  conclude,  that  all  moral  actions  are  either 
moral  or  immoral ;  for  they  prefuppofe  intention,  and 
are  attended  by  confequences. 

Morality  and  immorality,  flowing  from  the  nature  of 

acftions,  and  the  nature  of  circumftances,  in  reference 

to  the  nature  of  the  intention  by  which  they  are  done  or 

omitted,  are  intrivfic;  the  confequence  is,  that  they  are 

inf sparable  from  moral  actions,  and,  as  they  are  naturally 

connected,  may  be  known  by  rea  (on  and  experience. 

S<:h. — To  flab  an  innocent  man,  with  a  malicious  intention  to 
deftrcy  his  life,  cannot  but  be  an  action  in  the  highell 
degree  immoral,  though  it  were  fanctioned  by  the  appro- 
bation of  high  authority. 

Good  or  bad confequences,  flowing  from  moral  ac- 
tions, may  depend  alfo  upon  the  will  of  another-,  we 
may  therefore  conceive  morality  or  immorality,  which 
is  extrhtfic,  not  natural,  but  pqfitive. 

Sch.  1. — Extrinfic  morality  or  immorality  may  depend  upon 
cuftoms,  or  upon  particular  injunctions  or  prohibitions. 

Sen.  1. — Morality  and  immorality  that  zttmerefy  extrinfic,  may 
be  fe  para  ted  from  acftions;  for  cuftoms  may  change,  irt- 
jundtions  and  prohibitions  ceafe,  &c.  For  inftance,  we 
may  do  work  in  a  week  day,  whicii  is  improper  or  for- 
bidden on  the  Sabbath. 

ar&  3. — As  all  morality  or  immorality  has  a  necefTary  con- 
nection with  the  will  and  intention  of  the  agent;  it  fol- 
E  lows, 


/ 


.6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

lows,  that  no  action  that  is  not  fpontaneous  carl  be  mo- 
ral or  immoral. 
ScL  4. — A  part  of  a  houfe  broke  down  by  a  ftorm,  or  a  per- 
fon  falling  from  a  fcaffold,  caufi ng  the  death  of  a  man,  are 
anions  equally  difaflerous,  and  equally  innocent,  if  the 
latter  has  not  been  guilty  of  neglect. 


CHAPTER  11. 

Of  Moral   Obligation. 

T 

JL  HERE  are  innumerable  actions  in  our  power,  for- 
mally contingent,  affording  unlimited  fcope  for  choice, 
\n  refpect  of  actions  as  well  as  mode,  place,  manner, 
and  time  for  their  performance :  yet  we  find,  that  our 
mind  does  not  remain  in  fufpence,  but  refolves  upon 
one  individual  action,  mode,  place,  manner,  and  time, 
in  preference  to  all  others. 

This  particular  refolution  is  found  always  to  be  in 
confequence  of,  and  in  conformity  to  motives  •,  for  it 
is  the  nature  of  motives  to  controul  our  fpontaneity, 
giving  the  mind  a  particular  impulfe  and  direction, 
and  thus  caufing  a  moral  neceffity  for  doing  or  omitting 
t'lich  particular  actions  rather  than  others. 

Whenever  we  are  thus  actuated  by  motives,  we  are 

laid  to  be  under  a  moral  obligation ;  fo  that  moral 

obligation  may  be  laid  to  confift  in   a  connexion  of 

motrces  with  our  anions. 

Sch. — Writers,  who  contend  that  moral  obligation  is  only  con- 
ftituted  by  the  will of  'the fuperior ',  rejecting  all  other  defini- 
tions thereof  as  vague  and  chimerical,  feem  to  have  ab- 
ftra<ted  their  ideas  from  the  effect  of  laws  and  govern- 
ments in  civil  life,  where  all  obligations  ultimately  de- 
rive their  force  from  the  will  of  a  fuperior.  Under  the 
fuppofitiori)  that  all  who  claim  the  right  ot  a  fuperior,  be 

[awfully 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  5  7 

lawfully  vefted  therewith,  and  that  lawful  authority  be 
always  juftly  exerciled,  their  definition  might  be  adopt- 
ed with  fafety.  -  But  who  can  feel  fo  great  a  degree  of 
predilection,  as  to  venture  a  truth  of  the  greateft  im- 
portance upon  a  iuppofition,  the  fallacy  of  which  may 
be  proved  from  the  frequent  records  of  hiflory,  from  the 
imbecility  of  the  human  mind,  and  the  imperfection  of 
all  human  affairs.  Here  we  have  not  to  take  things  ac- 
cording to  the  notions  and  practices  of  men ;  we  have  not 
to  copy  the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  from  human  laws 
and  inftitutions;  on  the  contrary,  we  ought  to  look  for 
the  eternal  and  unchangeable  principles  of  juftice  and 
equity,  which  now  from  nature,  and  which  alone  can 
be  the  infallible  guide  and  foundation  of  civil  law, 
and  all  that  can  be  right  and  excellent  in  governments. 
How  many  monfters  has  the  world  produced  who  have 
ufurped  authority?  How  often  do  folly  and  caprice 
aflame  its  facred  name  and  appearance?  Suppofe  both 
fuperior  and  authority  lawful,  can  the  wifdom  of  men 
always  warrant  a  wife,  juft  and  proper  exercife  of  that 
authority?  What  therefore  is  moral  obligation,  that  has 
no  other  foundation  than  the  will  of  an  human  fuperior, 
but  an  expedient  in  moll  cafes  unfafe,  and  at  beft  as 
fickle  and  unftable  as  the  various  fentiments  and  devices 
of  men. 

The  definition,  which  we  have  laid  down,  is  not  liable  to 
fuch  exceptions,  as  it  fufficiently  guards  againft  all  that 
is  unlawful  in  the  exercife  of  authority  and  oppreflive  in 
obligation,  and,  on  the  contrary,  enjoins,  upon  a  foun- 
dation that  cannot  be  fliaken,  a  rational  and  fincere 
refpect,  deference  and  obedience  to  all  lawful  fuperioii 
in  all  that  they  juftly  require. 

For  a  lawful  fuperior  on  the  one  hand  derives  his  authority 
from  a  jult  caufe,  and  on  the  other,  is  under  the  moll 
facred  obligation  to  exercife  it  in  conformity  to  juftice. 
But  both  caufe  and  direction  of  juft  authority  muft  have 
for  their  obje£t  the  felicity  of  all  who  are  under  that 
authority.  Public  felicity  is  therefore  the  motive  why 
authority  fhould  be  lawfully  exercifed,  and  why  the 
will  of  a  fuperior  thus  exercifing  his  authority  ought 
to  be  refpected  and  obeyed.  Here  then  we  find  a  con- 
nection of  motives,  and  of  confecuence  obligation. 

A]} 


2  8  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

All  that  can  be  feid  in  refpect  of  moral  obligation, 
rrus  upon  the  confederation  of  the  caufes  of  that. 
connection,  upon  the  motives  connected,  and  upon 
the  quality  of  perfons,  actions  and  things  to  which  it 

extends. 

Connection  is  an  effect  that  muft  have  its  originat- 
ing caufe  or  caufes. 

Obligation  in  this  refpecl  is  either  natural  or  pofitive, 
or  qualified-,  as  the  connection  of  motives  remits  ei- 
ther from  the  nature  of  actions  and  of  circumftances, 
or  from  the  will  of  another,  or  from  both. 

Sch. — That  we  ought  not  to  commit  murder  is  a  qualified  ob- 
atiou,  enjoined  both  by  nature  and  by  the  fanction  of 
civil  laws. 

Poiitive  obligations  are  divine  or  human,  as  mo- 
tives are  connected  either  by  the  will  of  God  or  of 
man. 

All  natural  obligations  are  divine-,  for  nature,  and  all 

that  flows  from  it,  is  by  the  will  of  God. 

Sck.  i. — If  we  wifh  to  fatisfy  natural  obligation,  we  muft  look 
up  to  and  be  actuated  by  the  will  of  God.    For  inftance, 

noe  mufc  jludy  Jobriety,  net  only  from  a  confederation  that  it 
has  the  greaieji  influence  en  our  happinefs,  by  invigorating  our 
health,  preserving- our  life,  and  affording  our  foul  that  ferenity 
of  mind,  that  tranquillity  and  peace,  which  rife  fuperior  to  all 
change:  and  vicifjitudes  of  time  and  chance ;  but,  ive  ought 
alfo  to  refiefl,  that  this  virtue  is  commanded  hy  God,  that  a 
faithful  performance  of  it  is  pleafng  to  him,  that  a  contrary 
conduct  is  a  grievous  Jin,  and J'ubj  efts  us  to  his  awful  dif plea- 
fur  e,  £fXV. 
Sch.  2. — Divine  obligations  may  be  merely  pofitive ;  as,  circumci- 
flon  and  other  ceremonial  infitutions  of  the  Old  Tefiament. 

If  connection  of  motives  ceafes,  we  are  liberated 
from  obligation-,  if  new  motives  be  connected,  new 
obligations  arife. 

From 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  29 

From  pofitive  obligations,  whether  divine  or  hu- 
man, we  may  be  liberated;  for  the  connection  of 
motives  may  ceafe.  But  this  cannot  be  with  refpect 
to  natural  obligations,  they  are  unalterable  and  lafting 
as  nature  itfelf. 

Sch. — Qualified  obligations  confequently  admit  of  liberation 
as  far  as  they  are  pofitive. 

Ablions  may  reft  upon  many  motives,  and  in  this 
refpectmay  be  diftinguifhed  into  Jimple  and  compound. 
A  fimple  action  refts  upon  one  motive ;  a  compound 
upon  many. 

A  compound  action  may  be  confidered  as  an  aggre- 
gate of  as  many  fimple  as  there  are  motives. 

Obligations  therefore  admit  of  quantity ',  which  is  to 
be  eftimated  by  the  nature  and  number  of  motives. 

Sch. — In  refpect  of  the  nature  of  motives,  it  mnft  be  obferved, 
that  the  intrinfic  are  always  more  important  than  the 
extrinfic. 

Obligations  confequently  may  be  diftinguifhed  into 
greater  and  lefs. 

When  obligations  come  into  colli/ion,  we  muft  make 
an  exception  in  favour  of  the  greateft. 

Such  is  the  imbecility  of  the  human  mind,  that 
perfons  may  conceive  a  connection  of  motives  where 
it  is  not,  or  where,  if  they  were  better  informed, 
they  would  do  the  contrary.  In  this  cafe  motives  are 
miftaken  and  wrong,  and  the  conceited  obligation  er- 
roneous. 

Sch.  1. — Many  of  the  perfections  in  chinch  and  Mate  have  ta- 
ken their  rife  and  progrefs  from  erroneous  obligations. 

Sch.  2. — The  error  of  fuch  conceited  obligations  may  be  feen 
by  others,  but  the  perfon  labouring  under  the  mifbke 
fincerely  thinks  he  is  in  the  right,  and  all  wrong  who  are 

of 


;c  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

of-  a  contrary  fentiment.  Oppofition  commonly  increafes 
enthuliaftic  pride  and  obftinacy. 

ScL  3. — Perfons  of  that  clafs  are  rather  objects  of  pity  than 
ridicule  or  perfecution. 

Sck.  4. — If  a  remedy  is  to  be  applied,  let  it  be  conviction. 
Conftraint  is  only  allowable  in  cafes  where  the  effect  has, 
in  a  direct  manner,  a  fatal  tendency  to  difturb  the  feli- 
city of  fociety ;  and  even,  in  fuch  cafes,  coercive  meafures 
Ihould  be  ufed  with  all  poffible  humanity,  prudence  and 
moderation,  and  principally  levelled  againft  the  effect. 

ScL  5. — Upon  the  queftion,  Whether  it  would  not  be  better  to 
make  ufe  of  coercive  meafures,  than  to  leave  our  fellow 
creature  under  an  error  that  may  be  fatal  to  him  and  to 
others?  we  anfwer,  that  human  authority  is  not  compe- 
tent to  judge  the  confciences  of  men;  that  fuch  an  au- 
thority affumed  may  be  abufed  to  opprefs  a  confcience 
that  is  right,  and  actuated  by  a  juft  obligation.  To  judge 
the  confciences  of  men  is  thefole  right  of  God* 

No  rule  for  action  that  is  contrary  to  natural  obli- 
gation can  be  right ;  it  mud  be  falfe  and  erroneous. 

Sch. — This  proportion  is  very  important,  as  it  is  an  infallible 
ftandaui  for  a  wife  and  faithful  difcharge  of  legiflative  au- 
thority; where  errors  and  defects,  which  human  wifdom 
cannot  always  prevent,  ought  to  be  corrected  and  reme^ 
died  3s  foon  as  experience  brings  them  to  light. 

As  men  often  fubftitute  habit,  'prejudice,  cuftom,  pro- 
penjity  and  paffion  for  motives,  there  is  no  wonder  that, 
in  the  moft  important  occurrences  of  life,  they  loofe 
fight  of  true  obligation,  and  give  way  to  error  and 
fanaticifm. 

As  motives  prefizppofe  diflinct  reprefentation  of 
good  or  evil,  it  follows,  that  no  perfon  can  be  put 
under  moral  obligation  who  cannot  exercife  under- 
{landing,  reafon,  and  judgment. 

Actions  which  are  free  or  moral,  admit  of  motives, 
and  therefore  come  under  obligation. 

Sch. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  £f 

Sc/i.  i. — Hence  it  follows,  that  neither  brutes,  nor  children  be- 
fore their  years  of  discretion,  can  be  put  under  obligation. 

ScL  2. — In  directing  brutes,  we  muft  work  upon  their  Senii- 
tive  appetite  and  averfion,  and  connect  conSequence^ 
with  their  actions,  whereby  they  obtain  a  fenfe  of  good 
or  evil  in  them,  and  are  prompted  to  feel  inclinations  in 
conformity  to  that  (enfe. 

Sc/i.  3 — Humanity  requires,  that  means  for  directing  the  ac- 
tions of  brutes  be  as  gentle  as  poilible. 

Sc/i.  4. — Great  prudence  and  care  is  requifite  in  the  manage- 
ment of  children;  like  brutes  thcv  mav  be  driven  into  a 
compliance  with  our  wifhes,  but,  unlike  to  them,  by  too 
great  feverity,  and  too  frequent  violent  coercions,  they 
may  be  hardened,  rendered  brutal  and  cbftinate.  Never 
give  place  to  anger,  at  leafl  never  mow  it  in  chaftiSe- 
ments,  for  it  has  a  monftrous  form,  and  is  alone  Suffici- 
ent to  defeat  the  end  for  which  this  part  of  difcipline  is 
made  our  neceflary  duty.  The  power  of  fir  ft  impreffi- 
ons  and  the  force  of  examples  have  great  influence  upon 
the  tender  mind;  they  may  effect  great  changes  and 
fixed  habits  in  the  inclinations  of  youth,  both  for  the 
better  and  for  the  worfe. 

Sch.  £. — We  have  gained  a  great  deal  if  we  have  gained  their 
affection;  the  young  mind  fhould  therefore  be  cultivated 
at  a  very  early  date;  we  ought  to  work  upon  their  Supe- 
rior faculties  by  reproof,  and  advice  holding  forth  mo- 
tives ;  for  children  generally  have  Sufficient  discretion  in 
all  things  neceflary  for  or  Suitable  to  their  State  and  con- 
dition, and  by  proper  management  may  be  cauSed  to 
exerciSe  it  in  other  things  Sooner  than  they  would  be  able 
to  do  if  left  to  themfelves,  or  consigned  to  the  contagion 
of  vulgar  company  and  bad  examples. 

No  action  which  is  not  contingent  in  itfelf,  and  in 
the  power  of  the  agent,  can  admit  of  moral  obligation. 
impoffibilium  nulla  eft  obligatio. 

Befides  fpontaneity  in  the  agent  and  contingency  in 
refpect  of  action,  it  is  particularly  necefTary  for  render- 
ing actions  truly  obligatory,  that  they  have  a  good  ten- 
dency j  for  that  obligation  alone  is  true  and  real,  which 

enjoins 


32  •    MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

enjoins  what  is  good  and  prohibits  all  that  is  evii  % 
becaufe  for  that  end  only  a  connection  of  motives 
can  take  place. 

Sch.  i.— Obligations  that  enjoin  to  do  what  is  bad,  or  pro- 
hibit what  is  good,  are  abfurdand  void. 

Sch.  2. — Obligations  contrary  to  our  private  good,  are  Hill 
binding,  if  they  have  for  their  object  public  felicity;  in 
this  cafe  there  would  be  an  obligation,  not  to  do  what  is 
evil,  but  to  chufe  from  two  goods  the  greateft. 

Sd.  3. — Obligations  which  have  neither  private  nor  public 
good  for  their  object,  are  nugatory  and  invalid,  let  the 
authority  by  which  they  are  eftablifhed  be  ever  fo  re- 
fpectable. 

Sch*  4. — As  the  wifeft  lawgivers  cannot  always  forefee  the 
effect  which  laws  may  produce,  or  may  be  miftaken  in 
their  well-meant  intentions,  it  is  poflible  that  they  form 
obligations,  burthenfome  in  their  nature,  and  grievous  in 
their  effects,  militating  againft  both  public  and  private 
good.  A  queftion  arifes,  whether  citizens,  in  fuch  cafes, 
may  immediately  throw  them  aflde,  withhold  their  obe- 
dience, and  take  the  liberty  of  chufing  for  themfelves. 

This  queftion,  as  it  is  of  great  moment  and  importance,  ap- 
pears at  firft  fight  to  be  extremely  difficult;  much,  how- 
ever, of  that  difficulty  will  vanifh,  if  we  reflect  upon  other 
weighty  civil  obligations,  which  enjoin  to  every  citizen 
all  poflible  care  and  perfeverance  for  the  maintenance  and 
prefervation  of  peace  and  good  order  in  fociety,  fo  eflen- 
fcial  to  the  promotion  of  public  good.  Thefe  obligations, 
which  particular  acts  cannot  fuperfede,  dictate  in  all  cafes 
of  a  grievous  nature,  moderation,  forbearance  and  pa- 
tience, joined  to  a  magnanimous  folicitude,  conducted 
with  prudence,  to  try  all  poffible  means  for  redrefs,  ra- 
ther than  to  break  in  upon  the  tranquillity  of  our  fellow 
citizens.  What  is  a  temporary  fubmiilion  to  grievances, 
compared  to  the  horrid  confequences  of  anarchy  and  con- 
fufion?  Is  not  a  lefs  evil,  in  collifion  with  a  greater,  to 
be  confidered  as  a  good?  Public  commotions  are  ge- 
nerally attended  with  evils  and  calamities,  which  in- 
volve prefent  and  future  generations  in  the  raoft  ruinous 
:onfe-]uences;    they  are  therefore  to  be  placed  among 

thofe 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  33 

thofe  expedients  which  cannot  be  juftified  but  by  ex- 
treme neceflity,  where  grievances  are  wickedly  and  in- 
tentionally multiplied  and  ftudioufly  continued,  where 
all  lawful  means  in  the  power  of  men  have  proved  abor- 
tive and  fruitlefs. 
ScL  $. — The  effects  of  human  laws  are  for  the  molt  part  things 
eventual:  as  we  are  pleafed  with  thofe  which  happen 
to  be  beneficial,  we  ought  to  exercife  patience  under 
fuch  as  are  of  an  adverfe  nature. 

Since  the  fcope  of  moral  obligation  is  to  enjoin  thafi 

which  is  good  and  to  prohibit  evil,  it  follows,  that  a 

faithful  performance  of  our  obligations  renders  our 

uate  perfect,  and  procures  to  the  mind  pleafure  and 

fatisfaction. 

Sch. — Moral  obligation  is  therefore  the  friendly  direclrix  of 
liberty. 

Exercife  of  liberty,  contrary  to  obligation,  is  licm- 
tioufnefs. 

Moral  obligation  is  for  certain  ends,  and  extends  to 
all  the  means  necejfary  for  their  attainment :  for  ends 
and  means  are  things  naturally  connected ;  the  one  is 
therefore  infeparable  from  the  other. 

Se/i.  1. — The  consideration  of  the  extent  of  moral  obligation 
in  this  refpeft,  is  of  infinite  importance  to  all  human  af- 
fairs, particularly  in  the  weighty  concerns  of  government, 
where  inconceivable  mifchiefs  may  arife  from  not  care- 
fully obferving  a  due  diftinction  between  ends  abfolutely 
necefTary,  and  fuch  as  recommend  themfelves  by  plaufi- 
bility,  or  reft  upon  temporary  expediency. 

Sci.  2. — The  intolerable  hardfliips  under  which  nations  ftrug- 
gle  are  weighty  and  incontrovertible  arguments  why 
the  fplendor  of  their  governments  mould  not  dazzle  our 
eyes,  or  tempt  us  eagerly  to  adopt  their  maxims. 

ScL  3. — Citizens,  murmuring  againft  contributions  which 
have  a  necefTary  and  falutary  influence  upon  public  good, 
betray  a  want  of  difcretion  and  of  public  fpirit;  they 
wifn,  in  fuch  cafes,  to  feparate  protection  and  allegiance 

F  from 


j-f  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY'. 

from  that  fupport  without  which  the  one  cannot  be  af- 
forded, and  the  other  becomes  void  and  nominal. 

Obligations  and  rights  are  of  a  reciprdcdl  nature* 

ana  always  dependent  upon  one  another,  as  caufes  and 

effects.     As  there  cannot  be  an  effect  without  a  caufe, 

i'o  no  right  can  be  juftly  claimed  or  exercifed  except  it 

accord  with  a  previous  obligation. 

Sch.  i. — Could,  for  inftance,  the  highefl  public  authority 
claim  and  exercife  the  rights  of  ordering  military  fervices 
cr  impofing  taxes,  if  citizens  were  not  previously  under 
obligations  to  defend  the  (late  and  to  fupport  its  govern- 
ment? or,  can  government  extend  the  exercife  of  thofe 
rights  in  an  arbitrary  manner  to  the  deflruction  of  the 
date  ?  We  mull  anfwer  in  the  negative;  for  things  pny- 
iically  connected  cannot,  and  thofe  of  a  moral  nature 
ought  not  to  be  feparated.  To  pretend  that  rights  might 
be  claimed  without,  and  exercifed  beyond  or  contrary  to- 
obligations,  would  be  afferting  that  effects  can  take  place 
without  a  caufe. 

Sch.  2. — This  natural  and  indiflbluble  dependence  of  rights 
upon  obligations  deferves  our  particular  attention,  be- 
caufe  rights  are  generally  more  obvious  to  our  appre- 
henfion  and  more  pleating  to  our  feelings  than  obliga- 
tions: thefe  always  lay  us  under  a  kind  of  refrraint,  while 
it  is  the  property  of  rights  to  impofe  no  reftraint  upon 
ourfelves,  but  to  lay  the  burden  of  obligation  upon  others. 

Sch.  3. — Hence  we  difcover  a  principal  caufe  why  we  generally 
feel  a  reluctance  in  performing  our  obligations-,  and  why, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  are  fo  apt  to  boail  of  our  rights. 
Hence  it  is,  that  men,  actuated  by  fenfe  and  paffion,  often 
claim  rights  where  none  really  ex  ill,  and  are  prone  fo 
extend  thofe  which  they  pollefs  beyond  their  jull  and 
proper  limits. 
Hence  it  is  likiwife,  that  the  bell  eftablifhed  governments, 
conducted  with  all  pollible  moderation,  prudence  and 
juftice,  cannot  be  entirely  free  from  jealoufy  and  diffe- 
rence in  fentiment  between  rulers  and  the  ruled. 

From  this  natural  connection  of  obligation  and  right 
it  evidently  follows,  that  even  poiitive  obligations  can- 
not 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  35 

not  be  arbitrary,  but  muft  be  conformable  to  the  na- 
ture of  man,  of  things,  and  of  circumftances.  Poiitive 
obligations  depend  upon  the  will  of  others-,  but  that 
wilfought  to  be  directed  by  motives,  and,  if  properly 
exerciied,  cannot  be  contrary  to,  but  muft  be  in  uriifon 
with  natural  obligation. 

Sch. — Government  can  in  no  inftance  be  juftifiable  in  com- 
manding citizens  to  aft  contrary  to  public  good ;  nor  can. 
anv  aft  of  government  make  the  commihion  of  a  fin  juft 
and  lawful. 

There  is  a  diftinction  between  human  obligations 
and  their  correlative  rights :  fome  are  of  fuch  a  nature 
that  their  performance  is  liable  to  compullion,  whilft 
others  leave  the  performance  to  our  difcretion  and 
good  will.  In  the  former  cafe,  obligations  and  rights 
are  p  erf  eft ;  in  the  latter,  imp  erf  eft. 

Sch.  i. — All  acts  of  equity  and  humanity  are  of  imperfeft  right, 
and  reft  upon  imperfeft  obligation.  To  attend  to  the 
neceflities  of  the  poor,  to  clothe  the  naked,  to  feed  the 
hungry,  to  direft  into  the  right  way  thofe  who  are  gone 
aftrav,  &c.  are  important  obligations  upon  all  who  are 
blefled  with  the  means  of  afliftance  ;  and  on  the  part  of 
thofe  who  are  in  want,  there  is  a  facred  right  to  apply  for 
comfort  and  relief.  But  from  want  and  mifery  no  right 
can  refult  that  may  juftlfy  force  and  compulfion:  the 
right  of  the  poor  and  the  diftrefTed  in  this  cafe  is  imper- 
feft, and  fo  is  the  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  rich  and 
wealthy  ;  it  refts  with  them  to  judge  whether  affiftance  is 
in  their  power  necefl'ary  or  proper. 

£el,  2. — But  all  afts  of  ftrift  juftice  are  of  perfect  right,  and 
refult  from  perfeft  obligation.  To  oppofe  juft,  laudable 
and  falutary  purfuits,  by  hindering  our  neighbour  in  the 
ufe  of  juft  means  in  his  own  power,  is  an  aft  contrary  to 
his  right  and  our  obligation.  If  he  defift  upon  our  in- 
terference, he  cannot  fatisfy  an  important  obligation;  on 
the  contrary,  he  countenances  a  bad  action,  teeming  with 
confequences  fatal  to  himfelf  and  to  mankind  in  general. 
In  vain  are  his  rights,  and  to  no  purpofe  are  means  in  his 

power, 


3 6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

power,  if  in  fuch  cafes  he  cannot  compel  us  to  act  con- 
formably to  our  obligation  and  to  abftain  from  unjuft  in- 
terference. His  natural  obligation  to  make  a  proper  ufe 
of  thofe  means  with  which  he  is  bieiTed  for  good  ends, 
gives  him  in  this  cafe  the  right  of  compwlfion,  and  our 
obligation  not  to  interrupt  him  in  his  juft  purfuits  is 
perfect. 

We  call  that  our  own,  in  which  we  have  a  perfect 

right,  and  whereof  we  can  difpofe  as  we  pleafe. 

Sch. — Withrefpect.  to  God  we  cannot  call  any  thing  our  own; 
our  perfect  and  exclufive  right  can  only  have  reference 
to  our  fellow  creatures,  as  all  that  we  have  is  of  him,  and 
we  ourfelves  the  work  of  his  hand.  This  confideration 
alone  is  fufficient  to  prove  that  nothing  can  be  indifferent 
m  all  that  we  do  or  think,  and  that  abufe  is  unjuftifiable 
above  all  things.  Let  the  fons  of  luxury  and  pride  look 
upon  the  hand  that  fcatters  abroad  his  bleflings  upon 
men  and  beafts,  and  all  that  has  breath ;  is  it  not  for 
wife  and  good  pnrpofes  that  their  lot  fell  into  lovely  pla- 
ces? Is  it  not  that  they  mould  abound  in  virtue,  in  grati- 
tude to  God  and  benevolence  to  men  ?  Let  thofe  whofe 
hearts  are  too  obdurate  to  feel  the  weight  of  thele  reflec- 
tions, confider,  that  even  the  nature  of  their  right  con- 
demns all  indifference  of  conduct  with  refpeft  to  God 
and  men.  It  is  true,  in  our  perfect  right  no  man  may 
interfere;  but  can  we  have  or  exercife  it  juftly,  if  we  act 
contrarv  to  our  obligation  ?  But  what  is  more  inconfiflent 
with,  more  repugnant  to  our  facred  invariable  obligation, 
than  ingratitude,  inhumanity,  luxury,  with  its  natural 
offspring,  pride,  oppremon,  injuftice,  impiety,  &c? 


CHAPTER  III. 

Of  Moral  Law. 


-ORAL  obligations  obtain  particular  energy  and 
binding  force,  if  declared,  prefcribed,  enjoined,  and 
fanctioned  by  juft  authority  -,  thus  qualified,  they  be- 
come 


*» 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


37 


come  imperial  rules  for  human  conclude  in  all  circum- 
stances and  fituations  of  life,  and  aflume  the  appella- 
tion and  nature  of  moral  laws. 

Sch.  i. — Logicians  call  thoie  definitions  real,  which  {hew  the 
geneiis,  origin,  and  nature  of  the  object  defined.  Of  this 
defcription  is  the  definition  juft  given.  Upon  due  ex- 
amination it  will  be  found  not  to  difagree  in  any  necefFary 
point  from  the  nominal  definition  generally  adopted,  ac- 
cording to  which  moral  laiu  is  a  general  rule,  given  by  afu- 
perior  to  an  inferior,  for  regulating  human  conduct,  declaring 
ivhat  is  right  cr  ivrong,  or  in  what  mariner  ?na?i  ouvlit  to  conduct? 
his  actions  and  nfe  his  powers  and  faculties :  on  the  contrary, 
it  has  that  particular  merit  above  the  latter,  that  at  fir  ft 
fight  it  more  precifely  determines  the  idea  of  a  true  fupe- 
rior  upon  the  principles  of  juft  authority,  with  refpeft  to 
the  right  of  giving  rules  for  human  conduct,  and  the  juft 
mode  in  which  it  muft  beexercifed.  It  alfo  guards  againft 
a  poliible  abufe  of  power  in  the  adminiftration  of  juftice, 
by  excluding  all  arbitrary  rules  of  right  and  wrong  from 
the  facred  character  of  moral  laws.  Laftly,  it  maintains 
that  our  moral  obligation  in  its  nature  is  to  be  left  invio- 
late by  the  commanding  rule  of  authority:  this  gives  to 
the  former  force  and  fanction,  but  can  in  no  inftance 
change  its  nature — No  authority  can  caufe  true  obliga- 
tion to  ceafe  to  be  fuch,  nor  render  that  right  which  is 
repugnant  thereto,  under  any  circumftances  whatever. 

.Sv//.  2. — It  muft  be  deemed  a  high  recommendation  to  our  de- 
finition, that  it  is  in  perfect  anifon  with  the  invariable 
and  facred  laws  of  God,  both  the  natural  and  the  revealed. 
His  authority,  founded  in  his  infinite  power  and  godhead, 
fo  manifeftly  declared  in  the  works  of  creation  and  pre- 
servation of  the  univerfe,  gives  infinite  luftre  and  incom- 
prehenfible  majefty  to  the  divine  laws  ;  but  is  it  not  the 
*  peculiar  glory,  excellency,  and  beauty  of  thofe  laws,  that 
they  likewife  have  their  eternal  and  unchangeable  foun- 
dation in  the  infinite  wifdom  and  goodnefs  of  God,  en- 
joining nothing  but  what  is  profitable  and  good ?  He, 
tiie  Lord  of  the  univerfe,  is  clothed  with  abfolute  autho- 
rity, and  can  do  all  that  he  pleafes  ;  the  world  is  his,  and 
all  that  is  therein ;  but  he  is  pleafed  to  govern  man  by 
thofe  holy  laws  which  his  infinite  underftanding  from 

eternity 


0 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


eternity  has  feen  fit  and  ncceflary  for  his  glory  and  the 
happinefs  of  men;  laws  which  are  necefTarily  holy,  per- 
fect and  immutable,  for  infinite  wifdom  has  laid  their 
foundation,  infinite  power  carries  them  into  execution, 
and  infinite  goodnefs  directs  their  effects.  The  will  of 
God  is  that  we  mould  be  happy.  His  laws  enjoin  and 
command,  by  fanctions  the  moil  powerful,  benign  and 
majeftic,  our  true,  our  real  obligation  to  endeavour  to  be  happy 
indeed.  Here  rules  for  our  conduct  and  our  moral  obli- 
gation perfectly  agree :  the  language  of  the  laws  of  God 

1S,    THIS  DO,    ANJ)  THOU  SHALT  LIVE. 

Sch.  3. — Behold  the  glorious  pattern,  the  infallible  criterion  of  all 
that  is  excellent,  jufl  and  deflrable  in  human  laws!  But 
is  fuch  a  perfection  attainable  Dy  frail  mortals,  and  in  af- 
fairs of  which  men  are  to  have  the  management  ?  We 
anfwer,  and  in  its  place  fhall  prove,  that  it  is  the  obliga- 
tion of  each  particular  individual  £0  ufe  his  beff.  endea- 
vour to  come  as  near  it  as  pofiible:  is  it  not  the  divine 
command  which  lays  this  obligation  upon  all  men — be  ye 
-perfect  even  as  your  father  which  is  in  heaven  is  perfefl?  Can 
there  be,  therefore,  an  exception  with  refpect  to  thofe 
who  are  inverted  with  the  risfht  to  direct  the  actions  of 

O 

men?  Mud  it  not  be  their  indifpenfible  duty  to  make  ufe 
of  their  authority  for  the  happinefs-of  fociety,  flates  and 
nations?  Is  it  not  the  nature  and  defign  of  the  great 
power  intrulied  to  them,  that  dictate  the  neceffity  of  co- 
pying after  the  great  and  glorious  lawgiver  in  difpenfing 
benignity,  philanthropy,  and  difintereited  juftice  ?  How 
other  wife  mould  they   maintain  the  high   character  of 

GODS  ON  EARTH? 

Sch.  4. — How  happy  for  the  good  of  fociety  would  it  be,  if 
thefe  principles  were  always  realized  in  human  legiflation  ! 
Opprefiions  and  tyranny  would  ceafe;  arbitrary  meafures 
would  never  appear  or  have  any  duration  under  the  form 
and  facred  character  of  laws:  envy,  detraction  and  Edi- 
tion, with  a  train  of  black  vices  and  calamities  on  the 
part  of  the  governed,  if  ever  they  ihould  make  their  ap- 
pearance, would  rind  not  even  a  pretext,  much  lefs  coun- 
tenance. Societies,  flates  and  nations  would  be  bands  of 
brothers,  and  enjoy  happiuefs  indeed. 
But  alas!  it  is  to  this  day  a  matter  of  doubt,  whether  fuch 
principles  can  be  put  in  practice;  the  idea  is  generally 

ridiculed 


AJORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  jtt 

ridiculed  and  fpurned  at  by  thofe  who,  being  in  authority, 
have  the  power  to  bring  about  reformation  in  points 
where  arbitrary  meafures  have  aflumed  the  form  of  laws: 
the  notion  has  become  familiar,  that  human  authority 
has  unlimited  fcope:  even  authors  who  profefledly  have 
treated  of  the  nature  of  moral  laws,  favour  an  exception 
from  the  great  rule,   that  the  laws  of  Cod  maintain  general 
fuprcmacy    over   human   iufuthtions   and    laws;     thus°  they 
countenance  the  notion,  that  human  laws  have  a  pecu- 
liar chat-after  for  themfelves,  entirely  diftinft  from  the 
law  of   nature    and    revelation,    diitinft,  consequently 
from  the  nature  of  moral  law*     For,  to  give  but  one 
inftance  among  the  many,  what  does  it  avail,  that  we 
adopt  the  great  truth  which  the  celebrated  Biackilone  lavs 
down  in  words  very  expreffive,  upon  tkefe  two  foundations, 
the  law  of  nature  and  of  revelation,  depend  all  human  laws; 
when  we  find  that  almoft  in  the  fame  breath  he  affirms  as 
a  truth,   that  there  are  a  great  numher  of  indifferent  points  in 
which  both  the  divine  laws  and  the  natural  leave  a  man  at  his 
own  liherty ;  with  the  additional  obfervation,  that  in  re- 
fpeft  ot  them  human  laws  have  tlieir  greateft  force  and  efficacy  ? 
He  proceeds,  and  fpeaks  of  points  not  indifferent,  for 
mftancc,  murder,  and  allows    human  laws  declaratory- 
force  only,  thence  inferring  their  fubordination  to  the 
laws  of  nature  and  of  revelation.     Laws,  therefore,  ac- 
cording to  his  tacit  confeflion,  which  act  upon  things  in- 
different, do  not  aft  in  fubordination  to  them.   The  con- 
fluence then  is,  that  all  human  laws  depend  upon  thofe 
divine    laws,  the  natural  and    the    revealed;  and    that 
fome  human  laws,  particularly  thofe  which  have  great 
force  and  efficacy,  do  not  depend  thereon  !    If  thofe  un- 
changeable divine  laws  leave  points  indifferent,  how  can 
human  laws,  acting  upon  fuch  points,  depend  upon  them  ) 
No,  according  to  this  reafoning  they  depend  upon  the 
will  of  the  legislature;    they  have  no  folid  permanent 
foundation,  but  are  arbitrary.     Should  God  thus  leave 
his  rational  creatures  to  arbitrary  difpofal  ?    It  cannot  be. 
His  laws  leave  not  one  point  indifferent :  actions  as  ne- 
ceflarily  have  their  conferences  as  caufes  their  effects: 
theie  confeqnences  have  influence  upon  human  nature, 
individuals,  lbcieties,  &c.  they  are  confequently  far  from 
being  indifferent  in  the  light  o*f  God's  natural  law,  which 
extends  to  all  aftions  admitting  of  morality  or  immorali- 
ty.— 


40  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ty. — Suppofe  that  actions  were  indifferent,  or  their  influ- 
ence to  human  obfervation  imperceptible,  which  certainly 
cannot  be  the  cafe  with  God,  could  the  exercifeof  liberty, 
could  our  choice  be  indifferent,  when  it  is  evident  from 
the  nature  of  tilings,  that  acts  of  choice  are  acts  of  the 
will  ?  Where  there  is  room  for  choice,  there  is  a  connection 
of  motives,  moral  obligation,  and  cognizance  of  moral 
law,  and  of  courfe  controul  of  the  laws  of  God.  Does  it 
follow,  that  an  action  is  indifferent  becaufe  it  does  not 
•amount  to  murder?  The  diftinction  into  malum  infe,  an 
aclion  loicked  in  itfelf^  and  malum  prohibitum^  an  aft  Ion  wick- 
ed becaufe  it  is  forbidden  by  lazv,  cannot  prove  that  the  latter 
is  more  indifferent  than  the  former.;  all  that  it  intimates 
is,  that  actions  have  various  degrees  of  deformity  and 
guilt,  and  varioufly  influence  human  happinefs.  The 
forum  confcientise  extends  to  all  actions;  and  human 
laws  prohibiting  actions  which  are  repugnant  to  natural 
and  revealed  law,  add  indeed  more  guilt  to  difobedience, 
make  actions  more  immoral,  as  new  motives  added  natu- 
rally increafe  obligation,  and  leave  lefs  culpablenefs  and 
excufe.  They  are  fubordinate  to  the  divine  laws,  but 
have,  notwithflanding  this,  as  full  force  and  efficacy  as 
if  they  acted  upon  any  other  point.  Thefe  things  will 
be  placed  in  a  clearer  light  in  the  fourth  chapter  of  this 
treatife,  where  we  propofe  to  fpeak  of  the  various  degrees 
of  morality  or  immorality  in  human  actions. 

A  fmail  degree  of  attention  will  enable  us  to  defeat  the  force 
of  the  examples  by  which  the  author  illuftrates  his  rea- 
foning.  In  the  cafe  of  murder,  human  laws,  fays  he, 
have  but  a  declaratory  force,  and  act  in  fubordination  to 
the  divine  laws:  in  points  indifferent,  for  inftance,  ex- 
portation of  wool,  they  have  their  greatefl  force  and  ener- 
gy; they  enjoin  and  fanction  obedience,  and,  as  muft  be 
fuppofed  by  the  author's  reafoning,  change  the  nature  of 
action,  make  what  is  innocent  or  indifferent  guilt. 

But  why  may  human  authority  prohibit  the  exportation  of 
wool?  Is  it  becaufe  the  action  is  indifferent?  Upon  this 
fuppofition,  how  mall  we  account  for  the  jufHce  and 
wifdom  of  the  legiflature?  Is  it  becaufe  it  would  be 
contrary  to  public  good?  In  this  cafe  we  can  both  ac- 
count for  the  wifdom  and  neceffity  and  juitice  of  the  law : 
it  is  tjien  not  an  arbitrary  proceeding  acting  upon  a  point 

which 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  4 1 

which  is  indifferent,  but  very  important  indeed  to  the 
happinefs  of  fo<  iety :  it  is  giving  a  rule  for  the  conduct 

of  citizens,  which  perfectly  agrees  with  their  moral  obli- 
gation, under  which  they  are  naturally  and  neceiTarm 
members  of  fociety,  to  ahfiainfrou!  oil  $4?  is  contrary  ^  ami 
to  do  all  things  -which  are  beneficial  to  public  rood.  Behold 
here  a  moral  obligation  prefcribed,  enjoined,  and  fane- 
tioned,  in  perfect  conformity  with  the  facred  character 
cf  moral  law,  in  lubordination  to  the  laws  of  God,  both 
the  natural  and  the  revealed !  Why  mould  citizens  obey 
that  law?  becaufe  it  is  their  indifpenfible  obligation;  an 
obligation  prefcribed  and  {'auctioned  by  authority  upon 
1:  e  principles  cf  right  and  eternal  juftice.  If  all  citizens 
were  faithful  to,  if  they  but  knew  their  obligation,  they 
all  would  abibiu  from  au  exportation  prejudicial  to  pub- 
lic good,  although  there  were  no  reftraint  or  prohibition 
to  the  contrary  :  even  were  there  a  law  enacted  to  com- 
.mand  that  exportation,  they  would,  ceteris  paribus,  as 
facredly  be  bound  to  tranfgrefs  that  law,  as  they  are  bound 
to  tranfgrefs  that  which  mould  command  and  enjoin  the 
perpetration  of  murder:  becaufe,  in  both  cafes  the  com- 
mand would  be  inconfiffent  with  their  true  and  real  obli- 
gation :  and  there  is  only  this  difference,  that  murder  is  of 
direct,  tranfgrefiion  in  the  other  cafe  of  indirect  malici- 
oufnefs,  and  that  the  former  has  an  immediate  pernicious 
effect,  the  other  a  very  remote  one. 

If  the  prohibition  is  juft  and  neceffary  for  the  fupport  of 
the  poor  and  the  encouragement  of  honeft  induftry,  and 
for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  community,  a  tranfgreffion 
of  that  prohibition  may  become  in  its  confequences  very 
fatal ;  as  citizens,  for  want  of  employ,  may  habituate 
themfeives  to  Health,  and  perifh  by  the  hand  of  juftice 
— others  drag  out  their  days  in  a  comfortiefs  and  fbarved 
condition.    Such  a  point  mould  be  indifferent! 

We  admit  the  principle,  that  upon  the  law  of  nature  and 
the  law  of  revelation,  all  human  laws  depend,  and  main- 
tain, that  there  is  not  room  for  any  exception,  in  refpect 
ol  any  of  them,  fo  that  no  rules  for  human  conduct 

GIVEN  BY  ANY  AUTHORITY  WHATSOEVER,  CAN  BB 
LAWS  OF  A  BINDING  FORCE,  UNLESS  THEY  AGREE  WITH 
THE  LAWS  OF  NATURE  AND  OF  REVELATION  ENJOIN- 
ING OUR  TRUE  AND  REAL  OBLIGATION,  AND  CONSE- 
G  QUENTLY 


4'2  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

QUENTLY    BEARING    THE    STAMP    AND    CHARACTER  OF 
MORAL    LAW. 

Hard  as  this  conclufion  may  bear  againft  proceedings  of  a 
long  Handing,  which  have  taken  their  origin  in  times  of 
ignoranfce  or  con fu (ion,  or  have  fprUng  up  from  the  vio- 
lence of  party  fpirit,  gaining  frrength  from  habits  and 
mtereftednefs;  little  as  it  can  boaft  the  fupport  of  learned 
authority;  unfriendly  as  it  may  be  to  men,  who  have  ac- 
cu  Homed  themfelves  to  rule  independent  of  natural  jus- 
tice; ftill  it  is  true.  Founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  and 
having  for  its  fupport  the  internal  evidence  of  truth  itfelf, 
it  ought  to  be  regarded  as  the  palladium  of  ajuftadmi- 
niitration  of  government,  and  a  guide  at  all  times  and  in 
all  places  for  the  difpenfation  of  juftice. 

Neither  do  we  fubicribc  to  the  idea,  that  human  laws,  in 
points,  according  to  the  author,  not  indifferent,  have  but 
fole  declaratory  power.  Has  the  perpetration  of  a  crime, 
as  murder,  no  influence  upon  the  felicity  of  focietv? 
Should  not,  therefore,  human  laws  exercifethe  fame  right 
to  prevent,  and  to  punilli  fuch  as  are  guilty  thereof,  as 
they  have  the  right  to  punifh  all  who  act  contrary  to  the 
juit  and  falutary  laws  of  the  land?  By  all  means — go- 
vernments may  and  do  exercife  that  right. 

'v,'\  :. — It  remains  to  account  for  the  innumerable  indiffe- 
rent things  and  actions  known  by  the  appellation  of  per- 
miJfions,  becaufe  human  laws  take  no  cognizance  of  them. 
Thefe  are  facts  which  cannot  be  denied,  but  afford  no 
folid  objection  agaimt  the  preceding  animadversions;  as 
that  indifference  is  not  in  confequence  of  the  natural  and 
revealed  law  of  God,  or  of  moral  law,  but  a  neceflary 
effect  of  the  imoerfections  of  human  legiflators.  Be  their 
ftations  ever  fo  high,  their  power  and  wifdom  ever  fo 
great,  they  do  not  ceafe  to  be  men;  they  are  neither  om- 
nipotent nor  omnifcient.  Hence  fome  things,  in  refpecr. 
of  human  laws,  muff  remain  indifferent  in  their  nature  ; 
others  will  be  fo  under  a  variety  of  circumftances. 

Of  the  former  kind  arc  all  concerns  of  confeience  in  things 
in  which  men  are  only  accountable  to  their  God,  as  cer- 
tain modes  of  worfliip :  how  may  men  dictate  here,  where 
they  cannot  fee  nor  controul  the  hidden  thoughts  and 
windings  of  the  human  heart?  or  how  can  they  controul 
what  is  not  controulable  by  violence  and  forcer  Finally, 

how 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHV 


43 


now  dare  they  nfurp  the  prerogative  of  the  Molt  High? 
All  they  can  and  ought  to  do,  in  cafes  where  the  felii  it) 
of  foeiety  is  really  endangered,  is  to  put  a  check  upon 
the  fatal  effects  of  errors,  innovations,  &.c.  with  all  poflible 
prudence  and  moderation,  left  they  incur  the  jufi  ii 
tation  of  being  guilty  of  acts  oi  opprefiion,  nerfecution 
and  tyranny. 

Thefe  are  things  which,  in  their  nature,  ought,  before 
human  tribunals,  to  remain  indifferent.  Kcw  happy 
would  it  have  been  for  the  caufe  both  of  humanity  and 
chriftianity,  if  thefe  truths  had  guided  the  counfcls  of 
church  and  (late ! 

But  there  are  alfo  many  things,  many  anions  indifferent, 
upon  which  human  laws  might  act,  if  it  were  not  for 
want  of  power  and  wifdom.  It  wouid  be  endlefs  work, 
far  furpaffing  human  power,  to  direct  each  individual 
man  by  name  in  each  individual  action,  under  each  par- 
ticular circumftance  of  mode,  time  and  place,  and  in 
each  fituation  and  relation  of  life.  Only  God  can  and 
really  governs  thus:  each  man  partakes  of  human  nature, 
enjoys  the  powers  of  confeience,  is  placed  in  particular 
circumftances  by  prqvidence,  is  gifted  with  particular 
talents,  for  all  which  he  is  accountable  to  his  God,  who 
has  written  his  law  into  the  heart  of  every  man,  and 
knows  and  judges  his  thoughts.  In  the  revealed  law 
of  God,  wherein  he  declares  and  commands  what  men 
mil  ft  do  to  be  faved,  the  rules  are  general,  becaufe 
the  means  afforded  to  each  perfon  are  the  fame,  and 
confequently  things  in  themfelves  of  a  general  nature. 
'But  it  is  quite  othenvife  in  refpect  of  the  natural  law  oi 
God;  here  all  obligations  are  of  an  individual  nature. 
It  is  left  to  human  wifdom  and  a  proper  ufe  of  reafon  to 
bring  them  under  general  rules  and  forms;  for1  actions 
have  a  fimibrity;  many,  therefore,  may  be  confidered  of 
a  kin,  and  come  under  certain  fpecies  or  kinds. 

For  inftance:  Injury  comprehends  murder,  theft,  bearing  falfe- 
witnefs,  Sec. 

But  human  legiflators,  ignorant  of  individual  perfons,  not 
able  to  watch  and  to  controul  each  ftep  of  the  conduct  of 
men,  equally  unqualified  to  forefce  effects,  confequeoc 
and  relations,  muit  content  themfelves  with  general  rules 
comprehending  often  certain  defcri  t)  n  of  citizens  only, 


44  MORAL   PIIIL050PHV; 

or  actions  of  a  certain  clafs,  complexion  and  tendency; 

human  laws  can  and  do,  therefore,  give  only  general  cha- 
racters and  marks,  whereby  we  are  to  fee  our  obligation  in 
fpecial  cafes.  It  is  on  this  account  always  a  difficult  talk  to 
know  their  extent  and  their  proper  fenfe  and  meaning. 

We  could  add,  that  with  refpect  to  human  laws,  perfons 
aiiume  the  general  character  of  citizens,  and  as  fuch  are 
alike  with  others  under  general  moral  obligations. 

Thefe  obligations  mult  be  performed  by  individual  actions, 
Which  are  determined  as  well  in  refpect  of  our  relation 
with  other  citizens,  as  the  particular  mode,  place,  circum- 
ihmce,  or  any  other  quality  whatlbever.  Behold  then 
the  neceliity  of  general  rules,  pointing  out  our  parti- 
cular moral  obligation  !  But  let  it  be  remembered,  that 
rule  is  for  the  fake  of  obligation,  and  not  obligation  for 
the  fake  of  rule. 

We  may  only  adduce  one  or  the  other  inftance  from  human 
laws,  in  order  to  be  convinced  of  the  propriety  of  thefe 
remarks. 

The  moral  obligation  of  citizens  is  to  defend  the  ftate;  go- 
vernment has  a  right  to  enjoin  that  obligation  ;  each  citi- 
zen is  bound  to  obey  a  law  fo  falutary,  fo  neceiTary,  fo 
perfectly  confident  with  their  indifpenfible  obligation. 
But  what  would  become  of  the  ftate,  if  all  muft  take 
arms?  Is  public  good  confalted,  if  manufactures  cf  a 
necefiary  nature,  if  agriculture,  &c.  are  at  a  ftand?  Muft 
not  wifdom  direct,  that  a  certain  clafs  of  citizens,  of  a 
certain  age  and  occupation,  perhaps  a  certain  number 
only,  mould  oppofe  the  enemy,  the  reft  remain  for  culti- 
vating the  earth,  adminiftering  juftice,  &c? 

One  obfervation  remains,  that  things,  indifferent  in  the. 
eye  of  human  laws,  muft  ceafe  to  be  fuch  as  foon  as 
their  influence  upon  public  good  becomes  known: 
]ikewife,  precepts  or  prohibitions  that  have  a  danger- 
ous effect,  muft  either  be  changed  into  permiflions, 
or  turned  into  their  oppofites.  So  there  will  be  no  end 
to  the  obligations,  to  learn  wifdom,  that  we  may  fee  the 
right  wav,  and  endeavour  to  abound  more  and  more  in 
uprightnefs,  that  we  may  walk  therein. 

Thus  we  have  endeavoured  to  fhow,  that  all  laws 
ought  to  have  thefe  two  erTential  characters  of  morai 

law  -, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  45 

law,  true  moral  obligation,  and  its  fan  ct  ion  by  juft  au- 
thority. From  thefe  fources  flow  all  the  general  dif- 
t  motions  and  properties  of  laws. 

Laws  are  preceptive  or  prohibitory,  as  thev  'import 
affirmative  or  negative  obligations  :  thefe  enjoin  the 
omifTion,  the  former  the  performance  of  certain  actions : 
thus  the  firft  law  of  the  ten  commandments  is  prohi- 
bitory, for  it  enjoins  omifiion ;  thou  /halt  have  no  other 
gods  before  me.  The  fourth  and  the  fifth,  on  the  con- 
trary, are  preceptive,  &c. 

Sch. — However  proper  this  diftinttion  may  be  with  refpect  to 
the  general  obligations  which  form  the  principal  character 
of  laws,  yet  it  by  no  means  extends  to  all  their  particular 
injunctions.  There  cannot  be  fuch  a  thing  as  a  preceptive 
law  entirely  clivefted  of  prohibitions;  neither  can  there  be 
prohibitory  laws  which  comprehend  not  precepts;  for 
precepts  and  prohibitions  are  correlate  ideas;  the  one  can- 
not exift  without  the  other.  How,  for  inftance,  can  our 
conduct  be  conformable  to  any  precept,  if  we  do  not  omit 
things  which  are  repugnant  thereto?  Is  it  poflible  for  men 
to  be  juft  who  wallow  in  acts  of  unrighteoufnefs?  The 
fame  is  the  cafe  with  prohibitions  and  prohibitory  laws. 
How  can  we  act  conformably  to  the  law  which  com- 
mands, "  thou  malt  have  no  other  gods  before  me,"  if 
we  do  not  endeavour  to  feek  after  the  true  God,  to  defire 
to  know,  to  reverence,  and  to  put  our  truft  in  him? 

No  laws  can  be  given  to  perfons  who  are  not  capable 
to  exercife  undemanding,  reafon  and  judgment-,  for 
they  are  incapable  of  moral  obligation. 

Sch". — Hence  it  is,  that  infant  children,  lunatics  ami  madmen 
are  not  under  the  cognizance  of  laws. 

Laws  zrzumv 'erj hi  or  particular:  thefe  import  obli- 
gations which  bind  a  limited  number  of  perfons,  but 
the  former  enjoin  univerfal  obligations,  binding  to  all. 

Sch.  1 . — The  terms  univerfal  and  particular  being  what  is  called 

correlate  ideas,  are  taken  in  a  greater  or  I  it.    The 


Jt&  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

idea  of  univerfality  with  reipe&  to  men,  in  its  greater!  la- 
titude comprehends  the  whole  human  race,  and  leaves 
whole  nations,  Hates  and  focieties  under  the  character  of 
particular  ideas;  but  univerfality  is  often  reitrictcd  to  the 
idea  of  nations,  ftates  and  focieties,  and  leaves  under  par- 
ticular confideration  certain  claffes,  descriptions,  or  a 
plurality  of  their  refpective  members :  thefe  again  may  be 
formed  into  univerfal  ideas,  comprehending  a  greater  or 
lefs  number  of  individuals. 

Sch.  2. — The  laws  of  the  ten  commandments,  and  all  natural 
laws,  are,  in  the  mod  extenfive  fignirication,  univerfal ; 
for  they  bind  all'  mankind. 

Sch.  3. — Human  univerfal  laws  bind  whole  nations  and  ftates; 
all  citizens,  for  infeance,  are  bound  to  defend  the  Hate. 

Sch.  4. — Human  laws  are  for  the  greater!  part  particular  ;  for 
though  all  members  of  fociety  are  bound  to  promote  the 
common  good,  and  all  citizens  to  defend  the  ftate,  yet 
there  are  many  occupations  and  many  ways  in  which 
common  good  is  to  be  purfued,  and  there  are  alfo  many 
things  neceflary  for  a  vigorous  defence  of  the  ftate  befides 
military  fervice;  agriculture  is  not  to  be  neglected,  necef- 
fary  manufactures  muft  be  attended  to,  &c.  Many  ex- 
ceptions and  modifications  muft  therefore  enter  into  laws 
providing  for  common  or  public  good;  many  difpenfa- 
tions  will  be  found  neceflary  and  expedient. 

As  human  laws  ad  upon  a  vad  variety  of  interefts, 
under  an  inconceivable  multiplicity  of  circumftances, 
we  need  not  wonder  that  we  often  meet  with  intricacies 
and  difficulties  in  determining  their  extent  with  refpect 
to  the  perfons  and  actions  which  come  under  their 
cognizance.  Laws  are  conceived  in  words,  and  thefe 
have  not  always  a  precife  meaning-,  or  their  fenfe  may  , 
be  variously  affected  by  the  connection  of  fentences  in 
t\hj  various  expreffions  neceflary  to  fhew  the  particular 
modifications  of  the  obligations  which  laws  intend  to 
f motion.  The  (en(c  and  extent  of  the  precepts  and 
prohibitions  muft  therefore  often  remain  fluctuating, 
are  fubjeel:  to  different  conitructions,  and 

fometimes 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  47 

fometimes  admit  of  difpute.  It  is  therefore  neccflary 
to  have  a  foundation  for  the  conftruclion  of  laws,  lefs 
liable  to  change  and  more  uniform  than  words.  This 
muft  be  the  very  caufe  that  gave  rife  to  them*,  the  end 
and  fcope  for  which  they  were  enacted;  The  caufe 
and  fcope  of  laws  muft  therefore  lead  our  inquiries  into 
their  extent,  and  finally  determine  our  decifiqn:  on 
this  account  they  have  obtained  the  appellation  of  the 
fpirit  of  taws. 

But  how  {hall  we  always  difcover  the  true  caufe  and 
fcope  of  laws  ?  may  it  not  be  often  a  fubjecct  of  con- 
troversy ?  It  may  be:  but  we  mall  rind  our  inquiry  in 
that  refpccl  greatly  facilitated  by  confidering  the  occa- 
fion  of  lav/s  •,  that  is,  by  attending  to  a  concurrence  of 
circumftances  which  have  given  rife  to  them. 

ScL  i. — He  therefore  who  would  determine  the  extent  and 
meaning  of  laws,  muft  not  lofe  fight  of  their  fpirit — muft 
not  be  inattentive  to  the  occafion  of  their  origin. 

Sell,  2. — For  inftance:  in  times  of  a  public  commotion,  laws 
may  pafs  which  lay  great  reftriclions  upon  perfonsin  the 
purfuit  of  necefihry  and  innocent  occupations.  Should 
that  renramt  continue  when  the  affairs  of  the  ftate  or  city 
arc  fettled,  and  all  things  bear  the  afpeel  of  peace  and 
good  order?  Attend  to  the  pecafion  of  thofe  laws,  and 
you  will  find  that  thefe  reitriclions  have  loft  their  efficacy. 
Suppofe  farther,  that  the  law  forbids  any  peribn  to  be 
feen  in  the  ftreet  after  a  certain  hour;  can  that  extend  to 
a  meflenger  lent  for  a  phyfician  in  a  defperate  cafe?  can 
it  extend  to  the  phyfician?  Here  certainly  is  an  excep- 
tion, if  the  fpirit  of  the  law  be  confulted. 

No  actions  come  under  the  controul  of  laws  which 
are  not  in  our  power,  or  which  depend  not  upon  our 
will  •,  for  in  fuch  cafes  no  obligation  can  take  place. 

$ck. — It  was  not  a  law,  but  an  act  of  tyranny,  that  commanded 
the  Ifraelites  to  make  bricks  without  llraw. 

ry-1 


48  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  fpirit  and  fcope  of  all  laws  ought  to  be,  that  we 
do  what  is  good  and  avoid  all  that  is  evil ;  for  this 
alone  can  be  the  lcope  of  our  true  obligation. 

Sc/j.  1. — Laws  which  command  what  is  bad,  and  prohibit 
what  is  good,  are  grievous  oppreflions,  and  void  in  them- 
felves. 

ScL  2. — Laws  which  have  no  good  for  their  object,  are  nuga- 
tory and  invalid. 

Sch.  3. — Laws  are  falutary  and  have  binding  force,  which  have 
public  good  for  their  object,  though  they  bear  hard  oil 
private  intereft. 

Sch.  4. — Should  laws  prove  to  be  contrary  both  to  private  in- 
tereft and  public  good,  they  would  ceafe  to  bear  the  (acred 
character  of  laws,  and  have  no  validity  in  themfelves. 

ScL  5. — Upon  the  queftion,  Whether  we  are  at  liberty  to  fet 
thofe  laws  afide?  we  anfwer,  that  public  authority,  for 
the  fake  of  peace  and  order,  is  entitled  to  great  reipect 
and  deference;  that  one  improvident  act  cannot  difannul 
the  powerful  obligations  which  are  kept  inviolate  under 
the  protection  of  the  laws  of  the  land.  Public  felicity, 
fo  inseparably  connected  with  the  obfervance  of  order, 
renders  it  advifeable,  nay  neceflary,  that  the  ruled  bear 
patiently  a  temporary  inconvenience,  and  purfue  the 
moft  gentle  means  for  redrefs  of  grievances.  Thofe  who 
are  fo  very  apt  to  find  fault  with  government,  and  mag- 
nify ant-hills  into  mountains,  fhould  confider,  that  their 
rulers  are  but  men;  that  a  government  watching  for  the 
wellfare  of  a  ftate  or  a  nation,  is  a  momentous  and  ardu- 
ous tafk;  that  laws  have  to  take  a  profpect  of  things  which 
are  yet  in  the  womb  of  futurity;  that  effects  of  the  befr. 
intended  means  are  often  problematical ;  that  it  is  not  in 
the  wifdorn  or  power  of  men  to  forefee  or  to  controul 
events.  There  is  fuch  a  thing  as  a  laudable  jealoufy  on 
the  part  of  the  governed,  which  keeps  pace  with  the  fitua- 
tion  and  concerns  of  the  public  good,  and  aims  at  an  in- 
violate enjovment  of  our  natural  and  political  rights. 
The  character  of  a  good  citizen,  of  a  patriot,  is  not  to 
court  popularity,  by  catching  at  every  opportunity  to 
render  government  odious  in  the  eyes  of  his  fellow  citi- 
zens; public  good  is  his  primum  mobile;  he  will  be  in- 

ceflant, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  49 

ced'ant,  but  prudent  and  moderate  in  his  endeavours  to 
feek  a  happy  change  in  all  that  has  not  a  benign  influence 
on  public  happinefs. 
And  who  fliould  be  more  ready  or  willing  for  fuch  a  change 
than  men  in  authority,  who  have  power  to  rectify  all  that 
is  improper?     Should  they  not  be  vigilant,  even  antici- 
pating applications  for  redrefs,  by  timely  adminiftering 
falutary  and  necerTary  remedies,  when  any  public  mea- 
fure  has  taken  place  which  anfwers  not  public  good?     Is 
it  not  tor  this  end  that  the  very  power  they  poflefs  is  in- 
truded to  them?     Men  of  true  wifdom  will  always    be 
confcious  of  their  own  fallibility — the  guardians  of  the 
laws  mould  firft  fee  their  effects.    It  is  no  difgrace  to  any 
government  to  rectify  abufes :  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  a 
circumftance  not  altogether  honourable  to  the  under- 
Handings  or  the  hearts  of  rulers,  if  grievances  are  con- 
tinued:   I  know  of  no  epithet  ftrong  enough  to  convey 
the  idea  of  deteftation  and  abhorrence  which  a  govern- 
ment deferves,  if  it  mould  perfiit  to  defend  or  fupport 
them. 

Upon  the  preceding  proportion,  which  proves  the 
good  and  falutary  tendency  which  all  laws  ought  to 
have,  depend  the  ideas  of  legal  morality  or  immorality  : 
where  actions  conformable  to  law  are  considered  as 
good,  thofe  which  are  repugnant  to  its  precepts  or  pro- 
hibitions are  bad :  actions,  concerning  which  laws  do 
not  determine,  are  permijfions ,  that  is,  actions  legally 
indifferent. 

Sch.  1. — As  it  is  poffible  that  unjufl  laws  exift,  it  is  alfo  poffi- 
ble  that  actions  be  legally  bad  which  are  really  good,  and 
vice  verfa. 

■SeL  2. — How  often  have  unjufl:  and  tyrannic  laws  condemned 
as  treafon  and  herefy,  actions  the  mofl  heroic  and  bene- 
ficial to  the  caufe  cf  God  and  man? 

Sch.  3. — In  one  forum  an  action  may  be  permitted,  which  in 
another  is  not  fo.  In  the  forum  of  nature  and  of  nature's 
God  no  a6tion  is  indifferent;  no  permillion  takes  place. 

Sch.  4. — All  actionj  which  concern  the  confeiences  of  men 
pught  to  remain   indifferent   in  fcro  civili:    civil  laws 

II  may 


<^Q  MORAL  PHILOSOFHV. 

may  only  reltrain  tlie  effects  of  fuch  actions  when  they 
have  a  fatal  tendency  with  refpect  to  public  good. 

Sri.  c. — All  actions  indifferent  in  foro  civili,  becaufe  their 
good  or  bad  influence  upon  public  felicity  is  not  imme- 
diately discernible,  cannot  be  fuch  when  experience  points 
out  their  influence. 

We  are  faid  to  obey  a  law,  if  our  conduct  is  con- 
formable to  its  precepts  and  prohibitions  upon  the 
flrength  of  motives  taken  from  that  law :  a  contrary 
conduct  is  called  difobedience. 

Sch.  1 . — Hence  every  action  conformable  or  contrary  to  law 
cannot  immediately  be  confidered  as  an  act  of  obedience 
or  difobedience:  for  inftance;  ftrangers  not  knowing  our 
laws  may  conduct  themfelves  in  conformity  to  them  from 
a  fenfe  of  propriety;  they  cannot  take  motives  from  laws 
of  which  they  are  ignorant.  Likewife,  foreign  minifters 
are  not  amenable  to  our  laws;  they  are  not  bound  to  obey 
them;  ftill,  from  a  principle  of  good  fenfe,  decorum  and 
politenefs,  they  will  not  act  contrary  to  them. 

Sch.  2. — As  laws  have  for  their  object  to  command  what  is 
good  and  to  prohibit  what  is  evil,  it  follows,  that  by  obe- 
dience we  obtain  a  good,  and  fubject  ourfelves  to  evil  by 
difobedience.  Obedience  to  juft  laws  will  therefore  ren- 
der our  ftate  more  perfect ;  difobedience,  on  the  contrary, 
will  render  it  more  imperfect  both  in  the  eye  of  law  and 
in  reality. 

Before  laws  are  given,  they  cannot  be  obeyed  or 
difobeyed  -,  for  no  legal  motive  is  afforded  for  regulat- 
ing our  conduct. 

Sch. — Ignorance  of  a  law,  with  refpect  to  an  individual,  is  to 
him  as  if  it  were  not  in  exiftence;  for  our  mind  can  be 
as  little  affected  by  what  is  unknown  as  by  that  which 
does  not  exiit. 

Laws  can  only  direct  with  refpect  to  things  which 
may  take  place,  not  of  fuch  as  have  already  happened. 

Laws  which  have  retrofpect  on  things  paft,  are  filled. 
ex  foftfaffo  laws.     Such  contradict  every  principle  of 

reafon ; 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  5  I 

reafon ;  are  acts  of  unpardonable  injuftice,  and  oppofed 
to  the  very  idea  of  law. 

It  is  impofnble  that  a  perfon  can  obey  a  law,  or  be 
guilty  of  difobedience,  if  the  knowledge  thereof  is  not 
in  his  power. 

To  caufe  laws  to  be  known  that  they  may  become 
obligatory  and  binding,  is  called  the  promulgo.iion  of 
laws. 

Before  promulgation  no  law  can  be  known;  confe- 

quently  neither  obedience  nor  difobedience  is  poflible. 

Sch. — It  is  therefore  a  confideration  wefl  worthy  the  attention 
of  government,  and  of  great  importance  to  the  commu- 
nity, that  laws  be  properly  promulgated :  a  quefHon 
arifes,  whether  publication  in  a  newfpaperis  fuificient  to 
caufe  all  the  inhabitants  of  an  extenfive  country  to  know 
the  laws  by  which  they  are  governed  ?  To  put  laws  not 
fufficiently  promulgated  into  execution,  is  more  to  lay 
fnares  for  the  governed  than  to  take  proper  care  of  their 
conduct  and  to  benefit  fociety. 

Laws  cannot  properly  bt  faid  to  be  known  if  they 
are  not  underftood  •,  hence  it  is  evident,  that  laws  muft 
not  be  contradictory  to  themfelves,  that  they  be  intel- 
ligible, that  they  be  declared  and  prefcribed  in  words 
the  plaineft  and  the  moil  unequivocal,  that  every  (tn- 
tence  be  well  determined  and  exprefTed,  to  prevent 
mifconftruction  and  miflake. 

ScL — If  it  be  unavoidable  entirely  to  abfiain  from  technical 
terms,  it  follows  from  what  has  been  faid,  that  they  ought 
to  be  ufed  as  feldom  as  poflible.  They  may  ferve  to  dif- 
play  learning  and  fkill,  but  muft  remain  unintelligible  to 
a  great  part  of  the  community. 

Whatever  care  is  taken  to  render  laws  clear  and  in- 
telligible, yetfuch  is  the  condition  of  the  human  mind, 
fuch  the  nature  of  language,  that  it  is  impoMible  to 
convey  ideas  with  fuch  precifion  as  to  leave  no  room 

for 


52  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

for  a  poflible  mifapprehenfion.  It  is  therefore  necef- 
fary  to  explain  the  true  fenfe,  meaning  and  extent  of 
laws  j  that  is,  laws  muft  be  often  interpreted. 

Interpretation  is  diitinguifned  into  the  authentic,  the 

cufiomary,  and  the  dotlrinal. 

Sch.  i. — Authentic  interpretation  proceeds  from  the  lawgiver; 
the  cultomarv  is  inferred  from  the  cuftoms  of  a  country, 
or  a  particular  diftrict  thereof,  nay,  even  from  particular 
lifages  of  towns;  the  doctrinal  depends  upon  the  appli- 
cation of  the  rules  of  grammar  and  logic,  and  upon  in- 
ferences drawn  from  the  fpirit  and  occalion  of  laws. 

Sc/i.  2. — Some  adduce  precedents  as  helps  for  interpretation  ;, 
but  as  thefe  mav  be  pood  or  bad.  it  is  to  be  feared  that 
dependence  upon  them  is  often  very  unfafe. 

Ignorance  of  laws  is  faid  to  be  lincible,  if  it  has  been 
in  our  power  to  know  them;  if  otherwife,  it  is  invin- 
cible. 

Sdi. — One  who  labours  under  invincible  ignorance  may  violate 
a  law,  but  cannot  be  guilty  of  difobedience. 

Since  it  is  the  fcope  and  nature  of  falutary  laws,  that 
in  all  their  precepts  and  prohibitions  they  contemplate 
the  happinefs  of  thofe  who  are  under  their  cognizance 
and  controul,  it  neceflarily  follows,  that  nothing  is  of 
greater  confequence  to  the  general  felicity  of  mankind 
than  obedience,  nothing  more  hurtful  and  pernicious 
than  difobedience ;  for  as  fuch  laws,  duly  obferved, 
neceflarily  produce  falutary  effects,  affording  protection 
of  life  and  property,  and  fecuring  that  peace,  harmony 
and  concord  which  render  fecial  intercourfe  defirable, 
and  diffufe  cafe,  comfort  and  happinefs  into  every  ftate 
s.nd  condition  of  life ;  Co  acts  of  difobedience,  en  the 
contrary,  defeat  thefe  falutary  ends,  fruftrate  the  good 
intentions  of  the  lawgiver,  deprive  mankind  of  the 
choiceft  pleafures  of  which  this  life  is  capable,  and  fpread 

abroad 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  £$ 

abroad  difTention  and  confufion  to  the  annoyance  of  all 
that  is  agreeable  and  delightful  inhuman  converfation. 

Hercewefee,  that  the  nature  of  laws,  the  intention 
of  the  lawgiver  and  the  very  happinefs  of  mankind  re- 
quire that  the  due  obfervance  of  laws  fhculd  be  made 
as  important  as  poflible,  by  affording  to  all  who  are 
under  their  controul  the  ftrongeft  motives,  fufficient  to 
excite  every  well-wifher  to  mankind,  every  friend  to 
human  happinefs,  to  acts  of  faithful  obedience,  and  to 
deter  from  wanton  difobedience  thofe  whofe  hearts  are 
either  ftrangers  to  the  tender  feelings  of  duty  and  hu- 
manity, or  who  are  too  weak  to  withfland  the  tempta- 
tions and  allurements  of  vice. 

Laws  are  faid  to  be  [anflioned,  when  ftrong  and 
powerful  motives  are  connected  with  acts  of  obedience 
and  difobedience,  calculated  to  enfure  their  faithful 
obfervance :  this  will  be  the  cafe,  if  confequences  highlv 
beneficial  and  irttereftirig  are  connected  with  acts  of 
obedience,  while  the  contrary  will  refult  from  difobe- 
dience ;  for  in  this  manner  obedience  will  become  a 
great,  a  deferable  good,  difobedience  adeteftable  evil. 

As  good  or  bad  confequences,  refulting  from  acts  of 
obedience  or  difobedience,  have  reflectively  obtained 
the  name  of  rewards  and  punifhments^  it  follows,  that 
laws  mult  be  fenctioned  by  rewards  and  punifhments. 

Laws  thus  (auctioned  place  obedience,  which  is  the 
ba/is  of  all  virtue  and  all  that  is  excellent  in  human 
conduct,  in  its  true  light,  and .  hold  up  to  public 
view  difobedience,  that  defiling  fcurce  of  fin  and  vice, 
in  its  deteftable  turpitude  and  deformity,  for  rewards 
and  punifhments,  in  their  nature  and  effects,  arc  of  great 
extent,  and  have  the  greateft  influence  on  the  deareft 
interefls  of  mankind.    Leaving  to  an  abler  pen  the  tafk 


54  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  making  researches  into  the  various  caufes  that  may 
have  co-operated  and  ftill  co-operate  to  render  the 
fanctions  of  divine  and  human  laws  of  fo  little  import- 
ance to  the  generality  of  the  children  of  men,  as  to 
leave  room  for  doubt  whether  there  is  fuch  a  thing  that 
deferves  the  name  of  fanction,  and  in  its  nature  can 
ihield  the  inviolability  of  laws  from  unhallowed  infrac- 
tions, we  content  ourfelves  for  the  prefent  to  fhow, 
that  the  great  unconcernednefs  obferved  in  human  con- 
duct, the  neglect  of  the  laws  of  God  and  of  men,  does 
not  proceed  from  the  nature  of  moral  law,  nor  from 
the  nature  of  any  laws  which  bear  its  facred  character, 
nor  from  a  defect  in  the  fanctions  thereof.  Thefe  in 
their  nature  are  powerful,  and  will  not  fail  to  be  fo 
m  their  effects,  where  they  act  upon  a  fober  mind, 
unbiarTed  by  prejudice,  parTion  or  evil  propenfities  •,  a 
mind  immaculate,  not  blinded  or  debauched  by  the 
contagion  of  bad  examples  and  practices.  Are  there 
motives  more  powerful  than  the  principles  of  felf-in- 
tereft,  the  defire  after  honour  and  a  good  character,  or 
the  inward  (&n(t  of  happinefs  and  contentment  ?  Be- 
hold, all  thefe  principles  are  embraced  by  the  fanctions 
of  laws ! 

What  can  be  more  truly  interesting  than  obedience, 
fmce  it  is  the  only  fure,  neceflary  and  efficacious  mean 
whereby  all  the  beneficial  intentions  and  effects  of  laws, 
enfured  and  enhanced  by  the  additional  advantages  of 
their  fanctions,  are  realifed  and  appropriated  to  our- 
felves  ?  Protected  by  the  law,  we  are  free  from  fear  and 
danger  of  the  punimment  which  follows  tranfgreflion, 
both  by  the  nature  and  tendency  of  the  violated  prohi- 
bitions and  fanctions  thereof.  Is  it  not,  on  the  contra- 
ry, the  natural  effect  of  difobedience  to  fubject  the  vio- 
lator 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  $$ 

iator  to  all  evils  which  flow  from  fcranfgreflkms  and 
the  fanctions  of  laws,  and  to  deprive  him  of  all  their 
beneficial  intentions  and  ends  ? 

Do  we  not  feel  a  defire  after  honour  and  praife  ?  do 
we  not  efteem  highly  the  good  opinion  and  approba- 
tion of  others?  and  who  does  not  feel  himfelf  deeply 
affected  without  them?  What  a  powerful  incentive 
to  obedience  is  that  innate  (a\ih  of  honour  of  which 
the  moil  wicked  and  profligate  cannot  entirely  divert 
themfelves !  We  have  only  carefully  to  diftinguifh 
true  honour  from  adulation,  flattery,  pride  and  folly, 
and  we  fhall  find  that  faithful  obedience  to  law  is  the 
only  road  which  leads  to  true  honour  and  praife :  as  an 
action  of  a  benign  influence  on  fociety,  it  mull  have 
merit  in  the  fight  of  God,  of  the  human  lawgiver,  and 
of  all  who  value  virtue  and  human  felicity^  and  in  its 
effect  muff  be  reckoned  a  public  benefit.  Muff  not 
the  agent,  the  upright  man,  the  good  citizen,  by  fuch 
conduct  naturally  attract  the  attention  of  the  lawgiver 
and  of  all  good  men,  have  their  good  opinion,  and 
meet  their  approbation  ?  Is  it  not  in  this  that  true  ho- 
nour and  praife  confift  ? 

What  demerit*  on  the  contrary,  ought  difobedience 
to  have  in  the  fight  of  the  virtuous  part  of  mankind 
As  it  is  an  action  oppofed  to  the  general  good  of  (o  - 
ciety,  muff  it  not  be  abhorred  and  deteffed  by  all  who 
feel  for  the  caufe  of  humanity  and  juftice  ?  mult  not 
the  agent  be  confidered  by  them  as  an  enemy  to  pence, 
good  order  and  public  happinefs,  and  meet  their  cen- 
fure  and  blame  ? 

But  what  far  exceeds  all  external  honour  and  praife,  is 
above  all  worldly  fplendor  and  greatnefs,  even  where  it 
is  merited  and  juftly  bellowed,  and  is,  at  the  fame  time, 

our 


5#  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

our  fuppbrt  under  all  manner  of  adverfity— our  confo- 
lation  in  death,  is  the  internal  fen  fe  of  the  rectitude  of 
our  intentions  and  actions,  which  faithful  obedience  and 
virtue  doth  not  fail  to  initill.  How  great  is  the  reward 
of  virtue !  inward  fatisfaction  and  peace !  the  appro- 
bation of  a  good  confeience  !  the  approbation  of  our 
God  !  the  enlivening  {qu(q  of  his  favour,  and  a  glori- 
ous profpeci  of  eternity  ! 

Reverie  this  delightful  picture ;  you  will  fee  what 
bleflings  the  difobedient  fervants  of  fin  and  vice  lofe 
in  flighting  the  rewards  of  virtue.  The  punifhment 
they  draw  upon  themfelves,  by  their  wanton  tranfgref- 
iions,  exceeds  the  power  of  exprefiion— exceeds  hu- 
man compreheniion ! 

Sch.  1. — If  that  be  true  which  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter 
we  have  endeavoured  to  prove,  that  all  human  laws 
ought  to  bear  the  benign,  majemc  and  immaculate  cha- 
racter of  moral  law,  as  far  as  is  attainable,  we  may  with 
confidence  ailert  that  their  fa  net  ions  are  of  equal  extent. 
It  is  true,  human  laws,  with  refpect  to  the  authority  of  men, 
have  but  an  external  effect ;  their  power  cannot  reach  the 
internal  feelings  of  the  heart:  if  laws  are  obeyed,  that  is/ 
all  human  authority  requires,  and  that  is  neceffary  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  peace  of  fociety :  before  an  human 
tribunal,  no- enquiry  is  made  concerning  the  principle  of 
obedience,  whether  it  is  love  of  virtue,  or  fervile  fear  of 
punifhment. 
But  it  is  alfo  true,  that  more  is  required  for  fecuring  obe- 
dience and  the  happinefs  of  mankind,  than  human  laws 
can  effect.  That  which  they  cannot  reach  is  under  the 
control!  1  of  the  laws  of  God,  and  under  the  power  of 
confeience.  Before  the  tribunal  of  God,  and  at  the  bar 
of  our  own  confeience,  we  are  accountable  for  all  our 
actions,  whether  they  be  done  or  omitted  in  the  private 
walks  of  life,  or  in  our  focial  and  public  relations. 

Sck.  2. — Hence  the  neceffity  and  great  ufefulnefs  of  religion  in 
every  ftate  and  condition  of  life,  as  it  engages  the  con- 
fciehces  of  men,  and  requires  in  all  our  actions  fincefity 

and 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  0 

and  inward  rectitude,  and  imprefles  the  foul  with  a  moil 
lively  fenfe  of  our  refponfibility  for  all  we  do  or  think, 
frefore  the  tribunal  of  him  who  judges  in  rkjhteoufnefsj 
and  will  render  to  every  man  according  to  his  deeds. 

Permijjions,  as  has  been  already  obferved,  are  actions 

of  which  certain  laws  take  no  cognisance. 

ScL — In  one  forum  an  action  nlay  be  a  perrhiffioh  which  in 
another  comes  under  cognizance  of  laws,  and  perhaps  is 
a  high  tranfgreffion.  With  refpect to  the  jurifdiction  of 
the  United  States,  there  are  a  number  of  actions  permit- 
ted, which,  by  the  laws  of  the  refpectfve  ftatefe,  are  highly 
criminal,  and  vice  verfa.  All  that  is  ftrictly  a  matter  of 
confci^nce  human  laws  wifely  consider  as  perraiffions ; 
but  all  actions  of  that  nature  are  accountable  before  the 
tribunal  of  God. 

Abrogation,  derogation  and  difpenfatlon  are  terms 
which  have  reference  to  human  laws  acting  upon  even- 
tual objects,  which  are  for  the  mod  part  problematical 
and  uncertain  \  it  may,  therefore,  be,  that  all  or  only 
fome  precepts  or  prohibitions  of  laws  fail  to  produce 
the  intended  effect,  or  in  their  operation  happen  to 
have  an  oppofite  tendency.  If  all  precepts  and  pro- 
hibitions have  fuch  an  operation,  they  all  ought  to  be 
changed  into  permifrlons,  or  even  into  their  oppoiites, 
fhould  there  be  cafes  to  require  it;  that  is,  the  whole 
law  ought  to  be  repealed  or  abrogated. 

But  if  there  are  but  fome  precepts  or  prohibitions 
obnoxious  in  their  tendency,  thefe  ought  to  be  changed ; 
that  is,  the  law  ought  to  undergo  a  partial  repeal, 
known  by  the  name  of  derogation. 

Difpenfatlon  does  not  introduce  any  change  into  the 
precepts  or  prohibitions  of  a  law,  but  only  reftricts  its 
effects  in  favour  of  fome  perfons  or  circumftances. 

There  is  a  poffibility,  that  of  feveral  laws  certain 
precepts  and  prohibitions  come  into  collifion  -,  in  which 

I  cafe 


5^  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

cafe  it  is  2  queftfonable  matter  which  we  are  to  obey., 
and  which,  under  that  cireumftance,  may  be  fet  afide. 
This  queilioii  is  generally  folved  by  the  maxim,  Laws 
fubfequent  derogate  from  tbofe  which  are  of  a  prior  date, 
becaufe  it  is  the  lateft  declaration  of  the  will  of  the  Ie- 
giflator;  and  what  difference  appears  in  the  lateft  and 
former  laws  muft  be  fuppofed  to  be  produced  from  a 
change  of  his  fentiments  and  will.  It  muft  be  con- 
U  d,  that  this  maxim  has  much  plaufibility,  and 
might  be  fafely,  followed,  if  we  could  be  certain  that 
changes  introduced  are  always  for  the  better.  But  it 
preiuppofes  that  laws  have  for  their  foundation  only  the 
will  of  a  fuperior,  independent  of  the  previous  moral 
obligation,  and  therefore  little  good  may  be  derived 
from  it  -,  for  the  will  of  the  lawgiver  may  change  for 
the  worfe. 

We  mould  rather  think,  that  the  moral  obligation 
imported  by  fuch  laws,  and  principally  affected  by 
their  feveral  precepts  and  prohibitions,  is  the  true  cri- 
terion to  direct  our  choice  where  laws  and  duties  clam. 

Laws  are  greater  or  lefs,  as  the  obligations  which 
thty  import  confift  of  more  or  lefs  motives* 

If,  therefore,  whole  laws  mould  come  into  colliiion, 

fo  that  in  order  to  obey  the  one  we  muft  fet  afide  the 

other,  it  is  manifeft  that  the  greateft  has  binding  force. 

Sck.~— Thh  rule  was  very  well  applied  by  the  Apoflles  again/! 
the  prefurnptuous  command  of  human  authority,  forbid- 
ding them  to  publifli  faving  truth:  IVe  ought,  faid  they, 
to  obey  God  rather  than  ?nun.  A6ls  v.  29. 

TheYe  is  aliq  a  notable  diftinction  of  laws  into  natu- 
ral, pojitive  and  qualified,  as  they  import  obligations 
which  flow  from  nature,  from  the  will  of  another,  or 
from  both  alike. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHV. 

cui. — For  inftance;  the  law,   Thou ///alt  have  no  otk  Wfore 

me,  is  natural,  becaufe  it  flows  from  the  nature  of  God 
and  the  natural  dependence  of  man  upon  him  in  all  that 
concerns  his  happinefs;  but  it  is  a  pofitivclaw,  depending 
folely  upon  the  will  of  God,  which  is  recorded,   Exo  I. 
xxiii.  1 7.  in  thefe  words:  three  times  in  the  year  ail  t) 
fiill  appear  before  the  Lord  God.    The  fourth  command:!:    1 
contains  a  qualified  law  :  it  is  natural  that  man  fliould 
apart  a  certain  time  for  attending,  in  an  immediate  rnj 
ner,  to  the  concerns  of  his  immortal  fpirit:   public  ac- 
knowledgments of  the  bleffings  received  from  God,  acts 
of  humility  and  devotion  before  his  throne,  public  ado- 
ration and  thanksgivings,  are  obligations  refulting  from 
the  nature  of  Qod,  of  man,  and  of  that  relation  in  which 
he  ftands  with  refpect  to  his  maker  and  to  mankind  in 
general.     Cut  the  time  appointed  for  this  refr  depends 
upon  the  will  of  God,  and  in  no  wife  hows  from  nature. 

The  law  denouncing  death  againft  murder  is  another  in- 
ftance of  qualified  laws:  this  flows  from  nature,  bears  the 
fanction  of  the  will  of  God  declared  in  his  revelation,  and 
has  a  place  among  the  penal  laws  of  the  land. 

We  diftinguifh  natural  laws  into  neceffary  and  contin- 
gent \  for  natural  obligations  may  flow  from  the  nature 
of  actions  or  things  considered  in  themfelvcs,  or  from 
their  nature  confidered  under  circum fiances.  In  the 
firft  cafe,  natural  obligations  cannot  undergo  any  change 
or  modification  but  are  neceflary  ♦,  in  this  cafe,  they 
admit  of  modifications,  and  on  that  account  are  faid 
to  be  contingent. 

Sck.  1. — It  is  a  neceflary  natural  law,  "  thou  malt  have  no 
other  gods  before  me;"  and  of  this  kind  are  all  law$ 
which  have  actions  for  their  object  eitherof  internal  rec- 
titude or  internal  malignity,  or  what  is  otherwife  called 
a  good  or  an  evil  in  themfelves. 

Seh.  2. — But  all  natural  laws  which  have  forge  in  actions  that 
are  good  or  bad  under  circumilances,  are  contingent :   the 
nature  and  complexion  of  thefe  actions  change  accord::);. 
to  circumftances;  for  inftance,  the  law,  thou  Jhalt  not  i 
Is  a  natural  law  ■  it  flow^  from  the  nature  of  man  and  of 


6q  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

his  relation  to  God,  that  he  mould  enjoy  that  Ufe  which 
:j  given  him  as  well  as  another;  it  alfo  flows  from  nature, 
that  men  mould  rather  protect  than  take  it  away.  But 
Juppofe  the  cafe,  that  a  perfon  is  attempting  to  take  your 
life,  or  the  life  of  your  parent,  your  child — iuppofe  your 
country  in  imminent  danger,  and  many  valuable  lives  in 
jeopardy  ;  will  not  killing  fuch  an  enemy  to  manki-nd  be 
a  permimon,  pr  in  fome  cafes  even  an  obligation? 

Rewards  and  punifhments  are  alfo  diftinguifhed  into 

natural^  pofitive  ^  or  qualified-,  as  confequences  connected 

with  acts  of  obedience  or  difobedience  either  flow  from 

the  nature  of  the  law,  or  the  will  of  the  lawgiver,  or 

from  both  alike. 

Sch. — Peace  and  contentment,  the  natural  rewards  of  virtue, 
may  be  augmented  by  pofitive  rewards,  by  honour  and 
praife,  or  by  advantageous  (ituations  in  fociety. 

Want,  obfeurity  and  regret,  the  natural  confequences 
of  idlenefs  and  prodigality,  draw  after  them  contempt, 
blame,  difgrace,  fufferings,  expulfion  from  fociety,  &c. 
as  pofitive  puniihments  inflicted  by  a  wife  legiflator. 

Men  need  only  be  attentive  to  the  internal  feelings 
of  their  hearts,  and  they  will  find  the  effects  of  qualified 
rewards  and  punifliments  united. 

Should  it  happen,  by  a  ftrange  unconcernednefs, 
both  on  the  part  of  the  legiflator  and  on  that  of  the 
community,  that  virtuous  obedience  of  law  be  dis- 
regarded, and  tranfgrefTors  thereof,  the  enemies  of  the 
peace  and  liappinefs  of  fociety,  efcape  pofitive  puniih- 
ments, cenfure  and  blame,  and  be  fuffered  to  enjoy  the 
i  ftiraation  of  their  fellow  citizens,  be  honoured  and 
preferred,  becaufe  they  are  learned,  rich,  and  praclile 
upon  their  eafinefs  and  credulity,  we  can  only  pity  fo- 
ciety, and  affert,  that  their  indifcretion  is  and  muft  be 
•dr.ir  higheft  punifhment3  becaufe  they  are  guilty  of  a 

conduct 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  6f 

conduct  highly  repugnant  to  their  own  felicity.  Ho- 
nours thus  bellowed  may  have  the  name,  but  are  des- 
titute of  reality,  and  cannot  compenfate  for  the  want 
of  internal  peace  and  excellency. 

It  is  true,  there  are  punifhments  which  have,  what 
all  punifhments  in  a  certain  degree  ought  to  have, 
ihame  and  difgrace  annexed  to  them,  as,  for  initance, 
our  corporal  and  capital  punifhments :  but  mould  not 
he  alfo  be  blamed,  who,  by  fraud,  by  breach  of  pro- 
mife,  or  in  any  other  unjuft  manner,  opprefTes  his  fellow 
citizens,  and  deprives  them  of  their  character  and 
property  ? 

Let  us  conclude  this  fubjecl  with  this  obfervation : 
as  long  as  a  community  does  not  entertain  the  fanclions 
of  laws  as  they  ought,  it  cannot  be  expected  that  laws 
will  produce  their  falutary  effects,  or  fociety  enjoy  that 
peace,  concord  and  unanimity  of  which  it  is  capable, 
and  upon  which  its  greater];  ornament  and  happinefs 
depend. 

There  are  natural  laws,  for  there  are  obligations 
which  flow  from  the  nature  of  God,  of  man,  of  actions 
and  of  circumilances ;  for  inftance,  the  law,  thou  Jl •all 
have  no  other  gods  before  me. 

Natural  laws  are  immutable^  for  the  obligations  which 
they  import  flow  from  nature,. 

Immutability  may  be  abfoluie  or  hypothetical;  things 
abfolutely  immutable  are  unchangeable  in  themfelves; 
thofe  which  are  hypothetically  immutable  are  un- 
changeable under  circiimflances. 

Laws  necerTarily  natural  are  abfolutely  immutable  ; 
they  can  admit  of  no  modification  whatever  \  for  in- 
llance, biafphemy,  idolatry,  aflaffination,  murder,  can- 
not 


6 1  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

not  be  permitted,  much  lefs  commanded,  under  any 
circumftancc  whatever ;  thefe  are  what  is  called  actions 
wicked  in  ihemfelyes, 

Likewife,  actions  of  internal  rectitude,  as  feeking 
after  God,  adoring  his  goodncfs,  purfuing  virtue,  gra- 
titude to  a  benefactor,  no  laws  can  forbid :  though  they 
are  beyond  the  controul  of  human  laws,  they  cannot 
be  indifferent,  or  things  only  permitted  in  the  forum 
of  nature  and  of  nature's  God;  they  cannot  but  be 
pleafing  to  him;  they  mull  have  the  fanction  of  his 
will ;  and  the  contrary  thereof  muft  always  be  heinous 
fins. 

Laws  contingently  natural  are  hypothetical!}/  immu- 
table :  the  nature  of  the  action  is  affected  by  the  nature 
of  circumftanc.es ;  as  thefe  change,  the  nature  of  the 
action  obtains  a  different  modification.  Though  you 
cannot  expect  abfolute  immutability  in  this  kind  of  ac- 
tions, ftill  there  is,  with  refpecfc  to  the  modifications 

reof,  this  unchangeablenefs :  that  the  nature  of  the 
action  has  always  the  fame  complexion  under  the  fame 
eircum fiances  ;  for  ihftance,  the  law,  "  thou  malt  not 
kill,"  is  natural ;  for  it  equally  flows  from  the  nature 
of  another  perfon  and  his  natural  relation  to  God,  in 
whom  he  moves,  is,  and  has  being,  that  life  is  as  pre- 
cious to  him  as  it  can  be  to  us ;  we  may  as  little  take 
away  his  life  as  he  has  a  right  to  take  away  ours.  The 
railing  away  his  life  in  a  wilful,  malicious  manner, 
mud  therefore  be  a  fin  againft  the  abfolute  immutable 
natural  laws  of  nature,  and  cannot  be  permitted,  much 
lefs  can  it  be  right  under  any  circumflances  whatever. 
But  take  away  malignity,  that  internal  character  of 
murder,  and  you  will  find,  that  there  may  be  circum- 
ftances  where  the  life  of  a  perfon  may  be  taken  away 

innocently. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY1.  $4 

innocently.  Suppofe  a  pel-fern  (lie  draft  of  another's 
death  accidentally,  is  he  a  man  of  feeling  who  has  not 
pity  for  the  unfortunate  agent  ?     If  a  j  is  killed 

in  the  a<ft  of  committing  murder  on  a  parent,  a  child, 
a  neighbour,  or  in  waging  trnjuft  war  ncrainft  our  coun- 
try, who  can  blame,  who  will  not  highly  enVem  the 
hemic  protedlor  of  the  innocent,  the  patriotic  defender 
or  his  country  ? 

&■//.— From  this  hypothetical  immutability  flow  mod  of  the 
maxims  of  morality,  the  refpedtive  'rights  and  duties  of 
individuals,  focieties  and  nations  smoiig  one  another  If 
one  perion  has  a  right  td  repel  an  injury  bv  force,  another, 
it  inch  injury  is  committed  agaihft  him,  has  the  fame 
Claim;  If  one  nation  may  make  war  juitiy  upon  amrther 
on  account  of  a  certain  public  proceeding/ another  na- 
tion, let  it  be  ever  fo  weak,  has,  under  the  lame  circum- 
Itances,  the  fame  right,  &c. 

Natural  laws  may  be  known  by  reafon  ;  for  all  that 
flows  from  the  mature  of  things  and  circumftances  may  ' 
be  known  by  thartioble  faculty  of  the  human  foul. 

God  has  promulgated  human  laws,  by  endowiro- 
man  with  undemanding,  reafon  and  judgment,  & 

As  far  as  reafon  extends,  fo  far  extends  the  promul- 
gation of  natural  laws:  it  may,  therefore,  be  well  faid 
to  be  written  into  every  man's  heart. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  ignorance  of  the  laws  of  na> 
ture  is  vincible,  and  leaves  no  excufe. 

All  natural  laws  are  divine;  that  is  to  fay, 
mpendupon  the  will  of  Cod,  for  nature  and  all  that 
flows  from  it  is  by  the  will  of  God. 

He,  therefore,  who  withes  to  obey  natural  laws, 
muft  connaer  them  as  the  laws  of  God;  that  is,  he 
mutt  not  only  aft  conformably  to  them,  becaufe  they 
have  a  mod  filutaty  influence  upon  his  own  happinefs 


(W  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

gnd  the  felicity  of  others,  but  principally  becaufe  it  is 

thp  will  of  God— it  is  required  by  his  perfections— it 
procures  us  his  favour,  and  makes  us  conformable  to 
his  image :  motives  taken  from  the  will  and  perrcdhbns 
of  God°  will  elevate  our  minds— will  render  us  con- 
ftant  and  fmcere  in  our  purfuits,  and  fet  us  above  every 
other  confideration,  fo  that  no  envy  or  oppoiition  can 
make  or  change  our  refolution  to  obey  our  God  and  to 

do  his  will.  . 

Natural  laws  are  in  the  greater!:  latitude  umverral, 
for  the  obligations  they  import  are  binding  upon  the 
whole  human  race. 

ScJi  —All  men,  focieties,  dates,  nations  and  governments  are 
therefore  under  the  controul  of  the  laws  of  nature. 

Natural  laws  have  alfo  an  univerfal  extent  to  all  ac- 
tions of  a  moral  nature-,  for  natural  obligations  have 

that  extent. 

^..—Another  proof  that  no  atfion  can  be  indifferent. 

F-om  the  immutability  and  univerfality  of  the  laws 
of  nature,  it  follows,  that  no  law  can  be  juft  that  is 
contradictory  to  the  laws  of  nature-,  that  With  refpeft 
to  them,  no  abrogation,  derogation  or  difpenfation  can 
take  place  •,  that  they  leave  no  room  for  advice  or  per- 
miflions. 

Positive  and  qualified  laws,  as  far  as  they  are  pofitive, 
admit  of  abrogation,  derogation  and  difpenfation. 

Natural  laws  may  be  deduced  from  a  firft  principle, 
that  being  generally  the  cafe  with  things  which  have 
their  foundation  in  nature.  <  m 

Authors  on  morality  ftudioufly  differ  in  determining 
which  this  firft  principle  is.  From  a  laudable  defign 
to  introduce  into  all  deductions  the  original  purity  ot 
the  principle   frym  which  they    are  inferred,   fome 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  6$ 

will  hear  of  no  other  firft  principle  than  the  will  of 
God.     Conduct   yourself   in  all  your,  actions 

CONFORMABLY  TO  THE  WILL  OF  God  I    this,   theV  fav, 

is  the  firft  law  of  nature,  the  foundation  whereon  all 
others  ftand,  the  fource  from  which  all  duties  muft  be 
deduced :  this  affords  motives  of  the  higheft  nature, 
of  the  greatert  power,  that  have  a  purifying  influence 
on  the  human  heart,  render  it  /incere  and  upright,  and 
elevate  the  mind  far  above  the  temptations  of  mtereft 
and  the  praife  or  obloquy  of  men.  Here  we  have  not 
to  look  to  ourfelves  or  to  the  world :  we  are  to  look 
up  to  our  God,  and  place  our  happinefs  in  a  conformity 
to  his  will.  Thofe  who  differ  from  them  fully  fub- 
fcribe  to  this  excellent  principle,  and  maintain,  with 
equal  zeal,  that  our  obedience  ought  to  be  principally 
actuated  by  the  consideration  that  it  is  the  will  and 
majeftic  command  of  God. 

But,  excellent  and  infinitely  exalted  and  pure  as  this 
principle  may  be,  ftill  they  object,  Whereby  fhall 
we  know  what  the  will  of  God  enjoins  in  each  par- 
ticular cafe  ?  muft  not  that  will  be  declared  ?  ana  is 
not  that  which  declares  it  prior  in  refpect  of  our 
knowledge  ?  But  the  will  of  God  is  declared  by  the 
natural  aptitude  and  tendency  of  the  nature  of  things 
to  the  great  end  of  his  glory  and  of  human  happi- 
nefs. What,  therefore,  is  found  by  reafon  and  ex- 
perience to  render  us  happy,  is  commanded  by  God; 
all  actions  of  an  oppofite  tendency  are  forbidden. 
The  firft  law  of  nature,  then,  is,  "  do  those  things 

WHICH  RENDER  THY  STATE  HAPPY,  AND  AVOID  ALL 
THAT  CAN  RENDER  THYSELF  UNHAPPY  AND  MISER- 
ABLE," and  muft  be  confidered  as  the  firft  principle 
from  which  all  duties,  all  that  is  ricdit  or  wron£  anion?* 

K  men. 


66  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

men,  is  to  be  deduced,  whatever  their  ftate  or  condi- 
tion may  be. 

Before  we  determine  which  of  thefe  principles  ought 
to  be  considered  as  the  firft,  it  will  be  necefiary  that  we 
confider  principles  in  their  different  relations ;  for  there 
are  principles  which  have  reference  to  the  eflence  or 
exiftcnee  of  things,  and  principles  different  from  them, 
which  have  refpect  to  our  knowledge  of  thofe  things. 

All  pofiible  things  have  their  foundation  in  the  in- 
finite underit-anding  of  God. 

All  things  exifient  depend  upon  his  omnipotent  will. 

All  our  knowledge  of  things  poiiible  and  exiftent  is 
founcled  in  their  nature  and  efrecis,  difcovered  by  rea- 
fon  and  experience. 

Thus,  with  refpect  to  moral  law,  it  is  the  divine  un- 
derftanding  that  has  ordered  the  natural  influence  and 
tendency  of  things,  and  particularly  of  human  actions, 
in  fuch  a  manner  as  to  manifeft  the  glory  of  God  and 
render  mankind  happy.  His  omnipotent  will  has 
called  into  exiftence  whatever  his  infinite  undemanding 
faw  fit  for  the  happinefs  of  his  creatures  -,  and  by  giving 
man  reafon  he  has  nianifefled  and  declared  his  divine 
Will,  according  to  which  man  mult  conduct  himfelf  in 
order  to  be  happy. 

It  is  therefore  our  firft  and  indifpenfible  obligation 
to  endeavour  to  know  what  God  in  his  infinite  under- 
standing has  ordered  for  our  happinefs,  and  what  his 
clivine  will  commands  us  to  do  or  to  omit,  that  thereby 
we  may  be  enabled  to  act  in  conformity  to  his  laws  and 
obtain  their  end,  our  own  happinefs. 

We  cannot,  therefore,  but  adopt  the  propofition,  do 
thofe  things  which  render  thy  ft  ate  happy,  and  avoid  all 

that 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  6'v 

that  can  render  thyfelf  unhappy  and  miferabk%  as  the  firft 
law  of  nature,  and  the  firft  principle  from  which  every 
duty  and  all  that  is  right  or  wrong  in  human  conduct 
is  to  be  deduced. 

But  let  it  be  obferved,  that  although  this  prlncrpfe 

has  the  firft  place  in  directing  our  inquiries  concerning 

the  commands  of  the  will  of  God,   yet  it  is  the  divine 

will  itfelf  which  mould  be  our  firft  confederation  and 

our  principal  motive  in  practice;  fo  that  we  conduct 

eurfelves  conformably  to  the  laws  of  nature,  not  folely 

from  this  confederation,  that  thereby  we  render  our- 

felves  happy,  but  principally  becaufe  it  is  the  will  of 

our  God.     Thus  we  (hall,  in  all  we  do,  be  actuated  by 

fincerity  and  humility  of  heart,  and  walk  as  in  the  fighr 

of  God.     Our  conduct  then  will  not  give  occaiion  to 

objections  againft  our  firft  principle,  that  it  favours  toe* 

much  of  felf-intereft,  and  is  liable  to  be  perverted  to 

many  abufes:  on  the  contrary,  it  will  be  an  animating 

thought,  that  we  do  the  will  of  God  if  we  endeavour 

to  be  really  happy,  and  that  our  true  intereft,  our  real 

happinefs  requires  that  we  do  his  will. 

Sch. — Behold  the  indiiToluble  connection  between  our  duty 
and  our  intereft  !  Are  there  any  who,  from  motives  of 
intereft,  tranfgrefs  the  laws  of  nature?  It  is  not  the  prin- 
ciple of  law  that  mifguides  them  ;  it  is  the  perverfenefs 
of  their  heart  that  blinds  them  ;  it  is,  that  they  know  cr 
mind  not  their  true,  their  real  intereft. 

Since,  then,  the  principle  of  natural  laws  commands 
our  own  happinefs,  it  necefTarily  follows,  that  all  of 
them  have  the  fame  fcope  and  tendency,  and  that  by 
obeying  them  in  fincerity  and  uprightnefs  we  fhall  be 
happy.  Difobedience,  on  the  contrary,  muft  be  en- 
tirely repugnant  to  our  intereft,  as  it  cannot  fail  to 
render  us  unhappy. 


68_  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

What  an  important  confederation  this !  what  a  pow- 
erful motive  for  exciting  us  to  habitual  obedience,  and 
for  deterring  from  acts  of  difobedience ! 

Habitual  obedience  to  the  laws  of  nature,  or  a  habit 
of  acting  conformably  to  their  injunctions,  is  called 
virtue.     The  oppofite  of  virtue  is  vice. 

An  action  to  be  done  conformably  to  law  is  ftiled 

duty. 

Faithfulnefs  in  the  performance  of  our  duties,  and 
the  practice  of  virtue,  are  confequently  the  road  to 
happinefs.  Remifmefs  in  duty,  and  a  vicious  conduct 
of  life,  lead  to  deftruction. 

Actions  referred  to  natural  laws  conftitute  the  natu- 
ral forum. 

Before  the  forum  of  nature  all  actions  are  cogniza- 
ble-, they  confequently  will  be  either  conformable  or 
unconformable  to  the  injunctions  of  natural  laws, 
which,  as  has  been  mown,  leave  no  action  indifferent 
or  permitted.  All  actions,  therefore,  are  good  or  bad, 
and  as  fuch  will  be  rewarded  or  punilhed.  But  as  all 
natural  laws  are  divine  laws,  it  follows,  that  the  natural 
forum  is  the  divine  forum;  and  we  may  draw  this  con- 
clulicn,  that  in  the  forum  of  nature  and  of  na- 
ture's GOD,  THERE  IS  NO  ACTION  WHICH  WILL  NOT 
BE   EITHER  REWARDED  OR  PUNISHED. 

If,  therefore,  there  are  actions  which  are  not  reward- 
ed or  punimed  in  this  life  according  to  their  merit  or 
demerit,  it  is  evident,  that  a  day  muft  come  when  jh all 
he  rendered  to  every  one  according  to  his  deeds. 

Laws  are  -perfect  or  imperfect,  as  the  obligations 
which  they  respectively  import  are  either  the  one  or 
the  other. 

It 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  69 

It  is  the  nature  of  perfect  laws  to  give  remedial  rules 
againfr.  wrongs  received  •,  rules  which  warrant  coercive 
and  compulfory  means  for  obtaining  redrefs  and  inflict- 
ing punifhments. 

But  imperfect  laws  afford  no  remedies  of  a  compul- 
fory nature,  but  leave  the  tranfgrefTor  refponfible  for 
his  conduct  before  the  tribunal  of  God  and  before  his 
own  confeience. 

Sch. — Little  as  thefe  laws  mav  be  regarded  by  the  generality  of 
mankind,  as  in  the  human  forum  they  bear  the  afpecl:  of 
advice  rather  than  of  law,  ftill  they  are  of  the  greatefl 
importance.  They  are  the  unalterable  and  eternal  laws 
of  God,  of  the  higheft  and  moft  awful  refponfibility. 
Here  the  opprefled  and  their  oppreffors  muft  meet;  kings, 
emperors,  princes,  nobles,  the  exalted,  the  rich,  the  great, 
the  poor,  the  moft  diftrefled  muft  appear  as  men  ;  an  ac- 
count muft  be  rendered  for  all  that  human  laws  either  did 
or  could  not  reach,  and  every  man  receive  according  to 
his  works ! 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  different  degrees  of  morality  or  immorality  in 
hitman  conduff. 


E 


iXPERIENCE  evinces,  that  there  are  various  de- 
grees of  rectitude  or  malignity  in  the  actions  of  men. 
Thefe,  referred  to  the  intention  of  agents,  become  fo 
many  traits  in  the  moral  character  of  man,  defcriptive 
of  the  degrees  of  probity  or  reprehenfibility  of  his 
conduct.  It  is  on  this  account  that  the  languages  of 
civilized  nations  apply  various  epithets  both  to  actions 
and  agents,  as  they  are  refpectively  found  more  or  Ids 
conformable  or  contrary  to  their  ideas  of  right  and 
wrong. 

h  Set. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

8c/;.  i. — We  may  not,  however,  reft  our  eftimation  of  human 
conduct  upon  terms;  as  in  their  nature  they  are  but  arbi- 
trary figns  of  ideas,  they  may  and  indeed  do  often  change 
their  fignifications.  This  is  particularly  the  cafe  with  re- 
fpect  to  fubjects  of  morality,  as  words  denoting  the  diffe- 
rent degrees  and  qualities  of  merit  or  demerit  in  actions, 
and  the  proper  {hare  of  commendation  or  reprehenfibility 
which  agents  ought  to  have  in  our  eftimation,  are  fome- 
times  prornifcuoufly  and  frequently  very  variouily  ap- 
plied. Are  not  the  terms  juft  and  unjufl,  honeft  and  dif- 
lioneft, &c.  often  ufed  to  denote  actions  of  the  fame  qua- 
lity and  perfons  of  the  fame  character?  And  how  often 
does  vice,  with  its  offspring,  affume  the  appearance  and 
the  names  of  virtues  ?  Even  thefe  are  often  branded  with 
epithets  originally  defigned  to  fliew  vice  in  its  various 
windings  and  native  deformity. 

Sc/l  2. — It  is  therefore  necefiary  that  we  define  thofe  terms,  in 
order  to  introduce  into  this  fubject  that  precifion  which 
its  importance  demands.  With  us,  then,  the  terms,  c  a 
juft,  an  unjuft,  a  reafonable,  an  unreafonable,  an  honeft 
and  diflioneft  man,'  denote  not  one,  but  very  different 
characters :  we  make  a  material  diftinction  between  un- 
juft, unreafonable,  and  diflioneft  actions  and  men. 

Since,  as  has  been  proved,  both  perfect  and  imper- 
fect obligations  are  indifTorubly  connected  with  corre- 
late rights  •,  and  fince  it  is  the  nature  of  laws,  as  they 
import  moral  obligations,  to  define  our  rights  in  con- 
fequence  thereof;  we  may,  on  the  one  hand,  form  our 
ideas  of  right  and  wrong;  immediately  from  the  nature 
and  extent  of  our  moral  obligation,  or  derive  them  in 
a  mediate  manner  from  the  determinations  of  laws. 
If,  therefore,  we  wifh  to  form  an  eftimate  of  the  de- 
grees of  morality  or  immorality  in  actions,  we  may 
refer  them  to  perfect  or  imperfect  laws,  or  to  perfect 
or  imperfect  obligations. 

Thofe  actions  which  are  referred  to  perfect  or  im- 
perfect laws,  are  refpectively  juft  or  unjufl \  reafonable 
or  unreafonable. 

Actions, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  J  I 

A&ions,  on  the  other  hand,  referred  to  perfect  or 
imperfect,  obligations,  are  refpeclively  either  externally 
or  internally  hmeft,  or  the  contrary. 

Sch.  i. — A  juft  action  is  done  conformably  to  perfect  law,  the 
u nj uft  is  contrary  thereto;  for  inftance,  difcharging  a 
bond,  a  mortgage,  a  note;  or  making  over  property  to 
children  or  others,  in  order  to  defeat  thofe  perfect  de- 
mands. 

■Sch.  2.— A  reafonable  action  is  confident  with  imperfect  laws* 
the  unreafonable  is  inconfiftent  therewith;  as  giving  time 
or  remitting  our  perfect  demands,  if  the  debtor  has  been 
unfortunate;  or,  notwithstanding  this,  to  infill:  upon 
punctual  payment,  and  to  diflrefs  the  unfortunate. 

Sch.  3. — An  aftion  done  or  omitted  conformably  or  contrary 
to  our  perfe<5t  obligation,  is  honeft  or  difhoneft;  for  in- 
ftance, to  fatisfy  our  bonds  or  notes  before  another  makes 
demands,  in  as  full  a  manner  as  we  ought;  or  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  his  ignorance  or  eafmefs;  or  to  try  to  make 
fatisfaction  in  a  manner  inadequate  to  our  obligation, 
taking  advantages  of  the  infufficiency  of  laws,  of  terms, 
and  other  circumftances. 

Sch.  4. — Actions  done  or  omitted  in  conformity  with  our  im- 
perfect obligations  may  be  called  /we,  or  aft. ions  done  in 
upri?htnefs ;  for  here  we  onlv  confider  the  internal  beauty 
or  deformity  of  actions,  confult  the  feelings  of  humanity, 
nay,  take  pattern  from  the  ways  and  perfections  of  God. 

This  reference  of  actions  to  the  different  laws  and 
obligations,  and  the  diftinction  of  the  different  qualities 
of  actions  in  ccnfequcnce  thereof,  are  by  no  means 
things  of  an  arbitrary  nature,  but  founded  in  the  erTen- 
tial  properties  of  thofe  laws  and  obligations  refpeclive- 
ly. For  when  our  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  are  taken 
immediately  from  the  nature  and  extent  of  our  moral 
obligations,  they  muft  be  purer  and  more  certain,  as 
they  are  nearer  to  the  point,  than  thefe  which  we  form 
from  the  determinations  of  human  laws,  the  greateft 
merit  of  which  confifts  in  giving  rules  which  come  as 
near  our  moral  obligation  as  poiiible. 

In 


72  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  vain  do  we  look  for  confummate  purity  and  per- 
fection in  human  affairs.  It  is  true,  we  may  err  even 
if  we  pay  attention  to  our  obligations  •,  but  the  chance 
is  much  greater  in  refpe6t  of  the  directions  of  laws  *, 
for  as  it  is  the  nature  of  human  laws  to  contemplate 
only  the  general  character  of  men,  fo  the  obligations 
they  import  are  alio  of  a  general  nature,  and  cannot 
be  defined  with  exactnefs  and  precifion  in  their  indivi- 
dual qualities,  with  refpect  to  manner,  mode,  time,  ex- 
tent, and  other  circumftances  of  the  particular  actions, 
as  well  as  the  fituation,  ftate  and  capacity  of  the  agents. 
Actions  confequently  referred  to  human  laws,  muft  be 
deemed  right  or  wrong  in  confequence  of  their  general 
directions,  which  would  have  quite  another  afpect  when 
referred  to  our  moral  obligation. 

Sch.  i. — Laws,  for  inftance,  impofing  taxes,  contemplate  that 
each  member  of  the  ftate  contribute  in  proportion  to  his 
circumftances.  But  there  is  fome  property  in  a  ftate 
which  can  be  known,  whilft  there  is  a  pcflibility  that  a 
vaft  deal  is  out  of  the  reach  of  knowledge.  If  the  rich 
man  who  has  his  property  in  funds,  in  bonds,  mortgages, 
or  cafh  lying  by,  follows  the  directions  of  law,  he  will 
contribute  far  lefs  than  he  ought  to  do  in  proportion  to 
his  income.  Would  he  confult  his  obligation,  he  would 
not  fiiifer  men  in  low  circumftances  to  groan  under  pub- 
lic burdens,  but  would  voluntarily  come  forward  and 
contribute  his  (hare. 

Sch.  2. — The  honeft  man  is  ftudiOUS  to  fatisfy  his  perfect  obli- 
gation, though  others  may  not  know  or  not  chufe  to  ex- 
ercile  their  perfect  right;  he  wifhes  to  live  without  fear 
and  trouble,  content  that  no  man  has  a  perfect  demand 
upon  him;  whilit  the  difhoneit  takes  advantage  of  the 
ignorance  or  eafinefs  of  his  neighbour,  or  looks  abroad 
whether  he  has  not  a  legal  excufe  for  rejecting  his  perfect 
obligation,  or  not  fulfilling  it  in  its  full  extent.  Give 
this  man  the  opportunity  which  laws  have  provided  in 
cafe  of  public  calamity  as  a  remedy  for  reduced  and  dif- 
trefled  fufYerers,  he.  perhaps  a  gainer  on  that  very  ac- 
count. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  J* 

count,  at  leaft  not  a  lofer,  and  fully  able  to  fatisfy  his  per- 
fect obligations,  will  neverthelefs  evade  the  perfect  rights 
of  others,  by  deducting  intereft,  paying  in  paper,  &c. 
Behold  the  difhoneft  man!  Let  this  character,  deformed 
as  it  is,  and  made  up  of  fraud,  hypocrify  and  dillimula- 
tion,  be  joined  to  the  unjuft  man,  and  you  have  a  cha- 
racter ftill  more  deformed  than  evafion  and  diflimulation 
Gan  make  it — a  man  of  the  mod  depraved  and  debafed 
character.  The  difhoneft  man  is  dangerous;  he  preferves 
appearances,  pretends  honefty,  is  loud  in  profellions  of 
friendfhip  and  gratitude;  he  makes  life  of  various  wind- 
ings, attempting,  by  all  manner  of  plaufible  means,  to 
impofe  upon  good  nature  and  credulity,  and  grouty  dii- 
appoints  your  confidence.  But  the  unjuft  man  does  alt 
this,  and  he  goes  much  farther;  he  breaks  through  all 
bars  of  human  rectitude;  he  cares  as  little  for  appearances 
and  the  opinions  of  mankind,  as  he  minds  the  internal 
excellency  of  virtue  or  the  hideous  deformity  of  vice. 
Mifchief  and  violence  are  his  element;  to  fpread  abroad 
oppreffion,  confufion  and  mifery  is  his  delight :  in  fhort, 
he  is  to  human  fociety  what  beafts  of  prey  are  in  the  brute 
creation.  Perfect  rights,  perfect  laws,  with  all  their  fanc- 
tions,  have  no  effect  upon  him.  Mark  tho  character  of 
an  unjuft  man  as  a  monfter,  as  a  hydra  of  human  fociety, 
and  obferve,  that  fuch  characters  are  often  above  and 
beyond  the  reach  of  human  laws ! 
The  man  merely  juft  is  made  up  of  law;  but  you  muft  re- 
fort  to  it  to  oblige  him  to  fatisfy  his  perfect  obligations ; 
public  opinion  has  little  or  no  weight  with  him.  If  law 
is  on  his  fide,  you  find  him  inhuman  and  unmerciful ;  he 
pu flies  his  perfect  right  as  far  as  the  law  gives  him  fcope, 
is  callous  to  the  intreaties  of  the  unfortunate,  the  induf- 
trious  and  foberhufbandman,  the  honeft  trader — unaffected 
by  the  tears  of  widows,  and  deaf  to  the  cries  of  orphans. 
Shielded  by  law,  he  is  contented  that  his  unreafonable- 
nefs  and  inhumanity  are  not  contrary,  but  in  the  proper 
form  and  according  to  the  due  courfe  of  legal  proceed- 
ings. Remember,  therefore,  when  hereafter  we  fhnll  fpeak 
of  the  various  degrees  of  deformity  and  immorality  in  bad 
actions,  that  thofe  who  break  through  the  reftraints  of  law 
are  fartheft  from  the  loweft  degree  of  commendation  or 
morality,  and  therefore  in  a  high  degree  immoral  and  re- 
prehensible.    There  may  be  a  difference  with  refpect  to 

L  the 


74  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  object  of  a  tranfgrefiion  ;  but  tranfgreilion,  whatever 
its  object  may  be,  counteracts  public  good  and  defeats  the 
falutary  ends  of  Jaws  in  fpite  of  all  their  reftraints.  The 
man  who  can  export  wool  in  oppotition  to  the  laws  of  the 
1. ;:id,  would  as  foorf  export  powder  to  the  enemy,  if  he 
could  do  it  as  eafily.  Set  it  down  as  an  aft  of  injuitice. 
It  is  true,  we  have  delineated  thefe  characters,  perhaps,  in 
Hr  greaTSft  defor mirv ;  but  drop  one  or  the  other  hideous 
u  ;>;:.  end  vou  have  itill  a  multitude  of  actions,  iinjuft,  nn- 
real'onableand  difhonefr,  degrading  to-  the  dignity  of  man  ! 
But  the  i  menially  h on  eft  and  reafonable  man,  what  a  glo- 
rious character !  man  indeed,  a  rational  creature — ra- 
tional in  all  his  intentions,  actions  and  piirfuits !  He  is 
riot  contented  with  taking  things  as  men,  as  human  laws 
determine  them  ;  penetrating  into  the  very  nature  of  his 
moral  obligations,  he  forgets  fervile  fear,  fordid  intereft, 
legal  excufe;  he  fees  no  beauty  in  an  action  that  is  barely 
juit  or  honeil;  wiming  to  be  humane  and  reafonable  to 
the  utmoft  of  his  power,  he  contemplates  the  imperfect 
laws  which  do  not  command  this  or  that  action  iri  this  and 
that  manner,  and  to  fuch  an  extent,  but  enjoin  to  do  all 
the  good  We  can  in  the  beft  and  fincereft  polfible  manner, 
at  all  times  and  in  all  fituations  of  life.  Yes,  it  is  the  man 
of  probity  and  internal  honefly  who  penetrates  into  the 
fpirit  and  feepe  of  his  imperfect  obligations,  delights  in 
the  fight  of  its  beauty,  tafles  the  fweetnefs  of  a  virtuous 
action,  is  above  all  low  confiderations,  and  principally 
concerned  to  do  all  the  good  he  can  in  truth  and  fincerity. 
lie  penetrates  into  the  receives  of  the  difconfolate,  of  po- 
verty, want  and  human  miferv  ;  anticipates  application, 
and  fpreads  abroad  the  balm  of  comfort  and  relief.  This 
is  the  good  man  of  the  ancients;  this  character,  if  en- 
lightened by  the  heavenly  precepts  of  chriftianity  and 
actuated  by  thofe  animating  motives  which  flow  from  the 
infinite  love  of  a  reconciled  God,  is  the  ?nan  without  guile ! 

External  deportment,  where  it  is  enquired,  whether 
conduct  ourfelves  with  decency  or  in  an  indecent 
i,  inner. 5  whether  our  actions  are  proper  or  improper; 
is  another  fbtrree  from  which  the  degrees  of  rectitude 
and  reprehenfibility  of  human  conduct  may  be  deter- 
mined. 

Sch. 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHY',  J  $ 

Spfj, — The  rules  of  decency  and  propriety  have  a  vail  influence 
upon  our  actions,  as  a  conformity  to  them  adds  much 
external  beauty  and  ornament  to  our  behaviour  in  the 
fight  of  others,  and  brings,  as  it  were,  to  light  the'  i.tcr- 
nal  frame  and  qualities  of  the  mind.  It  is  true,  ail 
anions  have  native  beauty  in  themfelves;  but  thev  are 
infinitely  more  beautiful  and  commendable,  when  per- 
formed with  the  greated.poilible  decency  and  propriety. 
We  mav  anticipate  the  importance  of  decency  and  pro- 
priety in  human  conduct  from  this  confidcration,  that 
we  expect  neither  of  them  in  brutes  or  in  infant  children, 
they  being  confined  only  to  perfons  who  can  exercife  un- 
derdanding,  reafon  and  judgment.  Is  it  therefore  a  won- 
der, that  we  form  ideas  of  the  internal  ftate  of  the  mind 
according  to  the  degrees  of  decency  or  indecency  dif- 
covered  in  actions? 

Men  differ  very  much  in  their  ideas  of  decency  and 
propriety,  or  the  contrary ;  and  it  is  a  queftion,  whether 
any  fixed  rule  and  ftandard  can  be  given  to  enable  us  to 
diftinguifh  truth  from  error  ?  (  (. 

To  folve  this  queftion,  let. us  define  the  ideas,  and 
fee  whether  they  are  founded  or  not  founded  in  nature  -, 
if  the  latter  is  the  cafe,  we  mall  not  only  find  rules,  but 
rules  as  unalterable  and  unchangeable  in  the  moral 
fenfe,  as  nature  itfelf. 

What  is  confident  with  the  nature  of  an  intelligent 
being,  and  with  its  internal  and  external  ftate,  is  natu- 
rally decent  and  proper  \  the  contrary  is  naturally  inde- 
cent and  improper. 

Sch.  i.— All  juft,  honed,  reafonable  actions  are  naturally  de- 
cent; the  contrary  naturally  indecent:  the  former  are 
confident  with  the  nature  of  a  rational  being,  the  latter 
are  inconlident  therewith. 
.  Sch.  2. — All  actions  confident  with  the  internal  date  of  \ lie 
mind,  are  naturally  decent  and  proper;  the  contrary  arc- 
naturally  indecent  and  improper. 
"VVe  expect  another  deportment  in  the  learned  than  that  of  a 
man  who  is  illiterate  and  rude.    If  a  religious  man  fiioulcj 


7&  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ufe  the  language  of  the  prophane,  it  would  be  fhockirig; 
if  the  latter  mould  fpeak  religious  fentiments,  it  would 
caufe  furprife,  perhaps  difguft.  What  would  be  mocking 
in  a  Chriftian,  caufes  no  furprife  in  a  Jew.  If  Chriftians 
and  Jews  fhould  bow  before  Hone  and  wood,  or  adore  the 
works  of  the  hands  of  men,  who  could  bear  the  fight?  in 
a  heathen  it  has  fo  much  of  propriety,  that  we  revere  that 
fenfe  of  religion  which  the  former  perhaps  have  laid  afide. 
Sch,  3. — What  agrees  with  the  nature  of  our  external  flate  is 
naturally  decent  and  proper;  the  contrary  indecent  and 
improper. 

What  a  glory  is  added  to  an  exalted  flate  by  affability,  con- 
defcenfion  and  modefly,  that  virtue  which  becomes  every 
ftate  and  condition  of  life  !  How  amiable  is  the  character 
of  citizens  paying  refpect  to  perfons  in  public  ftations, 
loving  and  honouring  them !  How  truly  excellent  thefe, 
if  their  perfonal  virtues  juftify  that  diflinction !  What  a 
beautiful  fight  to  dif cover  among  fellow  citizens,  brethren, 
fellow  fludents,  an  affiduity  to  pleafe,  to  fhew  friendfhip, 
to  be  polite  and  civil  to  one  another ! — The  rich  man  is 
only  decent  in  a  rich  drefs ;  the  poor  would  make  in  it  a 
moll:  ridiculous  figure.  :  The  ftrong,  the  robuft  looks  befl 
employed  in  hard  labour,  and  carrying  along  with  him  the 
emblems  thereof;  a  tarry  veftment  adorns  the  failor,  &c. 
The  decrepid,the  fick,the  cripple  may  with  decency  apply 
for  relief  and  fupport;  a  thing  that  would  be  a  difgrace 
to  human  nature  in  a  young  man  of  ftrong  conftitution 
and  in  the  vigour  of  health. 

Sch.  4. — The  fenfe  of  decency  and  propriety  is  an  internal  in- 
gredient to  many  an  excellent  virtue.  What  is  humility? 
I  anfwer,  a  decent  fenfe  and  opinion  of  our  merits;  for 
one  who  errs  in  defect  is  not  the  man  of  humility,  but 
abject ;  he  who  has  too  great  an  opinion  of  his  merits  is 
arrogant  and  proud.  A  decent,  a  proper  management  of 
our  affairs,  with  refpect  to  expence,  is  ceconomy,  fruga- 
lity; the  excefs,  luxury,  prodigality;  the  defect,  ftingi- 
nefs,  avarice,  &c. 

Sch.  5. — The  juft  man  exercifes  little  decency,  the  honefl 
more;  the  difhonefl  flrives  to  have  the  appearance :  the 
reafonable  man  and  the  upright  give,  what  they  give, 
with  the  befl  grace,  reprove  with  fympathetic  gentle- 
nefs,  &c. 

There 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  77 

There  are  alfo  ideas  of  decency  and  indecency,  of 
propriety  and  impropriety,  which,  retting  only  upon 
the  general  opinions  of  mankind,  are  not  only  various 
and  very  different,  but  alfo  of  a  moft  fluctuating  and 
changeable  nature.  Here  is  not  the  queftion,  whether 
an  action  is  decent  and  proper,  or  the  contrary,  but 
whether,  in  human  converfation,  it  is  deemed  fuch. 
If  thefe  ideas  can  conftitute  any  thing,  it  is  fajkion,  a 
thing  moft  multifarious  and  arbitrary. 

Ideas  of  propriety  and  decency,  or  the  contrary,  are 
the  criterion  by  which  we  may  judge  of  the  tafte  and 
manners  of  nations,  ftates,  cities,  claffes  and  circles  of 
fociety.  l  As  long  as  they  lead  to  things  not  contradic- 
tory to  natural  decency,  &c.  fo  long  we  may  follow 
them,  and  gently  glide  down  the  ftream  of  public  opi- 
nion. But  if  it  be  fafhion  to  ftigmatize  good  actions, 
or  if  they  meet  not  with  due  commendation ;  if,  on  the 
contrary,  bad  actions,  difobedience  to  law,  &c.  become 
fafhionable,  that  is,  if  they  are  countenanced  by  a  fa- 
vourable opinion,  farewell  to  good  tafte,  to  good  man- 
ners. The  manners  of  a  people,  a  city,  a  fociety,  are 
debauched :  were  it  not  that  they  carry  their  punifh- 
ment  already,  we  fhould  fay  they  are  ripe  for  it.  So 
much  is  certain,  that  many  a  one  will  end  his  career  in 
ruin  and  in  fhame ! 

Another  criterion  of  the  different  degrees  of  morality 
or  immorality  of  actions  depends  on  their  effect  and  the 
intention  of  the  agents.  With  refpect  to  effects,  which 
conftitute  what  may  be  called  the  material  morality  or 
immorality  of  actions,  little  need  be  faid,  as  they  are 
very  obvious  to  an  attentive  obferver,  and  produce  efti- 
mation  rather  as  an  effect,  than  the  refult  of  a  judgment 
formed  thereon.     All,  therefore,  that  we  (hall  fey,  will 

be 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

he  to  call  the  attention  of  the  reader  not  only  to  the 
proximate,  but  alio  to  the  remote  effects  of  our  actions. 
This  will  enable  us  to  fee  the  great  excellency  and  ufe- 
juinefs  of  good,  and  the  keinoufnefs  of  bad  actions. 

Sc/h  :. — Behold  the  happy  influence  which  the  good  education 
of  children  has  upon  a  parent !  joy,  contentment  for  the 
torefent,  hope  and  confidence  in  approaching  days  of  age 
and  of  infirmity;  confolation  in  the  hour  of  death  !  Be- 
hold the  children  happy,  profpering,  blefled  by  their  pa- 
rents, and  bltiled  by  God)  They  know  the  value  of  good 
education;  they  reap  the  fruits  thereof  in  their  children, 
perhaps  more  abundantly  than  their  parents  did;  they 
conftitute  good  education  the  chief  inheritance  of  their 
offspring,  to  be  conveyed  unimpaired,  rather  improved, 
to  the  lateft  pofterity !  Reverfe  this  portrait,  and  you 
form  an  idea  of  the  high  reprehenfibility  in  parents,  who, 
though  it  was  in  their  power,  have  neglected  this  great 
.  dutv.  How  exceedingly  heinous  in  children,  if  they 
frustrate  the  fond  endeavours,  the  fweet  expectations  of 
their  parents,  who  do  all  in  their  power  to  promote  their 
happinefs! 

Sc/r.  2.:— Conftder,  that  acts  of  fraud,  of  injuitice  and  oppref- 
fioh,  are  felt  by  a  fellow  citizen  through  the  remainder  of 
his  days;  that  widows,  that  orphans,  that  pofterity  are 
affected  by  them.  The  murderer  kills  a  pofTibie  pofterity ; 
liFiiuft  wars  produce  calamities  which  involve  the  inno- 
cent with  the  guilty,  and  bring  poverty  and  ruin  upon 
tnofe  who  are  yet  unborn.  Slaughter  and  bloodfhed  pre- 
vent thoufands  from  feeing  the  light.  We  may  be  dead 
and  gone,  but  our  good  or  bad  examples  ftill  live,  being 
copied  by  children  and  children's  children.  Is  it  there - 
fore  ftrange  to  read,  that  the  Lord  will  vifit  the  fins  of 
parents  in  their  children  to  the  third  and  fourth  genera- 
tion ? 

But  our  principal  object  here  is  an  enquiry  into  the 
nal  morality  or  immorality  •,  whether  an  action  pro- 
ceeds from  intention,  and  with  what  degree  of  liberty 
that  intention  is  purfued :   for  the  greater  our  liberty  is, 
the  greater  is  the  morality  or  immorality  of  our  actions. 

As 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  /9 

As  liberty  comprehends  fpontaneity  hi  the  argent, 
contingency  in  the  action,  and  a  certain  degree  of  dif- 
rinct  knowledge  of  the  action  previous  to  the  commif- 
fion  or  omiflion  thereof,  it  follows,  that  we  have  three 
rules  for  determining  the  degrees  of  morality  or  im- 
morality in  human  conduct : 

i.  The  greater  the  fpontaneity  by  which  an  ag-. 
acts,  the  greater  is  the  morality  or  immorality  of  thv, 
action.  * 

2.  The  greater  the  contingency  of  the  action,  the 
greater  is  its  morality  or  immorality. 

3.  The. greater  the  knowledge  which  an  agent  had 
of  the  nature  and  confequences  of  an  aclion  before  the 
comm'ifTion  or  omiflion  thereof,  the  greater  is  the  mo- 
rality or  immorality. 

In  confequence  of  thefe  rules,  we  may  form  the  fol- 
lowing efrimate  of  a  variety  of  actions,  with  refpect  to 
their  different  degrees  of  morality  or  immorality. 

In  actions  done  or  omitted  in  confequence  of  compul- 

fion,  there  can  be  neither  morality  nor  immorality,  as 

there  is  no  room  for  fpontaneity  m  the  agent,  nor  any 

contingency  in  the  action. 

Sen. — If  a  perfon  is  forced  to  do  what  is  good,-  he  can  claim 
no  merit;  if  he  be  compelled  to  do  evil,  he  cannot  be 
blamed.  As  neceility  has  no  law,  fo  it  leaves  no  room 
for  merit  or  demerit  in  actions. 

Actions  done  or  omitted  under  conftrctiw^  that  is, 
where  the  agent  is  in  fuch  a  fituation  that  he  has  but 
to  chufe  between  two  or  more  actions  prcpofed,  where 
confequently  but  one  or  the  other  alternative  is  left, 
have  morality  or  immorality  in  greater  or  lefs  degrees, 
as  there  are  more  or  lefs  alternatives  for  choice.  Here 
fpontaneity  and  contingency  arc  forcibly  limited. 

Sch. 


SO  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sch. — A  perfon  intrufted  with  money,  for  inftance,  may  be 
attacked  by  a  robber,  who  propofes  the  alternative,  de«= 
liver  or  die ! 

Actions  done  or  omitted  under  reftraint,  that  is, 
actions  determined,  commanded  or  forbidden  by  laws, 
admit  of  a  high  degree  of  morality  or  immorality. 
Here  fpontaneity  and  contingency  are  limited  in  con- 
formity to  the  rules  of  right  \  liberty,  confequently,  is 
not  impaired,  but  directed.  There  is  as  much  room 
for  fpontaneity  and  contingency  as  a  rational  man  can 
vvifh  \  his  will  is  not  hindered,  but  led  to  that  which  is 
good  -,  the  action  is  entirely  voluntary. 

The  more  voluntary  actions  are,  the  higher  is  the 
morality  •,  for  the  reftraint  is  lefs,  and  confequently 
fpontaneity  and  contingency  greater. 

But  it  holds  not  good,  that  bad  actions  are  more 
immoral  in  confequence  of  their  being  more  voluntary 
and  under  lefs  reftraint.  On  the  contrary,  they  are 
more  obftinately  wicked,  as  no  confideration,  not  even 
reftraint,  can  refifl  them. 

Sch.  i. — Remember  the  character  of  the  unjuft  man  already 
defcribed. 

Sch.  2. — Let  it  be  obferved,  that  where  the  immorality  of  ac- 
tions is  affected  by  reftraint,  either  of  law,  advice,  exam- 
ple, or  external  motive  afforded  to  the  agent,  it  is  always 
greater  than  where  no  reftraint  takes  place,  and  that  the 
degrees  of  immorality  are  in  proportion  to  thofe  of  re- 
ftraint. In  thefe  cafes,  therefore,  the  degrees  of  morality 
and  immorality  do  not  keep  pace  in  direct  proportion  ; 
that  is,  from  the  higheft  morality  of  good  actions,  we 
may  not  immediately  infer  the  higheft  immorality  in  thofe 
actions  which  are  oppofite  to  them.  In  fome  actions, 
therefore,  there  will  be  occafion  only  to  determine  the 
degrees  of  morality,  and  leave  the  reader  to  judge  of  thofe 
of  immorality. 

Actions 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  8*t 

Actions  not  affected  by  rcftraint,  have  a  higher  de- 
gree of  morality  than  thofe  which  are  done  or  omitted 
in  confequence  thereof. 

Sch.  i. — A  perfon  may  do  a  good  action  b^caufe  the  lav/  coir, 
mands  or  a  friend  adviies  its  performance  :  the  example 
of  others  may  excite  us,  or  motives  afforded  make  it  eli- 
gible. In  all  thefe  cafes  the  agent  may  have  merit,  but 
the  law,  the  friend,  the  example,  the  perfons  affording 
the  motives  have  their  refpective  mare  in  it. 

Sch.  2. — Suppofe  a  perfon  does  a  good  aftion  from  an  inward 
defire  to  do  what  is  right,  independent  of  any  other  con- 
fideration,  will  he  not  be  entitled  to  all  the  merit? 

The  more  internal  motives  we  have  for  doing  or 
omitting  a  certain  action,  the  higher  is  the  degree  of 
its  morality  •,  for  the  agent  has  a  greater  mare  of  dif- 
tinct  knowledge  than  if  he  were  actuated  only  by  ex- 
ternal motives. 

The  more  external  motives  an  agent  has  before  he 
does  or  omits  an  action,  the  lefs  are  the  degrees  of  mo- 
rality, and  the  greater  the  immorality ;  the  former  is 
in  confequence  of  lefs  knowledge,  the  latter  of  more 
obftinacy  in  the  agent. 

Sch. — It  will  therefore  not  be  difficult  to  fee  the  far  greater  ex- 
cellency of  honeft  actions  before  thofe  which  are  merely 
juft,  that  of  the  reafonable  before  the  honeft,  &c. 

Actions  done  or  omitted  upon  motives  taken  from 
the  divine  perfections,  have  the  higheit  degree  of  mo- 
rality. 

A  habit  of  acting  upon  motives  taken  from  the 
perfections  of  God,  is  called  piety,  the  higheft  deoree 
of  morality,  the  greateft  excellency  of  virtue  within 
the  compafs  of  natural  principles. 

Sch. — Chriftian  piety  is  ftill  of  greater  excellency  and  purity, 

becaufe  the  motives,  taken  from  the  Infinite  love  of  God 

declared  in  the  ivork  of  redemption,  are  not  only  the  pureft 

M  '   and 


b2  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

and  moii  exalted,  but  proceed  from  the  pureft  fincerity 
of  the  heart,  from  the  principle  of  faith. 

Actions  complicated  or  compound  contain  as  many 

motives  as  there  axejtinple  actions  contained  in  them^ 

they  are  therefore  of  a  higher  degree  of  morality  or 

immorality  than  a  fimple  action  confifting  but  of  one 

or  a  few  motives,  becaufe  the  knowledge  and  the  fpon- 

taneity  in  the  agent  are  greater. 

Sc/u: — There  is  certainly  more  merit  in  an  agent  who  procures 
and  preferves  an  eltate  by  afiiduous  application  to  the  toil- 
ibme  duties  of  his  calling,  than  in  him  who  has  gained  a 
high  prize  in  a  lottery,  or  is  become  heir  of  an  eftate. 
There  is  alfo  a  higher  degree  of  criminality  in  the  act  of 
taking  away  a  perlbn's  life,  when  preparations  have  been 
made  for  its  perpetration  by  way-laying  him,  by  reforting 
to  a  particular  place,  by  {electing  the  time  moft  fuitable 
for  producing  that  effect,  than  there  is  when  that  act  takes 
place  on  a  fudden,  unexpectedly,  unpremeditated,  in  the 
heat  of  paflion,  &c. 

Deliberate  aclions  have  a  higher  degree  of  morality 
or  immorality  than  the  inconfiderate\  for,  as  the  former 
are  done  or  omitted  in  confequence  of  previous  conii- 
deration,  the  agent  acts  with  a  higher  degree  of  know- 
ledge and  fpontaneity  than  can  take  place  in  the  latter, 
which  are  done  without  previous  confederation. 

Sch.  i. — Actions  mav  be  deliberate  or  inconfiderate  with  re- 
fpect  both  to  hijikutioii  and  execution^  or  only  with  refpect 
to  the  one  or  the  other. 

StL  i. — We  may  erect  works  for  public  defence  upon  a  pre- 
meditated plan,  and  in  cafe  of  neceflity  make  the  moft 
vigorous  reliftance;  or  we  may  abandon  them,  or  give 
them  up  without  any  exertion  at  all,  or  be  guilty  of  im- 
prudence and  indifcretion  in  conducting  that  defence. 

Sch.  3. — A  pod:  may  be  taken  in  an  improper  place,  or  may 
not  be  fufficientty  fecured;  ftiU,  upon  an  attack,  the  be  ft 
exertions  may  be  made  to  refift  an  invading  enemy. 

Sc/i.  4. — To  act  with  deliberation,  we  muft  inftitute  our  ac- 
tions in  the  belt  pofftble  manner,  penetrate  into  their  na- 
ture 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  §3 

ture  and  tendency,  and  fpare  no  pains  to  carry  our  wcll- 
digefted  plan  into  execution. 

Sch.  jj.-rHow  requisite  is  deliberation  in  the  whole  tenor  of 
our  conduct  !  How  much  fhould  we  attend  to  the  confe- 
quences  of  our  actions!  How  careful  ought  we  to  be  in 
conducting  them  in  conformity  to  our  moral  obligation, 
as  they  have  the  greateit  influence  on  our  character,  our 
repofe,  our  happinefs,  and  the  felicity  of  mankind  1 

Remember  that  one  inconfulerate  act  can  ruin  your  happi- 
nds,  the  peace  of  your  mind  and  your  character:  con- 
sider how  deeply  your  parents  and  relatives  are  intereiled; 
how  deeply  afflicted  if  their  fond  hopes  and  expectations 
are  blalted  by  an  inconfiderate  conduct,  to  which  youth 
is  found  to  be  particularly  inclined. 

We  are  faid^to  be  the  author  of  an  action,  when  its 
exigence  or  non -existence  may  be  referred  to  our  fpon- 
taneity:  as  this  may  be  the  cafe  in  various  ways,  it 
follows,  that  we  may  be  authors  of  actions  in  different 
refpects.  We  may  be  the  immediate  caufe  of  an  ac- 
tion, or  be  it  in  a  mediate  manner,  by  means,  contri- 
vances, or  the  afliftance  of  others.  Hence  it  is,  that 
actions  may  be  diflinguifhed  into  immediate  and  me- 
diate :  of  the  former  we  are  the  immediate  author,  or  the 
immediate  caufe  \  that  which  ferves  as  a  mean  to  pro- 
duce the  latter,  is  called  the  niftrumental  caufe  thereof, 
in  contradiftinetion  to  him  who  has  given  occasion  for 
it,  and  thereby  mud  be  considered  as  the  principal 
caufe.  So  that  in  all  mediate  actions  there  is  a  princi- 
pal and  an  inftrumental  caufe. 

But,  as  inanimate  things,  or  brutes,  or  moral  agents 
may  be  ufed  as  means,  we  think  it  proper  that  the  ap- 
pellation of  inflrumental  caufe  fhould  be  confined  to 
means  not  enjoying  free  agency,  and  that  moral  agents, 
inftrumental  in  a6nons  defigned  by  others,  fhould  be 
called  the  proximate,  the  latter  the  moral  caufe  of  (hem,         M 

Thus, 


84  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Thus,  in  mediate  actions  effected  by  the  afliftance 
of  moral  agents,  we  diftinguifh  the  moral  and  the 
proximate  caufe  thereof.  And  it  becomes  a  queftion, 
what  fhare  of  commendation  or  repreheniibility  per- 
tains to  the  one  and  the  other  ?  for  if  things  of  an  in- 
animate nature  or  brutes  ferve  as  means  to  effect  per- 
nicious defigns  of  others,  no  refponfibility  can  be  ex- 
pected on  their  part ;  the  whole  blame  muft  fail  upon 
l  the  principal  or  moral  caufe  of  the  action  produced. 
But  it  is  a  very  different  cafe,  where  a  moral  agent, 
refponfible  for  his  conduct,  prefents  himfelf,  or  fufFers 
himfelf  to  be  made  an  inftrument  for  doing  actions 
deiigned  by  another :  in  a  good  action  he  muft  have 
merit,  in  a  bad  one  he  is  reprehensible,  as  in  both  cafes 
the  actions  are  referrable  to  his  will.  He,  therefore, 
except  under  compulfiony  will  be  anfwerable  for  the  con- 
fequences,  and  the  action,  with  refpect  to  him,  will 
have  certain  degrees  of  morality  or  immorality. 

Mediate  actions  have  a  lefs  degree  of  morality  or  im- 
morality than  the  immediate.  Thefe  are  done  without 
any  reftraint,  from  internal  motives,  confequently  with 
a  greater  degree  of  fpontaneity  and  contingency  *,  the 
former  are  done  by  external  motives,  which  caufe  a 
certain  degree  of  reftraint,  therefore  with  lefs  fponta- 
neity and  contingency. 

The  moral  caufe  acts  with  a  higher  degree  of  mora- 
lity or  immorality  than  the  proximate  -,  for,  with  re- 
fpect to  him,  mediate  actions  muft  be  confidered  as 

immediate. 

Sch,  i. — Here  the  axiom  holds  good,  what  one  caufes  to  be 
done  by  another  he  does  himfelf. 

Sch.  2. — We  may  bcome  a  moral  caufe  in  actions  done  or 
omitted  by  others,  in  different  refpects  and  degrees ;  for 
inftance,  by  command,   advice,   confent,  approbation, 

connivance., 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  $$ 

connivance,  participation,  by  concealing,  not  hindering, 
not  revealing,  &c. 

i*ch.  3. — Thus  we  may  become  the  moral  caufe  in  actions  ef- 
fected by  things  of  an  inanimate  nature,  not  only  when 
we  deiign  the  effect,  as  by  laying  traps,  fixing  guns,  &c. 
but  likewife  when  we  leave  them  in  a  condition  that  is 
obvioufly  dangerous;  for  indance,  leaving  fire-arms  care- 
lefsly  in  the  reach  of  children,  letting  a  ruined  wall  itand, 
&c.  The  fame  is  the  cafe  with  brutes ;  we  mav  drefs 
them,  or  fet  them  on  to  do  harm,  or  let  them  run  loofe, 
though  we  know  that  they  are  mifchievous. 

Sch.  4. — A  perfon  may  be  confidered  as  the  moral  caufe  of  an 
a<ftion  in  general,  but  not  of  every  particular  thereof:  for 
inftance,  one  ordered  or  ad'vifed  to  beat  another,  may 
proceed  too  far,  break  limbs,  or  deftroy  life.  In  fuch 
cafes  the  moral  caufe  of  the  a&ion  cannot  be  refponfible 
for  outrages  committed  by  the  proximate;  it  is  the  latter 
that  muff,  be  confidered  as  the  moral  caufe  of  ail  that  is 
done  by  excefs. 

Sch.  5. — There  are  cafes  which  require  undefined,  unlimited 
power;  as,  the  conducting  fleets  and  armies.  Here  the 
principal  caufe  of  a  war  mud  be  confidered  as  the  moral 
caufe  of  all  that  is  done  in  confequence  thereof.  The  in- 
human mariner  or  foldier  is  far  from  being  excufable  in 
any  act  of  oppreffion  and  injudice:  commanders  deferve 
the  highelt  punifhment,  and  the  execration  of  mankind, 
for  having  made  an  improper  ufe  of  the  powers  intruded 
to  them.  But,  as  all  the  glory  of  what  fleets  and  armies 
have  accompliflied  is  humbly  attributed  to  the  wifdom, 
the  unconquerable  power  and  greatnefs  of  the  govern- 
ment, which  has  laid  their  foundation  by  indituting  and 
planning  the  operations  of  a  war;  fo  certainly  all  outra- 
ges, all  acts  of  cruelty,  oppreffion  and  injudice,  done  on 
the  watery  element  or  in  the  different  quarters  of  the 
globe,  mud  and  will  be  brought  to  the  account  of  the 
principal  author  of  that  war;  he  is  the  principal,  the 
moral  caufe  of  all !  Is  the  glory  of  a  conqueror,  there- 
fore, an  object  of  envy  ?  or  can  acts  of  injuflice  condi- 
tute  true  glory  ? 

Actions  done  or  omitted  under  colliMon,  are  not  as 
high  in  morality  or  immorality  as  thofe  in  which  no 

collifion 


S6  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

coilifion  has  taken  place;  for  in  the  former  there  is  lefs 
fpontaneity  and  contingency. 

An  act  of  the  will,  referred  to  a  contemplated  effect, 
is  called  irtfffition ;  the  effect  contemplated  is  ftiledan 
end. 

Ends  are  diftinguimed  into  primary  and  fecondary : 
for  the  former  an  agent  would  have  acted  independent 
of  any  other  effect  •,  for  the  latter  he  would  not  have 
acted  at  all,  if  it  had  not  been  blended  with  another 
more  deiirable  object.  In  this  cafe,  our  intention  with 
refpect  to  the  chief  end  is  called  indirett^  in  the  former 
it  is  direct. 

Sch.  i. — The  primary  end  of  war  is  to  enjoy  peace,  to  be  free 
from  the  infults  and  vexations  of  a  reftlefs  nation:  repre- 
fentations  and  negociations,  conducted  with  moderation, 
prudence  and  juftice,  witnefs  the  direct  intention  of  thefe 
proceedings;  their  end  is  to  prevent  war  and  to  eftablifh 
peace:  but  fuppofe  armies  to  be  raifed,  magazines  to  be 
laid  up,  &c.  for  the  fame  end,  the  intention  may  be  the 
fame,  but  it  is  indirect:  even  war  may  be  declared,  bat- 
tles fought,  towns  facked,  blood  fpilt,  for  obtaining  an 
end  which  by  gentle  means  was  not  attainable.  Should 
we  fuppofe  a  nation  fo  cruel  as  to  make  deltruction, 
plunder  and  bloodihed  their  principal  object?  fhould  we 
derive  all  thefe  calamities  from  direct  intention?  No,  if 
there  is  yet  a  fenfe  of  honefty,  juitice  or  humanity,  thefe 
things  would  not  take  place  had  they  been  avoidable:  in 
all  thefe  proceedings  the  intention  is  indirect;  it  is  to 
compel  an  enemy  to  terms  of  a  lafting  peace. 

■Sch.  2. — Confequences  not  intended,  which  may  flow  from 
our  intentional  actions,  as  well  as  thofe  which  were  in- 
tended, are  faid  to  be  admitted.  Thus  the  deltruction  of 
lives,  of  property,  and  the  dreadful  catalogue  of  the  moll 
horrid  tranfactions  during  a  long  and  bloody  war,  are  faid 
not  to  be  intended,  but  admitted. 

All  intentional  actions,  both  direct  and  indirect,  are 
of  a  very  high  morality  or  immorality ;  for  they  are 

acts 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  $J 

acts  of  the  will — actions  complicated,  which  prefuppole 
a  high  degree  of  fpontaneity  and  knowledge  in  the 
agent. 

From  this  very  caufe  it  is  evident,  that  actions  done 
or  omitted  by  direct  intention  are  very  confidcrably 
higher  in  morality  or  immorality  than  thofe  which 
proceed  from  indirect  intention. 

Sc/i.  i. — The  deftru&ion  of  a  city  or  buildings  confequent 
upon  direct  intention,  is  the  height  of  cruelty  and  inhu- 
manity, caufing  our  deteftation ;  if  the  ftrength  of  a 
place,  the  vigorous  refinance  of  a  garrifon,  renders  it 
unavoidable,  it  caufes  pity  and  regret. 

Sc/i.  i. — Admiflions  have  generally  reference  to  the  unfavour- 
able confequences  of  intentional  actions:  according  to 
the  definition  given  of  them,  we  have  followed  the  au- 
thority of  fome  authors  rather  than  our  own  judgment. 
Names  and  terms  may  ferve  to  palliate  the  outrages  and 
horrid  calamities  infeparable  from  the  complicated  opera- 
tions of  war;  but  the  natural  and  infeparable  connection 
which  they  have  with  the  intention  of  the  author  or  au- 
thors of  war,  and  their  horrid  effecls,  will  eafily  difcover 
to  the  unprejudiced  mind  their  high  immorality.  Let 
the  man  who  fets  ftates  and  nations  at  variance,  feel  the 
whole  weight  of  his  guilt ;  let  him  have  no  excufe  before 
his  confcience  and  the  world,  that  inhumanity,  blood- 
fhed,  conflagration,  &c.  are  things  admitted  only,  things 
not  intended,  confequently  not  imputable.  No,  if  un- 
intended confequences  may  as  well  flow  from  onr  actions 
as  thofe  which  are  intended,  they  certainly  ought  to  be 
taken  into  confideration  before  we  determine  upon  an 
end ;  they  confequently,  confidered  or  not  confide  red, 
come  within  the  compafs  of  at  lealt  indirect  intention, 
and  as  intentional  acts,  actions  of  the  moft  direful  effects, 
muit  have  a  hi^h  degree  of  immorality. 

Sc/i.  3. — We  might  retain  the  term  admiilion,  to  denote  un- 
forefeen  confequences  happening  by  accident;  for  in-, 
fiance,  the  accidental  blowing  up  of  a  powder-magazine, 
and  the  death  of  many  perfons  occafioned  thereby. 

There 


88  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

There  is  an  inconceivable  variety  of  aclions  by 
which  ends  may  be  attained  -,  fuch  are  called  means. 
Affiduity  in  performing  aclions,  by  which  a  mean  may 
be  obtained,  is  called  diligence ',  a  mod  excellent  and 
neceflary  virtue  •,  the  contrary  is  negligence,  a  moft  def- 
picable  and  pernicious  vice. 

Sch.  i. — If  affiduity  in  anions  intended  and  calculated  for  the 
attainment  cf  ends,  which  are  objects  of  laws  and  our 
moral  obligations,  conftitutes  diligence;  we  may  fee  the 
dangerous  and  deformed  nature  of  idlenefs,  which  keeps 
mankind  bufied  in  things  which  anfwer  no  beneficial  or 
falutary  end. 

Sch.  z. — Idlenefs  ought  to  be  well  diftinguifhed  from  amufe- 
ments,  which  are  indulged  with  an  intention  to  afford  a 
certain  relaxation  to  the  mind,  that  it  may  be  thereby  re- 
frefhed  and  invigorated  to  purfue  the  ends  of  our  calling 
with  more  readinefs  and  with  greater  effect. 

Sch.  3. — Amufements  which  fpring  from  another  intention, 
and  are  not  calculated  or  ufed  for  that  purpofe,  are  temp- 
tations to  idlenefs,  nurferies  of  vice,  the  enemies  of  vir- 
tue; they  rob  us  of  the  molt  precious  gift  of  nature,  they 
rob  us  of  our  time. 

That  act  of  the  will  by  which  we  determine  the  ex- 
ecution of  an  action,  is  called  purpofe-,  purpofe  re- 
ferred to  the  end  propofed  is  ftiled  defign, 

Sch. — Actions,  with  refpect  to  purpofe,  may  have  a  moft 
amiable  afpe<ft;  but  referred  to  the  defign,  they  may  be 
of  the  greateft  criminality  and  deformity.  We  may  be 
affiduous  in  profeffions  and  external  acts  of  friehdfhip, 
give  entertainments,  &c.  the  defign  may  be  fordid  felf- 
intereft;  or  all  thefe  endeavours  may  be  ufed  in  order  to 
make  us  an  accomplice  in  an  act  of  treafon,  to  prevail 
with  us  to  betray  the  fecrets  of  our  cabinet;  or  the  defign 
may  be  againft  the  virtue  of  a  perfon. 

Actions  of  purpofe  and  defign  muft  be  of  high 
morality  or  immorality  •,  they  are  complicated  actions, 
which  prefuppofc  a  high  degree  of  knowledge  and  of 

fpontaniety, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  89 

fpontaniety,  and  have  a  place  among  the  moft  ftudied 

and  refined  intentional  actions. 

Sch. — As  we  are  bound  to  obey  the  law  of  nature,  it  follows 
that  we  are  alfo  bound  to  make  ufe  of  all  the  means  in 
our  power  in  order  to  qualify  oiirfelves  for  that  obedi- 
ence; in  all  our  .anions,  therefore,  it  ought  to  be  our 
invariable  purpofe  and  defign  to  obey  the  natural  laws, 
to  obey  our  God..  This  will  be  a  fhield  againft  the  in- 
numerable temptations  of  flattery,  fycophancy,  hypo- 
crify,  &c.  fo  prevalent  among  the  children  of  men. 

Moral  Rectitude  is  the  agreement  of  our  actions 

with  the  laws   of  truth  and  morality ;  for  our  moral 

actions  depend  upon  the  understanding  and  will ;  they 

confequently  are  right,   if  the  acts  of   both  under- 

ftanding  and  v/ill  are  right.     This  will  be  the  cafe  if 

the  former  agree  with  the  laws  of  truth,  the  latter 

with  the  laws  of  morality. 

Sch. — We  have  not  then  in  vain  beftowed  our  attention  upon 
the  principles  hitherto  explained;  for,  as  they  are  the 
eternal  and  unchangeable  laws  of  truth  and  morality, 
they  muft  be  confidered  as  the  bails  and  the  infallible  cri- 
terion of  rectitude  in  the  conduct  of  men. 

Fault  is  the  general  term  whereby  we  defignate  a 
defect  of  rectitude.  Such  a  defect  may  proceed  from 
an  act  of  the  underftanding  or  the  will. 

A  fault  that  takes  rife  from  a  defect  of  the  under  - 
{landing  renders  the  agent  culpable  -,  that  which  pro- 
ceeds from  a  defect  in  the  will  is  an  act  of  malice. 

A  knowledge  of  the  nature,  effects,  and  other  con- 
fequences  of  actions,  may  or  may  not  be  in  our  power : 
in  the  former  cafe  ignorance  is  vincible^  in  the  latter 
invincible. 

Faulty  actions  proceeding  from  invincible  ignorance 
c:«.r  not  be  culpable,,  much  lefs  malicious. 

N  Culpable 


§0  MOP.AL  PHILOSOPH#. 

Culpable  actions  proceed  from  vincible  ignorance, 
where  either  no  idea  is  formed  of  the  action,  or  where 
the  ideas  are  wrong. 

We  may  act  culpably  from  inattention,  improviden- 
cy,  precipitancy,  or  carelelTnefs ;  actions,  therefore, 
may  be  more  or  lefs  culpable. 

SJi.  i. — We  are  guilty  pf  inattention,  if  we  do  not  Sufficiently 
corifider  the  action  in  general ;  we  act  improvzdently,  if  wi 
proceed  to  action  without  confidering  the  confequences; 
we  are  charged  with  precipitancy,  when  we  take  no  time 
for  reflecting  on  the  proper  mode  and  manner  of  con-' 
dueling  actions  or  for  confidering  their  confequences. 
The  carehfs  act  without  any  consideration  at  all. 

Sch.  i. — In  culpable  actions,  therefore,  the  agent  omits  what 
is  necellary  for  obtaining  a  Salutary  end  :  hence  we  may 
draw  the  conclufion,  that  all  culpable  actions  proceed 
from  negligence. 

Malicious  actions  are  wilful,  for  they  proceed  from 
defect  in  acts  of  the  will. 

In  malicious  actions  the  agent  acts  both  wittingly 
and  willingly,  as  the  phrafe  is ;  for  the  faults  of  the 
will  have  their  origin  in  the  understanding. 

M-ilicious  actions  are  therefore  of  higher  immorality 
than  the  culpable,  for  they  are  acts  of  purpofe  and 
defign  j  their  effect  is  bad  by  intention,  and  their  ma- 
lignity is  internal. 

Whenever  actions  are  fo  conducted  that  their  out- 
ward complexion  is  contradictory  to  the  internal  acts  of 
the  mind,  we  are  laid  to  dijfemble. 

Acts  of  dirTembling  may  be  intended  for  good  and 
allowable  ends,  and  are  in  fome  cafes  necefiary ;  as^ 
feints  2.vAftraiagems.  But  as  many  acts  of  malice  are 
perpetrated  under  the  cloak  of  honefty,  of  friendship, 
&c.  it  follows,  that  nothing  fhort  of  abfolute  necemty 

ean 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


91 


can  juftify  difTembling  even  for  juftifiable  purpofes: 
we  betray  in  a  manner  the  facred  caufe  of  virtue,  if  we 
are  the  means  of  putting  it  under  any  kind  of  fufpicion : 
the  man  truly  virtuous  will  avoid  even  the  appearance 
of  evil. 

SeL- — -Allowing  that  feints  and  ftratagems  of  particular  kinds, 
and  to  certain  extent,  may  confift  with  the  principlec  of 
rectitude,  we  mult  obferve,  that  there  are  feldom  filia- 
tions in  life  which  can  equally  juftify  acts  of  awembling. 
From  an  enemy  we  expect  nothing  but  acts  and  defigns 
of  hoftility ;  as  we  may  place  no  confidence  in  him,  he 
cannot  betray  it.  We  may  therefore  draw  this  conclu- 
fion,  that  acts  of  difTembling  are  not  of  an  innocent,  but 
of  a  malignant  nature,  whereby  confidence,  for  which 
we  have  given  occafton,  is  difappointed  and  betrayed. 

An  act  of  difiimulation,  with  defign  to  betray  confi- 
dence, ftill  heightens  the  wickednefs  of  a  malicious 
action  -,  for  there  is  a  new*  determination  of  the  will, 
confequently  more  motives,  more  knowledge,  befides 
the  more  pernicious  effect  and  the  greater  danger  to 
which  it  expofes.  An  act  fo  conducted  may  be  called 
an  act  of  clandeftine  malice. 

Sell. — There  is  a  great  difference  between  murder  and  a flaffi na- 
tion ;  between  the  taking  away  one's  life  by  a  weapon  or 
by  poifon,  &c. 

There  is  alfo  a  difference  between  the  open  attack  upon  a 
perfon's  reputation,  and  the  clandeftine  aljaffin'ation  oi 
his  character. 

The  action  wittingly  and  willingly  done  contrary  to 
law  and  to  obligation,  is  of  dire '£t  malt 'cioufnefs:  there 
is  a  poflibility  for  an  action  which  has  been  done  cul- 
pably to  become  malicious,  by  approving  and  juftify- 
\\\<g  it,  and  glorying  in  its  effects.  Such  actions  we 
.call  acts  of  indireel  malice. 

Sch. — We  may  inadvertently  hurt  a  perfon,  and  fignify  our 
regret;  or  we  mav  rejoice  and  fhew  deirghfc  in  the  eff<   . 

Hi 


£2  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  the  former  cafe  the  action  at  raofl  renders  the  agent 
culpable;  but  in  the  latter  he  ftamps  his  will  and  appro- 
bation upon  it,  after  which  the  action  becomes  wilful  and 
malicious. 

By  fortune  and.  misfortune  we  underftand  an  unfore- 
ictn  concurrence  of  caufes,  which  have  a  favourable  or 
an  unfavourable  influence  on  our  happinefs. 

By  accidents  we  underftand  the  effects  of  unforefeen 

cauies. 

Fortune  and  misfortune,  and  accidents,  do  not  admit 

of  any  degree  of  morality  or  immorality,  for  ignorance 

in  fuch  cafes  is  invincible. 

Sen. — What  a  great  abufe  is  made  of  the  terms  misfortune  and 
accidents?  How  often  mult,  they  unmerited  ftand  for  the 
natural  effects  of  want  of  rectitude?  The  natural  confe- 
quences  of  folly,  inattention,  improvidency,  precipitancy, 
careleflhefs  and  wickednefs  make  up  the  greatefl  part  of 
accidents  and  misfortunes !  Comparatively  few  houfes  are 
deftroyed  by  lightning;  and  is  it  not  the  cafe  with  refpeft 
to  other  things,  as  poverty,  captivity,  &c.  ? 


CHAPTER  V. 

Of  moral  imputation. 

c 

OlNCE  actions  admit  of  various  degrees  of  morality 
and  immorality,  according  to  the  mode  and  manner  in 
which  they  are  done  or  omitted,  as  well  as  in  confe- 
quence  of  their  effects  and  the  intention  of  the  agent, 
it  follows,  that  it  is  impoflible  for  us  to  form  a  judge- 
ment of  the  proper  fhare  of  merit  or  demerit  of  parti- 
cular actions,  unlefs  they  are  reprefented  or  con/idered 
tinder  their  individual  circumftanccs, 

Actions 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  93 

Actions  coniidered  under  individual  circunjfianees 
are  called  faffs  or  cafes. 

The  moft  principal  circumftances  of  facts  are  their 
ciFecls  and  the  intention  of  the  agent,  for  to  them  all 
others  have  reference. 

Sch.  i. — The  firft  cafe  of  fratricide  is  thus  recorded:  Cain  rofe 
tip  againji  Abel  his  brother,  and  flew  him.  If  we  attend  to 
the  effect,  we  fliall  fee  that  it  was  an  aft  of  violence;  he 
rofe  and  Jlezo  him ,  not  accidentally,  not  in  a  fudden  phrenzy 
of  the  mind,  but  deliberately,  intentionally  and  maliciouf- 
ly.  Cain  ivas  wroth,  and  his  countenance  fell;  not  that  Abel 
gave  him  caufe,  or  provoked  his  anger;  no,  Abel's  inno- 
cence, his  virtue  was  the  caufe;  it  was,  that  the  Lord 
had  rather  refpect  to  his  than  to  the  murderer's  facrifice. 
What  an  aggravating  circumftance!  they  were  brethren, 
the  firft  of  brethren  ! 

Sch.  2. — Seeing  an  indifcriminate  concourfe  of  people,  our 
firft  enquiry  is  concerning  what  has  happened.  Being 
told  that  a  man  has  drowned,  we  not  only  enquire  who 
he  is,  when  the  event  took  place,  when  and  where  the 
body  was  found;  but  principally  whether  the  fact  has 
taken  place  from  his  or  another's  intention,  or  whether  it 
is  an  accident. 

If  we  give  a  detail  of  the  circumftances  of  a  fact, 

we  are  faid  to  give  a  fiats  thereof. 

Sch.  i. — In  ftating  a  cafe,  every  circumftance,  great  or  final!, 
even  the  pofture,  countenance,  and  expreilions  of  the 
agent,  if  any  were  made,  the  occasion,  origin,  progrefs, 
manner,  mode  and  time,  &c.  of  the  action,  ought  to  be 
moft  carefully  particularifed,  that  thereby  the  intention 
of  the  agent  may  be  made  fully  to  appear:  for  the  leaft  of 
thefe  circumftances  omitted  or  mifreprefented  may  give 
the  fact,  particularly  the  intention  of  the  agent,  a  different, 
perhaps  a  moft  unmerited  complexion;  and  our  judgment 
formed  upon  fuch  an  imperfect  or  mifreprefented  ftate 
of  the  fact,  may  be  erroneous  and  highly  unjuft. 

Sch.  2. — Such  imperfect  and  miftaken  ftatement  of  a  fact:  has 
obtained  the  name  of  error  of  fad ;  and  when  a  declaration 
is  made  that  fuch  an  error  has  taken  place,  it  is  called  an 
exception  to  the  f aft. 

Sch, 


94-  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sfk,  3. — Witnefles  in  judicial  proceedings  ought  to  be  ex- 
tremely careful  to  teftify  concerning  all  circumftances  of 
which  they  have  any  knowledge,  jufl  in  fuch  a  manner 
as  they  know  them,  left  they  render  themfelves  refponii- 
b!e  lor  acts  of  opprefiion  and  injufiice,  as  moral  or  prox- 
imate caufes  of  them. 

Sch.  4. — Falfe  reprefentations  of  facts  mult  be  confidered  as 
the  principal  fources  of  the  innumerable  acts  of  detrac- 
tion, calumny  and  (lander,  fodeftructive  to  the  peace  and 
harmony  of  focial  intercourfe.  How  careful  fhould  we 
be  neither  to  originate  nor  to  propagate  rnifreprefentations 
of  this  kind,  or  to  form  a  judgment  thereon  to  the  injury 
and  detriment  of  our  neighbour! 

A  fact  is  faid  to  be  imputed^  if  a  declaration  is  made 
that  it  is  referable  to  the  Spontaneity  or  will  of  a  certain 
agent.  As  referring  actions  to  the  will  of  a  perfon  is 
declaring  him  the  author  thereof,  we  may  define  impu- 
tation of  f aft  to  be  the  declaration  that  a  certain  perfon 
is  its  author. 

Not  only  actions,  but  alfo  their  confequences,  that 
is,  their  merit  or  demerit,  may  be  referred  to  the  will 
of  their  author.  A  declaration  that  certain  merits  be- 
long to  a  fact,  is  imputation  of  law ;  becaufe  it  is  the 
peculiar  province  of  laws  to  determine  the  merits  or 
demerits,  the  rewards  or  punifhments  due  to  actions 
which  come  under  their  cognizance. 

Sch. — Imputation  of  law,  whether  in  judicial  proceedings  or 
in  common  converfation,  fhould  therefore  be  according 
to  the  directions  of  laws  and  confident  with  the  degrees 
of  morality  or  immorality  of  facts,  other  wife  an  error  of 
law  will  be  committed.  A  declaration  that  fuch  an  error 
has  taken  place  is  filled  exception  to  the  law. 

Moral  imputation  comprehends  both  imputation  of 
fact  and  of  law,  and  may  be  defined  a  declaration  that 
a  certain  fact  and  its  confequences  are  referable  to  a 
certain  perfon  as  the  author  thereof. 

J6A. 


Moral  philosophy,  95 

Sch.  1. — In  moral  imputation,  therefore,  it  is  not  fo  much  the 
quefrion,  whether  actions  have  been  done  or  omitted,  but 
principally  whether  they  proceed  from  the  intention  of  a 
certain  agent. 

5V//.  2. — Hence  it  appears,  that  no  facts  can  be  imputed  to 
perfons  who  cannot  exercife  underftanding,  reafon  and 
judgment;  for  they  cannot  exercife  will,  nor  act  from 
intention. 

Sch.  3. — Neither  can  any  other  but  moral  actions  be  imputed, 
for  they  only  depend  upon  the  will  or  intention  of  agents'. 

Sch.  4. — Natural  actions  cannot  be  imputed  farther  than  they 
admit  of  fpontarieity  ;  that  is,  only  with  refpect  to  time, 
place,  mode  and  manner. 

Actions  referable  to  the  will  of  an  agent  will  be 

imputable  as  far  as  that  will  is  free. 

Sch.  1. — Actions  done  or  omitted  under  compulsion  cannot  be 
imputed  to  the  immediate  agent  thereof,  but  mult  be 
wholly  charged  to  the  moral  caufe  of  that  compulsion. 

Sch.  1. — Actions  done  "by  inftruirrental  caufes,  are  imputable 
to  thofe  who  are  the  principal  caufes  thereof. 

Sch.  3. — Actions  done  by  a  proximate  caufe  are  imputable  both 
to  the  proximate  and  to  the  moral  caufe. 

Sch.  4. — Actions  done  by  brutes,  by  infant  children,  by  luna- 
tics and  madmen,  may  be  imputable  to  moral  caufes,  as 
far  as  they  are  referable  to  their  will ;  for  inftance,  if  we 
know  their  milchievous  nature,  and  do  not  our  belt  to 
keep  them  from  doing  harm. 

As  actions,  with  refpect  to  the  degrees  of  liberty, 

have  likewife  their  degrees  of  morality  or  immorality, 

We  may  conclude,  that  imputability  of  actions  will  be  in 

proportion  to  their  degrees  of  morality  and  immorality ; 

for  both  have  their  foundation  in  certain  degrees  of  will 

and  intention. 

Sch. — If  we  value  a  good  confeience,  and  wifh  the  happinefs 
of  preferving  it  pure  and  undented,  we  mufr.  in  all  our 
conduct  pay  the  ftri<tefr  attention  to  the  laws  of  morality, 
as  they  are  the  rule  and  ftandard  of  imputation. 

From 


96  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY* 

From  the  preceding  proportion  it  follows,  that  we 
may  diftinguifh  fads  in  perfect  fimilarity  to  the  diftinc- 
tions  obferved  in  moral  adions,  and  aflign  their  pro- 
portionate degrees  of  imputability  in  the  following 
manner: — 

Voluntary  fads  will  be  mofe  imputable  than  the 
involuntary,  the  immediate  more  than  the  mediate,  the 
intentional  more  than  the  unintentional,  the  deliberate 
more  than  the  inconfiderate :  there  is  more  heinoufnefs 
and  guilt  in  an  unjuft  than  in  a  diihoneft  fad-,  and  a 
malicious  fad  is  more  criminal  than  a  culpable  one,  &c. 
Sck.  1. — As  fads  are  a  fpecies  of  moral  adions,  it  is  eafy  to  con- 
ceive, that  to  determine  the  imputability  of  the  former, 
we  have  only  to  attend  to  the  morality  or  immorality  of 
the  latter;  fubftituting  imputability   for  morality  or  im- 
morality, and  fad  for  adion. 

All  imputation,  whether  moral,  or  that  of  fad  or 
of  law,  is  conduded  in  the  way  of  fyllogiftic  argu- 
mentation. 

Sch.  1.— For  inflance:  imputation  of  fad  may  be  conceived  to 
proceed  in  this  form: 
To  whofe  will  the  exigence  or     He  who  malicioufly  has  killed 

non-exillence  of  the  fad  B  is         Clodius,  has  committed  mur- 

referable,   he  is  the  author         der. 

thereof. 
It  is  to  the  will  of  A  that  the     Milo  has  malicioufly  killed  Clo- 

fad  B  is  referable;  therefore         dins;  therefore  Milo  is  guilty 

A  is  the  author  of  fad  B.  of  murder. 

$c±  2. — Imputation  of  law  is  by  this  fyllogifm : 
Whatever  fad  is  of  fuch  a  par-     Murder  deferves  capital  punifh- 

ticular  nature,  to  it  belongs  meat; 

fuch  rewards  or  punifhments. 
But  the  fad  B  is  of  that  particu-     The  death  of  Clodius  is  murder; 

lar  nature; 
Therefore  to  the  fad  B  belongs     Therefore  the  death  of  Clodius 

fuch  rewards  or  punifhments.         calls  for  capital  punifhment. 

Sck. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  97 

ScL  3. — Moral  imputation  comprehends  both  imputation  of 
fact  and  law,  and  is  in  this  form: 
Whoever  is  the  author  of  foci     Whoever   has  committed   the 
M,  to  him  belongs   the  pu-         murder  of  Clodius,   he  is  to 
nifhment  D  1  be  punifhed  with  death. 

Milo  is  the  author  of  faft  M;       Milo  has  committed  the  mur- 
der of  Ciodius; 

Therefore    Milo  deferves  the     Therefore  Milo  rnuft  be  du- 

i. 

punilliment  D.  mlhed  with  death. 

Imputation  may  be  true,  falfe  or  dubious :  for  fyllo- 
giftic  argumentation  may  be  one  or  the  other,  or  it 
may  depend  upon  premifes,  from  which  only  a  pro- 
bable conclufion  may  flow. 

If  the  fact  be  not  true  or  certain,  imputation  cannot 
be  the  one  or  the  other  -,  for  if  one  of  the  premifes  be 
destitute  of  the  criterions  of  truth  and  certainty,  the 
conclufion  muft  be  defective  accordingly. 

ScL  1. — -Suppofe  a  trinket  be  miffing,  and  no  perfon  known 
to  have  been  in  the  room  in  which  it  was  kept  but  a  fer- 
vant  of  the  houfe,  is  it  not  probable  that  the  fervant  has 
taken  it  away?  An  imputation  upon  thefe  probable  cir- 
cumftances  is  dubious,  for  the  trinket  may  be  miflaid  or 
taken  away  by  another. 

ScL  2. — Imputation  may  be  in  a  high  degree  probable,  and 
come  near  to  certainty  itlelf,  itill  it  is  dubious  and  may 
be  falfe,  for  the  greatest,  probability  may  be  fo.  Add  to 
the  former  inftance,  that  the  fervant  is  wavering  in  hi'j 
apology,  that  the  article  is  found  in  a  pocket  of  his  coat 
in  the  room  allotted  to  him ;  ftill  another  perfon  may  have 
put  it  there;  or  if  not  thus  found  among  his  things,  the 
mailer  of  the  houfe,  who  never  concerned  himfelf  with 
things  of  this  kind,  may  have  lent  it  to  a  neighbour. 

ScL  3. — Suppofe  the  fervant  ConfefTes  the  fact,  tells  where  the 
trinket  is;  or  if  witnefies  have  feen  him  take,  or  fell,  or 
hide  it  away;  the  imputation  will  be  certain. 

ScL  4. — Sufpicicm,  in  a  certain  fenfe  of  the  term,  has  reference 
to  probable  imputation  of  facts;,  when  it  becomes  a  pro- 

O  penfity 


£$  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

penfity  or  a  paflion  of  the  mind,  it  is  a  moft  difagreeable 
fouree  of  lafting  inquietude  to  the  heart  in  which  it 
dwells;  befides,  it  is  a  mortal  enemy  to  peace  and  harmo- 
ny, the  greateft  bleffings  of  families,  of  human,  inter- 
courfe,  and  all  focial  connections;  it  deftroys  character, 
wounds  reputation:  actions  the  moft  innocent  are  con- 
ftrued  into  evil  defigns:  it  traduces  the  caufe  of  truth,  of 
virtue,  of  God  and  man. 

Neither  is  imputation  true,  if  merits  or  demerits  are 

imputed  which  do  not  belong  or  are  difproportionate 

to  facts. 

«SV//.  i.— Human  legislators,  therefore,  ought  to  eftablifh  in  the 
fanctions  of  their  laws  proper  gradations  of  rewards  and 
punifhments,  adapted  to  the  refpective  degrees  of  morality 
or  immorality  in  actions ;  for  how  can  imputation  be 
true,  if  its  foundation  is  defective  or  falfe? 

Sch.  2. — In  forming  our  judgments  concerning  the  conduct  of 
men,  whether  they  are  our  fuperiors,  equals  or  inferiors, 
we  fhould  never  lofe  fight  of  this  necefTary  criterion  of 
true  imputation;  for  how  can  we  avoid  fcandalous  flat- 
tery, envy,  detraction,  infolence  and  feverity,  if  we  pay 
not  attention  to  the  rules  of  rectitude,  to  the  degrees  of 
morality  or  immorality  in  actions  ?  We  muft  make  a 
difference  between  riches,  power,  connections,  and  be- 
tween true  greatnefs  and  real  goodnefs.  We  muft  efteem 
men  by  their  virtue,  humanity,  prudence  and  induftry : 
not  by  appearances  nor  paflion,  not  by  the  prevalent  opi- 
nions of  mankind;  but  truth  muft  be  our  guide,  where 
juftice  and  a  good  conscience  are  the  object. 

Sck.  3. — If  an  innocent  man  fhould  fuffer  public  punifhment, 
and  the  guilty  be  rewarded,  would  it  not  be  deemed  an 
act  of  moft  horrid  cruelty  and  injuftice?  Can  we  there- 
fore be  innocent,  if  we  defpife  or  difefteem  a  good  man 
becaufe  he  is  poor,  has  no  connections,  no  great  expecta- 
tions; and  applaud  the  noify,  turbulent,  extravagant  and 
wicked  man,  becaufe  he  is  rich,  tec.} 

As  partiality  and  refpect  of  perfon  find  no  place 
before  God,  fo  they  mould  find  none  in  courts  of  juftice. 
It  wouid  be  a  great  happmefs  to  mankind  if  they  were 
entirelv  banifhed  from  fociety. 

He 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  *9J 

He  upon  whom  imputation  of  fact  depends  is  the 
accufer\  and  the  perfon  who  imputes  law  exercifes  the 
office  of  a  judge. 

No  accufation  can  be  juft  and  unexceptionable,  ex- 
cept the  fact  be  cognizable,  true  and  certain. 

*>V//.~ Information  is  a  kind  of  accufation. 

Falfe  accufation  may  be  culpable  or  malicious. 

Moral  imputation  cannot  be  juft  where  imputation 
of  fad  is  unfair  or  unjuft;  for  the  author  of  the  fact 
not  being  afcertained,  the  merits  or  demerits  of  actions 
cannot  be  referred  to  the  intention  of  an  agent. 

Neither  can  mora)  imputation  be  juft,  if  the  proper 
merits  and  dements  which  belong  to  facts,  and  their 
authors,  are  not  aflignefi. 

Sch.  i. — As  laws  are  to  determine  the  merits  and  demerits  of 
actions,  it  is  evident,  that  no  juft  imputations  can  be 
founded  thereon,  except  they  be  juft  and  wifely  inftituted. 

Sch.  2. — No  people  can  be  happy  without  a  wife  and  juft  ad- 
miniftration  of  laws. 

Hence  it  appears,  that  the  judge  muft  underftand 
and  be  able  to  interpret  laws;  that  he  muft  have  full 
and  fufficient  information  of  facts  -9  that  he  be  careful 
that  evidences  be  examined,  their  teftimonies  compared 
and  fcrutinized  according  to  the  necefTary  criteria  of 
truth,  otherwife  he  may  become  culpable:  if  any 
rhing  is  omitted  with  defign,  he  is  guilty  of  malicious 
partiality  and  injuftice. 

By  relative  equity  we  underftand  a  ftrict  obfervance 
of  the  various  circumftances  of  facts,  which  may  ferve 
ro  mitigate  or  aggravate  their  guilt,  or  to  determine  the 
degrees  of  commendation  in  actions  done  conformably 
ro  laws  •,  for  human  laws  cannot  provide  for  all  poflible 
cafes,  and  facts  of  the  fame  kind  may  afTume  different 

complexions 


100  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

complexions  under  different    circum fiances,    and    be 

more  or  lefs  referable  to  the  •   rention  of  the  agent. 

But  as  this  ought  to  be  the  principal  confideration  in 

imputation*  it  follows,  that  in  juft  imputation  relative 

equity  is  to  be  obferved. 

Sch. — On  this  account  the  laws  of  the  land  very  wifely  leave 
power  in  the  executive  part  of  the  government,  to  fuf- 
pend,  remit,  or  to  mitigate  punifhments  in  certain  cafes. 

Jufiice  is  another  requifite  in  imputation  *,  for,  as  by 

its  general  definition  it  is  a  habit  of  doing  juft  actions, 

there  cannot  be  a  better  place  for  its  exercife  than  where 

we  have  to  determine  merits  or  demerits  according  to 

the  eternal  laws  of  juftice  and  of  equity.     The  idea  of 

juftice  being  more  fpecifically  confined  to  perfect  laws 

defining  the  perfect  rights  of  men,  which  require  that 

we  give  every  one  his  due,  is  more  generally  known 

by  the  definition,  that  it  is  that  virtue  by  which  tvegive 

every  one  bis  due.     Thus  juftice  commands,  that  good 

men  be  rewarded  and  evil  doers  punifhed. 

Sch.  i. — Though  both  thefe  definitions  be  true,  and  the  latter 
molt  generally  adopted,  (till  it  muft  be  confefTed,  that  our 
ideas  of  that  virtue  are  fucli  that  we  cannot  fee  its  Ioveli- 
nefs  and  the  benignity  of  its  nature  fo  eafily  as  we  do  of 
other  virtues,  which  in  God  are  infinite  and  unfpotted  at- 
tributes of  his  efTence,  and  in  man  the  higheft  degree  of 
excellency  and  perfection.  Juftice,  with  refpect  to  our 
fenfibility,  has  the  appearance  of  feverity,  nay,  is  often 
taken  by  mankind  for  feverity  itfelf.  Hence  it  is,  that 
tender  minds  cannot  reconcile  infinite  inflexible  juftice  in 
God  with  his  infinite  love  and  mercy.  But  there  is  no 
fuch  unfriendly  ingredient  in  divine  juftice,  nor  in  juftice: 
that  is  to  be  adminiftered  by  men.  The  confeioufnefs  of 
our  guilt  before  God  muft  be  aftigneu  as  one  of  the  caufes 
of  our  mifapprehenfions  with  refpeet  to  this  his  unfpotted 
and  infinite  attribute;  and  the  frequent  examples  of  feve- 
rity which  we  fee  in  the  exercife  of  juftice  by  human  au- 
thority, are  another  caufe  why  wc  are  very  apt  to  form 
unfriendly  conceptions  of  its  nature. 

9c&. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  10  I 

Sr/;.  2. — It  is  on  this  Account  that  we  feel  a  predilection  for 
the  definition  which  feme  writers  have  given  of  juilice, 
calling  it  kindnefs  admini/Iard  according  to  the  laiv  of wifdom. 
This  definition  fully  anfwers  the  idea  of  juflice,  and  is 
very  well  calculated  to  remove  fa  He  imprdiions  from  our 
minds,  and  to  obviate  every  unfavourable  conftruclion. 
It  leads  us  immediately  into  a  fenfe,  as  it  were,  of  the  be- 
nign nature  of  divine  juflice,  and  the  necefTary  and  bene- 
ficial influence  of  this  virtue  on  the  general  happinefs  of 
mankind.  It  is  fo  far  from  feverity,  that  it  is  kindnefs 
itfelf. 

Sch.  3. — Kindnefs,  a  promptitude  to  render  others  happy,  being 
in  God  the  natural  effecf  of  his  infinite  love  to  his  crea- 
tures, is  the  eflential  and  invariable  fcope  of  all  that  comes 
under  the  direction  of  human  laws;  for  they  have  for 
their  end  the  general  felicity  of  fociety.  To  whom 
fliould  we  look  for  benignity,  for  kindnefs,  but  to  God, 
who  is  love  itfelf,  and  to  thofe,  fathers  of  their  country 
who  fnould  in  all  their  purfuits  have  for  their  principal 
aim  the  happinefs  of  mankind  ?  Is  it  a  wonder,  there- 
fore, that  juflice  is  a  property,  an  attribute  of  the  divine 
eflence,  and  its  adminiftration  a  particular  prerogative  of 
governments  among  men? 

Sch.  4. — But  have  we  not  to  look  for  that  benignity  in  perfecf. 
agreement  with  wifdom?  As  by  zeifdem  we  underftand 
that  fcience  which  teaches  tne  beft  ends,  by  the  proper 
nfe  of  the  heft  means  for  the  attainment  thereof,  the  law 
of  wifdom  will  direcf  that  kindnefs  be  not  difpenfed 
'  indiscriminately  to  offenders  as  well  as  to  faithful  ob- 
fervers  of  law,  but  in  fuch  a  manner  that  thereby  the 
general  happinefs  of  mankind  may  be  obtained.  This 
cannot  take  place  where  the  laws  are  not  duly  obeyed  ; 
but  obedience  is  to  be  incited  by  rewards,  and  by  punifh- 
ments  inflicted  upon  the  difobedient.  Therefore,  true 
wifdom  in  God  and  in  all  governments  requires  that 
kindnefs  mould  be  extended  to  all  who  conduct:  them- 
felves  conformably  to  law,  and  be  withdrawn  from  thofe 
who  act  contrary  thereto. 

In  the  exercife  of  juftice,  therefore,  we  mav  not  confine 
our  confideration  to  the  punifhment  of  the  wicked,  who 
have  forfeited  all  claim  to  kindnefs,  but  mould  princi- 
pally attend  to  its  benign  inttueuce  on  xht  happinefs  of 

fociety 


102  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

focicty  in  general.  Juftice  requires  that  the  diforderiy 
and  wicked  experience  the  rigour  of  law;  and  that  the 
good  and  the  upright  may  enjoy  its  protection. 
Sch.  5. — Heft  there  ftill  remain  fomething  in  our  conceptions 
concerning  the  nature  of  juftice,  leaving  it  liable  to  un- 
favourable conftructions,  it  ought  to  be  confidered,  that 
this  is  a  necefTary  confequence  of  the  natural  imbecility 
of  human  adminiftrations  thereof;  for  from  this  our  ideas 
of  juftice  are  commonly  formed,  and  mult  be  imperfect, 
as  they  furnifh  but  feldom  examples  of  rewards,  whilft, 
on  the  contrary,  they  frequently  exhibit  puniftiments  to 
public  view.  Hence  it  is,  that  we  fee  juftice  but  qp  its 
dark  lide;  not  in  the  full  difplay  of  its  beauty  and  loveli- 
nefs,  but  in  its  pitiable  and  dreadfuKeffects  upon  the  dif- 
obedient  and  wicked  tranfgreffors  of  laws. 

We  may  add,  that  the  human  heart,  fo  very  apt  to  difregard 
bleffings  which  we  enjoy  every  day,  is  very  feldom  pro- 
perly affected  by  the  rewards  which  are  confequent  upon 
obedience  and  ftrict  obfervance  of  laws.  God  is  juft; 
and  the  day  will  come  when  no  labour,  no  pain,  no  fuf- 
fering,  no  endeavour  to  do  our  duty,  will  remain  unre- 
warded ;  and  even  now  his  bleffings  are  innumerable  upon 
his  children;  and  in  the  difpenfntions  of  his  providence 
we  often  fee  thofe  bleffings  withdrawn  from  nations,  nay, 
from  individual  perfons,  as  the  juft  confequences  of  their 
difobedience  and  vices,  and  the  particular  tokens  of  his 
difpleafure.  How  necefTary,  then,  that  we  form  our  ideas 
from  the  adminiftration  of  juftice  by  divine  providence, 
and  the  declarations  which  God  has  made  by  revelation, 
of  its  full  and  glorious  difplay  that  fliall  take  place  when 
he  will  judge  the  world  in  righteoufhefs ! 

And  are  we  not  guilty  of  inconfideration,  if  even  in  human, 
adminiftration  we  do  not  fee  the  rewards  which  are  a  na- 
tural confequence  of  obedience  and  a  faithful  obfervance 
of  laws  ?  Is  not  the  fccurity  of  our  life,  property  and 
rights,  which'  laws  afford  to  faithful  obfervers,  a  great, 
nay,  the  beft,  the  moft  valuable  of  all  rewards?  Is  not 
a  good  character,  and  the  favour  of  the  virtuous  and  up- 
right, a  great  and  delirable  good  ?  Add  inward  peace; 
and  tranquillity  of  mind,  the  effects  of  a  good  confcience, 
what  more  can  be  expected  that  the  world  can  give? 
The  reward  of  virtue  exceeds  the  wifdom  and  power  of 

men : 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  IO^ 

men:  it  is  the  prerogative  of  God.  Men,  as  they  cannot 
fee  what  is  in  man,  cannot  give  virtue  its  due  reward. 
Since  they  cannot  with  precition  djfcern  the  virtuous  and 
upright  man  from  the  deceitful  and  the  hypocrite,  would 
not  falfe  pretenders  run  away  with  the  rewards  of  virtue, 
and  virtuous  modefty  remain  neglected  ?  Suppofc  even 
that  the  inward  principles  and  fprings  of  actions  could 
be  known;  fuppofe  that  the  ftock  of  a  ftate  be  niexhaufti- 
ble  for  rewarding  every  aft  of  obedience  to  law ;  what  has 
the  world  befides  riches,  honours  and  preferments?  Can 
thefe  tilings  be  rewards  for  virtue,  which  may  be  acquired 
without  an  aft  of  our  own,  or  by  afts  of  fraud  and  mj-uf- 
tice,  and  pofTefTed  by  fools,  monfters  and  oppreflbrs  ? 
The  virtuous  man,  if  he  poffefies  them,  can  add  luftre  to 
them;  they  receive  defirablenefs  and  luftre  by  the  virtu- 
ous poffeflbr,  and  the  ufe  he  makes  of  them. 

As  long  as  men  of  doubtful  character  enjoy  riches,  fill  offi- 
ces, or  are  elevated  to  high  flat  ions,  fo  long  no  riches,  no 
honours,  no  preferments  can  in  themfelves  be  conudered 
as  rewards;  they  cannot  add  any  thing  to  the  internal 
beauty  and  excellency  of  virtue.  Virtue  is  its  own  re- 
ward in  this  life — an  inexhauftible  fource  of  bleffings  in- 
deed !  If  the  world  prefents  you  with  inftances  which 
feem  to  render  this  axiom  doubtful,  take  them  for  incon- 
trovertible arguments,  that  there  will  be  another  (late  of 
exiftence,  where  juftice  will  be  manifefted  in  its  full  glo- 
ry, and  every  virtuous  aft  of  this  life  will  receive  its  due 
reward.     God  isjuft,  infinitely  righteous ! 

The  fcope  of  the  exercife  of  juftice  is,  that  the  laws 
be  obeyed,  and  the  happinefs  of  mankind  promoted 
and  preferved.  Hence  it  is  that  it  is  faid  to  be  diftri- 
butive;  becaufe  it  diftributes  rewards  to  the  obedient 
and  punifhments  to  the  difobedient. 

Diftributive  juftice  is  therefore  diftinguilhed  into 
remunerative  and  punitive. 

Sch. — Some  call  punitive  juftice  vindiftive,  but  this  term  ap- 
pears to  us  to  be  rather  inconfiltent  with  the  general  na- 
ture of  the  juftice  of  God,  and  that  which  ought  to  be 
excrcifed  by  men.  How  can  revenge  be  confifttnt  with 
kindnefs  ? 

By 


104  MORAL  rHILOSQPHY. 

By  fentencc  we  underftand  the  refult  of  moral  impu- 
tation, declared  by  him  who  performs  the  office  of 
judge,  concerning  the  quantum  of  imputability  in  ac- 
tions, according  to  the  dc  frees  of  morality  or  immo- 
rality, and  the  lhare  of  reward  or  pummment  due  to 
a  certain  fact  and  its  author. 

Sentence  includes  a  favouiable  or  unfavourable  efti- 
mate  of  the  conduct  of  the  agent;  fuch  an  eftimate 
conftituting  honour  and  approbation,  or  blame  and 
difapprobation,it  follows,  that  honour  and  blame  muft 
beconfidered  in  fome  refpect  as  reward  or  punimment. 
Sentence  is  juft  when  it  refults  from  juft  imputation  * 
no  fentence,  therefore,  will  be  juft,  where  the  obfervers 
of  law  meet  not  due  honour,  and  the  difobedient 
marked  blame :  where  the  reverfe  takes  place,  it  is 
certainly  faife  and  highly  criminal. 

ScL  i. — How  careful,  therefore,  fnould  we  be  to  fet  up  for 
judges  over  the  conduct  of  our  brethren,  whether  they 
be  ourfuperiors,  equals  or  inferiors?  How  important  a 
talk  is  laid  upon  uf,  when  the  caufe  of  truth  and  huma- 
nity calls  us  to  the  performance  of  this  office,  as  there  is 
<*reat  danger  that  we  may  injure  both  that  very  caufe  and 
our  fellow  creature  ?  .  Nothing  is  of  a  more  delicate  na- 
ture than  character.  How  often,  like  him  Who  travelled 
from  Jerufalem  to  Jericho,  is  our  character  wounded  and 
laid  proftrate  ?  Flow  general  is  the  cafe,  that  not  only 
the  prieft  and  levite,  but  the  generality  of  mankind  pafs 
by  a  wounded  character?  and  how  ieldpm  is  a  Samaritan 
found  to  heal  or  to  relieve  it  ? 
Sc/i.  2. — But  how  much  more  important  is  this  confederation 
to  all  who  are  concerned  in  judicial  proceedings,  the 
accufer,  judge,  witneffes,  jurors,  &c.  where  there  is  dan- 
ger even  from  the  imbecility  of  human  nature,  that  the 
fa cred  caufe  of  juftice  may  be  betrayed  or  perverted! 
Beware  of  partiality,  whether  of  a  culpable  or  a  mali- 
cious nature.  May  fuch  proceedings  never  find  place  in 
courts  where  the  fword  of  juftice  is  uniheathed  to  exe- 
cute wrath  upon  evil  doers! 

W  here 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  10$ 

Where  fentence  is  cr'iven  according  to  certain  laws, 
there  is  a  forum,  a  tribunal.  Laws  may  be  human,  na- 
tural arid  divine  :  the  former  conftitute  the  human, 
thefe  the  natural  and  divine  forum,  which  likewife  is 
called  the  forum  of  confciencc. 

Sch. — To  the  human  forum  belong  only  thofe  actions  which, 
come  under  the  cognizance  of  the  laws  of  the  land;  the 
natural,  the  divine,  and  the  forum  of  confeience  extend 
to  all  manner  of  actions  which  are  of  a  moral  nature. 
Imputation  before  the  tribunal  of  God  will  be  in  perfect 
truth,  according  to  unerring  ju (lice,  and  fentence  accord- 
ing to  deferts. 

Iii  natural  imputation,  all  the  natural  confequences 
of  moral  actions  will  be  imputed  to  the  authors  of 
them.  No  good  action  will  be  unrewarded,  no  evil 
impunifhed. 

There  is  fuch  a  thing  as  internal  imputation,  where 
the  author  of  a  fact  imputes  to  himfelf  both  actions 
and  their  confequences. 


The  faculty  of  the  human  foul,  by  which  we  impute 

to  ourfelves  actions  and  their  confequences,  is  known 

by  the  name  of  moral  confeience:  confeience,  therefore, 

perforins  both  the  part  of  an  accufer  and  the  office  of 

a  judge. 

Sch.  i. — In  order  more  fully  to  underftand  the  nature  and  great 
importance  of  moral  confeience,  and  the  various  diftinc- 
tions  thereof,  intimated  by  various  epithets  applied  to  its 
a&s,  it  will  be  neceflary  that  we  attend  to  the  very  foun- 
dation from  which  thole  acts  proceed.  This  is  undoubt- 
edly the perfonality  of  the  human  foul,  by  which  it  cannot 
but  be  confeious  of  itfelf,  of  all  its  thoughts  and  actions: 
with  perfonaiity  is  intimately  connected  the  infernal fenje9 
that,  as  a  rational  being,  it  is  under  obligations  to  do  what 
is  good  and  to  avoid  evil :  upon  perfonality  and  this  in- 
ternal fenfe  refts  the  act  of 'judgment  concerning  the  con- 
formity or  contrariety  of  our  actions  to  our  moral  obliga- 

P  tion : 


1O0  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

tion  ;  reajhn  thence  infers  the  merits  or  demerits,  the  re- 
wards or  punifhments  which  are  due  to  us  on  account  of 
our  obedience  or  difobedienee,  according  to  the  degrees 
of  their  morality  or  immorality. 

S'ck.  2. — From  this  analyfis  feveral  general  inferences  may  be 
drawn : — 
i.  That  no  man  can  lofe  confeience  altogether;  for,  how- 
ever much  he  may  defire  it,  he  cannot  lofe  the  perfonality 
of  his  foul.  Hence  it  is  that  we  read,  f  the  ungodly  have 
no  peace;'  and  it  is  inconteftibly  true,  that  confidence 
will  exert  its  power  after  life. 

2.  That,  as  the  internal  fenfe  of  obligation  is  in  connection 
with  the  knowledge  we  have  of  good  or  evil,  there  mull 
be  a  vaft  difference  between  an  uninformed^  and  an  informed 
confeience.  An  uninformed  confeience  is  milled  by  ex- 
amples, by  fenfe  and  paiiion,  and  judges  of  things  and 
actions  according  to  appearances:  an  informed  confeience 
confiders  the  reality  of  things,  and  judges  of  actions  ac- 
cording to  their  confequences. 

Confeience  may  be  more  or  lefs  informed,  and  therefore 
capable  of  improvements  and  liable  to  neglect  and  abufes, 
By  improving  confeience  we  preferve  it  undefikd;  by  fol- 
lowing bad  examples,  fenfe  and  paflion,  it  becomes  de- 
filed. 

The  enlightened  confeience  is  the  effect  of  the  fpirit  and  word 
of  God :  an  enlightened  confeience  duly  exercifed  is  pure, 

Sch.  \\ — Whatever  our  information  may  be,  there  is  ftill  dan- 
ger,  that  by  inconfideration  and  inattention  to  our  actions 
and  their  confequences,  confeience  may  be  neglected  ; 
that  we  either  form  no  judgment  of  our  actions  and  their 
effects,  of"  that  fuch  judgment  is  partial  and  falfe.  How 
unaccountable  is  fuch  a  conduct  in  perfons  endowed  with 
underftanding,  reafon  and  judgment,  hot  to  exercife  thefe 
powers,  not  to  make  a  proper  ufe  of  thefe  heavenly  gifts? 
Certainly  the  inconfiderate  Heathen,  the  diforderly  Jew 
and  Chriflian,  all  are  equally  inexcufable;  not  becaufe 
they»  have  equal  advantages,  God  in  his  infinite  wifdom 
has  not  feen  fit  to  grant  it;  but  they  are  equally  guilty  of 
neglecting,  abufing  or  perverting  thofe  gifts  which  are 
heilowed  upon  them, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  10/ 

«SV^.  4 — When  confcience  does  not  exerciie  its  power  as  accu- 
ser and  judge,  the  caufe  may  be  inattention,  a  fettled  negT 
left,  or  evil  and  vicious  habits.  In  the  former  cafe  con- 
fcience is  faid  to  be  afleep,  in  the  fecond  it  is  callous,  in  the 
third  feared.  When  the  contrary  is  the  cafe,  confcience 
is  awake,  tender,  and  vigilant.  Confcience,  with  refpect 
to  imputation  of  fact,  is  faid  to  accufe  or  to  excufe;  with 
refpect  to  imputation  of  fact -and  law,  it  is  right  or  erroneous, 
certain  or  doubtful,  approving  or  dif approving,  condimnin?  or 
abfolv'mg,  or  wavering.  If  confcience  judges  in  reference 
to  the  degrees  of  morality  or  immorality,  it  is  good,  quiet, 
ferene,  full  of  peace  and  joy ;  or  bad,  gnazoing^  gloomy,  df~ 
ponding,  tormenting,  full  of  defpair. 

Sch.  $. — In  the  moral  as  well  as  in  the  phyfical  world,  nothing 
happens  without  previous  caufes;  confcience,  therefore, 
can  never  become  callous  or  feared  except  it  be  fuf  ered 
to  deep:  neither  mall  we  eafily  run  the  riik  of  being  mif- 
led  by  an  erroneous  confcience,  if  we  exercife  our  judg- 
ment and  reafon,  together  with  the  internal  fenfe  of  our 
obligations,  and  do  not  depend  upon  examples  or  confult 
fenfe  and  paffions.  We  fhall  be  fecure  againft  defpon- 
dency  and  defpair,  if  we  guard  againft  a  bad  confcience. 
We  may  enjoy  great  peace  and  joy,  if  we  take  care  to 
have  a  good  confcience  before  God  and  before  men. 
Finally,  obferve  that  happinefs  and  mifery  in  this  life  do 
not  confift  in  things  external:  nor  riches,  nor  honours, 
nor  the  pofTeffion  of  the  earth  can  make  a  man  happy  who 
has  not  a  good  confcience:  no  poverty,  no  perfecution, 
even  death  cannot  render  the  man  unhappy  who  does  his 
belt  endeavours  to  preferve  a  confcience  pure  and  unde- 
nted. 

Sc/i.  6. — It  is  in  our  power  to  awaken  confcience  when  it  falls 
afleep;  it  is  therefore  in  our  power  to  keep  it  undebauch- 
ed,  tender  and  vigilant;  for  attention  and  reflection  are 
in  our  power,  and  we  ought  to  keep  them  in  exerciie,  as 
rational  creatures  accountable  to  God  for  all  we  think, 
fpeak  or  do.  The  day  comes,  and  mult  come,  when  even 
the  feared  confcience  will  become  fenfible,  when  it  will 
find  no  excufe,  no  hiding  place,  but  muft  feel  unutter- 
able pangs  of  defpair,  anticipating  God's  righteoufnefs 
in  judgment. 

As 


IC8  MCT.AL   PHILOSOPHY-. 

As  the  conuieniious  man  is  invariably  determined  to 
conduct  him/elf  conformably  to  his  internal  fenfe  of 
obligation,  it  fellows,  that,  as  fuch,  he  maintains  in 
general  the  character  of  the  internally  honefl:  and  up- 
right man. 

However  commendable  thefe  characters  may  be, 
frill  it  is  necefTary  that  in  our  conduct  we  attend  alfo  to 
other  things  befides  the  internal  principle  of  our  mind. 
For  infrance,  may  not  the  upright,  the  confeientious 
man  be  inattentive  to  the  rules  of  decency  and  pro- 
priety ?  may  he  not  form  an  erroneous  idea  of  the 
confequences  of  actions,  or  the  intention  of  the  agent  ? 
may  he  not,  therefore,  make  a  miflake  with  refpect  to 
the  particular  laws  of  morality  or  immorality  ?  In  one 
word,  cannot  a  confeientious  man  be  miftaken,  or  act 
from  an  erroneous  confeience  ? 

The  confeientious  man,  who  acts  from  a  right  and 
well  informed  confeience,  is,  therefore,  the  mofr.  ex- 
cellent character,  worthy  our  imitation. 

Sen. — What  (hall  a  man  dp  under  a  miftaken  or  erroneous 
confeience  ?  We  anfwer,  Let  him  caft  it  off  as  foon  as 
he  is  convinced  of  that  error,  but  follow  it  as  long  as  he 
conceives  himfelf  right.  Suppofe  he  fhould  not  obferve 
the  latter,  would  he  not  fin  againft  his  confeience?  and 
would  he  not  be  apt  to  do  fo  in  cafes  where  his  confeience 
might  be  right?  Who  would  trull  that  man?  A  man 
without  confeience  is  a  monfter! 


PART 


P  A  R  T     II. 


Se£k.  I.  Comprehending  Ethics. 


INTRODUCTION. 


B 


}Y  ethics  we  underftand  that  part  of  moral  philoso- 
phy which  treats  of  the  duties  of  man. 

Duties  are  actions  to  be  done  or  omitted  conformably 
to  the  directions  of  moral  obligations  and  Jaws. 

Duties  may  be  distinguished  into  commiffive  and  omif- 
five,  into  perfecl  and  imperfe£l\  into  duties  to  God,  to 
our/elves,  and  to  others.  The  two  former  distinctions 
have  reference  to  the  obligations  and  laws  which  enjoin 
them,  the  latter  has  refpect  to  their  immediate  objects. 

Commiilive  duties  are  enjoined  by  perceptive,  the 

omiilive  by  prohibitory  laws  •,  as,  love  God  with  all  thy 

heart — do  not  love  fin. 

Sch.  i. — What  has  been  obferved  with  refpect  to  the  distinction 
of  preceptive  and  prohibitory  laws,  may  in  fome  meafure 
be  applied  to  this  ditt.inct.ion  of  duties :  for  the  commiffive 
duties  imply  omiffion  of  all  acts  inconfn'lent  with  the 
performance  thereof;  and  there  are  commiffive  acts  like- 
wife  necefTary  in  omiffive  duties,  fo  that  both  muft  be 
considered  as  correlate  ideas,  infeparable  from  one  ano- 
ther. It  is,  therefore,  only  the  general  and  principal  cha- 
racter of  duties  that  juftifies  this  diftinction,  and  the  pro- 
per ufe  we  are  to  make  of  it  is,  that  we  learn  at  once  the 
great  extent  of  our  duties  in  all  the  particulars  which  a 
faithful  performance  of  them  requires.  For  inftance,  the 
love  of  God  requires,  befides  the  commiflion  of  many 
things  which  conftitute  that  affirmative  duty,  that  we  ab- 

flain 


flQt  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

ftain  from  ill  that  is  inconfiftent  with  its  performances 
not  only  our  whole  heart,  foul,  mind  and  flrength  is  to  be 
engaged  in  doing  what  is  pleating  to  our  God,  but  we  muft 
alfo  avoid  all  things  which  are  fin  fill  and  difpleafing  to 
him,  if  we  fincerely  defire  to  love  him.  The  fame  is  the 
cafe  with  refpeil  to  the  negative  duty,  Jo  no  injury  :  here 
we  have  not  only  to  omit  many  things  which  are  of  an 
injurious  nature,  but  we  have  alfo  to  do  all  actions  con- 
fident" with  and  necefiary  for  its  performance:  we  mull 
pay  our  debts,  requite  fervices  and  labour  done  in  our 
behalf,   Sec. 

Sch.  1. — -VvTe  may  therefore  lay  down  this  general  maxim  re- 
flecting the  performance  of  duties,  that  all  commiffive 
duties  imply  thofe  omiifive  acts  without  which  their  per- 
formance cannot  take  place,  and  vice  verfa. 

Perfect  duties  are  enjoined  by  perfect  laws,  and  re- 
fult  from  perfect  obligations.  As  the  performance  of 
them  may  be  compelled,  they  are  denominated  duties 
of  necejjiiy. 

Imperfect  duties  have  reference  to  imperfect  obliga- 
tions and  laws.  As  no  compuliion  can  take  place, 
they  are  filled,  duties  of  humanity,  for  in  performing 
them  we  act  up  to  the  dignity  of  human  nature. 

Sc/i. — The  divifion  of  duties  in  refpect  of  laws  may  be  carried 
to  a  great  length,  as  laws  are  of  various  complexions  and 
denominations:  thus  civil,  religious,  family,  public  and 
private  duties,  &c.  have  reference  to  civil,  religious,  fa- 
mily, public  and  private  laws,  &c. 

Duties  to  God  have  for  their  immediate  objects  the 
infinite  perfections  and  will  of  God. 

Duties  to  ourfelves  have  for  their  immediate  objects 
the  properties  and  qualities  of  our  nature,  and  all  that 
is  interefting  to  our  own  ftate. 

Duties  to  others  have  for  their  immediate  objects 
the  concerns  and  interefts  of  our  fellow  creatures. 

It 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  III 


Ji  ought  to  be  obferved,  that  all  duties  to  ourfelveS 
and  to  our  fellow  creatures  are  in  a  mediate  manner 
duties  to  God,  for  ultimately  they  have  reference  to 
his  will  and  divine  perfections.  We  do  his  will  in 
rendering  ourfelves  and  others  happy -,  and  we  ought 
to  be  attentive  in  performing  all  obligations  to  ourfelves 
and  others,  in  order  faithfully  to  dilcharge  our  duty 
towards  God,  All  laws  ultimately  depend  upon  his 
will,  and  our  obedience  ought  to  be  prompted  by  mo- 
tives taken  from  the  divine  perfections. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Of  our  duties  to  God. 


i 


T  is  a  principal,  nay,  the  firft  duty  we  owe  to  God, 
that  we  fincerely  defire  to  know  him,  for  we  ought  to 
render  our  ftate  happy  by  faithfully  obeying  the  natural 
laws :  this  will  be  the  cafe  if  we  confider  them  as  the 
laws  of  God,  by  taking  our  motives  of  obedience  prin- 
cipally from  the  divine  perfections :  hence  it  is  necef- 
fary  that  we  know  thole  perfections.  By  knowing  the 
divine  perfections  we  know  God :  the  firft  principle  of 
nature,  therefore,  enjoins  the  duty  that  we  defire  to 
know  God. 

ScL — This  duty  might  be  proved  from  the  nature  of  the  foul, 
which  can  be  as  little  affected  by  things  unknown  as  by 
thofe  which  do  not  exift  :  but  Laving  eftablifhed  a  firft 
principle  of  morality,  it  is  proper  that  all  duty  and  right 
mould  be  deduced  therefrom. 

Things  which  may  be  known  of  God  have  either 
reference  to  his  exiftence,  or  to  his  eftence,  or  to  his 
relation  to  man  and  other  creatures :  hence  we  ought  to 

know, 


I  I  2  MORAL  philosophy. 

know,  with  con  virion  of  foul,  both  that  he  is,  and 
what  he  is  in  and  to  himfelf  and  to  his  rational  crea- 
ture?. 

There  is  a  God!  God  exifts  !  This  truth,  deeply  im- 
planted into  the  human  mind,  and  universally  acknow- 
ledged by  all  nations,  admits  of  demonstrative  proof  in 
the  llricleft  fenfe  of  the  word,  and  refts  upon  principles 
which  cannot  be  ihaken;  fo  that  no  manner  of  room 
is  left  for  a  reafonable  pretext  of  doubt. 

Amongfl  the  various  arguments  from  which  the  ex- 
iftence  of  God  may  be  demonftrated,  we  confine  cur- 
sives but  to  one,  which  is  as  irrefragable  as  it  is  uni- 
verfally  obvious :  for  a  rational  man  will  be  furTiciently 
convinced  of  the  exiftence  of  a  God,  if  he  can  be  as 
certain  of  that  exigence  as  he  is  of  his  own. 

We  are  confeious  of  ourfelves  and  of  other  things 
without  us,  confequently  we  think.  Thoughts  of  our 
mind,  like  other  affections  or  modes,  can  only  be  pre- 
dicated of  things  which  have  exigence.  Our  own  con- 
fcioufnefs,  our  own  thoughts,  therefore,  proclaim  our 
exigence.  Since  our  confeioufnefs  of  other  things, 
which  are  objects  of  fenfe  and  thought,  likewife  evinces 
their  exigence,  we  draw  this  general  conclufion:  We 
and  other  things,  i.  e.  the  world,  exifu 

However,  every  thing  has  its  caufe  why  it  is  fo  and 
not  otherwife  •,  our  exiflence  and  that  of  the  world  mud 
confequently  be  the  effect  of  a  fufficient  caufe.  This 
caufe  of  our  own  exigence  and  that  of  the  world  is  ei- 
ther in  ourfelves  or  in  the  world,  or  in  a  being  diitincl 
from  both.  Were  the  former  the  cafe,  We  or  the  world 
would  exhr.  necefTarily  •,  that  exiftence  would  be  eternal 
and  immutable-,  for  what  is  necelTarv  cannot  be  other- 
wife,  and  confequently  can  undergo  no  change,  cannot 

begin, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  II^ 

begin,  cannot  ceafe  to  be.  Therefore,  as  we  are 
changeable,  beginning  and  cearjng  to  exift,  and  as  the 
whole  world,  in  all  things  of  which  we  have  knowledge, 
is  contingent  and  variable,  it  evidently  follows,  that  our 
existence  and  that  of  the  world  are  the  effect  of  a  caufe 
without  ourfelves  and  without  the  World-,  the  effect 
of  a  caufe  which  exifts  of  itfelf,  eternally,  immutably, 
and  invariably,  and  is  the  firft  caufe  of  all  things  that 
exift.  This  rlrft  caufe  is  called  God:  our  own  exig- 
ence, therefore,  and  that  of  the  world,  proclaim  the 
truth,  there  is  a  God. 

A  God  of  eternal  and  immutable  exigence,  and  the 
firft  caufe  of  all  things,  muft  in  himfelf  poffefs  all  porTi- 
ble  perfections;  for  his  immutability  admits  of  no 
augmentation,  nor  of  any  diminution.  A  being  pof- 
fefted  of  all  poftible  perfections  is  called  infinite  i  God, 
therefore,  is  infinite. 

God  is  a  being  of  ajzmple,  mvifible^  incomprehenjible 
nature ;  for  composition  of  parts,  which  implies  both 
limitation  and  mutation,  cannot  take  place  in  a  being 
which  is  infinite*  neceftary,  and  immutable. 

God,  the  great  firft  caufe,  who  has  ordered  all  things 
in  wifdom,  muft  be  poftefted  of  understanding  and  will ; 
but  as  thefe  are  properties  and  attributes  of  fpirits,  it 
follows,  that  God  is  a  fpirit. 

God  is  not  only  a  fpirit  fimilar  to  the  foul  of  man 
and  other  celeftial,  invisible,  intelligent  beings,  but  he 
is  eflentially  different  from  all  fpirits,  whatever  their 
exalted  perfections  may  be:  thefe,  like  our  fouls,  are 
finite  beings,  creatures  of  his  power :  he,  the  creator, 
is  the  only  infinite  fpirit ;  becaufe  his  underftanding  and 
will,  like  all  the  glorious  perfections  of  his  effence,  are 
infinite. 

Q^  Hence 


i  14  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  in  refpect  of  the  divine  eifence 
there  is  but  one  God^  for  there  can  be  but  one  infinite 
being. 

Sch.  i. — If  we  fuppofe  two  or  more  infinite  beings,  they  mufl 
either  be  equal  or  unequal  in  perfections.  But  beings  of 
equal  perfections  and  power  could  oppofe  and  refill  each 
other;  neither  of  them,  therefore,  would  poflefs  all  poili- 
ble  perfections,  that  is,  neither  of  them  would  be  infinite. 
If  they  poflefs  unequal  perfections,  certainly  that  being 
which  is  inferior  to  the  other  cannot  be  infinite. 

Sch.  2.— Nature,  therefore,  perfectly  agrees  with  divine  revela- 
tion, which  mo  ft  ftrenuoufly  inculcates  the  unity  of  the 
divine  eflence:  but  no  argument  can  be  drawn  from  this 
unity  of  effende.  againit  a  plurality  of  perfcns. 

Sch.  3. — Among  the  infinite  perfections  in  God,  which  flow 
from  his  necefury  exiftence  and  from  his  fpiritual  nature, 
the  following  may  be  principally  noted:  his  necefTary  ex- 
iftence, eternity,  immutability,  independence,  fpirituality, 
infinity,  all-fufficiency,  omnifcience,  omniprefence,  wif- 
dom,  omnipotence,  faithfulnefs,  goodnefs,  juftice,  holi- 
nefs. 

Superftition  and  atheifm  are  high  offences,  militat- 
ing a^ainit  this  our  firft  duty,  by  which  we  are  bound 
to  endeavour  to  know  the  exigence,  the  infinity  and 
fpiritual  nature  of  God. 

By  fiiperfiition  we  underftand  that  fatal  error  where- 
by falfe  conceptions  are  formed  of  the  pure  and  infinite 
perfections  of  the  deity,  or  falfe  inferences  drawn  from 
his  true  perfections,  fo  that  they  are  made  motives  for 
and  principles  of  actions. 

Sch.  1. — Superftition  likewife  attributes  to  creatures  things 
which  only  infinite  power  can  effect;  but  this  and  other 
kinds  of  fuperftition  come  under  our  definition;  for  all 
of  them  imply  a  denial  of  his  omnifcient  care,  ail-funi- 
cierrt  power  and  infinitely  wife  government. 

Sch.  2. — Were  fuperftition  a  lefs  active  principle  than  it  really 
is,  there  would  be  rather  caufe  to  pity  than  to  deteft  per- 

fons 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  W£ 

fons  tainted  with  it.  But  who  does  not  feel  horror  in  re- 
volving in  his  mind  the  fcenes  of  bloodfhed,  of  devalua- 
tion and  human  mifery  which  persecuting  fuperftition  has 
fpread  over  the  world?  Who  does  not  know  that  every 
kind  of  fuperftition  is  of  that  perfecuting  nature  in  one 
degree  or  another? 

Falfe  conceptions  of  the  infinite  perfections  of  God 
may  lead  into  a  wanton  denial  of  his  exiitence.  This 
unnatural  offence  is  known  by  the  name  of  atheifm. 

Sch.  i. — That  perfon  would  be  guilty  of  theoretical  atheifm,  who 
in  exprefs  terms  mould  fay,  there  is  no  God.  It  may  be 
queftioned,  whether  man  has  ever  advanced  fo  far  in  in- 
fanitv  and  folly. 

Sch.  2. — But  it  is  not  fo  with  refpect  to  praclical  atheifm,  of 
which  thofe  are  guiltv  who  live  as  if  there  were  no  God, 
or,  to  fpeak  in  terms  which  have  already  been  defined, 
who  do  not  take  motives  from  the  divine  perfections. 
Men  who  are  deaf  to  the  call  of  reafon,  callous  and  infen- 
fible  to  the  voice  of  confeience,  and  commonly  given  to 
every  evil,  may  acknowledge  the  exiftence  of  a  God,  but 
in  works  will  reject  and  deny  him. 

What  fhall  we  fay  ofdeifm,  which  is  fplit  into  various 
fects  ?  Thofe  who  believe  not  divine  revelation  and 
the  myfteries  of  falvation,  becaufe  they  never  enjoyed 
the  great  privilege  of  living  under  the  gofpel,  we  con- 
fider  as  objects  of  our  fympathy  and  humanity:  thofe 
who  reject  thefe  advantages  we  leave  refponfible  for 
inconfiftent  conduct  and  itch  after  novelty  before  the 
tribunal  of  God.  But  that  feet  which  holds  to  th<t  ex- 
igence of  a  God,  and  denies  his  providence,  we  here 
defignatc  by  that  name,  and  charge  its  adherents  with 
the  moil  foolifn  fuperftition  that  has  ever  degraded 
human  nature.  God  ihouid  have  created,  his  power 
fhould  fupport  all  things,  and  fhould  not  care  for  them  ? 
he,  the  father  of  the  univerfe,  the  father  of  mankind, 
mould  be  too  great,  too  high  to  regard  the  world  and 

the 


llS  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  conduct  of  the  children  of  men  ?  Defpotic  error ! 
God  mould  be  too  great,  too  high  to  be  wife  and  good ! 
Nature  recoils  at  the  thought ;  and  that  man  mull  cer- 
tainly  have  gone  far  in  wickednefs  who  can  fay  in  his 
heart,  there  is  no  God,  or,  which  is  the  fame,  God 
does  not  fuperintend  and  govern  the  univerfe.  Can 
there  be  any  perfection  wanting  in  him  who  is  infinite  ? 
Could  he  be  infinite,  could  he  be  God,  if  he  were 
wanting  in  goodnefs  and  care  ?  To  him  nothing  is  too 
little,  becaufe  nothing  is  too  great. 

How  nearly,  then,  are  the  offences  allied,  which  are 
levelled  againft  the  true  knowledge  of  God  ?  How  dif- 
ficult is  it  to  determine  which  is  the  greater!  folly,  whe- 
ther to  fay  there  is  no  God,  to  live  without  God,  or 
to  affert  that  he  who  has  formed  the  ear  does  not  hear^ 
he  who  has  made  the  eye  does  not  fee  ? 

All  thefe  abfurd  errors,  with  other  ftrange  notions 
attending  them,  are  high  offences  ;  for  they  militate 
againft.  the  laws  of  nature  and  nature's  God.  All, 
therefore,  who  give  way  to  or  continue  in  any  of  them 
muit  render  themfelves  unhappy  and  miferable. 

What  a  great  value,  therefore,  ought  we  to  fet  upon 
that  wifdom  which  is  after  God  ?  and  how  thankful 
mould  we  be  for  the  means  fo  abundantly  given  us  to 
attain  to  a  true  knowledge  of  his  exiftence  and  infinite 
perfections  ? 

As  an  affemhlage  of  perfections  conftitutes  glory, 
and  as  by  tnajefty  is  intimated  the  fupreme  power  of 
government-,  and  as  thefe  in  God  are  infinite,  it  fol- 
lows, that  he  is  in  and  to  himfelf  a  fpirit  of  infinite 
glory  and  majerty. 

It  is  our  duty  to  God  to  glorify  him,  by  taking  mo- 
rives  for  our  conduct  from  his  infinite  oerfections. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  I? 

Sc/i. — God's  glory  being  infinite,  it  follows,  that  by  glorifying 
him  we  cannot  add  to  it;  neither  can  it  be  diminifhed  by 
a  contrary  conduct.  He  does  not  ftand  in  need  of  any 
thing  his  creatures  can  do.  How,  then,  can  it  be  faid, 
that  we  glorify  God?  We  anivver,  in  manifeiiing  his 
glory  to  our  fellow  creatures;  for,  by  acting  from  motives 
taken  from  the  divine  perfections,  others  may  be  led  to 
trace  thefe  motives,  and  thus  feel  an  incitement  to  endea- 
vour to  know  God,  to  ferve  him  in  fpirit  and  in  truth, 
and  to  be  fenfible  of  his  infinite  glory  and  majefry. 

Blafphemy  is  the  unnatural  and  horrid  crime  of  ufing 
words  which  attribute  imperfections  to  God. 

Sch. — Prophane  fwearing,  fpeaking  of  God  in  a  loofe  and  ir- 
reverent manner,  taking  his  name  in  vain,  &c.  if  they  do 
not  amount  to  blafphemy,  are  ftili  a  kind  of  that  horrid 
offence. 

God  of  infinite  glory  and  majefty  is,  with  reipect  to 
us  and  all  creatures,  a  being  of  infinite  fuperiority  in 
right  of  government  and  controul.  As  the  inward 
fenfe  of  another's  fuperiority  is  failed  reverence,  it  fol- 
lows, that  we  muft  think  of  God  with  the  greateft  hu- 
mility and  reverence. 

As  by  the  worjhip  of  God  is  underftood  a  proclivity 
of  the  mind  to  mow  our  reverence  to  his  infinite  glory 
and  majeiry,  it  is  evidently  our  duty  to  worfhip  him. 

In  the  worfhip  of  God  two  things  may  be  diftin- 
guifhed  \  the  internal  fenfe  of  the  divine  glory  and  ma- 
jefty,  and  the  actions  by  which  that  fenfe  is  manifefted: 
in  the  firft  cafe  our  worfhip  is  theoretical^  in  the  laft 

practical. 

Practical  worfhip  is  internal,  when  the  fenfe  of  re- 
verence actuates  the  internal  acts  of  the  mind;  and 'it 
becomes  external,  if  thefc  are  outwardly  exprefled  by 
words  and  actions. 

Worfhip 


I  I  8  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY* 

Worfhip  may  be  true  or  falfe  ;  for  things  of  the 
holieft  nature  may  be  perverted  by  abufe. 

If  our  worfhip  is  true,  our  theory  of  the  existence, 
perfections,  infinite  glory  and  majefty  0^  God,  muft  be 
true;  that  is,  we  muft  have  a  true,  and,  as  far  as 
pofiible,  a  diftinct  knowledge  thereof:  for  only  diftinct 
knowledge  convinces  the  heart;  and  if  conviction  is 
rooted  in  the  foul,  we  cannot  but  be  ftruck  with  awe 
and  reverence  for  that  God  in  whom  we  live,  move, 
and  have  our  being.  We  muft  feel  delight  in  holy 
meditation  on  his  bountiful  goodnefs- — feel  pure  defire 
for  his  favour  and  communion;  outward  actions, 
words  of  our  lips,  prayers,  Amplications,  praifes  and 
thankfgivings  will  be  the  willing,  the  natural  effects  of 
the  fulnefs  of  our  heart.  Our  whole  conduct  in  life 
mould  be  a  kind  of  divine  worfhip;  ail  our  actions 
mould  mow  that  our  heart  is  inwardly  fenfible  how 
exalted,  how  glorious,  how  bleffed  is  the  Lord  of 
hofts ;  how  worthy  to  be  reverenced  and  praifed ! 

Worhhip  founded  on  a  falfe  theory  cannot  be  true  in 
practice. 

Divine  worfhip  paid  to  what  is  not  the  true  God,  is 
idolatry. 

If  the  theory  is  founded  in  erroneous  conceptions 
of  the  perfedtions  and  glory  of  God,  worfhip  cannot 
but  be  fuperftitious. 

Worfnip  may  be  true  in  theory,  and  full  falfe  in 
practice. 

Internal  and  external  worfhip  may  be  feparated;  for 
the  mind  can  and  ought  to  be  fenfible  of  the  prefence 
of  God  and  his  infinite  perfections,  whilft  we  are  occu- 
pied in  the  external  duties  of  our  calling. 

Sch. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  II9 

Sch.  1. — If  reparation  of  internal  and  external  worfhip  is  car- 
ried farther,  we  become  guilty  of  perverfion,  and  a<5t 
contrary  to  a  great,  a  glorious  and  neceflary  duty.  What 
is,  for  inftance,  external  worfhip  without  the  internal; 
what  are  the  praifes  of  the  lips  with  a  heart  eftranged 
from  God,  but  Lvpocrify,  fhameful  in  the  eyes  of  men 
and  abominable  in  the  fight  of  God  ? 

Sch.  2. — Neither  can  internal  worfhip,  always  feparatfd  from 
external,  maintain  the  character  of  true  worfhip ;  for 
in  the  firft  place  it  is  our  duty  to  glorify  God,  that  is,  to 
fhow  by  our  external  actions  the  inward  acts  of  the  mind, 
and  thereby  incite  our  fellow  creatures  to  praife,  to  glorify 
and  to  fear  the  Lord  their  God.  There  is  between  the 
body  and  the  foul  an  indiffoluble  connection,  by  which 
the  fulnefs  of  the  heart  muft  actuate  our  body  as  necefla- 
rily  as  the  external  experiences  by  our  fenfes  muft  actuate 
the  mind. 

Sch.  3. — A  certain  portion  of  time  ought,  therefore,  to  be  fet 
apart  for  the  exercife  of  external  worfhip,  when  the  whole 
man,  all  that  is  within  us,  all  our  powers  of  foul  and 
body,  ought  to  be  engaged  in  contemplating  the  infinite 
glory  of  God,  meditating  on  his  love  and  goodnefs,  and 
fhowing  forth  his  praifes. 

Sch.  4.-— If  we  thus  exercife  the  duties  of  internal  and  external 
worfhip  jointly,  we  are  faid  to  ivorj/iip  God  infant  and  in 
truth. 

Worfhip  of  God  is  public  or  private*,  in  the  former 
we  join  a  number  of  our  fellow  creatures  j  in  the  latter 
only  our  houfhold  is  engaged. 

Neglecting  or  treating  flightly  the  worfhip  of  God 
are  offences  unpardonable  in  themfelves  and  of  a  per- 
nicious tendency  -,  for  in  the  firft  cafe  one  of  the  moil 
excellent  and  heavenly  duties  is  neglected,  and  in  the 
latter  things  of  the  moil  glorious  nature  are  prophaned 
and  abufed. 

Sck. — Divine  worfhip,  therefore,  whether  public  or  private, 
ought  to  be  conducted  with  fincere  and  humble  devotion, 
equally  remote  from  cold  and  indifferent  formality,  and 
from  exctntrical  and  unnatural  epthufiafm. 

The 


120  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

The  more  we  learn  to  know  God  and  meditate  upori 
his  infinite  perfections,  the  more  fenfible  we  become  of 
the  great  imperfection  of  our  theory.  Our  worfhip, 
therefore,  in  this  life,  is  at  beft  but  imperfect. 

Worfhip  is  confequently  fufceptible  of  various  de- 
grees of  purity  and  perfection. 

Hence  it  is,  that  from  imperfections  obferved  in  va- 
rious modes  of  worfhip,  we  ought  not  immediately  to 
judge  them  falfe. 

God,  confidered  in  his  ways  towards  the  children  of 
men,  is  an  object  of  the  purert  love,  of  filial  fear,  of 
our  cordial  gratitude,  of  the  fincereft  and  moil  humble 
invocation  and  adoration,  of  the  molt  faithful  obedience 
and  the  mod  rengncd  acquiefcence  in  his  will. 

There  is  not  a  duty  more  comprehenflve  than  love, 
whether  its  object  be  God,  or  we  ourfelves,  or  our 
fellow  creature:  it  involves  all  other  poffible  duties, 
and  thence  is  very  juftly  ftiled  the  fulfilling  of  the  law. 
This  is  the  caufe  why  its  general  definition  is  difficult, 
and  its  diftinguifhing  characters  many  and  various.  We 
venture  to  afiert,  that  its  general  idea  is  animating  affec- 
tion concerning  happincfs,  caufing  delight  wherever  excel- 
lency and  happinefs  are  found ',  and  defire  for  them  where 
they  are  wanting. 

Love  is  generally  diflinguifhed  into  love  of  affeftion, 
love  of  complacency,  and  love  of  communion. 

Sch.  t. — Love  of  affection  confifts  in  a  folicitude  for  the  hap- 
pinefs  of  ourfelves  or  others.  This  love  God  manifefls 
in  his  providence  towards  the  world,  and  particularly  to- 
wards the  children  of  men ;  the  good  and  the  bad,  the 
righteous  and  the  unrighteous,  things  animate  and  inani- 
mate, being  equally  its  objects.  This  love  we  mould  alfo 
feel  and  exerciie  towards  all  men,  and  extend  it  to  all 
creatures  endued  with  animal  life :  nothing  mould  blunt 

its 


MORAL  PHIL030PHV.  tit 

its  fenfibiliry  and  effe&s:  all  men.  the  jnft  and  the  up- 
right, the  friend,  the  obedient  child,  the  faithful  fervant 
and  the  weil-difpofed  neighbour,  as  well  as  the  uttjuft  ami 
the  difhoneir,  the  enemy,  the  refractory  {on,  the  fini 
ful  fervant  and  the  ill-natured  neighbour,  have  a  claim  to 
it.     It  is  true,  we  have  it  not  always  in  our  power  to  ren- 
der others  happy;  fome  refute  our  cood  offices,  others 
abufethem:  we  mu ft  often  fee  peribns  unhappv;  but  we 
may  ufe  our  endeavours  to  bring  them  to  a  ienfe  of  their 
duty  ;  we  may  pity  the  ftate  of  the  diforderly  and  refrac^ 
tory,  and  fmcerely  wifh  for  their  reform  and  happinef*. 
Why  is  it  that  the  father  cannot  Sear  the  fight  of  a  pro- 
fligate fori?    Why  is  the  fenfe  of  refentment  in  a  brother 
fo  keen  againft  a  diforderly  brother?    Why  is  difguft 
among  relatives  fo  deeply  rooted  ?    Why  do  we  feel  our 
hearts  troubled  at  the  fight  o(  improper  behaviour  in  youth 
entrufted  to  our  care  ?     It  is  love  in  the  father;  his' heart 
could  not  feel  fo  forely  wounded   if  he  could  caft  off  pa- 
rental affe&ipri,  if  he  could  look  upon  his  fob  as  a  ftran- 
«;er.   ^  So  it  is  with  brethren,  relatives,  neighbours,  &c. 
So  it  is  with  faithful  teachers;  could  they  cai?  off  the' fenfe 
of  their  duty,  could  they  diveft  themfelves  of  that  affeaiori 
for  their  truft  which  duty  imppfes  and  humanity  and  re- 
ligion improve,  they  could  render  their  fituation  very 
ealy,  they  would  not  feel  fo  many  of  their  laborious  hours 
embittered  with  the  reflexion  that  their  endeavours  are 
not  crowned  with  the  wifaed-for  fuccefJ. 

Sck  2.—fr  is  not  thus  with  the  love  Qficmpfacencyi  this,  if  it  is 
true,  has  for  its  objecl  all  that  is  lovely  and  excellent,  every 
thing  wherein  there  is  perfection,  or  that  is  influential  on 
our  happinels.     As- real  good  is  only  an  objecl  of  delight 
we  feel  true  love  of  complacency  only  in  what  is  good. 
Thus  God  loves  his  children,  being  pleafed  with  their 
ways;  thus  the  father  delights  in  his  obedient  fon,  the 
brother  m  his  virtuous  relation;  thus  we  feel  fatisfa&ion 
m  the  diligent,  the  manly,  the  virtuous  and  regular  ftu- 
dent;  thus  we  ate  pleafed  with  excellent  and 'beautiful 
objecls,  with  what  is  decent  and  right,    Perfohs  of  a  con- 
trary character,  things  of  dangerous  and  pernicious  qua  . 
lities,  difpleafe,  difguft,  and  often  diftrefs  us. 

Sci.  3---The  We  of  complacency  begets,  as  far  as  is  attain* 

able,  the  love  of  communion.     God,  who  delights'  in  his 

R  children, 


122  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

children,  dwells  in  their  hearts:  the  father  feels  happy  in 
-  the  converfation  of  his  dutifui  fon,  and  fixes  his  favour 
upon  him:  brethren  live  in  harmony  and  communion, 
endeavouring  to  prevent  one  another's  wifhes:  we  rejoice 
in  opportunities  to  mow  our  efteem  to  the  diligent,  the 
virtuous  ftudent,  &c. 

What  we  cannot  attain  to  is  an  object  of  efteem,  contem- 
plation, &c. 
Sch.  4. — We  ought  to  diftinguifh  this  heavenly  virtue  jufl 
now  explained,  whic^  has  for  its  object  real  good,  real 
excellency  and  happinefs,  from  that  paffion  of  the  mind 
which  is  likewife  ftiled  love,  and  is  in  confequence  of 
objects  reprefented  by  the  inferior  faculties  of  the  hu- 
man foul  as  excellent,  defirable  and  lovely.  This  love, 
though  not  in  itfeif  a  virtue,  if  it  is  well  directed  and 
under  the  controul  of  reafon,  paves  the  way  to  a  more 
exalted  and  virtuous  love.  Innocent  fenfitive  love  has 
for  its  object  innocent  fenfitive  pleafures,  in  a  degree 
becoming  rational  creatures  deftined  for  lafting  felicity. 
If  our  habits  are  thus  directed,  will  they  not  more  eagerly 
purfue  real,  lafting  pleafures  and  true  felicity,  and  lead 
to  all  that  is  good  and  virtuous?  But  not  all  fenfitive 
love  is  innocent;  it  often  leads  to  vanities  and  finful  ob- 
jects: if  the  love  of  the  world  and  its  lufts  occupies  the 
heart,  there  is  no  room  for  virtuous  love;  love  fixed  upon 
fuch  things  is  perverted.  You  may  innocently  prefer  one 
ti i ill  before  another;  fo  you  may  without  guilt  prefer  the 
innocent  converfation  of  one  perfon  to  that  of  another, 
&c.  But  you  cannot  be  innocent  in  loving  idlenefs,  mif- 
chief,  empty  and  tempting  amufements,  bad  company, 
exceffes,  &cc\  The  tendency  and  effects  of  fuch  love  are 
unhappinefs  and  ruin.  Such  a  love  is  degrading  to  hu- 
man nature,  and  inconfiflent  with  the  love  of  God. 

God  is  the  moft  excellent,  and  therefore  above  all 
things  the  mod  worthy  objecl:  of  cur  love;  he  is  the 
fource  of  all  beatitude,  the  caufe  of  cur  exiftence  -,  he 
is  our  preferver,  our  benefactor,  and  benign  father*  his 
perfections,  infinitely  glorious,  fhine  with  unfpotted 
purity  and  holTriefs.  But  how  /hall,  how  can  we  love 
him  who  is  fo  infinitely  exalted  above  all  things  his 

creatures 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  23 

creatures  can  do  ?  We  anfvver,  by  a  folicitude  to  do 
nothing  that  is  inconfiftent  with  his  glory  and  infinite  per- 
fections. 

Sch. — We  prefer  this  definition  to  others,  beeaufe  it  gives  us  a 
moft  particular  and  infallible  criterion  of  our  love  to  God. 
It  is  true,  the  love  of  God  comprehends  the  ftim  of  all  that 
can  be  a  duty  to  him;  he  who  loves  him  fincerely  will 
contemplate  his  perfections  with  delight,  and  defire  his 
favour  and  communion  above  all  things:  but  can  I  per- 
fuade  myfelf  that  divine  love  dwells  in  me,  if  I  am  not 
defirous  and  highly  felicitous  fo  to  order  my  conduct  that 
it  may  be  pleafing  to  him  and  confident  with  his  glory? 
In  vain,  then,  do  perfons  flatter  themfelves  that  they  love 
God,  if  they  love  fin,  the  world,  with  its  vanities  and 
lufts,  and  if  their  deeds  counteract  the  divine  will.  This 
is  love  to  God,  fays  an  apoftle,  that  zve  keep  Lis  command- 
?nentsy  and  his  commandments  are  not  grievous. 

It  is  a  duty  that  we  love  God-,  for  it  is  our  duty  to 
know  him,  to  know  that  he  is,  and  what  he  is  in  and  to 
himfelf  and  to  his  rational  creatures  :  a  God  of  infinite 
glory  and  majefty,  worthy  to  be  wormipped  in  fpirit 
and  in  truth;  the  creator,  the  preferver,  the  fupreme 
ruler  of  the  univerfe !  Can  it  be  faid  that  we  know 
him,  if  his  infinite  glory  does  not  ftrike  our  fouls  with 
admiration  and  awe  ?  Can  the  foul  be  filled  with  true 
admiration,  if  it  be  not  enraptured  and  drawn  towards 
him  with  delight  ?  And  muft  not  delight  in  God  im- 
prefs  us  with  a  longing  defire  for  his  favour  and  holy 
communion  ?  Can  our  defires  after  God  be  fincere,  if 
we  are  not  actuated  by  an  anxious  folicitude  to  pleafe 
him  ?  Can  we  pleafe  him,  if  we  act  inconfiftent 
with  his  glory  and  perfections  ?  As  love  to  God  is  our 
indifpenfible  duty,  fo  it  is  our  glorious  privilege,  and 
conftitutes  our  greater!  happmefs. 

Among  the  divine  perfections  is  his  will :  a  folici- 
tude of  the  mind  not  to  act  contrary  to  the  will  of  ano- 
ther has  obtained  the  name  of  fear. 

ScL 


1  I;-  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sch.  i. — Fear  is  diftinguifhed  into  filial  and  fervife;  the  former 
is  a  folicitude  not  to  aft  contrary  to  rhe  will  of  another, 
becaufe  we  love,  eftee'm  and  reverence  him ;  the  latter 
takes  place  when  that  folicitude  arifes  from  a  dread  of  evil 
confequences. 

Sch.  2. — A  perfon  actuated  by  fervile  fear  loves  himfelf  and 
hates  the  one  he  fears  ;  for  looking  to  the  bad  confequen- 
ces he  feels  an  averlion,  and  a  ftron;*  decree  of  averfion 
is  hatred. 

Sch.  3. — Only  filial  fear  can,  therefore,  be  a  virtue;  fervile  fear 
is,  on  the  contrary,  of  a  vicious  quality,  and  carefully  to 
be  avoided  in  our  conduct  towards  God  and  man. ' 

Sch.  4. — Hence  the  faying,  fewilefear  is  better  than  none  at  all^ 
cannot  be  conftrued  as  attributing  to  it  any  degree  of  ex- 
cellency or  rectitude ;  but  mult  be  taken  in  reference  to  its 
unmerited  effects  upon  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  fo- 
ciety.  As  lions  and  tygers  are  reilrained  from  evil,  fa 
men  of  vicious  difpofitions  and  habits  muft  be  kept  in 
awe  by  compulfive"  means,  often  by  confinement  and  cor- 
poral nunifhment,  that  public  good  may  fuftain  no  harm. 

Sch.  5.— From  thefe  obfervations  we  may  draw  another  argu- 
ment for  proving  the  imbecility  of  human  laws  and  the 
ufefulnefs  and  necefnty  of  religion. 

It  is  a  duty  that  we  fear  God  in  a  filial  manner; 
for  he  is  worthy  of  our  love,  and  without  fearing  we 
cannot  love  hirm 

It  is  alfo  a  duty  that  we  endeavour  in  our  conduct: 

towards  Gpd  to  cad  away  fervile  fear ;  becaufe  love  to 

God  and  fervile  fear  cannot  exift  together. 

Sch. — Hence  the  neceffity  of  the  utmoft  care  in  the  manage- 
ment of  families,  to  inftill  into  the  minds  of  children  and 
of  fervants  the  principles  of  filial  fear,  in  order  to  feciire 
their  obedience  and  faithfulnefs. 

As  love  to  a  benefactor  is  (tiled  gratitude,  it  follows, 
that  it  is  our  duty  to  be  grateful  to  God;  for  he  is  not 
only  the  object  of  our  fincereft  love,  but  his  benefits 
and  bleflinp-s  are  innumerable.  Every  bleflinp;  is  a 
new,  an  additional  motive  for  us  to  love  him,  and  to 

pay 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  125 

pay  him  the  duty  of  gratitude.  Praiies  and  thanks- 
givings being  the  efFuflons  of  a  grateful  heart,  let 
them  be  the  tribute  which  our  hearts  rejoice  to  bring 
before  the  footftool  of  cur  God. 

Can  there  be  a  more  monftrous,  heinous  and  unna- 
tural vice,  than  ingratitude  to  God  ? 

Sch. — All  are  guilty  of  that  vice  who  do  not  love  God,  who 
do  not  reflect  upon  his  merciful  bleffings,  and  who  care 
not  to  ufe  them  to  his  glory  and  the  end  for  which  they 
are  given.  Thofe  who  envy  others,  and  murmur  again  ft 
the  ways  of  providence;  thofe  who  look  down  with  a. 
proud  and  unfeeling  heart  upon  human  diftrefs,  and  fuffer 
it  on  their  part  to  continue  unrelieved,  &c.  are  guilty  of 
ingratitude.  But  unnatural  as  this  vice  is,  ftill  it  is  pre- 
valent among  the  children  of  men,  not  only  with  refpect 
to  their  conduct  to  one  another,  but  alfo  to  that  God  in 
whom  they  live,  move  and  have  being. 

As  a  proclivity  of  the  mind  to  do  what  another  com- 
mands is  called  obedience,  It  follows,  that  we  muft  obey 
God  v  for  we  are  bound  to  obey  the  natural  laws, 
which  are  the  commands  of  his  will ;  we  ought  to 
fear  and  love  him.  No  human  authority  can  free  us 
from  this  duty,  and  in  cafes  of  real  colliiion,  we  muft 
pbey  God  rather  than  man. 

When  we  are  actuated  in  our  obedience  by  no  other 
confederation  than  the  will  of.  the  commander,  we  are 
faid  to  acquiefce  in  that  will,  or  to  be  refigned  to  it.  Since 
God  is  a  being  of  infinite  glory,  majefty,  wifdom,  power 
and  goodnefs,  it  is  our  duty  to  feel  ourfelves  happy  in 
doing  his  will,  and  to  be  fully  refigned  to  all  the  ways 
of  his  government  and  providence.  He  is  omnipotent, 
therefore  our  relu6f ance  would  be  vain ;  and  as  his  will 
is  our  happinefs,  difcontent  and  murmuring  cannot  but 
be  foolifh  and  finful. 


126  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY^ 

ScL — Resignation  arms  the  mind  with  fortitude  under  adversi- 
ty, poverty,  ficknefs  and  perfecution;  inward  peace  and 
cor. folation  are  its  faithful  attendants;  it  triumphs  over 
death. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Of  duties  to  our/elves. 


J\ 


S  the  duties  we  owe  to  ourfelves  refult  from 
the  fame"  principles  of  natural  law  from  which  our 
duties  to  God  are  inferred,  it  follows,  that  the  former 
muM:  be  in  perfect  confiftency  with  the  latter  •,  for 
both  ultimately  flow  from  one  fource,  to  wit,  the  will 
of  God,  and  have  one  and  the  fame  end  for  their  object, 
the  happinefs  of  mankind.  They  confequently  are  of 
the  fame  authority  and  importance,  excepting  the  dif- 
ference of  their  immediate  objects.  Duties  to  our- 
felves are  therefore  in  a  mediate  manner  duties  which 
we  owe  to  God. 

Hence  we  may  infer  thefe  infallible  axioms :  Nothing 
can  be  a  duty  to  ourfelves  that  is  repugnant  to  the  duties 
we  owe  to  God:  What  is  repugnant  to  a  duty  we  owe  to 
ourfelves  cannot  be  a  duty  to  God. 

Natural  laws,  commanding  us  to  render  our  flate 
perfect  as  poffible,  require  that  we  principally  endea- 
vour to  promote  our  own  happinefs.  But  as  fuch  an 
endeavour  is  called  love,  it  follows,  that  it  is  a  princi- 
pal, nay,  our  ntft  duty  to  love  ourfelves. 

If  we  are  bound  to  love  ourfelves,  we  mud  conduct 
ourfelves  in  all  our  purfuits  conformably  to  the  injunc- 
tions and  prohibitions  of  the  law  of  nature*,  for  a  con- 
trary conduct  is  repugnant  to  our  real  happinefs. 

ScJu 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  l±J 

Sch. — How  groflly  miftaken,  therefore,  are  thofe  perfons  who, 
from  a  vain  and  erroneous  perfuafion  that  they  love  the'm- 
felves,  run  into  all  manner  of  excefTes,  feeking  pleafure 
and  fatisfaction  in  vanities  and  wicked  purfuits?  Stran- 
gers to  virtuous  love,  they  take  fenfe  and  paflion  for  their 
guide,  never  confulting  their  true  intereft  and  happinefs. 
Such  perfons  are  their  own  enemies,  as  in  reality  they 
hate  themfelves. 

As  a  ftate  of  perfection  and  real  happinefs  caufes 
true  pleafure^  it  follows,  that  true  love  only  leads  to 
real  pleafure  and  fatisfaction. 

As  real  pleafure  depends  upon  many  things  as  means 
neceffary  for  its  acquisition  and  prefervation,  it  will  he 
our  duty  to  endeavour  to  obtain  and  to  make  a  proper 
ufe  of  all  thofe  things  which  contribute  to  our  real 
happinefs. 

There  can  be  no  real  pleafure  and  happinefs  where 
there  is  not  inward  peace,  tranquillity  of  mind  and  a 
good  conference;  he,  therefore,  who  truly  loves  him- 
felf,  muft  endeavour,  by  an  irreproachable  conduct  be- 
fore God  and  men,  to  poiTefs  and  to  prefer ve  this  de- 
firable  treafure. 

Thus  our  true  intereft  is  our  principal  duty,  and  as 
thefe  in  their  nature  and  tendency  are  things  infepara- 
bly  connected,  it  is  one  of  our  molt  important  duties 
to  learn  our  real  intereft, 

Sch.  i. — To  fee'k  our  intereft  in  things  which  gratify  the  {enfe9 
pleafe  the  fancy,  and  flatter  our  pailions,  which  inflame 
pride,  invite  ambition,  avarice  and  lufts,  is  and  has  at  all 
times  been  the  fatal  fource  of  folly,  extravagance  and  mi* 
fery  among  the  children  of  men. 

Sch.  i. — It  is  from  want  of  attention  and  reflection  that  fuch 
empty  things  have  fo  forcible  and  fo  general  an  influence 
on  the  human  heart.  Evil  habits  are  contracted  before 
we  exercife  reafon:  bad  examples,  with  which  the  world 
abounds,  fteel  the  foul  againft  the  voice  of  underftanding. 

Itfence 


4  * 

128  -TORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

Hence  it  is  that  the  road  to  virtue  is  dirlicult,  and  t'ir-.,'. 
thoutands  run  headlong  to  deftruction:  not  becaufe  they 
wifn  not,  but  becaiiie  they  neglecl  to  know  their  happi- 
nefs. 

True  love  to  ourfelves  is  therefore  an  arduous,  com-, 
prehenfive  arid  complicated  duty  ;  for,  independent  of 
all  our  duties  to  God  and  to  our  fellow  creatures,  with 
which  it  is  indhiblubly  connected,  it  comprehends  the 
perfections  of  the  foul  and  body,  together  with  their 
internal  ftates,  befides  innumerable  other  things  influ- 
ential on  their  happinefs  and  neceffary  for  the  perfection 
of  our  nature. 

In  loving  ourfelves,  our  first  care  mould  be  to  render 
our  immortal  foul  as  perfect  as  poiUble,  by  duly  exer- 
cising and  improving  its  faculties,  particularly  the  fu- 
perior,  our  understanding  and  will :  by  thefe  we  rank 
with  fpirits,  and  refemble  God  the  father  of  {pints. 

We  are  therefore  in  duty  bound  to  render  our  un- 
derstanding as  perfect  as  poflible,  by  endeavouring  to 
obtain  knowledge  of  all  things  influential  on  our  hap- 
pinefs ;  in  particular  to  know  God,  his  infinite  perfec- 
tions, and  our  ditties  to  this  glorious  being ;  to  know 
ourfelves,  and  the  end  of  our  being;  to  know  the  hu- 
man heart*,  to  know  mankind;  to  know  our  duties  to 
others,  together  with  the  right  and  beft  mode  of  per- 
forming them ;  to  investigate  the  nature,  the  qualities 
and  destination  of  as  many  things  of  this  world  as  pof- 
fible;  to  know  what  is  good  or  bad,  risht  or  wrorp-j 
what  is  neceflary  and  ufeful  in  life,  &c. 

But  whatever  we  know  or  can  know,  let  it  remain 
a  particular  care  that  our  knowledge  be  as  distinct  as 
poflible,  that  it  be  free  from  confusion  and  error,  that 
we  may  diftinguifh  good  from  bad,  right  from  wrong, 

thiwj?. 


iMORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  29" 

things  of  great  ufefulnefs  from  thofe  which  have  an  in- 
fluence lefs  beneficial,  and  from  fuch  as  are  dangerous, 
(inful,  improper  or  wicked.  Flow  earned:!)',  tljen, 
fhould  we  attend,  how  inderatigably  reflect  upon  all 
things  which  prefent  themfelves  as  objects  of  know- 
ledge ?  And  how  eager  fnould  we  be  to  find  out,  to  fee 
by  the  eye  of  under  flan  ding  the  more  exalted  and  glo- 
rious things  to  which  fenfe  cannot  afpire?  It  is  pro- 
per that  a  fpirit  immortal,  cleftined  for  eternity,  mould 
make  itfelf  acquainted  with  the  things  of  eternity,  in- 
visible and  full  of  glory. 

The  duty,  therefore,  which  we  owe  to  our  under- 
standing, may  be  comprehended  in  thefe  few  words  : 
Endeavour  to  acquire  knowledge  of  all  things  which 
may  have  influence  on  your  duties  and  happincfs,  and 
do  all  in  your  power  that  your  knowledge  be  as  diitincl: 
as  poflible-,  for  wemaybe-faid  only  to  know  that 
which  we  know  without  error  and  confuflon. 

Sch.— Obferve,  that  we  feldom  find  men  wicked  and  abandon- 
ed for  want  of  knowledge,  but  generally  for  want  of  at- 
tention and  reflexion,  for  want  of  exercifinp  reafon  and 
judgment. 

We  mult  alfo  endeavour  to  render  our  will  as  perfect 
as  poflible ;  for  what  does  all  knowledge  avail  us,  if 
we  do  not  thereby  become  better  men  ?  The  principal 
aim,  therefore,  in  improving  our  understanding  and 
reafon,  mould  be,  that  the  inclinations  of  our  will  be 
thereby  directed  to  purfue  that  which  is  really  good 
and  excellent.  Reafon  is  given  us  that  we  fhould  walk 
by  its  light.  He  who  does  not  realife  his  knowledge 
in  the  purfuit  of  virtue  may  perhaps  boaft  of  the  name 
of  a  learned,  but  can  never  claim  the  character  of  a 
wife  and  good  man. 

S  Our 


IjO  MORAL   PHILOSOPHV. 

Our  will  is  perfect,  as  far  as  it  is  actuated  by  diftinct 
ideas  of  good  and  evil,  of  right  and  wrong;  and  has 
controul  over  fenlitive  appetite,  paflions,  propenfities 
and  inftinct,  by  fupprefling,  retraining  or  directing 
them  in  conformity  to  the  dictates  of  natural  laws,  our 
own  happinefs,  and  the  felicity  of  others. 

Our  will  is  endowed  with  liberty,  and  we  muft  di- 
rect it  in  chufing  always  what  is  really  good,  what  in 
every  circumftance  of  life  is  beft.  If  this  be  our  inva- 
riable purpofe  and  defign,  our  will  obtains  a  firmnefs 
and  excellency  worthy  the  dignity  of  our  rational  na- 
ture j  the  purfuit  of  virtue  will  become  more  and  more 
pleafant ;  we  mail  triumph  over  {cn(^  paffion,  and  the 
vanities  of  the  world — be  happy,  and  refemble  the  in- 
finitely perfect  pattern  of  holinefs,  as  far  as  perfection 
is  attainable  in  this  life. 

Great  and  comprehenfive,  therefore,  is  the  duty  we 
owe  to  our  immortal  fouls.  We  muft  make  many  a 
lacrince  to  our  underftanding  and  will,  in  order  to  con- 
duct ourfelves  conformably  to  the  will  of  God.  We 
muft  endeavour  to  diftinguifh  truth  from  error,  good 
from  evil,  realities  from  appearances,  principally  for 
this  end,  that  we  may  invariably  purfue  the  one  and 
reject  and  avoid  the  other.  We  muft  ftudy  nature  in 
all  its  beauty,  ufefulnefs,  harmony  and  order,  that  the 
heart  may  be  convinced  of  the  exiftence,  the  infinite 
Wifdbm,  goodnefs  and  rnajefty  of  God,  and  fenfibly 
feel  the  neceftity  and  importance  of  our  indifpenfible 
obligation  to  glorify,  love  and  obey  him.  We  muft 
be  indefatigable  in  our  refearches  after  truth,  that  we 
may  have  all  pofhble  motives  to  examine  our  own 
hearts,  to  invigorate  our  inclinations,  and  to  render 
them  ftedfaft  in  the  purfuit  of  holinefs.     The  road  to 

virtue 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  13I 

virtue  oftea  becomes  arduous  and  difficult;  many 
temptations  muft  be  overcome,  paflions  muft  be  fub- 
dued,  lively  pictures  of  fenfe  and  imagination  muft  be 
fupprefTed,  our  judgments  fufpended,  our  inclinations 
traverfed,  and  the  whole  compafs  of  our  duties  attended 
to;  not  one  is  to  be  done  by  halves,  much  lefs  to  be 
neglected. 

Hence  it  is  not  a  lefs  important  duty  that  we  be  ex- 
tremely affiduous  in  the  ufe  of  all  the  means  by  which 
the  understanding  may  be  improved,  the  will  melio- 
rated, and  the  mind  invariably  determined  not  to  de- 
viate in  the  leaf!  from  the  line  of  rectitude.  We  muft, 
on  the  contrary,  moft  carefully  avoid  all  things  which 
might  miflead  the  underftanding  and  give  the  will  a 
contrary  direction. 

Among  the  means  which  may  afiift  the  improvement 
of  the  mind,  good  books  and  good  company  are  prin- 
cipally to  be  efteemed;  for,  as  the  former  fet  forth  the 
caufe  of  religion  and  virtue  in  their  true  excellency  and 
falutary  tendency,  fo  the  latter  is  calculated  to  infpire 
the  mind  with  a  noble  zeal  of  emulation,  and  as  a  for- 
cible ftream  to  carry  with  it  our  inclinations  to  prcfecute 
virtuous  purfuits  with  ftedfaftnefs  and  delight. 

But  care  and  circumfpection  are  neceftary,  as  there 
are  great  numbers  of  bad  and  dangerous  books,  and  as 
the  world  abounds  with  bad  examples  and  company. 

Among  bad  books  we  rank  thofe  principally  which 
advocate  the  caufe  of  irreligion,  fpeak  {lightly  of  virtue 
and  its  rewards,  and  reprefent  vice  as  harmlefs  or  in- 
different, or  exhibit  it  under  the  captivating  appear- 
ances and  names  of  virtue. 

Novels  and  romances  of  a  lafcivious  nature  and  ten- 
dency, as  they  have  done  and  ftill  do  a  great  deal  of 

mifchief, 


Ij2  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

mifchief,  are  juftly  brought  into  the  catalogue  of  dan- 
gerous books ;  for  the  purpofe  of  them  is  to  intoxicate 
the  mind  with  faJfe  and  fictitious  reprefentations,  cal- 
culated to  excite  and  inflame  the  paftlons,  pervert  the 
judgment  of  youth,  and  to  give  a  loofe  to  all  the  boif- 
tercus  inclinations  of  an  unfettled  difpofiticn.  Such 
books  in  the  hands  of  youth  muft  be  particularly  dan- 
gerous; for,  as  their  underftandings,  not  yet  mature, 
want  the  aid  of  experience  to  diftinguifh  realities  from 
appearances  and  juft  reafoning  from  fallacy,  not  only  a 
considerable  part  of  precious  time  will  be  wafted  and 
loft,  but  their  morals  will  be  corrupted,  and  the  temp- 
tations thrown  in  their  way,  like  hidden  poifon,  will 
have  a  pernicious  effect. 

We  cannot  fpeak  highly  in  favour  of  the  beft  books 
of  this  kind,  though  their  exprefs  deflgn  is  to  recom- 
mend virtue  and  perfeverance  in  goodnefs  under  a  va- 
riety of  trials  •,  for,  as  all  is  fiction,  which  feldom  or 
never  can  be  realifed  in  life,  curiofity  may  thereby  be 
entertained,  but  no  melioration  of  the.  heart  effected. 

We  mould  rather  feel  inclined  to  advife  thofe  who 
have  leifure  hours  to  fpend  them  both  agreeably  and 
profitably  in  reading  hiftory :  facts  realifed  in  life  are 
in  themfelves  interefting,  and,  befides,  exhibit  leflbns 
of  prudence  with  refpect  both  to  public  and  private  life. 
Hiftory  gives  us  a  lively  reprefentation  of  the  ways  of 
divine  providence  in  the  world.  Contemplating  the 
rife  and  fall  of  empires,  we  learn  to  revere  God's  righ- 
teous judgments. 

Much  alio  will  depend  upon  our  choice  of  company  •> 
for,  as  converfation  with  good  and  righteous  perfons 
is  one  of  the  moft  lively  incitements  to  virtue,  and  cal- 
culated to  ihield  us  againft  many  temptations,  fo  the 

company 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY'.  I  33 

company  of  the  wicked  is  a  peft  to  good  manners,  the 
fchool  of  vice,  and  an  alrnoft  infallible  criterion  of  a  bafe 
mind  and  depraved  heart. 

What  can  be  a  greater  incitement  to  a  faithful  dis- 
charge of  our  duty  than  the  consideration  of  the  im- 
mortality of  the  foul  ?  The  care  we  take  of  it  fhall 
never  caufe  regret ;  the  good  done  in  this  life  fhall  be 
enjoyed  forever. 

Sch. — The  immortality  of  the  foul  is  doubtlefs  one  of  the  moft 
important  truths  that  ever  can  engage  the  human  under- 
ftanding;  for  we  are  thereby  enabled  to  know  the  great 
and  glorious  deftiny  of  our  nature;  and  it  is  from  a  due 
confideration  thereof  that  our  fouls  feel  inexpreffible  ani- 
mation in  the  arduous  performance  of  all  the  duties  of 
'  life.  It  fets  divine  wifdom,  power,  goodnef6  and  juflice 
in  the  cleareft  light,  and  caufes  us  to  triumph  over  all 
manner  of  adverfity,  even  over  death  itfelf.  Convinced 
of  the  immortality  of  the  foul,  we  may  look  for  a  glorious 
reftoration  of  that  frail  part  of  our  nature,  the  deftiny 
of  which  is  to  return  to  the  duft  from  whence  it  is  taken, 
until  God  fhall  judge  every  man  according  to  his  deeds. 
Our  labour,  then,  in  the  purfuit  of  virtue,  our  denials  in 
the  faithful  difcharge  of  our  duties,  (hall  not  be  in  vain, 
but  ultimately  crowned  with  fuccefs  and  rewarded  with 
everlafting  glory. 

The  immortality  of  the  foul  comprehends  two 
things,  to  wit,  a  continual  duration  of  its  exiftence,  and 
the  never-ceafing  confcioufnefs  of  itfelf  and  of  thofe 
actions  which  have  been  done  in  conjunction  with  the 
body  in  this  life. 

All  beings  of  a  /imple  nature  have  perpetual  exig- 
ence in  common  with  the  fouls  of  men.  Though 
we  are  not  able  to  give  a  fatisfactory  account  of  the 
future  deftiny  of  the  fouls  of  animals,  or  the  firft  ele- 
ments of  compound  beings,  yet  we  may  take  it  for 
granted,  that  they  will  anfwer  the  great  ends  which  in- 
finite 


IJ4  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

finite  wifdom  and  goodnefs  hath  defigned  in  decreeing 
and  giVirig  them  exigence,  particularly  as  the  power  of 
God  is  all-fufficient.  So  much  is  certain,  that  things 
of  a  fimple  nature  cannot  ceafe  to  exift  as  thofe  which 
are  compounded :  where  parts  may  be  tranfpofed  or 
difiblved,  there  only  changes  or  diflblution  can  take 
place.  If  the  former  mould  ceafe  to  exift,  nothing  in 
themielves  nor  any  thing  from  without  could  be  a  fuf- 
ficient  caufe  of  fuch  an  effect  except  the  will  of  God. 
That  power  alone  can  caufe  things  to  return  to  their 
priftine  ft  ate  that  called  them  from  mere  poflibility  to 
a  ftate  of  exigence. 

An  act  of  the  divine  will,  by  which  God  mould 
caufe  things  that  exift  to  return  to  the  ftate  of  mere 
poffibility  in  which  they  were  before  creation,  is  known 
by  the  term  annihilation.  Beings  of  a  fimple  nature 
cannot,  therefore,  ceafe  to  exift  but  by  annihilation. 

But  it  is  a  aueftion*  Will  God  annihilate  ?  We  an- 
j.  * 

liver  in  the  negative  •,  for,  with  refpect  to  the  fouls  of 
brutes  and  the  fir  ft  elements  of  compofition,  no  fhadow 
of  proof  can  be  afforded  that  their  annihilation  would 
be  confident  with  the  wifdom  of  God.  "With  regard 
to  th^  human  foul,  we  have  convincing  arguments  that 
its  annihilation  would  contradict  the  infinite  wifdom, 
goodnefs  and  juftice  of  God.  He  mould  have  en- 
dowed it  with  faculties  fuperior  to  the  limits  of  time 
and  fpace,  and  given  that  power  itfelf  but,  as  it  were, 
a  momentary  exiftence  ?  Can  infinite  wifdom  and 
goodnefs  do  any  thing  in  vain  ?  And  muft  we  not  af- 
iert  fuch  an  abfurdity,  if  v/e  hold  that  the  foul  fhall  in 
a  fhort  fpace  of  time  ceafe  to  exift  ?  Certainly  a  perfon 
who  knows  any  thing  of  the  power  that  is  in  man  muft 
be  fenfible  that  its  thoughts  connect  things  paft  with 

the 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  1   ■  J 

the  prefent,  and  from  thefe  look  forward  through  in- 
conceivable eternity.  Limited  now  to  the  body,  it 
takes  its  range  into  the  heavens,  pervades  the  dark  re- 
gions, the  habitations  of  endlefs  mifery,  pierces  through 
the  veil  of  time,  and  beholds  the  blefied  abodes  where 
peace  and  joy  for  ever  reign.  That  fpirit  mould  ceafe 
to  exift  that  has  capacities  fo  vaft  and  divine?  What 
mail  we  fay  of  the  defires  of  our  fouls,  which  nothing 
of  a  frail  or  temporary  nature  can  fatisfy,  and  which 
finds  contentment  only  in  the  hope  that  it  fhall  enjoy 
God  and  his  communion  from  eternity  to  eternity? 

And  for  fuch  an  enjoyment  the  foul  is  qualified  by 
its  perfonality.  It  is  confcious  of  its  exiftence  and  ac- 
tions in  the  prefent  moment ;  it  has  power  to  recollect 
time  which  is  pan1,  and  that  power  fhall  continue  unto 
eternity.  For,  though  the  fou!  obtains  primitive  ideas 
by  the  organs  of  fenfe,  yet  it  forms  thofe  which  are  dis- 
tinct by  its  own  application  and  powers,  in  a  manner  fc 
far  independent  of  the  body,  that  this  is  not  feldom  an 
obftacle  and  incumbrance  to  the  exercife  of  thofe  fpiri- 
tual  and  fublime  reprefentations,  which,  once  imprefied 
on  the  foul,  can  never  be  erafed  from  its  recollection. 
The  foul,  therefore,  after  feparation  from  the  body,  will 
certainly  know  that  it  once  exiiled  in  conjunction  with 
it,  and  committed  or  omitted  fuch  actions  as  render  it 
acceptable  to  God,  or  an  object  of  his  difpleafure. 
Thus  the  human  foul  will  not  only  continue  to  exift, 
but  be  confcious  of  its  prefent  and  pair,  ftates,  and  capa- 
ble of  everlafting  rewards  or  punimments  -,  that  is,  the 
human  foul  has  not  only  perpetual  duration.,  but  is 
deftined  for  immortality. 

This  truth,  together  with  a  future  ftate  of  exiftencc 
of  our  bodies,  is  (till  more  firmly  efiablifhed  upon  the 

unerring 


l%6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY," 

unerring  juftice  of  God.  Shall  the  judge  of  the  world 
not  do  right  ?  Shall  not  every  good  action  meet  its  re- 
ward, and  all  acts  of  unrighteoufnefs  be  ultimately  pu- 
nifhed  according  to  their  deferts  ?  We  anfwer  in  the 
affirmative;  for  that  God  is  righteous  is  as  certain  as 
that  he  exifts ;  and  as  the  heavens  and  the  earth  declare 
his  exigence,  fo  the  day  will  come  when  they  mall 
witnefs  and  approve  his  righteous  judgment. 

Sch.  1. — Though  we  hold  to  the  continued  duration  of  all  be- 
ings of  a  fimple  nature,  yet  we  deny  that  any  other  than 
thofe  which  are  intelligent  are  poifefled  of  an  immortal 
nature.     Immortality  is  the  prerogative  of  fpirits. 

Sch.  2. — But  mail  not  cur  bodies  be  alfo  raifed  to  immortality? 
We  anfwer,  that  the  glorious  immortality  with  which  our 
bodies  mall  be  endued  does  not  flow  from  the  natural 
powers  of  them,  but  from  the  power,  wifdom  and  juftice 
of  God. 

Since  the  foul  and  body  are  the  efTential  parts  of  our 
nature,  and  exifl:  in  the  clofeft  union  and  harmony 
whilft  we  are  in  this  life,  it  follows,  that  we  cannot 
perform  our  duty  to  the  foul  if  we  do  not  at  the  fame 
time  endeavour  to  render  the  body  as  perfect  as  poffible. 

As  the  body  is  capable  of  an  infinite  variety  of  modes, 
influential  on  human  happinefs,  among  the  various  per- 
fections of  which  it  is  fufceptible  we  may  diftinguifh 
thofe  which  are  born  with  us  from  others  which  are 
acquired. 

The  perfections  of  the  body  born  with  us  may  be 
called  its  conftitution-,  thofe  which  are  acquired  conMit 
of  various  habits  and  accomplijkmenls^  and  have  reference 
either  to  the  necefTaries,  the  conveniences  or  the  luxuries 
of  life :  as  they  may  be  conformable  or  contrary  to  the 
dictates  of  natural  laws  and  the  fcope  of  our  prefent 
exiftence,  they  become  particular  objects  of  commiffive 

and  omiillve  duties. 

The 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  137 

The  foundation  of  conftitution,  health,  and  all  ether 
accompJifhments,  is  life  itfelf,  the  greatest  of  earthly 
ble/Tings.  The  oppofite  of  life  is  deatl\  the  greateft 
evil  that  can  befal  the  body. 

Love  to  life  and  the  fear  of  death  are  ihmnclts  which 

we  have  in  common  with  other  beings  endowed  with 

animal  life,  fave  this  difference,  that  the  fenfe  thereof 

is  heightened  by  the  profpect  of  futuritv,  which  brutes 

are  incapable  of,  or  rjoilefs  in  a  very  fmall  degree.     But 

as  rational  creatures  enjoy  life  for  far  more  glorious 

purpofes  than  brutes,  it  becomes  us  to  love  life,  not 

for  the  fake  of  its  enjoyment  folely,  but  principally  for 

the  purpofe  of  being  active  in  the  performance  of  all 

the  duries  which  the  Creator  has  affirmed  us  for  the 

great  ends  of  his  glorification,  for  our  own  felicity  and 

that  of  others.     Thus  animal  life,  which  confifls  in  the 

activity  of  anirrial  powers,  becomes  rational  in  man,  if 

not  only  the  powers  of  the  body,  but  principally  thofe 

of  the  foul  are  employed  and  conftantly  active  for  the 

attainment  of  the  end  of  his  exiftence,  for  a  felicity  that 

lafts  for  ever. 

Scli. — How  important  is  life,  if  it  is  confidered  as  a  ftate  of 
preparation  for  that  of  a  more  glorious  and  everialting 
exiflence!  How  inglorious,  when  thefe  great  ends  are 
neglected,  when  men,  endowed  with  rationality,  live  to 
no  better  purpofe  than  to  go  through  the  rotine  of  eating, 
drinking  and  fleeping,  until  death  finifhes  their  career! 
If  the  brute  lives  fo,  it  lives  innocently,  and  accomplishes 
the  end  for  which  its  exiftence  is  given :  but  can  man  be 
innocent,  if  his  foul  is  not  active  In  the  purfuit  of  virtue, 
perhaps  active  in  fm  and  vice?  Dees  he  live  up  to  the 
dignity  of  his  nature  by  fpending  his  days  idly  and  nn- 
profitably  to  himfelf  and  others? 

It  is,  therefore,  an  important  duty  that  we  learn  to 

know  the  value  and  deftination  of  life,  that  we  may 

improve  it  by  an  indefatigable  purfuit  after  virtue. 

~T  Upon 


itt  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


3 


Upon  this  confederation  it  cannot  but  be  one  of  our 
firft  duties  that  we  endeavour  to  preferve  life. 

This  duty  is  generally  known  by  the  term  felf-prc- 
fervation^  and  writers  on  morality  juftly  lay  it  down  as 
the  greateft  and  firft  of  duties  •,  for  if  life  ceafes,  all 
poftlbility  to  do  our  duty  m  this  world  is  at  an  end. 

The  horrid  crime  oppofed  to  this  duty  is  filicide^ 
where  a  perfon  deprives  himfelf  of  life. 

Sch.  i. — ^Since  we  have  not  given  life  to  ourfelves,  and  fince 
it  is  given  by  God  for  greater  and  more  glorious  purpofes 
than  fenfual  enjoyment,  it  follows,  that  no  perfon,  under 
anv  circumftances  whatever,  is  at  libertv  to  take  awav  his 
own  life. 

Sen.  2. — :It  is  to  be  hoped,  that  a  crime  fo  unnatural  will  find 
no  advocates  among  the  rational  part  of  mankind;  and 
there  is  caufe  to  fuppofe,  that  perfons  who  have  made 
themfeives  fad  examples  of  its  perpetration  have  laboured 
under  mental  infirmities,  or  were  furprifed  by  moft  vio- 
lent pa&ons. 

Sen.  3. — Suicide  may  betray  daftardly  cowardice,  but  can  ne- 
ver be  a  fign  of  magnanimity  and  true  courage.  The 
example  of  Cato  is  not  an  exception,  and  his  harangue 
is  floic  bombaft  and  phrenzy. 

All  actions  where  life  is  expofed  to  unnecefiary  dan- 
ger, amount  to  a  kind  of  fuicide,  and. are  therefore  to 
be  avoided. 

But  life  may  be  expofed  to  imminent  danger  in  a 
very  jufc  manner,  nay,  even  loft  with  glory,  when  the 
glory  cf  Gcd  or  public  good  in  an  immediate  manner 
require  that  facrifice  •„  for  the  chief  end  of  life  is  the 
glory  of  God-,  and  with  the  prefervation  of  our  coun- 
try, our  own  life  and  the  prefervation  of  other  valuable 
lives  is  connected.  By  thus  fupporting  the  caufe  of 
God  and  of  cur  country,  we  cannot  be  charged  with 

flighting 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  39 

flighting  a  blefling,  bat  we  are  to  chufe,  in  a  eojliftoa 

of  important  duties,  the  performance  of  the  greateit. 

The  prefervation  of  life  is  immediately  connected 
with  another  important  duty,  which  enjoins  all  pofiible 
care  and  the  obfervance  of  all  neceffary  means  to  pre- 
ferve  our  health.  A  fickly  life  is  but  a  lingering  death  •, 
for  what  are  things  of  the  mod:  exquiiite  tafte  and 
beauty  to  a  conftitution  dead  to  enjoyment  and  plea- 
fure  ?  Sicknefs  not  only  renders  the  body  unable  to 
perform  the  duties  of  our  calling,  but  alio  damps  the 
powers  of  the  foul,  and  thus  unfits  it  for  any  great  and 
yfeful  undertaking :  in  fliort,  it  renders  life  difagreeable 
to  ourfelves  and  unprofitable  to  others. 

Thofe,  therefore,  who,  by  the  ill  management  of 
Jife,  by  excefTes,  luxury,  idlenefs,  and  intemperance, 
ruin  their  conftitution,  fin  againft  their  own  life  and 
render  themfelves  in  fome  meafure  guilty  of  fuicide. 

Our  conftitution  being  the  quality  of  the  body  born 
with  us,  confifts  in  a  harmonious  ftructure  and  a  moft 
wonderful  mechanifm  of  its  feveral  parts :  thefe  depend 
for  their  operations  upon  things  which  fuppcrt  that 
harmony.  There  is  a  proper  mixture  of  fluids  requi- 
site to  prevent  its  derangement.  Too  great  a  wafte  of 
powers,  or  other  extraneous  caufes  or  accidents,  may 
debilitate,  nay,  deftroy  it. 

Many  things,  therefore,  are  neccflary  for  the  prefer- 
vation of  our  health,  which  of  courfe  become  import- 
ant duties :— We  muft  procure  fuftlcient  meat  and 
drink,  afford  the  body  moderate  reft  and  relaxation, 
provide  it  with  cloathing  and  convenient  fhelter  againft 
the  inclemency  of  the  feafons,  ftudy  cleanlinefs,  &c. 

As  all  thefe  duties  require  the  application  of  mental 
faculties  and  bodily  ftrength,  there  is  fuilicient  caufe 

on 


14°  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

on  that  account  why  labour  and  diligent  application 
fnould  be  claffed  amongit  the  mcft  indifpenfible  duties 
for  the  prefer vation  of  life  and  health. 

But  there  is  another  confederation  which,  if  poffible, 
enhances  the  obligation,  and  fhould  particularly  endear 
to  us  a  ufeful  occupation  in  life :  this  is,  that  exercife 
and  health,  labour,  and  the  enjoyment  of  the  good 
things  of  this  life,  are  infeparably  connected.  Labour 
invigorates,  idlenefs  and  luxury  weaken  our  conftitu- 
tion :  a  laborious  perfon  finds  exquifite  fweetnefs  in  the 
coarfeft  and  moil  common  nourifhment,  whilft  the 
luxurious  idler  is  condemned  to  chew,  not  to  eat,  fince 
he  finds  relifh  in  nothing. 

Another  neceflary  mean  and  duty  for  the  preferva- 
tion  of  our  health  is  temperance,  that  excellent  virtue 
which  commands  moderation  in  all  our  enjoyments  : — 
intemperance,  with  its  fcandalous  offspring,  gluttony, 
drunkennefs,  lafcivioufnefs,  incontinence,  pride  and 
orientation,  independent  of  their  horrid  effects  upon 
the  peace  of  families  and  fociety,  may  be  looked  upon 
as  more  deftructive  to  the  life  cf  mankind  than  war, 
hunger  and  the  plague  together. 

Serenity  and  tranquillity  of  mind,  the  natural  con- 

fequences  of  a  prudent  and  virtuous  conduct:,  form  an 

invaluable  ingredient  in  the  promotion  of  health.     A 

taithful  performance  of  our  duties,  therefore,  becomes 

necefTary,  not  only  for  the  perfection  of  the  foul,  but 

alfo  tor  the  perfection  of  the  body. 

Sch.  i. — From  the  comprehenfive  duty  which  commands  the 
prefervaiion  of  life  and  health,  many  inferences  may  be 
draVh,  which  might  ferve  as  maxims  for  the  regulation 
of  our  conduct  in  the  multifarious  fituations  and  circum- 
fiances  of  life.  We  ought,  for  inftance,  to  be  truly  {en- 
fible  of  the  necefTity  of  government,  and  the  great  advanr 


tag;e? 

J? 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I4I 

tages  we  derive  from  its  protection,  iince,  among  many- 
other  valuable  benefits,  it  affords  fecurity  to  both  life  and 
property. 

Se/i.  2. — We  ought  to  avoid  every  thing  bv  which  others  may 
obtain  the  right  to  confine  our  perfon  or  deprive  us  of  life. 

Sch.  3. — Tt  will  often  become  our  indifpenfible  duty  to  feek  the 
affiffance,  and  faithfully  to  follow  the  directions  of  thofe 
who  have  fuccefsfuliy  applied  their  time  and  talents  to  the 
fludy  and  practice  of  the  healing  art. 

Sch.  4. — Life  above  all  things  is  precious;  but  nothing  is  more 
valuable  in  life  than  health  and  a  good  conference. 

There  may  be  fituations  of  life  in  which  it  will  be- 
come impofhble  for  us  to  obey  all  the  laws  which  have 
controul  over  us,  on  account  of  their  collifion :  in  fuch 
cafes  we  cannot  perform  all  our  duties  ;  but  by  acting 
conformably  to  one  we  muft  act  contrary  to  another ; 
that  is,  our  duties  clajh,  and  it  becomes  our  obligation 
to  perform  the  greateft  in  preference  to  the  leaf!:. 

Whenever  a  duty  dailies  with  the  great  law  of  felf- 
preiervation,  we  are  faid  to  be  in  ?l  ftate  ofnecejjity. 

The  ftate  of  necefTity  may  be  abfolute,  extreme,  or 
refpective. 

A  ftate  of  abfolute  necefTity  is,  where  life  is  in  im- 
minent danger  •,  as,  where  a  perfon  with  a  drawn  fword 
or  a  charged  gun  runs  againft  another  threatening  to 
fake  away  his  life. 

A  ftate  of  extreme  necefTity  is,  where  our  owrn  life  is 
not  immediately  in  imminent  danger,  but  that  of  per- 
fons  who  are  next  to  life  dear  to  us  •,  or,  where  things 
abfoluteiy  neceftary  for  the  prefervation  of  life  are  for- 
cibly taken  away  \  as,  for  inftance,  if  a  perfon  runs  up 
with  fword  or  piftol  in  a  threatening  pofture  againft 
another's  wife,  child,  brother,  father  or  neighbour  \  or, 
if  he  is  taking  away  our  provifion  in  a  defert  far  diftant 
from  a  pofiibility  of  obtaining  a  fupply,  &c. 

A  ftate 


*42  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

A  ftate  ofrefpeffive  necefiity  has  reference  to  cafes 
where  life  has  not  really  been  in  imminent  danger,  but 
where  the  agent  has  considered  himfelf  in  fuch  a  fitua- 
tion :  foT  inftance;  a  perfon  may  have  a  gun  uncharged, 
a  circumftance  well  known  to  himfelf  and  to  others, 
but  unknown  to  him  whole  courage  he  intended  to  put 
to  a  trial,  by  aiTuming  a  threatening  pofiure  with  the 
weapon  in  his  hand. 

In  a  ftate  of  abfolute  necefFity,  the  duty  of  felf-pre- 
fervation  juftifies  and  commands  to  take  aw  ay  the  life 
of  an  aggrefibr,  if  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  defend  our- 
felves  by  any  other  means.  But  to  take  away  life  when 
we  can  preferve  our  own  by  maiming  or  otherwife 
clifabling  or  confining  the  aggreflor,  would  be  naturally 
unlawful. 

The  fame  duties  will  refult  from  a  ftate  of  extreme 
necefTity.  If  we  cannot  defend  the  life  of  a  wife,  child, 
&c:  &c.  without  taking  the  life  of  the  aggreftbr,  felf- 
prefervation  juftifles  that  dreadful  alternative.  The 
fame  would  be  the  cafe  if  thofe  things  are  taken  away 
whereon  the  prefervation  of  life  immediately  depends  -, 
as,  provinon  in  a  wildernefs. 

In  a  ftate  of  refpective  neceftity,  we  cannot  account 
for  the  feelings  of  another.  If  he  who  paffes  an  im- 
prudent and  unmanly  joke  upon  another  fuffers,  we 
have  caufe  to  pity  his  indifcretion,  but  judge  the  de- 
fendant innocent. 

Injudicial  proceedings,  confideration  for  the  feelings 
of  a  perfon  who  has  conceived  himfelf  in  a  ftate  of  ne- 
cefTity, is  Wiled  favdyr  of  nccejjity. 

Ech.  i. — Extreme  neceffity  may  be  greater  or  lefs ;  perfons 
likewifl*  differ  v/irh  refpeft  to  temper;  circum (lances  have 
alfo  a  confide:  hience  upon  the  human  mind;  fa 

that 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  1 43 

that  it  is  vcrv  difficult  to  judge  what  a  perfon  ought  to 
have  done  or  omitted.  We  fhould  not  be  forward,  there- 
fore, to  enter  upon  a  peremptory  judgment  with  rcfpect 
to  the  conduct  of  others,  who  have  been  more  or  lefs  in 
a  ii.ite  of  necefiity,  or  had  caufes  to  conceive  themfelves 
in  fuch  a  fituation. 
«SV//.  2. — The  barbarous  cuftom  of  duelling  being  founded  up- 
on a  chimerical  law  of  honour,  in  direct  contradiction  to 
the  facred  precepts  of  moral  law,  is  fo  fart  from  ccrming 
under  a  ftate  of  necefhty,  that  it  is  in  every  tnftance  a 
premeditated  act  of  wilful  tranfgrellion  againft  the  laws 
of  God  and  the  municipal  laws  of  the  land — a  crime 
equally  participating  of  filicide  and  of  murder. 

ScL  3. — A  wife  and  good  man  will  never  fufler  himfelf  to  be 
milled  by  fnch  miftaken  notions  of  honour;  nor  will  he 
ever  find  himfelf  deftitute  of  the  moft  efficacious  means 
of  defending  his  character;  for,  wifely  purfuing  the  path 
of  virtue,  he  cannot  fail  of  having  the  good  opinion  of 
the  upright  in  his  favour;  and  he  fets  not  fo  great  a  value 
upon  the  eflimation  of  perfons  of  a  contrary  character  as 
that  he  mould  wilfully  violate  the  laws  of  God  and  his 
country. 

There  are  innumerable  things  neceilary  as  means  for 
a.  prudent  and  faithful  performance  of  the  duties  we 
owe  to  the  foul  and  body.* — Things  neceilary  and  con- 
venient for  the  prefervation  of  life,  and  calculated  to 
affift  us  in  the  performance  of  our  duties,  may  be  com- 
prehended under  the  term  eflate. 

It  therefore  becomes  a  weighty  duty  which  we  owe 
to  ourfelves,  that  we  endeavour,  by  all  lawful  means 
in  our  power,  to  procure  and  to  preferve  an  eftate. 

Actions  by  which  an  eflate  may  be  procured  and 
preferved  in  a  lawful  manner,  are  denoted  by  the  term 
labour-,  and  a  certain  mode  of  conducting  labour  is 

called  an  occupation. 

j. 

We  are  confeo^iently  bound  to  labour,  and  to  follow 
a  certain  lawful  occupation. 


144  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sc&.  i. — It  is  from  the  furprifing  variety  of  occupations  that 
each  perfon  may  be  ufeful'y  employed  and  may  lawfully 
obtain  a  portion  of  the  general  flock  of  thofe  things 
which  are  neceffary  and  convenient  for  life :  it  is  from  the 
fame  fource  fhat  countries  draw  their  riches,  and  acquire 
importance  and  ftrcngth;  that  commerce  flourilhes,  and 
the  produce  of  the  earth,  the  fruits  of  induftrv,  fupply 
and  conn  eel:  the  molt  diftant  regions  of  the  globe. 

Sch.  2. — The  oppolite  of  labour  is  idlenefs,  a  pernicious,  un- 
natural and  moil  injurious  vice,  in  itfelf  difgracefui  to 
human  nature,  and  the  fatal  fource  of  innumerable  evils, 
deftrucVive  both  to  the  morals  of  the  idler  and  others,  and 
hurtful  in  a  high  degree  to  families  and  fociety. 

It  is  consequently  our  duty  to  make  the  beft  ufe  of 
our  own  for  rendering  life  as  ufeful  and  comfortable  as 
poffible ;  and,  as  our  own  means  and  application  may 
not  always  prove  fufficient  for  thefe  purpofes,  vc  muft 
endeavour  to  conciliate  the  pjocd  will  and  afTiilance 
of  others.    . 

This  leads  to  another  important  duty  which  we  owe 
to  ourfelves  •,  that  we  remain  in  all  our  actions  and 
purfuits  folicitous  to  maintain  a  good  name  and  cha- 
racter-, fot  nothing  more  conciliates  the  good  will  and 
benevolence  of  others,  or  renders  us  more  extenfively 
ufeful  in  life. 

It  is  true,  that  a  good  name  and  character  reft  upon 
the  good  opinions  of  others  concerning  the  rectitude  of 
our  conduct,  and  that  nothing  feems  to  be  lefs  at  our 
command  than  that  opinion :  but  we  may  not  thence 
infer  that  a  good  name  and  character  are  things  entirely 
of  a  precarious  nature  or  unattainable.  A  faithful 
performance  of  all  our  duties  will  attract  the  notice 
and  influence  the  good  opinion  of  all  the  virtuous  and 
upright  who  know  us  *,  to  have  a  good  name  with  them 
is  true  honour  -,  nay,  virtue  has  a  certain  charming 

power 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  145 

power  even  in  the  fip-ht  of  thofe  who  are  votaries  fo 
vice,  that  they  cannot  hut  efteem  it  m  others.  How- 
ever that  may  be,  we  have  caufe,  for  our  own  fatisf  ac- 
tion and  contentment  in  life,  to  maintain  that  character-, 
for  if  the  world  proves  uirjuft,  we  ought  to  do  ourfelves 
juftice,  and  defeat,  by  a  ftedfaft  conduct  In  the  line  of 
rectitude,  all  attacks  which  envy,  calumny  or  malice 
may  invent. 

Among  the  means  given  us  for  the  great  duties 
which  we  are  bound  to. perform  to  ourfelves,  is  princi- 
pally time :  we  ought  to  be  careful  to  improve  it  by  a 
wife,  prudent  and  diligent  management  of  every  thing 
that  is  comprehended  in  our  duty  to  God,  to  ourfelves 
and  to  others.  Time  unprofitably  fpent  is  wafted,  loir. 
Our  duties  in  life  are  great ;  the  time  allotted  for  the 
faithful  performance  of  them  is  limited  to  an  uncertain 
and  fhort  fpace.     . 

It  is  evident  from  what  has  htzn  hitherto  explained, 
that  our  duties  are  not  only  extremely  comprehenfive, 
but  likewife  fo  varioufty  modified,  fo  intimately  con- 
nected and  interwoven  with  one  another,  that  ail  our 
exertions,  ail  poffible  care,  prudence  and  circumfpection 
ought  to  be  joined  to  our  pureft  intention,  left  we  -be 
wanting  to  ourfelves,  and  eventually  mifs  thathappi- 
nefs  which  is,  next  to  the  glory  of  God,  the  great  and 
ultimate  end  of  our  exiflence. 

It  is  for  this  end  that  we  mould  beware  of  feparating 
our  duties ',  which  will  be  the  cafe  if  we  perform  fomc 
and  neglect  others,  if  we  are  careful  in  one  refpect  and. 
negligent  in  others. 

Let  us  not  prepofteroufly  imagine,  that  we  can  be 
faithful  to  ourfelves  without  being  fo  to  God  and  to  our 

U  fellow 


J 46  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

fellow  creatures ;  or  that  we  can  pleafe  the  Almighty, 
if  we  neglect  the  duties  to  ourfelves  and  others. 

Sch.  i. — Hence  it  appears,  that  impofing  upon  ourfelves  par- 
ticular hardfhips  and  feverities  under  the  idea  of  felf-de- 
nial,  is  unjuft  cruelty  committed  againft  ourfelves,  and 
by  no  means  a  fervice  rational  or  plealing  to  God. 

Sch.  2. — It  is  likewife  evident,  that  we  cannot  be  truly  religious 
if  we  do  not  endeavour  to  be  as  ufefu!  to  others  as  poflible, 
or  if  we  neglect  duties  which  we  owe  to  ourfelves  and  our 
own  houfhold. 

Sch.  3. — It  is  therefore  a  falfe  notion,  if  people  place  religion 
only  in  immediate  acts  of  worfliip,  confined  to  houfes  of 
public  aflemblies,  meetings,  or  the  clofet;  as  if  thole  things 
had  a  peculiar  merit  in  themfelves,  and  were  not  ordained 
or  neceflary  to  qualify  us  for  the  faithful  performance  of 
all  our  duties  in  all  circumitances,  fituations  and  relations 
in  life.  It  is  a  high  authority  that  commands  us,  whether 
ivis  cat  cr  drink,  or  whatfoever  zee  do,  to  do  it  to  the  glory  of  God. 

Even  in  that  clafs  of  duties  which  has  immediate 
reference  to  ourfelves,  particular  care  and  circum- 
fpeflion  is  neceflary  to  beware  of  a  fatal  feparation  of 
duties :  for  it  is  pofiible, 

1  ft.  That  perfons  may  fuppofe  themfelves  well  en- 
gaged in  their  duties  towards  foul  and  body,  even  whilft 
they  neglect  things  neceflary,  convenient  and  ufeful  for 
life,  bv  fquandering  away  or  being  unconcerned  for  an 
effete,  not  carefully  attending  to  an  ufeful  occupation 
in  lite,  or  flighting  the  good  opinion  of  others. 

2d.  That  man  may  confine  his  care  and  attention 
entirely  to  the  foul,  neglecting  the  body  and  all  concern 
for  the  means  of  fubfiftence  and  fupport. 

3d.  That  he  may  pay  all  attention  to  the  body, 
whilit  the  weighty  concerns  of  an  immortal  foul  are 
neglected,  and  whjlft  he  is  unmindful  of  neceflary  la- 
bour and  the  prefervation  of  an  eftate. 

4.  That 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  4 


•• 


4.  That  perfons  may  engage  with  io  much  avidity 
in  the  purfuks  of  honour,  preferment  and  an  eftate,  as 
to  forget  their  important  obligations  to  foul  and  body. 

Sch.  1. — If  we  except  the  fuperftitiojis  modes  r.;  m  maftic  life, 
there  are  perhaps  but  few  inftances  of  fuch  as  confume 
their  health  and  Subftance  by  too  lev.  re  application  for 
the  improvement  of  their  mental  faculties :  fo  mich  is 
certain,  that  a  Studious  and  Sedentary  life  require 
tion  of  the  mind  and  fome  bodily  exercifefor  kcepihi,  the 
conftitution  ftrong  and  vigorous. 

Sch.  2. — The  number  of  fuch  as  wim  to  mine  in  literary  or 
great  circles,  who  feel  an  ambition  for  drefs  and  a  Sump- 
tuous way  of  living,  fet  an  example  01  high  life  before 
their  children,  or  bring  them  up  in  a  higher  ftate  than 
their  circumftancts  permit,  may  be  more  confiderable. 
However  that  be,  they  are  more  dangerous  tofociety  than 
the  former,  as  the  effects  of  their  extravagance  are  fre- 
quently felt  by  the  indufrrious  part  of  the  community, 
who  have  afforded  the  means  thereto  without  receiving 
juft  compensation.  Such  characters  may  fhine  in  fa- 
fhionable  life,  but  they  are  in  reality  unjuir.  to  themfelves, 
to  their  houfhold,  and  to  others. 

Sch.  3. — The  glutton,  the  drunkard,  the  Spendthrift,  &c.  Serv- 
ing their  bellies,  confume  the  patrimony  of  their  children, 
lead  a  beaftly  life,  and  are  drones  to  Society. 

Sch.  4. — The  mifer,  callous  to  every  feeling  of  humanity,  is 
oppreffive  and  cruel  to  all  who  are  under  his  authority, 
and  uncharitable  both  to  himfelf  and  to  others;  his  only 
aim  is  to  gather  for  his  children,  who  are  brought  up  in 
ignorance  and  Stupidity,  and,  like  him,  remain  Grangers 
to  both  mental  and  corporeal  accomplishments. 

Sch.  y — As  thefe  are  but  a  few  inftances  of  the  evil  consequen- 
ces flowing  from  a  Separation  of  duties  which  men  owe 
themfelves,  we  may  eafily  conceive  how  dreadful  is  the 
evil  if,  befides  reprehenlibiiity  in  this  particular,  a  fepa- 
ration  takes  place  in  the  duties  we  owe  to  God  and  to  our 
fellow  creatures. 

In  each  of  thefe  cafes,  nay,  in  every  inftance  where 
duties  are  Separated,  we  act  contrary  to  the  dictates  of 

natural 


I  4  S'  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

natural  laws;  for  we  do  not  render  ourfelves  as  happy 
ss  poiTible.  Jnllead  of  performing  our  duties,  we 
pervert  them,  and  render  ourfelves  guilty  of  neglect 
and  difobedience. 

It,  then,  the  great  extent  and  high  importance  of 
our  duties  be  weii  considered \  if  cur  natural  infirmity 
be  brought  into  contraft  with  the  high  degree  of  purity 
and  rectitude  which  is  required  in  all  our  intentions  and 
the  whole  conduct  of  life,  through  innumerable  temp- 
tations which  befet  us  from  within  and  without ;  we 
may  well  conclude,  that  more  is  required  for  our  ulti- 
mate happinefs  than  human  nature  in  its  prefent  ftate 
is  able  to  perform. 


Muft  not  this  lead  to  another  inference,  equally  ra- 
tional, of  the  greateft  importance,  and  perhaps  not 
improper  to  be  introduced  here,  that  our  nature  is  fallen. 
frpm  its  original  purity,  and  muft  be  renewed  and  power- 
affifted  if  we  are  to  be  happy  ?  Alas !  there  are  in- 
numerable part  offences  which,  were  it  even  in  cur 
power,  the  mdft.  perfect  performance  of  our  duties  for 
t\\z  future  could  not  erafe :  and  as  our  beft  endeavours 
ftiU  fall  fhort  of  v/hat  we  know  to  be  our  indifpenfible 
duty,  the  profpect  of  an  atonement  on  our  part  is  as 
gloomy  as  the  retrGfpect  on  our  former  accumulated 
guilt.  " 

Reafon,  however,  leaves  us  not  without  hope:  jut 
tice  and  mercy  in  God  may  meet  together.  Afuper- 
natural  remedy  is  poffible  with  him  who  is  infinite  in 
power  and  wii'aom,  and  from  his  infinite  goodnefs  it 
may  be  expected. 

Hence,  in  a  itriking  manner,  flow  both  the  proba- 
bility and  the  necefiity,  on  our  part,  of  a  iupernatur^l 

•:crht, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  149 

light,  by  divine  revelation,  fhewing  the  way  of  our  re- 
conciliation with  the  offended  majefty  of  heaven. 

If  fuch  a  revelation  be. given  by  God,  it  mud:  have 
finking  and  infallible  criteria,  by  which  it  may  be  in- 
conteftibly  afcertained  as  fuch,  and  thereby  diftinguifhed 
from  the  falfe  and  pretended. 

Among  the  criteria  of  a  divine  revelation,  the  fol- 
lowing particularly  deferve  our  notice :  that  it  muft  re- 
veal a  mode  of  reconciliation  which  is  beyond  the  reach 
and  power  of  reafon,  yet  by  no  means  contradictory 
thereto  -,  that  the  way  of  happinefs  which  it  points  out 
is  perfectly  confident  with  the  glory  and  perfections  of 
God,  and  fully  adequate  to  the  natural  infirmity  and 
fpiritual  wants  of  man  •,  that  it  refts  upon  an  extraor- 
dinary and  the  beft  eftablifhed  teftimony. 

Sch.  1. — The  firft  criterion  refts  upon  this  plain  proof:  If  there 
were  a  way  of  reconciliation  within  the  reach  of  reafon, 
an  exprefs  divine  revelation  would  not  have  been  necef- 
fary,  confequently  not  given ;  for  God  does  nothing  in 
vain. 

Sch.  2. — As  reafon  is  given  by  God,  and  a?  revelation  is  necef- 
fary  for  the  purpofe  of  affording  it  more  light  and  eleva- 
tion with  refpecl  to  thofe  things  which  are  requisite  for 
our  eternal  happinefs,  it  is  evident,  that  what  is  contra- 
dictory to  reafon  cannot  be  a  revelation  proceeding  from 
Go* 

We  ought,  therefore,  well  to  diflinguifh  things  beyond  the 
compafs  of  reafon,  from  fuch  as  are  contradictory  thereto. 

Sch.  3. — If  a  revelation  fhould  point  out  a  mode  of  reconcilia- 
tion contradictory  to  the  divine  perfections,  it  would  carry 
with  it  the  inconteftible  proof  of  its  fallacy. 

Sch.  4. — A  mode  of  falvation  which  is  incompetent  for  reliev- 
ing the  infirmities  and  fpiritual  wants  of  men,  cannot 
have  God  for  its  author;  nor  is  the  revelation  pointing  it 
out  from  God. 

Sck. 


I^O  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Stft.  ;. — Men  pretending  to  a  miflion  from  God,  mull  be  en- 
dowed with  fuch  gifts  as  will  enable  them  to  prove  that 
million  by  extraordinary  figns  and  wonders. 

It  is  therefore  a  mod  important  duty  to  ourfelves, 
th.it  we  carefully  examine  into  what  is  offered  as  a  di- 
vine revelation,  and  embrace  and  follow  that  which  has 
thefe  incontrovertible  criteria  of  divine  truth  •,  for,  by 
a  contrary  conduct  we  neglect  tho,  ufe  of  means  requisite 
for  our  happinefs,  are  guilty  of  feparating  our  duty, 
act  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  the  laws  of  God,  both  the 
natural  and  revealed,  and  render  ourfelves  miferable. 

There  is  not,  nor  has  there  ever  been  a  book  in  which 
thefe  and  other  criteria  of  divine  truth  were  to  be  found, 
befides  the  bible  containing  the  Old  and  New  Tefta- 
ments:  thefe  exhibit  a  revelation  of  the  will  of  God 
concerning-  our  eternal  falvation,  worthy  a  divine  ori- 
gin,  and  worthy  the  adoration  both  of  angels  and  men: 
here  we  find  doctrines  furpaffing  indeed  what  finite  be- 
ings fully  comprehend,  yet  perfectly  confident  with 
reafon;  doctrines  fo  far  from  being  repugnant  to  the 
perfections  of  the  Deity,  that  they  reprefent  them  in 
their  full  glory.  Infinite  juftice  and  mercy  are  fhewn 
in  their  intimate  connection,  in  perfect  harmony, 
as  they  meet  in  a  Redeemer's  rightecufnefs  :  God,  the 
holy  one  of  Ifrae!>  juftmes  the  ungodly:  divine  power 
converts  the  foul  and  renews  the  mind:  the  fpirit  of 
God  infpires  tho:  heart  with  the  principle  of  faith  and 
holinefs :  God  works  to  will  and  to  do  according  to  his 
good  pleafure;  man  is  by  grace  enabled  to  work  out 
his  falvation. 

For  this  end  we  alfo  find  in  thefe  books  all  duties  to 
God,  to  ourfelves  and  ethers,  defcribed  in  their  greatefl 
1  puritj  :   here  all  is  functioned  with  the  ma- 

jeftic 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  i 


0 


jeftic  command  of  God;  death  and  life  are  laid  before 
man,  and  the  moft  cogent  motives  given  for  exciting 
his  obedience.  The  divine  perfections,  the  eternal  love 
of  our  heavenly  Father,  the  philanthropy,  the  fuffer- 
ings,  the  death,  the  refurreclion,  the  future  judgment, 
&c.  of  the  Son  of  God,  mould  ftrengtheh  our  fmcerity, 
and  quicken  our  diligence  In  the  purfuit  of  virtue  and 
holmefs.  The  great  truths  which  reafon  faintly  com- 
prehends are  here  laid  open;  the  immortality  'of  the 
foul,  the  refurreclion  of  the  body,  the  final  righteous 
judgment  of  the  Lord  of  heaven  and  earth,  is  brought 
to  full  light.  There  is  an  eternal  and  infinitely  glorious 
reward  referred  for  thofe  who  love  him.  God  is  all- 
fufHcient,  unchangeably  faithful. 

Thefe  fcriptures  ought,  therefore,  to  be  received  as 
the  exprefs  divine  revelation  of  God  for  our  prefent 
and  future-  happinefs.  They  exhibit  the  moft  perfect 
rule  of  faith  and  life,  given  by  the  higher!:  pcflible 
authority,  for  conducting  us  in  the  bed  manner  as  men 
and  chnftians  3  the  moft  perfect  fubjectioii,  therefore, 
is  due  to  its  directions. 

'  Hence  it  follows,,  that  if  we  neglect  the  reading, 
neanng  and  obeying  the  word  of  God,  we  commitTk 
moft  heinous  offence  againft  heaven  and  our  own  hap- 
pinefs. L 

ScLi.—Utus  therefore  not  vainly  imagine,  that  we  know- 
enough  of  our  duties  when  we  are  able  to  trace  them  from 
natural  principles.  Let  us-  not  reft  contented  with  the 
glimmering  light  of  reafon,  but  refort  daily  to  the  divine 
revelation.  Let  us  draw  from  the  fountain  head,  enjoy 
the  full  light  of  the  gofpel  for  concluding  ourfeives 
conformably  to  the  will  pf  heaven.  Let  us  be  fenfible 
or  our  fpintual  wants,  and  among  other  things  which 
S  a  L-  t  du?eS,of  location  and  adoration  before  the 
iUoit  High,  aft  from  the  Father  of  Light  that  xvifdorn 

which 


-*52  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Which  is  from  above,  and  the  guidance  of  his  lpirit  in  ail 
the  ways  of  holinefs  and  truth. 

Sck.  2.- — There  is  nothing  better  calculated  to  give  us  both 
light  and  ftrength  in  the  performance  of  the  duties  of 
cnriftialrity,  than  the  folemn  opportunities  which  the 
public  exercifes  of  religion  fo  frequently  afford  :  thefe  are 
not  only  adapted  to  imprefs  the  mind  with  a  inoft  lively 
fenfe  of  the  omniprcfence  of  God,  and  give  it  that  ele- 
vation above  all  things  of  a  tranfitory  nature  which  ena- 
bles us  to  worfhip  him  in  fpirit  and  in  truth;  but  they 
likewife  remind  us  continually  of  our  infirmity,  fet  before 
us  the  mercies  of  our  God,  and  engage  us  in  the  concerns 
of  an  everlafting  life  and  happinefs. 

Sen.  3. — Let  us  therefore  fet  a  proper  value  upon  thefe  folemn 
opportunities;  let  us  efteem  them  as  our  greateff.  privi- 
leges; let  us  ufe  and  improve  them  for  the  great  and 
falutary  purpofes  for  which  they  are  given. 

Would  it  not  be  the  height  both  of  indifcretion  and  ingra- 
titude, if  we  mould  refufe  or  reject  the  light  which  is 
given  us  for  purfuiug  and  obtaining  everlafting  happinefs? 

The  fcriptures  fet  the  higheft  poflible  pattern  of 
virtue  before  us  •,  we  are  not  to  reft  contented  with  any 
thing  Abort  of  the  will  and  perfections  of  God :  Be  ye 
perfecl^  it  is  fa  id,  as  your  Father  which  is  in  heaven  is 
perfeB.  It  is  true,  we  mall  never  be  able  to  attain  to 
that  purity  and  perfection  which,  as  an  attribute  of  the 
Mo  ft  High,  is  unattainable  by  any  finite  being  •,  ftill, 
by  prefTing  forward  we  fhall,  with  divine  aftiftance, 
come  nearer  and  nearer  to  his  image,  and  may  humbly 
hope,  that  our  fincere  endeavours  will  be  acceptable  to 
him,  and  ultimately  rewarded  with  an  exceeding  great 
reward. 

The  road  of  virtue  is  difficult;  extremes  muft  be 
avoided  in  all  our  actions  •,  the  whole  fum  of  our  duties 
muft  be  attended  to,  left  we  deviate  from  the  path  of 
rectitude,  and  render  ourfelves  miferable. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  1$$ 

Sett,  i. — No  iction,  not  even  the  befl  intended,  can  be  virtu- 
ous, if  it  contradicts  any  of  our  duties :  we  ought  to  be  ;;s 
careful  not  to  fin  by  excefs,  as  we  fhould  to  guard  againft 
deficiency  in  any  of  our  efforts.  Let  it  beobferved,  that 
virtue  is  a  mean  between  two  oppoiite  extremes,  which 
deferve  the  name  of  vices,  becaufe  they  are  wilful  and 
habitual  tranfgreflions  againft  moral  reftitude,  and  againff. 
the  law  and  will  of  God;  and  that,  befides  vicious  and 
wilful  habits  of  vice,  there  are  innumerable  interme- 
diate deviations  from  virtue,  which  confritute  greater  or 
lefs  faults,  as  the  will  of  the  a°;ent  is  more  or  lefs  engaged, 
and  his  conduct  more  or  lefs  conformable  to  the  line  of 
duty. 

Sc/i.  2. — Thefe  obfervations  feemed  necefTary  in  this  placa; 
for,  as  our  obedience  cannot  but  be  imperfect  in  this 
life,  there  is  danger  that  we  fall  into  extremes  with  refpect 
even  to  our  judgment,  by  being  too  ftrict  or  too  lax,  by- 
harrowing  as  it  were  the  path  of  virtue,  that  none  feels  an 
inclination  or  difcovers  a  pofiibility  to  walk  therein  ;  or, 
on  the  other  hand,  by  throwing  open  the  bars  of  recti- 
tude, to  flatter  vice  and  render  miners  fecure. 

Sck.  3. — Let  us  confider  that  our  perfection  admits  of  degrees, 
and  that  we  are  faid  to  be  virtuous  not  becaufe  there  is  no 
imperfection,  no  manner  of  fault  in  us ;  this  is  the  ftate 
we  look  for  in  another  life;  but  we  may  flatter  ourfelves 
to  be  in  the  way  of  virtue,  when  we  grow  daily  in  fin- 
cerity,  goodnefs,  uprightnefs  and  piety — when  we  hate  fin 
and  vice,  deny  ourfelves  and  the  world,  and  love  God  in 
fincerity  and  truth. 

Sch.  4. — We  have  obferved,  that  each  virtue  is  a  mean  which 
has  two  oppofite  extremes,  befides  a  number  of  interme- 
diate deviations;  ideas  which  perhaps  will  not  be  general- 
ly underftood  without  fome  kind  of  illuftration. — Sup- 
pofe  the  known  figure  of  a  circle,  with  its  diamelLr:  if 
lines  be  drawn  through  the  points  of  the  circumference 
which  are  cut  by  the  diameter,  fo  that  they  do  not  equally 
touch  the  centre,  they  cannot  be  perfectly  ftraight;  how- 
ever, they  are  far  from  being  as  crooked  as  the  circumfe- 
rence or  linesnear  it :  compared  with  thefe  they  may  rather 
pafs  for  ftraight.  Thus,  as  perfection  is  not  expected  in 
human  conduct,  actions,  where  the  deviation  is  very  fmall, 
muft  not  be  confounded  with  eccentricity  of  conduct: 

X  .  faults 


1$4  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

faults  may  be  greater  or  lefs,  and  fo  numerous  as  at  Iaff  to 
contract  the  guilt  and  eccentricity  of  vice.  Take,  for 
other  inftances,  the  highly  commendable  virtues  of  cou- 
rage, frugality  and  piety ;  are  not  the  extremes  thereof, 
known  by  the  terms  temerity,  profufenfs^fuperjiithn,  as  re- 
mote from  them  as  the  extremity  of  defect,  as  coioardice, 
avarice  and  impiety? — May  there  not  alfo  be  defects  with 
refpect  to  thofe  virtues  which  do  not  amount  to  temerity, 
profufenefs  and  fuperftition,  nor  render  an  agent  guilty 
of  cowardice,  avarice  and  impiety? 

As  duties  are  anions  done  conformably  to  laws,  they 
mult  be  confident  with  our  moral  obligations  •,  nothing, 
therefore,  can  be  our  duty  that  is  repugnant  to  our 
obligations.  But  as  obligations  and  rights  are  things 
infeparably  connected,  it  likewife  follows,  that  we  muft 
have  particular  refpect  to  our  own  rights  and  thofe  of 
others,  and  that  nothing  can  be  our  duty  which  is  in- 
confiftent  with  them. 

Sc/i. — Let  us  then,  in  all  the  purfuits  and  purpofes  of  life,  ftill 
remember  the  important  queftion,  Is  it  right?  As  virtue 
is  generally  a  habit  to  conduct  ourfelves  conformably  to 
law,  we  may  conclude,  that  it  is  of  infinite  importance 
early  to  form  inch  habits  as  are  conformable  to  the  will 
and  law  of  God,  both  the  natural  and  revealed,  and  to 
guard  againfl:  any  deviation  from  our  duty,  left  a  contrary 
habit  be  contracted,  which  will  eltrange  the  mind  from 
the  love  of  virtue,  and  render  the  attainment  of  it  difficulty 
perhaps  impoffibie. — As  we  cannot  too  foon  begin  the 
practice  of  virtue,  fo  there  is  no  maxim,  perhaps,  better 
calculated  to  fecureus  againfl  vice  than  this:  Principiis 
objia  !    Beware  of  begimiings  ! 


CHAPTER 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  $$ 

CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  duties  of  humanity  in  general . 


w, 


ITH  refpect  to  the  duties  which  we  owe  to  our 
neighbour,  reference  may  be  had  to  imperfect  obliga- 
tions and  laws,  which,  as  they  warrant  no  right  of 
compuliion  in  any  perfon  to  enforce  performance  on  our 
part,  leave  a  compliance  with  his  wimes  or  applications 
entirely  to  our  own  good  will  and  free  choice,  without 
the  fear  of  coercion:  or  refpecl  may  be  had  to  perfect 
obligations  and  laws,  which,  in  cafes  of  non-perform- 
ance on  our  part,  give  our  neighbour  a  perfect  right 
to  enforce  it  by  coercion  or  violence.  Duties  thus 
confidered  are  of  two  kinds :  the  former  are  called  im- 
perfett  duties,  or  duties  of  humanity  •,  the  latter  are  known 
by  the  appellation  of  perf eft  duties,  or  duties  of  neceffity. 

Sch.  i. — Inftances  of  the  firft  kind  we  find  in  the  duties  of /cW 
friendfiip,  affifance,  gratitude,  fympathy,  forbearance,  &c 
Thefe,  as  we  faall  (hew  in  the  next  chapter,  we  owe  our 
neighbour,  and  of  them,  in  one  or  the  other  refpeft,  he 
may  ftand  greatly  in  need;  but,  as  he  has  no  right  to  en- 
force their  performance,  his  only  reliance  is  on  our  good 
will:  if  this  mould  fail,  nothing  remains  but  patiently  to 
bear  the  difappointment,  or  repeat  his  application  in  hopes 
of  better  fuccefs. 

Sch.  2. — But  it  is  quite  a  different  thing  with  refpe#  to  the  du- 
ties of  neceffity :  for  inftance;  the  payment  of  taxes  by  a  ci- 
tizen, in  confequence  of  the  directions  of  the  laws  of  the 
land;  the  obedience  due  from  an  officer  to  his  general,  from  a 
foldier  to  his  officer ;  the  labour  zvhich  ajcrvant  is  to  perform  for 
his  wafer;  the  payment  which  a  debtor  muft  make  to  his  creditor. 
Here  government  may  compel  the  citizen,  the  general  the 

officer, 


I56  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

officer,  the  officer  the  foldier,  the  mafter  the  fervant,  the 
creditor  the  debtor;  as  the  laws  give  each  reflectively  the 
right,  in  cafe  of  non-compliance,  to  enforce  it  by  coer- 
cion and  violence. 

Treating  in  this  chapter  of  the  duties  of  humanity 
jn  general,  it  may  not  be  amifs,  perhaps,  to  apprife 
the  reader,  that  there  are  writers  who  have  exprened  a 
wifh  for  terms  to  denote  duties  of  the  firft  kind  more 
fui table  than  the  expreflions  imperfeB  duties,  or  duties 
of  humanity  \  terms  which,  they  fay,  are  very  apt  to 
convey  the  erroneous  ideas,  either  that  there  is  fome- 
thing  of  a  defective  nature  in  thofe  duties,  with  refpect 
to  their  internal  beauty  and  excellency,  or  that  the  per- 
formance of  them  is  lefs  cogent  and  necefTary  than  that 
of  perfect  duties;  whereas  thofe  duties  which  eftablifh- 
ed  ufe  defignates  by  thefe  improper  terms,  are  the  mod 
exalted  in  their  nature,  the  moft  excellent  of  all  our 
duties  y  and  the  faithful  performance  of  them  confti- 
tutes  the  greater!:  ornament  of  the  human  character. 

However,  as  in  all  fciences  attention  is  necefTary  to 
the  definitions  of  fubjects  on  which  they  treat,  in  order 
to  avoid  mifapprehenfions  and  miftakes,  let  it  be  ob- 
ferved,  that  this  is  more  particularly  requifite  in  inftan- 
ces  like  the  prefent,  where  language  furnifhes  only  fuch 
terms  as  at  firft  fight  feem  to  favour  ideas  repugnant  or 
derogatory  to  the  objects  v/hich  they  are  intended  to 
deflgnate. 

Upon  this  confederation,  as  our  definition  is  well 
calculated  to  imprefs  the  mind  of  the  reader  with  the 
internal  beauty  of  thefe  moh1,  nay  only,  excellent  duties, 
we  may  expect,  that  a  due  attention  thereto  will  fecure 
him  againft  any  improper  idea  which  the  common  ufe 
of  thefe  terms  might  be  fuppofed  to  fuggeft. 

And 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  57 

And  will  not  this  fuppofed  impropriety  vanifii,  if 
thefe  expreflions  are  taken  in  a  true  reference  to  their 
fpeciflc  objects  ? 

What  impropriety  is  there  in  calling  duties  imperfect, 
to  the  performance  of  which  our  neighbour  has  but  an 
imperfect  right  ? 

And  may  not  thofe  duties  be  called  duties  of  huma- 
nity, which  are  done  from  an  inward  fenCt  of  obligation, 
without  any  controul  or  fear  of  compulfion  ?  Certainly, 
if  free  agency  is,  what  it  really  is,  the  glory  of  human 
nature,  then  the  entirely  voluntary  exercife  of  this 
heavenly  gift,  in  the  purfuit  of  actions  of  the  higheft 
excellency  and  rectitude,  cannot  fail  to  be  highly  or- 
namental to  the  character  of  man,  and  becoming  the 
dignity  of  human  nature. 

What  ferves  ftill  more  particularly  to  imprefs  the 
mind  with  a  due  fenfe  of  the  great  importance  of  thefe 
duties,  and  mould  quicken  our  diligence  in  faithfully 
obeying  the  gentle  precepts  of  the  laws  of  nature  and 
of  nature's  God,  inviting  us  to  the  moft  cordial  per- 
formance of  our  obligations,  is  the  confederation  that 
all  our  duties,  whatever  their  immediate  objects  may 
be,  are  either  duties  of  humanity  in  themfelves,  or  may 
and  ought  to  be  made  fuch  by  all  who  fet  a  value  upon 
virtue  and  the  approbation  of  a  good  confeience ;  for  no 
moral  action  is  conceivable  but  where  room  is  left  for 
choice,  and  where,  in  fome  degree  or  other,  it  depends 
upon  our  fpontaneity,  whether  we  will  do  or  omit  it  in 
a  manner  confident  with  our  internal  obligations,  or  in 
conlequence  of  the  degrading  principle  of  fervile  fear, 
or  dread  of  violence. 

It  is  on  this  account  that  a  faithful  obfervance  of  the 
duties  to  God  and  to  ourfelves  fo  much  heighten  the 

excellency 


l<%  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


D 


excellency  of  the  human  character -,  they  are  in- them- 
felves  duties  of  humanity,  depend  upon  our  free 
choice,  and  give  free  agency  the  moft  ample  fcope  •,  in- 
ternal motives  actuate  the  mind.  We  act  worthy  of 
ourfelves  if  we  conduct  ourfelves  as  rational  beings, 
by  glorifying  our  Creator  and  Preferyer,  and  by  ad- 
vancing our  own  felicity. 

If  we  ever  love  God,  we  mud:  love  him  freely,  no 
forced  fervice  is  acceptable  to  the  Deity :  he  requires 
the  heart  in  all,  and  this  we  ought  to  offer  him  freely. 

No  action  that  is  done  or  omitted  with  refpect  to 
ourfelves,  can  be  a  virtue,  or  in  any  degree  ornamental 
to  human  nature,  which  does  not  proceed  from  an  inter- 
nal fenk  of  duty,  and  is  not  done  in  fincerity  and  truth. 
An  human  agent  forced  to  do  a  profitable  action,  is  in 
that  inirance  as  little  above  the  level  of  brutes  as  his 
action  has  internal  merit.  Thefe  cannot  act  freely,  but 
muft  be  forced  into  a  compliance  with  our  wiiTies. 

In  all  acts  of  impiety,  impropriety,  indecency,  in- 
juftice  and  oppreftion,  man  abufes  free  agency,  fins 
againft  the  dignity  of  his  nature,  and  degrades  himfelf 
far  below  the  order  of  beads. 

Behold  both  the  excellency  and  neceffity  of  a  moft 
careful  performance  of  the  duties  of  humanity,  with 
refpect  to  God  and  to  ourfelves ! 

Of  the  fame  nature  are  our  duties  with  refpect  to 
the  brute  creation  and  to  other  things  of  an  inanimate 
nature:  he  who  fhould  think  that  we  might  conduct 
the  management  and  ufe  of  them  in  quite  an  arbitrary 
and  capricious  manner,  would  give  us  but  indifferent 
proofs  of  his  underftanding  and  heart:  both  reafon and 
revelation  point  to  the  wife  and   benign  defign  for 

which 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  $q 

which  they  are  given :  by  abuMng  them  we  render  our- 
felves  ungrateful  to  God,  and  act  in  a  manner  unbe- 
coming  the  rationality  of  our  nature. 

Though  the  dumb  creature  cannot  fet  up  a  claim  of 
perfect  right;  though  things  inanimate  have  no  fenfe 
of  pain  or  fatisfaction,  like  the  former;  and  though 
neither  of  them  can  apply  force  to  avert  tyranny  or 
abufe-,  ftill  there  are  duties  on  our  part,  duties  of  hu- 
manity :  we  ought  to  conduct  ourfelves  in  that  refpect, 
as  indeed  in  all  other  occurrences  of  life,  conformably 
to  the  will  of  God. 

Sc/i. — Shew  me  a  man  who  is  cruel  and  inhuman  to  brutes, 
who  wantonly  deftroys  or  abufes  other  things;  thoufand 
to  one  but  you  point  outaperfon  who  cares  little  for  God 
and  his  own  confcience. 

We  have  already  feen,  that  fome  of  the  duties  to  our 
neighbour,  that  is  to  fay,  to  our  fellow  creatures,  arc 
in  themfelves  perfect,  and  liable,  in  refpect  of  perform- 
ance, to  violence  and  compulfion.  However,  it  may 
be  eafily  difcovered,  that  we  can  make  them  on  our 
part  imperfect  duties,  by  preventing  the  exercife  of  our 
neighbour's  perfect  right,  that  is  to  fay,  by  doing 
freely,  from  a  fenfe  of  our  duty,  what  another  has  a 
right  to  enforce.  Perfect  laws  warrant  force  only  in 
cafes  of  reluctance,  delay  or  oppofition ;  there  is,  conse- 
quently, no  caufe  to  fear  violence  where  it  may  not  be 
exercifed.  The  ftri6left  duty  of  neceflity  may  therefore, 
without  any  fhadow  of  doubt,  be  made  with  us  duties 
of  humanity. 

Whatever  our  focial  connections  may  be,  we 
mould  feel  an  ambition  to  perform  our  duties  from 
choice  rather  than  from  fear.  Prudence  and  a  tender 
regard  for  our  repofe  and  character  require,  that  we 

lhould 


l6o  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

mould  lay  more  ftrefs  upon  the  will  of  God  and  the 

internal  kn.fe  of  our  duty,  than  upon  the  confideration 

that  others  are  porTeffed  of  perfect  rights,  or  that  there 

are  compulfory  remedial  rules    provided  by   perfect 

laws :  thefe  are  againft  the  unruly,  the  diforderly,  the 

difhonert,  the  unjuft  part  of  fociety,  for  the  purpofes 

of  protecting  the  upright  and  confcientious  man,  who 

is  actuated  by  the  impulfe  of  his  internal  obligation, 

and  does  freely  what  is  right. 

Sch. — Mere  we  may  advert  to  what  fcripture  declareth,  the  law 
is  not  maddfor  a  righteous  man.    I  Tim.  i.  9. 

Would  it  not  be,  as  it  were,  a  new  heaven  and  a  new 
earth,  if  the  practice  of  the  duties  of  humanity  mould 
become  co-extenfive  with  the  human  race,  comparing 
all  that  is  or  can  be  an  object  of  human  thought  and 
defire  ?  Behold  man,  the  obedient  fervant  of  God,  the 
beloved  object  of  his  complacency,  the  friend  of  his 
Creator !  Strenuous  and  indefatigable  in  the  purfuit  of 
virtue,  behold  him  an  ornament  to  himfelf  and  to  hu- 
man nature !  Behold  all  men,  united  in  virtuous  fenti- 
ments  and  in  mutual  love,  confpiring  in  their  endea- 
vours to  glorify'  their  Maker,  zealous  to  befriend  one 
another  and  to  be  benefactors  of  brutes,  all  of  one  ac- 
cord endeavouring  to  make  the  wifeft  and  beft  ufe  of 
the  gifts  of  Providence  !  all  caufes  of  ftrife,  animofity, 
hatred,  envy  and  litigation  done  away  among  the  chil- 
dren of  men !  Behold  a  faint  picture  of  human  happi- 
nefs,  which  virtue,  were  it  univerfal,  would  produce  a 
happinefs  where  nothing  is  wanting  but  greater  perfec- 
tion in  our  nature,  and  a  more  lading,  nay,  an  ever- 
lading  duration ! 

But  alas,  the  world  has  at  all  times,  even  to  this  day, 
exhibited  human  conduct  in  direct  oppofition  to  this 

pleafing 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY;  Ibl 

pleaung  and  definable  .  representation.  We  have  not 
lived  to  fee  virtue's  gentle,  reign;  the  earth  groans  un- 
der opprefTion,  and  its  inhabitants  for  the  greater!:  part 
wear  the  chains  of  bondage. 

Courts  of  juilice  are  frequently  fcenes  of  heinous 
intrigues  and  other  fecret  vices,  and  often  become  en- 
gines of  crying  injufHce.  There  we  behold  brethren 
in  difcord,  litigation  and  ftrife!  «  Little  of  humanity 
is  difcovered  in  human  intercourfe,  and  mankind  have 
learned  to  make  up  for  the  lofs  thereof  by  the  empty 
ceremonial  of  etiquette,  by  the  madow  of  good  breed- 
ing, and  by  unmeaning  compliments.  Where  liberty 
yet  upholds  her  ilandard,  where  humanity  mould  ihine 
in  an  amiable  difplay  of  focial  happinefs,  we  find  fre- 
quent inftances  of  illiberality  and  licentioufnefs.  But 
w  hy  mould  we  enlarge  on  things  which  daily  offend  an 
obferver's  eye  ?  There  is  rather  caufe  to  look  to  our- 
felves,  reform  what  is  faulty  in  our  conduct,  and  take 
an  animated  refolution  to  do  our  part,  by  fincerely  and 
flrenuoudy  purfuing  virtue,  and  performing  all  our 
duties  in  the  bert  pofiible  manner.  By  fuch  a  conduct 
we  may  expect  the  bleflings  and  favour  of  God,  advance 
our  own  happinefs,  and  fpread  felicity  abroad.  Let  us 
thus  prepare  for  that  kingdom  of  peace  where  unity, 
joy  and  happinefs  for  ever  lair. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  duties  of  humanity  which  we  owe  to  others, 

OlNCE  it  is  the  obvious  courfe  of  nature,  and  of 
confequence  the  wife  plan  of  the  government  of  God 
over  the  concerns  of  the  human  race,  that  no  man  can 

Y  be 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

fee  happy  in  a  itate  of  foiitude,  but  by  that  kind  provi- 
dence which  determined  his  exigence  is  made  imme- 
diately dependent  upon  others,  not  only  for  life  and  the 
enjoyment  of  its  comforts,  but  alfo  for  fuch  acquire- 
ments and  qualifications  as  enable  him  to  perform  du- 
ties to  his  creator  and  prefer ver,  as  well  as  to  himfelf, 
in  order  to  be  pleafmg  to  God  and  to  render  his  own 
frate  happy :  it  is  manifeft,  that  it  is  the  will  of  God 
that  men  alfo  perform  duties  to  thofe  who  are  endowed 
with  the  fame  rational  nature,  and  inhabit  the  fame 
earth  as  fellow  members  of  the  univerfal  fociety  of 
mankind,  of  which  God  himfelf  is  both  the  author  and 
the  fupreme  ruler  and  governor. 

To  this  end  his  laws  extend  to  ail  men,  taking  cog- 
nizance of  all  their  moral  actions :  the  rules  which  they 
prefcribe  are  defigned  for  directing  human  conduct,  and 
of  courfe  the  actions  of  each  individual  of  the  human 
race  -,  the  precepts  and  prohibitions  thereof  are  equally 
intereiling  to  all  who  defire  to  glorify  God  and  to  be 
happy.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  a  matter  of  indiffer- 
ence,  how"  men  conduct  themfelves  with  refpect  to  one 
another,  whether  they  make  ufe  of  their  talents  and 
gifts,  and  the  opportunities  allotted  them,  for  the  bene- 
fit, or  apply  them  to  the  hurt  and  detriment  of  others. 

God  is  fo  far  from  giving  his  gifts  in  vain,  that,  on 
the  contrary,  he  commands  all  the  good  we  can  do  to 
others,  and  enjoins  us  by  his  laws  to  take  motives  from 
his  perfections  and  ways  towards  the  children  of  men; 
It  is  not  only  by  internal  a6ts  of  piety,  but  by  an  up- 
right and  irreproachable  conduct  before  men,  that  we 
rnuit  glorify  him,  and  thus  excite  our  fellow  creatures 
to  that  reverence,  love  and  obedience,  which  they  owe 
to  their  cteator,  prefer  ver,  and  fupreme  governor. 

As 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  6$ 

As  rational  creatures,  daily  experiencing  and  partak- 
ing of  the  difpenfations  of  the  love,  mercy  and  benefi- 
cence of  God  towards  man^  we  ought  to  copy  from  the 
divine  original,  by  delighting  in  the  happinefs  of  ethers, 
and  by  ufing  all  our  powers  for  prompting  the  welfare 
of  thofe  around  us. 

Hence  it  appears,  that  we  have  not  only  duties  to 
be  obferved  towards  our  fellow  creatures,  but  that  thefe 
duties  are  of  the  higher!:  importance,  as  facred  and  ne- 
4  cefTary  as  thofe  which  are  due  to  God.  How  is  it  pof- 
iible  that  our  religious  profefTions  can  be  fincere,  if  we 
do  not  endeavour  to  refemble  the  deity,  if  we  feel  not 
affection  and  love  for  thofe  who,  as  well  as  ourfelves, 
are  the  objects  of  his  tender  love  and  regard. 

Nay,  thefe  duties  are  fo  interefting  and  necefiary, 
that  without  a  faithful  obfervance  of  them  we  cannot 
perform  thofe  duties  which  appertain  to  ourfelves-, 
for  daily  experience  fo  inconteftibly  evinces  the  necef- 
fity  of  the  agency,  participation,  aid  and  affiftance  of 
others  for  the  attainment  of  our  own  happinefs,  that 
without  the  one  and  the  other  we  could  have  never  ob- 
tained life  or  continued  therein,  much  lefs  have  enjoyed 
or  been  partakers  of  any  of  its  comforts.  Any  action, 
therefore,  towards  others,  which  may  incline  them  to 
afford  us  their  necefTary  aid  and  afTiitance,  becomes  a 
duty  to  ourfelves  j  that,  on  the  contrary,  which  might 
induce  them  to  withhold  their  good  offices  or  obferuct 
our  happinefs,  is  injurious  to  our  own  true  intereft  and 
repugnant  to  the  firrt  principle  of  natural  laws,  which 
commands  us,  by  every  jurt  and  lawful  endeavour,  to 
render  our  rtate  happy. 

It  is,  therefore,  mort  evidently  manifeft,  that  God 
the  creator  and  preferver  of  mankind,  has  connected 

the 


164  A1QE.AL  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  individuals  of  the  human  race  by  the  natural  ties  of 
mutual  duties  and  reciprocal  good  oflices,  as  well  as  by 
identity  of  nature,  wants  and  inclinations,  His  govern- 
ment over  mankind,  which  mufi  neccfTarily  be  the  moft 
perfect,  is  at  the  fame  time  exceedingly  gracious  and 
benign.  Human  happinefs,  in  which  God  will  be 
glorified,  is  moft  wifely  provided  for  by  laws,  which 
enjoin  one  common  intereft  to  all,  founded  upon  the 
invariable  nature  of  things,  whereby  each  p erf  on  be  ft 
promotes  his  own  real  inter  efts  and  happinefs^  by  endeavour- 
ing as  much  as  pojjible  to  promote  the  felicity  of  all  men. 

Upon  this  plan  all  natural  relations  among  mortals 
are  founded.  Men,  by  the  defign  of  their  creator  and 
the^  precepts  of  natural  laws,  are  veiled  with  equal 
rights  in  cafes  where  it  may  be  requifite  to  expect  the 
help  and  affiftance  of  thofe  who  are  in  a  fituation  to 
afford  it,  for  without  this  human  happinefs  cannot 
exifr.  Thofe  who  are  endowed  with  faculties,  talents 
and  gifts,  are,  on  the  other  hand,  equally  under  obliga- 
tions to  apply  them  for  the  benefit  of  others,  where  an 
opportunity  offers  for  promoting  their  felicity.  Force 
and  compulfion  find  place  only  where  one  hinders  ano- 
ther in  the  ufe  and  pofleffiqn  of  his  own  faculties  and 
gifts,  and  thus  obrtructs  his  felicity,  but  not  at  all 
where  we  have  to  ufe  our  own  powers  for  our  intereft 
and  the  benefit  of  others :  for  thefe  we  are  accountable 
only  to  God  and  our  own  consciences.  We  are  not 
here  to  be  directed,  In  the  ufe  of  our  own  powers,  by 
the  claims  or  defires  of  others,  much  lefs  by  force  and 
coercion ;  but  the  will  of  God  and  cur  own  happinefs 
are  motives  fufficiently  ftrong  to  incite  us  to  ufe  them 
tor  the  great  end  for  which  they  are  given  us,  and  for 
which  we  are  placed  in  the  world. 

Hence 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  1 65 

Hence  it  appears,  that  all  our  duties  to  others  which 
flow  from  natural  relations,  are  duties  of  humanity, 
which  call  for  the  exertion  of  the  nobler  faculties  of  the 
human  foul,  for  a  conduct  conformable  to  the  will  of 
the  Almighty,  and  becoming  the  dignity  of  our  nature. 

As  their  immediate  object  is  all  that  may  contribute 
to  the  well-being  and  happinefs  of  mankind,  fo  are  all 
their  injunctions  uniformly  calculated  to  excite  the  hu- 
man heart  to  the  practice  of  love  and  philanthropy. 
Duties  of  humanity  to  others  are  therefore  duties  of 
love:  nay,  this  virtue  is  both  their  liim  and  bafis.  Love 
thy  neighbour  as  thyfelf  fays  the  heavenly  precept ; 
which  is  one  of  thofe  principles  of  natural  laws  which, 
among  others,  has  obtained  the  particular  finction  of 
the  will  of  God,  declared  in  his  word,  in  order  to  im- 
prefs  our  fouls  both  with  the  great  importance  and  the 
necerlity  of  a  faithful  performance,  in  all  pofTible  rela- 
tions,  where  it  is  in  our  power,  and  where  opportuni- 
ties offer  for  exercifmg  this  great  duty.  In  this  extent 
the  term  neighbour  is  taken  in  the  revelation ;  and  the 
divine  word  is  juft  in  other  terms  enjoining  what  the 
duties  of  humanity  require,  to  wit,  that  we  fhould 
love  all  men;  for  how  can  we  love  God  if  we  do  not 
love  thofe  who  are  the  objects  of  his  affection  and 
care  ? 

We  muft,  therefore,  fed  an  interesting  concern  for 
the  happinefs  of  all  men,  delight  therein,  and  fincerely 
endeavour  to  promote  it  as  much  as  pofTible  -,  for  this 
is  the  nature  of  true  love,  and  one  or  the  other  of 
thefe  acts  may  take  place  in  our  conduct  towards  cur 
fellow  creatures,  whofe  fituations  and  relations  are 
fuch  as  render  the  performance  of  all  of 'them  im- 
poflible  or  impracticable.      It  is   here  in  particular 

that 


l66  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  the  diftincticn  into  love  of  affection,  of  coin- 
placency  and  of  communion  fhould  arreft  our  at- 
tention-, for  from  our  own  abilities,  which  in  many 
refpects  are  limited  to  a  very  imall  extent,  as  well  as 
from  the  various  relations  and  fituations  of  others  with 
refpect  to  us,  it  would  be  impoflible  to  love  all  men, 
if  it  were  rcquifite  that  we  mould  lo?e  them  equally 
and  with  the  fame  degree  of  concern  and  affection.  To 
take  equal  delight  in  perfons,  to  conform  to  their  de- 
iires  and  ways,  our  duties  to  God ,  and  to  ourfelves 
ftrictly  forbid.  There  are  perfons,  relations  and  fitua- 
tions more  immediately  interefting  to  us  than  others : 
we  meet  writh  fentiments  among  our  fellow  creatures 
more  frequently  contrary  to  than  congenial  with  our 
own :  men  differ  vaflly  in  their  conduct,  and  cafes  fre- 
quently occur,  which  create  in  us  difguft.  and  merit  our 
difapprobation :  there  are  fome  who  favour  our  defigns, 
whilft  others  are  unconcerned  about  our  interefts,  or 
even  opoofe  them :  both  our  acquaintance  with  perfons 
and  our  general  knowledge  of  individuals  are  very 
much  limited,  whiht  the  greater  part  of  our  fellow 
creatures  remain  to  us  utterly  unknown.  There  is  in- 
deed no  calculation  to  be  made  of  the  various  modifi- 
cations of  the  extenfive  object  of  love-,  and  the  con  fe- 
culence is,  that  love  in  every  refpect  muft  be  varioufly 
modified. 

Neither  can' it  be  the  defign  of  God  that  we  mould 
love  all  men  with  the  fame  degree  of  ardor  and  affec- 
tion, or  in  the  fame  manner  and  to  the  fame  extent,  fince 
he  himfelf  obferves  a  difference  in  the  difpenfations  of 
his  providence,  and  varioufly  qualifies  the  children  of 
men  for  the  refpective  duties  of  life.  All  men  have 
the  fame  nature,  but  not  the  fame  talents  and  gifts  -, 

all 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  l&f 

ail  are  inhabitants  of  the  earth,  but  not  of  the  fame 
climate  and  foil;  all  are  liable  to  wants  and  infirmities, 
but  thefe  are  vailly  diversified,  as  well  with  refpect  to 
their  nature  and  extent  as  to  their  duration;  all  may 
contribute  to  the  happinefs  of  others,  but  not  in  the 
fame  way,  degree  and  extent. 

In  fhort,  talents  and  gifts,  v/ants  and  fuperfluities, 
Situations,  opportunities,  and  other  circumftances  in  life 
are  fo  distributed  among  the  individuals  of  the  human 
race,  and  all  things  fo  ordered,  that  men  may  fupply 
the  wants,  alleviate  the  fufTerings,  and  in  a  certain 
fphere  prove  inlfrumental  in  promoting  the  felicity  of 
others.  What  our  Situation  and  power  cannot  reach, 
we  may  reach  by  our  good  wifhes;  where  no  other 
power  by  immediate  good  offices  is  left  us  befides  this, 
others  may  have  both  ability  and  opportunity  to  afTift 
more  effectually.  We  have  to  act  our  part  and  per- 
form our  duties  faithfully  as  far  as  we  are  able;  and 
there  is  no  doubt  but  our  example  will  prove  instru- 
mental in  exciting  others  to  emulate  our  conduct  :-*- 
Thus,  if  every  one  is  afTiduous  in  the  exertion  of  his- 
powers  for  the  promotion  of  the  intereft  and  happinefs 
of  others,  love  will  be  effectually  extended  to  all,  and 
univerfal  harmony  will  prevail. 

How  infeparably  and  how  nearly  has  divine  provi- 
dence connected  the  interests  of  parents  and  children ! 
How  neceflary  is  dependence  for  mutual  offices  between 
relatives,  between  the  {cxts^  and  thofe  who,  in  the 
Strict  fenfe  of  the  word,  are  neighbours  !  for  without 
fuch  provision  made  for  life,  its  preservation  and  necef- 
fary  Support,  human  happinefs  could  not  exirf.  Love 
and  affection,  attachments  and  intimacy  there  remit 
from  initinct,  or  are  pamons  of  the  human  mind  which 

naturally 


I  68  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY* 

naturally  arife  from  the  nccefTary  and  unavoidable  in- 
tercourfe  with  one  another,  and  dictate  an  affiduity  to 
pleafe,  and  produce  mutual  afllftance  and  reciprocal 
offices  To  neceflary  for  the  being  and  welfare  of  man- 
kind. But  let  it  be  remembered,  that  they  are  frill 
effects  of  natural  inftinct  or  acquired  habits,  and  only 
fo  far  confident  with  human  happinefs  as  their  direction 
and  extent  are  Confident  with  that  noble  virtue  which 
the  natural  laws  enjoin  as  the  flrrt  duty  of  humanity. 
If  parents  truly  love  their  children,  their  natural  fond- 
nefs  mud  often  s;ive  way  to  the  exercife  of  parental  au- 
thority, wounding  their  tendernefs  as  much  as  it  bears 
hard  upon  the  humours  and  caprices  of  children.  In 
one  word,  the  duty  of  love  is  to  be  the  directrix  of  all 
the  intimate  ties  of  blood  and  affections,'  as  well  as 
every  relation  of  life,  however  didant  and  rem6te :  we 
are  not  to  accommodate  ourfelves  to  the  fentiments,1 
defires  and  expectations  of  others,  except  it  be  in  cafes 
where  they  agree  with  the  dictates  of  natural  laws, 
where  consequently  compliance  is  in  our  power  and 
confident  with  our  duties  to  God  and  to  ourfelves :  if 
the  contrary  mould  be  the  cafe,  our  love  to  others 
enjoins,  that  we  conduct  ourfelves  quite  otherwise  than 
they  may  expect,  that  we  even  cuofs  their  deiigns  and 
incur  their  difpleafure. 

Whatever,  therefore,  the  relations  of  life  and  the 
difpofitions  and  defires  of  our  fellow  creatures  may  bej 
the  duties  of  humanity  enjoin  true  love  towards  them, 
and  require  that  we  endeavour  as  much  as  poffible  to 
promote  their  true  interefts,  and  thereby  advance  their 
real  felicity. 

Little  as  inftinctive  love,  or  habitual  attachments 
ariiing  from  familiarity  or  an  -unavoidable  intercourse 

with 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  69 

with  others,  ought  to  be  taken  for  the  excellent  duty 
of  love,  fo  little  does  this  virtue  confift  in  that  natural 
tendernefs  and  fenfibility  of  heart,  which,  as  it  is 
effected  by  a  certain  fhite  of  the  nervous  fyftem,  pro- 
ceeds from  the  conftitution  of  our  body,  and  is  known 
by  the  term  good  nature.  All  that  can  be  faid  of  either 
of  them,  and  more  particularly  of  the  Jail,  is,  that  they 
are  only  fo  far  innocent  and  falutary,  as  they  are  under 
the- guidance  of  reafon,  and  directed  by  that  fincere 
defire  to  promote  the  happinefs  of  others  wherein  true 
love  confute. — Good  nature  may  be  particularly  con- 
sidered as  a  natural  difpofition,  exciting  us  to  the  exer- 
cife  of  the  duty  of  love  to  others,  but  is  far  from  being 
love  in  itfelf;  for,  independent  of  a  poffibility  that  this 
eafy  difpofition  is  liable  to  impositions  and  miitakes, 
and  has  frequently  proved  ruinous  to  its  pofleflbrs  and 
others,  it  is  very  evident,  from  the  principles  of  natural 
law,  that  we  have  neither  to  depend  upon  the  fenti- 
ments  and  defires  of  others,  nor  upon  our  own  feelings* 
where  our  duty  requires  obedience  to  the  laws  of  God 
and  a  folicitude  to  take  our  motives  from  his  holy  per- 
fections and  ways  towards  the  children  of  men. 

Sch.i. — We  ought  to  guard  againfr.  the  childifh  opinion  fo 
much  in  vogue  in  human  intercourfe,  by  which  all  that 
is  agreeable  to  our  notions  and  defires  is  taken  for  love, 
and  the  oppofite  thereof  for  difaffection  or  hatred.  Thus 
ftiameful  neglect  of  duty,  ruinous  indulgence,  flattery, 
hypocrify,  &c.  meet  with  approbation  and  a  welcome  re- 
ception ;  whilft  the  reproofs,  admonitions,  Counfels,  ex- 
hortations and  expoflulations  of  parents  and  friends  pafs 
for  auflerity,  ill-nature,  difefteem,  and  want  of  affection. 
'  Sc/i.  2. — Want  of  complaifance  is  a  great  fault  in  the  human 
character;  but  complaifance  may  be  carried  too  far,  and 
prove  to  be  the  ruin  both  of  011  ndves  and  others. 

If  our  own  feelings  have  no  controul  over  theexer- 
cife  of  the  duty  pf  love,  it  is  evident  that  we  muft  even 

Z  love 


i'jO  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

love  our  enemies;  for,  from  the  Jaw  of  nature  and  the 
precepts  of  the  gofpel  as  well  as  from  the  very  nature  of 
love,  it  can  be  proved,  that  every  thing  which  is  good, 
excellent  and  defi  rable  in  itfelf,  or  wherein  there  is  any 
thing  of  this  kind,  is  an  object  of  our  concern,  defire 
and  aftection.  Let  us  fuppofe  perfons  to  be  our 
enemies,  favages,  barbarians,  drunkards,  profligate 
meters;  we  cor.fefs  there  is  no  pofiibility  to  feel 
complacency  in  their  conduct;  but  frill  we  can  and 
ought  to  love  their  perfons;  they  are  men,  rational 
creatures  endowed  with  human  nature,  our  fellow  citi- 
zens on  earth,  fellow  fubjects  of  the  fupreme  govern- 
ment of  the  Molt  High:  the  fame  laws  which  enjoin 
unto  us  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  in  order  to  ob- 
tain his  favour  and  our  own  happinefs,  impofe  on  them 
the  fame  duties  towards  us  that  are  required  at  our 
hands  towards  them. 

There  are  indeed  many  weighty  caufes  why  we  en- 
tertain a  greater  affection  for  our  nearer!  relatives  and 
neighbours,  for  friends,  and  perfons  of  a  virtuous  con- 
duct in  life,  for  acquaintances,  townfmen,  countrymen, 
&c.  than  we  commonly  feel,  or  can  feel  for  ftrangers, 
enemies,  profligate  or  wicked  characters:  but  there  is 
nctonejurt  caufe  why  we  mould  hate  or  entirely  with- 
hold our  love  from  the  latter.  If  we  are  duly  impref- 
fed  with  an  efteem  for, the  dignity  of  human  nature, 
we  will  regard  it  in  others  •,  if  we  think  it  neceflary  to 
conduce  ourfelves  conformably  to  the  will  of  God,  we 
will  efTeem  it  as  a  duty  to  love  all  men. 

From  what  has  been  hitherto  explained,  it  is  mani- 
fest:, that  love  undergoes  innumerable  modifications, 
keeping  pace  with  the  various  relations,  fituations, 
cfifpofitions,  tempers,  qualities  and  modes  of  conduct 
amonffft  men. 

In 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  17£ 

In  confequencc  of  thefe  modifications,  love  is  diftin- 
guiflied  into  many  virtues,  the  mod  principal  of  which 
are  denoted  by  particular  terms :  love,  When  it  embraces 
the  concerns  of  the  whole  human  race,  is  called 
lanthropy:  a  heart  animated  by  this  virtue  wiihes  well 
to  and  thinks  well  of  all  men,  and  is  amicably  interefled 
both  in  their  profperity  and  adverfity.  Philanthropy 
has  therefore  for  its  concomitants  the  amiable  virtues  of 
univerfal  benevolence,  charity  and  fympatby. 

Acts  of  univerfal  benevolence,  exercifed  to  foreigners 
and  Grangers,  who  happen  to  come  within  the  fphere 
of  our  knowledge  or  agency,  conftitutc  hofpitaliiy* 

Love  to  our  country,  that  is,  the  virtue  of 'pairiotifmy 
not  only  enjoins,  that  we  mould  feel  the'utmoft  foii- 
citude  for  the  profperity,  M^iy  and  prefervation  of 
the  rights  of  our  country  againfc  all  external  and  in- 
ternal violence  and  machinations,  but  alfo  requires  a 
particular  regard  for  the  perfons  and  concerns  of  our 
fellow  citizens.  How  becoming  are  acts  of  friendship 
to  thofe  who  are  our  fellow  citizens,  connected  with  us 
in  one  common  intereir. !  Love  here  enjoins  tlit  duties 
of  civilitv. 

Love,  in  thediftant  relations  of  citizenfhip,  enjoins, 
according  to  different  flates  and  circumiiances  of  life, 
the  various  acts  of  friendmip  and  civility  expreMcd  by 
the  terms  refpecl,  eft  cent,  affability,  regard,  genercfily, 
politenefs,  meeknefs,  lenity,  complaifance>  ccc. 

In  the  nearer  relations  of  acquaintance,  the  lair,  men- 
tioned duties  ought  to  be  performed  with  a  frill  higher 
degree  of  affection  and  complacency,  becaufe  they 
more  nearly  concern  our  intereft,  and  are  highly  necef- 
fary  for  ilveetening  and  endearing  that  daily  intercourie 
which  our  relative  fituation  renders  unavoidable. 

Among 


iyz  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Among  relatives  and  thofe  who  are  the  constituent 
members  of  families,  there  ought  to  reign  the  highcfi 
pofhhle  affection,  exercifed  by  the  mod  {metre  fait  bful- 
nefs,  an  unalterable  attachment,  a  particular  iendernefs 
and  rational  friendjbip. 

Sen. — How  fincere,  prudent,  faithful,  &c.  mould  be  the  love  of 
parents  to  their  children!  How  affectionate,  grateful  and 
obedient  fliould  be  children  towards  their  parents !  What 
ornaments  are  gentlenefs,  moderation  and  reafonablenefs 
to  heads  of  families!  How  defirable  are  faithfulnefs  and  obe- 
dience in  thole  who  are  under  their  command  and  care! 

Human  mifery  calls  for  love  of  compaffwnm  various 
degrees,  which  is  to  be  exercifed  by  acts  of  charity, 
benevolence,  humanity  and  philanthropy. 

That  profperity  may  attend  the  ways  of  our  fellow 
creatures*  is  the  wifh  of  a  heart  filled  with  benevolence 
and  love-,  we  mould  therefore  feel  fatisf action,  and  even 
exult  in  the  welfare  and  happinefs  of  another. 

The  virtuous  and  upright  man  ought  to  poilefs  our 
heart,  be  high  in  our  efteem,  meet  with  our  countenance 
and  applaufe;  whilft  a  friend  deferves  our  confidence  \ 
a  benefactor  our  fincereft  gratitude. 

The  diforderly,  the  profligate,  the  wicked  leave 
room  for  pity  and  companion  •,  the  enemy  forforgivenefs, 
forbearance,  moderation:  where  there  is  no  merit  we 
may  exercise  genercfity:  perfons  who  have  contracted 
demerit  and  guilt,  have  yet  a  claim  to  our  humanity,  to 
magnanimity,  grace  and  mercy. 

Nay,  there  is  no  ftate,  no  fituation,  no  relation  in 
life,  where  we  mav  not  cxercife  the  duties  of  love  and 
humanity. 

It  is  therefore  criminal  in  us  not  to  love  our  fellow- 
creatures  :  it  is  an  act  of  the  greatest  inhumanity  to 
hate  them. 

Hatred 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  7  J 

Hatred  is  the  oppofite  of  love,  and  confifls  in  envy- 
ing our  neighbour's  happinefs,  or  endeavouring  to 
render  his  (late  miferable. 

As  we  fhould  endeavour  to  love  all  men,  Co  it  is  our 
duty  to  beware  of  envying  or  hating  any  perfon,  or 
of  giving  any  occafion  why  they  fhould  envy  or  hate 
us  -,  for,  in  either  of  thefe  cafes  we  tranfgrefs  the  laws 
of  nature,  and  render  our  ftate  unhappy. 

Thofe  who  hate  us  are  called  our  enemies:  the  crite- 
rion of  friendfhip  is  love. 

It  is  a  duty  that  we  entertain  friendfhip  for  all,  and 
be  at  enmity  with  none. 

Friendfhip^  a  proclivity  to  love  others,  is  diflin- 
guimed  into  internal  and  external.  Internal  friendfhip 
confifts  in  an  inward  and  fincere  defire  to  render  the 
ftate  of  others  happy ;  external  friendfhip  comprehends 
acts  declarative  of  that  intention. 

Since  it  is  our  duty  to  love  all  men,  it  follows,  that 
we  are  under  a  mod  facred  obligation  to  exercife  inter- 
nal friendfhip  to  all,  even  to  enemies  and  the  moft 
wicked  and  profligate  perfons  \  for  they  are  men,  and 
therefore  objects  of  our  love. 

But  external  friendfhip  may  often  become  both 
phyfically  and  morally  impofiible ;  that  is,  acts  decla- 
rative of  the  friendly  difpofition  of  our  heart  may  not 
be  in  our  power,  or  may  be  contrary  to  our  duty. 

True  and  lafting  friendfhip  is  one  of  the  greateft 
comforts  of  life,  and  is  only  to  be  expected  among; 
perfons  of  virtuous  conduct  and  intentions.  Powers 
may  fail  to  give  fufficient  vent  to  the  tender  fentiments 
of  the  heart;  but  it  never  can  be  contrary  to  duty  to 
make  z  true  friend  a  perfect  confident,  a  partaker  of 

ail 


174  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

all  our  concerns,  and  to  exercife  towards  him  every  act 
of  friend/hip  in  our  power. 

Among  the  various  duties  which  are  due  to  an  ene- 
my, remember  this  as  particularly  requisite,  to  endea- 
vour, by  all  juft  and  lawful  means,  to  fof ten  his  refent- 
fnerifi  that  is,  to  caufe  a  high  degree  of  his  hatred  to 
become  lefs ;  for  the  greater  his  hatred  and  animofity 
towards  you,  the  more  he  will  be  determined  to  do  all 
he  can  to  your  detriment,  the  greater  confequently  is 
your  danger  -,  but  by  weakening  his  refentment  the 
danger  will  be  diminished,  and  your  ftate  in.  that  refpect 
rendered  lefs  imperfect.  The  fame  argument  likewife 
proves  the  duty  of  making  him  your  friend,  as  far  as 
It  is  in  your  power  and  confident  with  your  duty. 

External  proofs  of  friendfhip  confift  principally  m 
hnding  to  others  our  aid  and  afiiftance :  we  aid  and 
afBft  if,  by  our  agency,  another  is  caufed  to  obtain 
his  end.  As  it  is  our  duty  to  befriend  others,  it 
follows,  that  it  is  alfo  a  principal  duty  to  aid  and  afliffc 
them  in  ali  cafes  where  our  afiiftance  is  wanting  and 
where  the  end  is  lawful.  Where  afiiftance  is  not  in 
our  power,  we  are  jtiftificd  in  making  excufes:  where 
thQ  end  propofed  is  unlawful,  or  where  it  may  be  at- 
tained without  our  aid,  there  duty  warrants  a  refufal ; 
for  it  can  never  be  our  obligation  to  do  a  thing  that  is 
unjuft  or  unneceffiry. 

Sch.  i. — He,  therefore,  who  has  it  in  his  power  to  help  himfelf, 
has  no  reafonable  claim  to  our  aid  and  afliflance. 

Sen.  2. — We  may  aid  and  a  (lift  in  as  many  different  ways  as  we 
may  become  the  moral  caufe  of  the  actions  of  others;  for 
in  all  anions  whichtake  place  in  confequence  of  our  afiift- 
ance, the  effect  is  to  be  attributed  to  our  will :  by  aiding 
and  atnfting,  therefore,  we  claim  merit  in  all  good  actions 
done  by  others,  and  contract  demerit  in  all  that  are  of  a 
contrary  nature. 

A  pro- 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


/'J 


A  proclivity  of  the  mind  to  aid  and  aflift.  others  is 
called  benevolence  in  the  rcUrielxd  fenfe:  actions  decla- 
rative of  benevolence  conftitute  beneficence :  the  author 
of  fiich  actions  is  filled  benefatlor. 

As  benevolence  is  the  foul  of  internal  friendship, 
fo  beneficence  is  the  effect  of  that  which  is  external: 
benevolence  confequently  is  unlimited  in  its  nature  and 
extent-,  but  with  refpect  to  beneficence,  it  is  requisite 
that  it  be  in  cur  power,  and  regulated  by  cur  duty  and 
other  circumftarxes. 

To  be  the  benefactor  of  mankind,  is  to  be  in  a  man- 
ner to  our  fellow  creatures  what  God  is  to  the  human 
race. 

Love  to  a  benefactor  is  gratitude  \  all  motives  for 
love  are  therefore  motives  for  gratitude,  and  each  be- 
nefit received  mould  imprefs  the  foul  with  grateful 
fentiments,  and  engage  us  to  exprefs  them  by  fuitable 
actions  towards  our  benefactors.  Ingratitude,  want 
of  love,  or  hatred  towards  a  benefactor,  is  beyond 
expreffion  horrid',  inhuman  and  unnatural. 

Sch. — It  is  therefore,  a  very  humiliating  fpectacle,  manifesting 
the  great  corruption  of  the  human  heart,  when  we  fee  men 
ungrateful  to  their  maker  and  preferver;  children  to  their 
parents;  citizens  ungratefully  abufing  the  bleliings  of 
peace  and  of  liberty,  Sec. 

Before  we  conclude  this  chapter,  we  think  it  necef- 
fary  to  remind  the  reader,  that  what  has  been  obferved 
of  friendfhip  and  benevolence,  with  refpect  to  the  dif- 
tinction  of  the  internal  fentiments  of  the  mind  from 
the  external  acts  declarative  of  them,  holds  good  in 
all  other  duties  of  love  and  humanity.  A  concern 
for  and  an  endeavour  to  promote  the  happinefs  and 
mitigate   the   fufferings  and   mifcry   of  others,   we 

can 


tj6  Moral  philosophy/ 

cm  and  ought  always  to  feel;  but  it  may  not  be  in 
our  power,  or  it  may  be  inconfiftent  with  our  duty, 
both  in  reflect  of  our  fituation,  and  the  particular  cir- 
cumftances  wherein  our  neighbour  is  placed,  or  often 
places  himfelf  by  indifcreet  and  improper  conduct,  to 
participate  with  him,  and  to  aid  and  aliift  him  as  we 
might  otherwife  wifh.  We  cannot,  for  inftance,  for- 
give an  injurer  at  the  coft  of  a  neighbour,  or  of  our 
country :  we  may  not  fhcw  lenity  where  its  effects 
countenance  vice.  Parents,  who  truly  love  their  chil- 
dren, muft  often  wound  their  own  feelings,  and  refort 
to  means  of  a  difagreeable  nature.  God  himfelf  chaf- 
teneth  thofe  whom  heloveth. 

It  remains  for  us  to  fpeak  of  the  means  by  which  the 
knowledge  and  practice  of  thefe  duties  maybe  greatly 
facilitated.  With  refpect  to  the  former,  it  will  not  be 
amifs  to  liilen  to  the  voice  of  nature,  to  ftudy  carefully 
the  natural  principles  of  morality,  to  read  thofe  books 
which  treat  of  our  duties  in  life ;  but,  as  there  is 
not,  and  indeed  cannot  be  a  more  pure  and  perfect 
fyftem  of  morality  than  the  go/pel,  and  as  the  duties 
of  chriilianity  exhibited  therein  are  thofe  of  huma- 
nity, ftrengthened  by  the  pureft  and  mod;  powerful 
motives,  and  fanctioned  by  the  exprefs  will  and  com- 
mand of  our  divine  Redeemer,  we  mould  be  highly 
culpable  if  we  were  not  folicitous  to  confult  daily  this 
heavenly  monitor,  in  order  to  learn  with  the  greateft 
pofftble  conviction,  what  is  cur  duty  in  every  circum- 
ilance  of  life.  There  is  not  a  more  pure  and  perfect 
pattern  to  copy  after  than  the  author  of  that  gofpel, 
the  author  and  nnifher  of  our  faith,  who  forgave  his 
moll:  cruel  enemies,  and  has  (o  loved  mankind  that 
he  has  given  himfelf  for  them. 

He 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  yj 

He  has  loved  men  more  than  himfelf,  and  com- 
mands that  we  love  our  neighbour  as  ourfelves;  that 
we  mould  be  ready  and  willing  to  do  unto  others  as  we 
wifh  they  mould  do  unto  us. 

Sc/i.  i. — We  ought  confequently  to  flunk  well  of  our  neigh- 
bour, not  to  give  an  eafy  ear  to  backbiters,  nor  counte- 
nance the  tongue  of  the  flanderer :  when  truth  and  a  con- 
viction thereof  forbid  the  exercife  of  univerfal  benevo- 
lence towards  him,  charity  and  fympathy  command,  that 
our  hearts  feel  forrow  and  regret.  To  delight  in  the  faults 
and  in  the  wretchedncft  of  others,  is  a  lure  iign  that  true 
love  is  yet  a  ftranger  to  the  heart. 

ScL  2. — We  Ihould /peak  well  of  our  neighbour,  acknowledge 
his  merits,  honour  his  virtues:  is  his  condufl  fufch  that 
we  muft  ceafe  to  commend  his  actions,  we  ought  to  con- 
fider  the  faireft  fide  of  his  character,  and  feel  heartily  Fprry 
when  we  can  no  longer  praife  him.  To  commend  and  dif- 
commend  are  things  very  different:  a  lovino-  heart  throws 
a  cloak  over  all  faults,  which  no  higher  duty  commands 
to  reveal;  that  which  is  deftitute  of  love  fports' with  the  foi- 
bles and  faults  of  another.  There  is  ho  vice  more  inhuman 
than  Spreading  the  tale  of  actions,  which,  if  done  by  our- 
felves,  we  would  wim  buried  in  eternal  oblivion;  becaufe 
truth  is  here  frequently  mingled  with  untruth:  other  in- 
tentions are  often  fuggefted  than  were  entertained  by  the 
unfortunate  author;  foibles  are  made  faults,  and  thefe  are 
again  transformed  into  vices.  Suppofe  all  were  true 
who  is  edified  thereby?  certainly  no  perfon  :  but  fuch  a 
.Conduct  is  always  attended  with  bad  confequences:  the 
voice  of  calumny  fteels  the  heart  of  the  calumniator  as 
well  as  thofe  who  give  him  countenance  againft  that  love 
which  we  fhould  have  for  all.  Many  temptations  are 
avoided  by  our  thinking  well  of  others;  and  thoufands 
would  not  be  thought  or  heard  of,  were  it  not  for  idlers, 
who  bufy  themfelves  abroad  whilft  they  neglect  their  du- 
ties at  home:  pretending  an  acquaintance  with  every  per- 
fon's  ways,  they  remain  Grangers,  entire  Grangers  to  their 
own  folly  and  their  own  hearts. 

Sc/i.  3. — We  fhould  finally  do  all  the  good  we  can  to  advance 

the  comforts,  the  interefts  and  felicity  of  others,  to  fpread 

the  balm  of  confolation  and  extend  relief  as  far  as  pcffible, 

A  a  Thus 


178  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Thus  our  life  will  be  a  general  blefling  on  earth,  our  con- 
duct ornamental  to  fociety,  whilft  our  nature  attains  to 
the  higheft  excellency,  a  conformity  to  the  will  and  ways 
©f  God. 


c 


CHAPTER  V. 

Of  the  duties  of  necejfity. 

E  may  neglect  duties  which  we  owe  to  others 
ithei  by  not  directing  our  powers,  faculties,  talents 
and  gifts  for  the  advancement  of  their  happinefs, 
or  by  applying  them  to  their  detriment,  hindering  and 
difturbing;  them  in  the  ufe  and  poflefTion  of  their 
powers  and  faculties,  by  which  they  might  promote 
their  own  interefts.  In  either  of  thefe  cafes  we  act 
contrary  to  our  duty,  with  this  difference,  that  in  the 
former  we  fin  againft  the  dictates  of  the  imperfect  laws 
of  nature,  act  inconfiftent  with  the  imperfect  rights  of 
our  neighbour,  and  omit  thofe  acts  by  which  we  mould 
endeavour  to  render  his  ftate  more  happy :  in  the  latter, 
we  render  his  ftate  more  unhappy,  tranfgrefs  laws, 
and  act  contrary  to  rights  which  are  perfect. 

An  action  done  or  omitted  contrary  to  the  imperfect 
laws  of  nature,  and  repugnant  to  the  imperfect  rights 
of  our  neighbour,  we  call  a  breach  of  duty ;  that  which 
is  contrary  to  perfect  laws  and  rights,  is  an  injury. 

Sck  1. — The  criterion  of  a  perfon  internally  honeft  and  up- 
right, humane  and  conscientious  in  his  conduct,  is,  that 
he  guards  as  much  againft  a  breach  of  duty  as  he  is  averfe 
to  Siting  ah  injury;  for  he  acts  principally  from  a  fenfe 
of  his  internal  obligations,  regulates  his  conduct  conform- 
ably 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHY.  Ijg 

ably  to  the  dilates  of  perfect  laws,  and  carefully  regards 
the  precepts  of  thofe  which  are  imperfect. 

£ch.  2. — Not  every  omiffion  of  what  is  deemed  a  duty  of  hu- 
manity is  immediately  to  be  conftrued  into  a  breach  of 
duty;  for  innumerable  cafes  may  occur,  where  a  collilion 
of  duties  fuperfedes  the  performance  of  thofe  which  are 
not  as  highly  obligatory  as  others  with  which  they  hap- 
pen to  clam.  We  may  deny  the  poor  charitable  affifl:- 
ance,  when  our  houfnold  ftands  in  need  of  thofe  things 
which  are  required  for  that  afilitance. 

$ch.  3. — In  all  cafes  where  duties  of  humanity  to  others  clafli 
with  perfect  duties,  the  latter  fuperfede  the  former;  for 
perfect:  duties  proceed  both  from  internal  and  external 
motives;  the  obligation  is  therefore  ftronger.  Bv  toegle&- 
ing  a  duty  of  humanity,  we  tranfgrefs  imperfect,  but  by 
neglecting  a  duty  of  neceflilv,  we  fin  both  againfi:  imper- 
fect and  perfect  laws. 

Add  to  thefe  confiderations,  that  by  neglecting  a  duty  of 
neceflity,  we  render  ourfelves  liable  to  force  and  violence, 
which  our  neighbour  has  a  perfect  right  to  ufe;  the  con- 
fequence  is,  that  we  render  our  Hate  imperfect. 
We  may  not  lend  money  which  is  due  to  others  :  when  it  is 
our  duty  to  adminifter  juftice,  we  may  not  take  confider- 
ations from  the  principles  of  humanity  which  might 
counteract  impartiality:  we  may  not,  in  any  refpect,  do 
evil  that  good  may  refu.lt  therefrom. 
Sch.  4. — As  a  (trict  adherence  to  the  duties  of  humanity  on 
our  part  may  prevent  the  exercife  of  the  perfect  right  of 
which  our  neighbour  is  pofTefTed,  fo  a  careful  obfervance 
of  them  is  neceffary  for  exercifing  perfect  rights  and  per- 
forming the  duties  of  neceflity  in  the  beft  poffible  manner. 
We  may  claim  our  due  in  a  rough  or  in  a  gentle  manner. 
We  may  exercife  juftice  impartially,  though  it  be  admi- 
niflered  with  as  little  rigour  as  poffible.  Where  we  can- 
not lpare,  we  may  feel  and  fhew  pity  and  compaffion,  &c. 

If  an  action  done  or  omitted  contrary  to  perfect  laws 
and  rights  .is  an  injury,  it  is  plain,  that  no  perfon  can 
be  injured  except  he  be  hindered  and  difturbed  in 
the  ufe  and  poflefiion  of  his  own;  for  it  is  only  in  this 
that  he  can  have  a  perfect  right.  .. 

To 


I  So  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

To  prove  that  we  have  fuflained  an  injury  by  ano- 
ther, we  mult  confirm  two  truths:  fitft,  that  the 
thing  in  which  we  pretend  an  injury  to  be  fuflained 
is  our  own  \  fecondly,  that  we  have  been  hindered  in 
the  ufe  and  pofTefTion  thereof  by  the  agency  of  another. 

Sch. — Every  evil  we  fuffer  from  others  cannot,  therefore,  be 
confidered  as  an  injury. 

It  is  a  perfect  duty,  that  we  do  no  injury  to  any  per- 
forty  for  perfect  laws  enjoin  that  we  fhould  not  invade 
the  perfect  rights  of  another. 

Since  we  do  not  invade  another's  perfect  rights  if  we 
give  him  his  own,  it  follows,  that  the  duty  which  en- 
joins us  to  do  no  injury  to  another,  requires  that  we 
give  every  one  his  own.  . 

We  prevent  an  injury,  if  we  make  ufe  of  all  lawful 
means  in  oup  power,  fhort  of  violence  and  compulsion, 
to  difiuade  others  from  hindering  or  disturbing  us  in  the 
ufe  of  our  own :  we  are  faid  to  repel  an  injury,  if  We  re- 
fort  to  force  and  violence  for  the  purpofe  of  averting  it. 

Since  it  is  a  duty  not  to  fufTer  ourfelves  to  be  hin- 
dered or  disturbed  in  what  we  have  a  perfect  right  to 
direct  for  the  promotion  of  our  own  felicity,  it  follows, 
that  it  is  a  duty  which  we  owe  to  ourfelves  and  others, 
if  pofiible  to  prevent,  or,  mould  this  fail,  to  repel  an 
injury. 

Sch.  i. — As  the  duties  of  humanity,  of  love  and  benevolence 
dictate  all  poffible  care  for  the  prevention  of  injuries,  fo  a 
itrict  adherence  to  them,  in  all  our  conduct,  will  be  the 
belt  mean  to  fecure  us  againil  the  fhafts  of  calumny  and 
other  injurious  attempts  prejudicial  to  our  life,  property, 
character,  and  good  name. 

Sch.  i. — However  proper  thefe  means  may  be,  when  we  have 
to  do  with  perfons  who  are  not  deaf  to  the  voice  of  reafon, 
they  ceafe  to  be  means  with  thofe  who  are  carried  away 
bv  paflion,  and  are  obdurate  and  infenfible  to  their  duty; 

for 


MORAL   PHILGSOi'KY.  1  S' I 

for  they  v.' ill  not  produce  the  propofcd  end:  force  and 
compulfion  muft  be  retorted  to,  and  exemfed  to  inch  a 
degree  as  will  caufe  the  aggreflbr  to  delift  from  his  inju- 
rious intentions  and  conduct. 

Sch.  i. — The  right  of  repelling  an  injury  extends  to  fuch 
means  as  are  fufficient  for  fcVfcrtirtgitj  thofe  which  are 
more  violent  than  is  requifitc  for  that  end,  are  improper 
and  unlawful. 

The  two  proportions,  do  no  injury, — give  every  one 
bis  ozvn^  may  he  confidered  as  the  firft  principles  of  all 
perfect  laws  which  regulate  the  conduct  of  men. 

Things  are  cur  own,  either  by  nature,  as  life,  foul, 
body,  our  members,  health  and  abfolute  natural 
tights*  or  by  acquifition,  as  accomplishments  of  the 
body  and  foul,  honour,  character,  eftate,  and  all  ac- 
quired rights  both  in  things  and  in  perfons.  There 
are  therefore  various  ways  in  which  we  may  do  or 
fufFer  an  injury. 

Hence  it  is,  why  civil  laws  diftinguifn  them  into  va- 
rious clafies,  each  of  thefe  into  many  kinds,  and  each 
kind  into  different  fpecies.  Thefe  clafles,  kinds  and 
fpecies  are  formed  into  general  and  fpeciflc  laws,  under 
which  each  injurious  aftion  is  refpectively  brought,  in 
order  to  determine  the  degree  of  its  demerit,  and  the 
manner  in  which  remedies  are  to  be  applied,  that  the 
injured  may  obtain  juftice. 

ScL — We  need  not  therefore  be  furprifed  at  the  multiplicity 
of  civil  laws;  nor  ought  we  to  give  an  ear  to  thofe  who 
difclaim  either  the  practicability  cr  neccliity  of  reducing 
laws  to  firft  and  invariable  principles,  and  the  ltudy  of 
them  to  fcientific  rules. 

There  can  be  no  injury  conceivable,  or  it  mull:  ul- 
timately proceed  from  a  violation  of  both  the  afore- 
mentioned principles  of  perfect  laws.     The  following 

two 


I  82  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

two  infbtnces,  which  we  fhall  give  of  general  laws  de- 
duced from  them,  will  mew  the  eafy  mode  of  deduc- 
tion, and  ferve  to  lead  us  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Spi- 
rituality of  laws. 

The  law,  "  thou  malt  not  kill,"  reduced  to  the 
principle,  "  do  no  injury,"  is  this  general  rule,  do  not 
injure  thy  yieighboafs  life.  Whatever  therefore  is  inju- 
rious to  the  life  or  health  of  our  neighbour,  or  endan- 
gers either  one  or  the  other,  is  repugnant  to  the  law, 
"  thou  (halt  not  kill." 

If  we  refer  it  to  the  principle,  "  give  every  one  his 
own,"  we  find  that  it  enjoins  upon  us  a  care  for  our 
neighbour's  life  and  health,  and  requires  our  protec- 
tion and  affiftance,  if  one  or  the  other  is  in  danger. 

The  lav/,  "  thou  malt  not  fleal,"  referred  to  thofe 
general  principles,  prohibits,  on  the  one  hand,  all  man- 
ner of  violence,  hurt,  damage,  fraud,  ccc.  by  which 
our  neighbour  may  fuffer  injury  in  his  property ;  and, 
on  the  other,  enjoins,  that  we  afford  afllflance  if  it  is 
in  danger,  and  make  difcovery  when  we  know  it  is 
purloined,  &c. 

Sch. — There  are,  befides  thefe  confiderations,  innumerable 
modes  in  which  injuries  may  be  committed  and  fuftained: 
in  fome,  an  agent  may  act  culpably,  in  others  malicioudy. 
Laws  juftly  make  diftinftions  not  only  with  refpeft  to 
the  nature  and  effects  of  injuries,  but  likewife  to  their 
immorality,  refulting  from  the  intention  of  the  injurer. 
There  is  on  this  account  a  vaft  difference  made  between 
the  punifliment  of  man-Oaughter  and  that  of  murder,  &c. 

By  damages  we  underftand  evils  arifing  from  injuries. 

Damages  are  diftinguifhed  into  immediate  and  medi- 
ate \  the  former  are  the  immediate,  thefe  the  more 
diftant  and  remote  effects  of  injuries. 

Immediate 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I  83 

Immediate  damages  are  eafily  perceived  by  the  na- 
tural effects  which  injuries  produce  at  the  time  when, 
they  happen  or  are  difcovered:  for  inftance,  the  forg- 
ing or  palling  a  falfe  note,  at  the  value  of  ten  pounds, 
caufes  the  receiver  a  lofs  of  ten  pounds. 

Mediate  damages  are  the  remote  and  general 
confequences  of  an  injury :  for  inftance,  the  ftealing  a 
horfe,  feed,  or  plough,  or  an  cflential  part  thereof, 
particularly  in  a  place  or  under  circumftances  where 
the  lofs  cannot  be  immediately  fupplied,  is  in  its  im- 
mediate confequences  not  fo  considerable  as  in  thole 
which  are  remote:  confider,  that  the  owner  of  the 
horfe,  of  the  feed,  &c.  cannot  fow  ;  the  confequences 
will  be,  that  he  cannot  reap,  cannot  fupport  his  family, 
or  ftand  to  other  weighty  engagements. 

In  civil  fociety,  great  flrefs  is  to  be  laid  upon  the 
confequences,  to  which  actions  lead,  and  which  they 
would  produce  mould  they  become  general ;  if  forging 
becomes  common,  no  note  will  pafs ;  if  ftealing  or  de- 
fertion  become  general,  there  is  no  fecurity  for  pro- 
perty, no  poflibility  of  defending  the  country. 

ScL — Civil  laws  are  therefore  juftly  fevere  in  punifhing  ac- 
tions which  are  dangerous  in  their  remote  and  general 
confequences. 

To  prove  a  damage,  it  is  not  fufficient  to  make  it 
evident -that  another  has  been  the  author  of  an  ac- 
tion which  has  caufed  us  inconveniency  or  lofs ;  but 
we  muft  alfo  make  it  appear,  that  the  action  com- 
plained of  is  an  injury. 

The  fame  duty  which  enjoins  us  not  to  do  injury 
to  any  perfon,  forbids  doing  damages. 

We 


184  MORAL  philosophy'. 

We  make  reparation  for  injury  or  damage,  if  we 
caufe  the  evil  arifen  therefrom  to  ceafe. 

It  is  a  perfect  duty  that  we  make  reparation  for  in- 
juries and  damages-,  for  it  is  our  duty  to  commit  nei- 
ther the  one  nor  the  other  •,  but  as  long  as  evils  ariferi 
and  arifing  from  injuries  are  fujrered  to  remain,  fo 
long  injuries  continue,  and  .fo  long  we  iin  againft  the 
laws,  "  do  no  injury, — give  every  one  his  own."  The 
dictates  therefore  of  natural  law  forbidding  injury,  and 
enjoining  us  to  give  every  one  his  own,  likev/ife  com- 
mand the  reparation  of  Injuries  and  damages. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  reparation  is  to  be  made 
according  to  the  law,  "  give  every  one  his  own." 

It  is  in  two  ways  that  this  law  may  be  fatisned  ;  ei- 
ther by  returning  anothers  own  in  kind,  or,  where 
that  is  impofTible,  by  an  equivalent. 

If  we  give  to  the  injured  perfon  his  own  in  kind, 
we  are  faid  to  make  reftitution-,  if  we  give  him  an 
equivalent,  we  make  fatisfaclion. 

In  all  cafes  where  reititutiort  is  poflibie,  fatisfacliorl 
cannot  pafs  for  full  reparation,  except  it  meet  the  con- 
{cnt  of  the  party  aggrieved;  for  fatisfaclion  is  only  a 
fubftitute  for  reltitu tion,  where,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
the  latter  is  impoiTible. 

Damages,  for  which  no  restitution  or  fatisfacliort 
can  be  made,  are  faid  to  be  irreparable-,  thofe  for 
which  either  the  one  or  the  other  can  be  made,  are  re- 
parable. 

Sch.  1. — To  kill  a  parent  is  an  irreparable  damage  to  children; 
fo  the  taking  away  theiife  of  a  child  is  an  irreparable  lolk 
to  parents.  To  betray  the  virtue  and  innocence  of  per- 
fons  is  a  high  crime,  and  the  damages  irreparable  1 

Sch. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  I  S§ 

t 

Sd.  2. — In  the  ftri&eft  fignification  of  the  term,  and  in  eon? 

fequence  of  the  nature  of  things  confidcred  in  themfelves, 
nothing  fliort  of  reftitution  can  be  a  reparation.  Human, 
laws  may  be  fatisfied  by  lines  and  coniiderations  of  in- 
tereit,  but  certainly  not  the  laws  of  God :  it  cannot  be 
right  that  the  wealthy  mould  fport  with  the  rights  of  others^ 
becaufe  they  poflefs  advantages  which  others  have  not. 

It  is  then  a  perfect  duty,  that  we  make  reftitution 
for  injuries  and  damages  if  poilible  ♦,  if  otherwife,  we 
muft  make  fatisfaction ;  for  we  are  bound  to  caufe  the 
evil  arifen  from  injuries  to  ceafe. 

The  greater  the  damages  are,  the  greater  are  the  in- 
juries from  which  they  refult;  for  the  degrees  of  the 
material  morality  or  immorality  refult  from  the  confe- 
quences  of  moral  actions. 

Sch. — A  thief  who  fteals  a  hundred  pounds  does  a  greater  in- 
jury than  one  who  fteals  a  hundred  cents,  &c. 

But  there  are  alfo  various  degrees  of  heinoufnefs  iri 
injuries,  where  reference  is  had  to  the  will  and  inten- 
tion of  the  agent. 

Sch.— One  may  injure  inadvertently,  culpably,  or  malicioiiny. 

Damages,  therefore,  with  refpect  to  the  intention  of 
the  agent,  are  diftinguifhed  into  cdfuah  indireft^  and 
direff. 

Cafual  damages  are  confequences  not  proceeding 
from  amoral  caufe-,  as,  from  lunatics,  infant  children^ 
brutes,  and  inanimate  things. 

Indireti  damages  proceed  from  injuries  which  are_ 
done  culpably,  by  inattention,  improvidency,  precipi- 
tancy, or  careleflhefs :  thus,  damages  done  by  lunatics* 
madmen,  children,  brutes,  and  inanimate  things,  may- 
become  indirect  with  refpect  to  him  who  had  the  care 
of  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  them,  and  who  knew 

B  b  their 


I  86  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY." 

their  mifchievous  difpofition  or  dangerous  condition* 
and  did  not  ail  in  his  power  to  prevent  the  evil  confe- 
quences. 

Dzrefl  damages  are  done  deliberately,  intentionally 
and  malicioufly,  and  are  therefore  peculiarly  heinous, 
according  to  the  various  degrees  of  malice. 

As,  therefore,  cafual  damages  excufe  from  repara- 
tion, and  as  indirect  injuries,  on  the  contrary,  bind 
thereto,  it  is  plain,  that  in  the  cafe  of  direct  injuries 
and  damages,  befides  reparation  and  fecurity,  the  laws 
may  order  punimments  according  to  the  degrees  of  ma- 
lignity in  the  conduct  and  intention  of  the  injurer. 

We  have  a  perfect  right  to  compel  reparation,  for 
we  have  fuch  a  right  to  avert  and  repel  injuries :  but 
injuries  continue  until  reparation  is  made;  the  fame 
right,  therefore,  which  juftifies  us  in  repelling  an  inju- 
ry, warrants  all  neceflary  means  for  forcing  the  injurer 
to  make  reparation. 

We  are  faid  to  remit  our  right,  if  we  declare  that 
we  will  not  exercife  it. 

Remittance  of  injury  among  private  perfons  is  for- 
givenefs'9  forgivenefs  proceeding  from  authority,  with 
refpect  to  private  perfons,  is  pardon.  Remiiiion  of 
right  to  demand  and  compel  damages  declared  by  go- 
vernment, is  known  by  the  term  amnefty. 

As  our  rights  are  our  own,  we  cannot  injure  a  third 
perfon  by  remitting  or  by  lawfully  exerciiing  them. 

If  a  third  perfon  fuffer  damages  in  the  lawful  exercife 
of  our  right,  the  injury  and  damage  muft  be  charged 
to  him  who  has  provoked  the  exercife  of  that  right, 
r.hat  is  to  fay,  to  the  injurer. 

Sck, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  iS/ 

$Jlt  I# — By  caufing  the  imprifonment  of  a  debtor,  or  compel- 
ling payment,  an  innocent  wife  may  lofe  her  patrimony, 
innocent  children  their  fupport,  &c. 

Sc/i.  2. — It  is  to  be  obferved,  that  he  is  not  always  the  injurer 
who  firft  makes  ule  of  violence  ;  but  he  undoubtedly  is, 
who  is  the  caufe  and  has  unjuftly  provoked  the  exercife 
thereof. 

That  reparation  is  proportionate,  in  which  no  more  is 
demanded  and  exacted  than  is  fufficient  to  caufe  the 
evil  confequences  of  an  injury  to  ccafe. 

By  exacting  lefs,  we  fhow  favour  and  generofity. 

By  ufing  more  violence  than  is  neceflary  for  repara- 
tion, we  difturb  another  in  the  ufeand  pofl'eflion  of  his 
own  without  a  jiift  caufe-,  the  confequence  is,  that  in 
fuch  cafes  we  commit  injury  and  damage  as  far  as  our 
exaction  exceeds  the  damages  fuftained. 

ScL — In  all  acts  of  violence,  however,  allowances  are  to  be 
made,  in  favour  of  the  profecutor,  for  accidental  wafte 
and  warmth  of  refentment;  becaufe  both  the  natural  and 
unavoidable  confequences  of  injuries  muft  be  charged  to 
the  author  of  them,  not  to  him  who  is  under  the  neceffity 
of  exercifing  a  difagreeable  right. 

Damages  may  be  done  by  a  number  of  perfons  col- 
lected together :  in  fuch  cafes,  how  fhall  reparation  be 
made  ?  The  principles  of  nature  dictate,  that  each 
perfon  is  to  pay  his  quota  of  damage,  if  he  is  able  and 
it  can  be  ascertained.  Where  the  quota  of  damage 
done  by  each  perfon  cannot  be  afcertained,  the  whole 
company,  at  lean;  thofe  who  are  able,  are  to  make  repa- 
ration for  the  whole :  if  all  are  not  known  or  unable, 
thofe  who  are  known  and  able  muft  ftand  for  the  reft : 
for,  in  thefe  cafes,  thofe  who  affociated  in  mifchief  had 
the  choice  of  their  company,  at  leaft  all  who  had  a  hand 
in  it  ought  to  have  informed  themfelves  both  with  re- 

fpect  to  perfons  and  circumftances. 

Scfft 


X  SB  _        MORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

Sch, — To  take  one  for  all,  in  cafes  where  all  or  a  number  of 
them  are  both  known  and  able  to  make  full  reparation  for 
injury,  is  a  way  of  procedure  not  altogether  confident 
with  the  principles  of  natural  equity. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the  rights  of  defence  and  war. 

ASIDES  attual  injuries  and  damages  treated  of 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  there  may  be  fuch  as  are 
impending  •,  for  in  many  cafes  it  would  be  both  impru- 
dent and  unfafe  to  delay  our  right  of  repelling  injuries 
until  they  mould  have  actually  taken  place.  We  have 
a  right  to  enjoy  our  own  in  fecurity :  a  ftate  of  fear 
and  appreheniion  of  danger  is  fo  far  from  being  happy, 
that  it  frequently  renders  us  uneafy  and  miferable :  we 
may  therefore  be  juftly  faid  to  be  injured,  if  another 
fhews  an  inclination  to  difturb  us  in  the  ufe  and  pofTef- 
iion  of  our  own.  Such  an  inclination  fhewn,  we  call 
an  impending  injury,  and  the  evils  arifing  from  it  are 
impending  damages. 

The  greater  the  damages  of  an  impending  injury, 

the  greater  is  the  injury. 

Sch. — There  is  a  vafi  difference  between  the  cafes,  where  one 
meets  us  in  a  threatening  pofture  with  a  clenched  fift,  or 
with  fword  or  piftol  in  hand. 

Pie  who  actually  difcurbs  us  in  the  ufe  of  our  own, 
or  fhews  an  inclination  to  do  fo,  is  called  an  aggreffor ; 
the  act  itfelf  is  ftiled  an  aggreffion ;  and  he  againft  whom 
the  injury  is  levelled  or  intended,  is  the  party  aggrieved 
qt  aggrejjed* 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  189 

If  we  bring  evils  upon  an  aggreflbr  with  an  intent 

to  flop  the  further  progrefs  of  an  actual,  or  to  avert 

an  intended  injury,  we  are  faid  to  defend  ourfelves. 

Sch. — Here  we  underftand  violent  defence,  where  recourfe  is 
had  to  force  and  compulfory  means ;  not  that  where  we 
make  life  of  arguments  with  tin  intention  to  ward  oft  the 
imputation  of  a  fact  laid  to  our  charge. 

Defence  cannot  be  juft  where  there  is  not  a  juft 
caufe-,  for  by  doing  violence  to  another  without  a  juft 
caufe,  we  unjuftly  difturb  him  in  the  ufe  and  porTeffion. 
of  his  own,  and  commit  an  injury,  becaufe  we  act 
contrary  to  the  dictates  of  natural  law. 

Where  there  is  neither  actual  nor  impending  injury, 
there  cannot  be  a  juft  caufe  for  defence. 

We  are  faid  to  prevent  an  cggreffion,  when  we  ufe 
officious  means,  lawful  in  themfelves,  but  not  violent 
in  their  nature  and  confequences,  for  the  purpofe  of 
inducing  another  not  to  entertain  a  defire  or  mew  an 
inclination  to  injure  us  or  to  become  an  aggreflbr. 

Well  founded  arguments,  proving  thejuftice  of  our 
conduct  and  intentions  towards  another,  or  fettino-  in 
a  proper  light  the  injuftice  of  the  meafures  purfued  by 
him,  together  with  their  fatal  tendency  to  difturb  our 
peace  and  fecurity,  may  have  great  weight  with  thofe 
who,  open  to  conviction,  are  not  intoxicated  by  paftion, 
or  carried  away  with  haughtinefs  and  felfiih  views  of 
ambition :  but  where  juftice  and  truth  are  difregarded, 
the  beft  mean  for  preventing  aggrefnons  is  doubtlefs  to 
put  ourfelves  in  a  proper  ftate  of  defence,  and  fhew 
both  vigilance  and  vigour  in  afTerting  and  maintaining 
our  jult  rights. 

It  is  more  confident  with  the  principles  of  humani- 
ty, more  fafe,  and  confoquently  more  politic,  that  we 

endeavour 


I9O  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

endeavour  to  prevent  an  aggreflion,  than  purfue  a 
contrary  conduct,  by  which  we  might  be  precipitated 
into  violent  meafures. 

The  party  aggrieved  has  a  juft  right  of  defence; 
for  he  either  fuflains  an  aggreflion  or  is  under  the  fear 
of  one,  and  confequently  in  a  ftate  where  he  may  law- 
fully make  ufe  of  forcible  means  either  to  ftop  the  pro- 
grefs  of  an  actual  or  to  avert  an  impending  injury. 

We  may  not  refort  to  the  right  of  defence  if  no  ag- 
greffion  has  taken  place-,  that  is,  where  there  is  no 
actual  or  impending  injury. 

As  certainty  is  very  difficult  to  be  attained  in  matters 
of  fad,  particularly  in  cafes  where  the  motives  and  in- 
tentions of  the  agent  are  to  be  proved,  it  follows,  that 
the  eftablifhment  of  an  aggreflion  with  refpect  to  an 
impending  injury,  muft  necefTarily  give  occafion  to 
doubts  and  controversies  •,  for  it  is  poflible,  that  an 
impending  injury  may  be  certain  or  probable,  or  may 
only  be  pretended. 

With  refpect  to  aggreffion,  we  have  therefore  to  atr 
tend  to  certain  particulars,  which,  either  in  their  nature 
or  by  the  cuftom  and  confent  of  mankind,  carry  with 
them  the  criteria  or  the  prognoftics  of  the  intentions  of 
another  perfon.  If  fuch  particulars  take  place,  there 
is  a  poffibility  of  coming  to  as  much  certainty  as  the 
nature  of  the  thing  admits  of,  and  we  may  in  that  re- 
fpect pofitively  know  whether  an  injury  is  intended 
or  not. 

An  open  avowal  of  an  inclination  or  deflgn  to  injure 
or  difturb  us,  leaves  no  doubt  but  that  aggreflion  has 
already  taken  place  •,  and  a  difavowal  does  not  in  every 
cafe  amount  to  a  proof  that  no  injury  is  intended. 

There 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  ICjl 

There  may  be  circumftances  particularly  notable 
with  refpect  to  matters  of  fact,  from  which  probable 
conclufions  can  be  drawn  of  the  intention  of  the  agent. 
We  may  therefore  form  an  idea  of  a  probable  right  of 
defence,  which  takes  place  when  there  is  a  concurrence 
of  notable  circumftances,  from  which  collectively  wc 
fee  fufficient  caufe  to  apprehend  an  aggreftion. 

Sch. — Suppofe  rival  nations,  of  which  the  one  is  difcovered  to 
be  bufy  in  exploring  the  coafts  and  harbours  of  the  other, 
being  at  the  fame  time  deeply  engaged  in  refitting  its  navy, 
recruiting  its  army,  building  or  repairing  fortifications, 
and  making  alliances;  would  not  the  other  have  caufe  to 
apprehend  an  aggreflion,  and  be  juftifiable  in  taking  mea- 
fures  for  defence? 

It  ought,  however,  to  be  well  obferved,  that  the 
greateft  probability  may  be  falfe;  many  aggrefllons, 
therefore,  are  only  pretended,  and  defence  is  often 
nothing  but  clandeftine  injury  and  aggreflion,  under 
the  mafk  of  a  neceflary  and  lawful  exercife  of  ajuft 
right. 

Sch. — Jealoufies,  ambitious  fchemes,  fubterfuges,  fo  common  . 
in  national  governments,  may  blind  the  eyes  of  indivi- 
duals or  other  nations,  but  cannot  take  away  the  injuftice 
of  their  bloody  meafures,  nor  their  refponfibility  to  God. 

He  who  juftly  defends  himfelf,  exercifes  his  own 
right-,  he  may  caufe  hurt  to  a  third  perfon,  but  cannot 
be  charged  with  damages,  nor  held  to  make  reparation, 
for  this  plain  caufe,  that  in  exercifing  his  own  right  he 
does  not  commit  an  injury. 

If,  therefore,  a  third  perfon  fuffer  hurt,  it  muft  be 
charged  as  a  damage  to  the  aggreflbr;  for  he  is  the 
moral  caufe  of  all  the  natural  and  unavoidable  confe- 
quences  flowing  from  the  juft  exercife  of  the  right  of 
defence. 

The 


1 02  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  aggrefibr,  therefore,  is  bound  to  make  good  all 
damages  fuftained  by  a  third  perfon  from  the  juft  ex- 
ercife  of  the  right  of  defence,  for  which  he  has  given 
caufe  and  provocation. 

Sc/i. — We  mull,  however,  well  confider,  that  only  fuch  lofTes 
and  inconveniencies  are  chargeable  to  the  aggrefibr,  as 
cannot  be  avoided  in  juftly  exercifing  the  right  of  defence. 
Making  allowances,  as  we  have  already  mentioned,  for 
unavoidable  wafte,  we  muft  charge  the  defender  with  all 
that  is  done  wantonly  or  unnecefiarily :  in  thefe  cafes  he 
may  have  a  juft  right  of  defence,  but  he  is  far  from  ex- 
ercifing it  juftly. 

Ke  who  hinders  us  in  the  juft  exercife  of  the  right 
of  defence,  difturbs  us  in  the  ufe  and  pofleffion  of  our 
own,  commits  an  injury,  and  is  bound  to  make  repa- 
ration. 

The  right  of  defence  involves  the  right  of  prevent- 
in  g  aggrelTion.  We  prevent  aggreffion  .by  the  fame 
■conduct  and  means  by  which  injuries  are  prevented. 

§ch. — Remember,  that  putting  ourfelves  into  a  proper  ftate  of 
defence,  is  found  to  be  one  of  the  moft  powerful  argu- 
ments for  preventing  infults  and  aggreffion. 

Defence  may  be  juft  with  refpect  to  its  caufe,  and 
ftifl  unjuft  with  regard  to  the  mode  in  which  it  is  con- 
ducted. On  the  other  hand,  defence  may  be  conducted 
in  a  proper  mode,  &c.  and  ftill  be  unjuft  with  refpect 
to  its  caufe. 

$c)tt — Defence  which  has  not  a  juft  caufe,  can  never  be  ren- 
dered juft,  though  it  be  conducted  in  the  beft  poffibfe 
manner;  for  it  is  in  itfelf  an  injury  and  an  unlawful  ag- 
greffion. 

With  refpect  to  the  juft  mode  of  conducting  defence, 
we  diftinguifh  both  means  and  the  ufe  of  them  into 
lawful  and  unlawful. 

Defence 


MOR.AL  PHILOSOPHY.  tt>3 

Defence  is  juflly  conducted,  if  the  means  are  lawful 
and  lawfully  ufed;  for  nothing  can  be  juffc  that  is  re- 
pugnant to  the  dictates  of  natural  law.. 

Thofe  means  are  lawful  which  are  not  unnatural  m 
themfelves,  nor  difproportionate  to  the  purpofes  of  a 
juft  defence. 

We  call  thofe  means  unnatural  which  are  ihconfiflent 
with  the  ends  of  jufl  defence. 

The  ends  of  juft  defence  being  feCurity  and  peace  in 

the  ufe  and  pofierTion  of  our  own,  it  follows,  that  fuch 

means  as  render,  among  other  things,  life  in  the  higheft, 

degree  infecure,  are  contradictory  to  the  very  nature  of 

defence,  and  are  juflly  called  unnatural. 

Sch. — Among  the  unnatural  means  of  defence  is  afTaffinafiori, 
poifoning  and  perjury;  for,  independent  of  the  horrid  in- 
ternal malignity  of  fiich  actions,  there  would  be  an  end 
to  all  fecurity  and  truft,  as  well  as  to  a  poffibility  of  mak- 
ing ufe  of  the  right  of  defence,  if  fuch  practices  Should 
become  general.  As  this  moil  certainly  will  be  the  cafe^ 
if  any  one  who  has  the  right  of  defence,  or  pretends  la 
have  it,  might  ufe  fuch  means,  there  would  be  no  poffibi- 
lity of  preventing  others  from  following  the  fatal  example* 
Indeed,  no  man's  life  would  be  fafe. 

Means  unlawful,  becaufe  they  are  difproporiionaie^ 
are  fuch  as  are  calculated  in  themfelves  to  bring  more 
evils  upon  the  aggreflbr  than  are  neeefiary  for  averting 
the  aggreflion. 

The  proportion  of  means,  or  the  contrary  thereof, 

mud  be  eftimated  by  the  nature  and  circumftances 

of  the  aggreflion;  for  inftance,  a  fword  is  a  proper 

mean  of  defence,  if  the  ap-areffor  invades  us  with  a 

weapon  of  that  kind,  but  is  far  from  being  fo"  againfl. 

one  who  attacks  us  with  his  lift. 

Sen. — It  would  be  murder,  not  cfefencej  if  a  perfon,  thou 

C  c  rrjuttly* 


194  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

unjuftly  beaten,  fliould  rip  up  the  entrails  of  the  aggrefTor^ 
as  there  is  an  evident  difproportion  between  the  aggreflion 
and  defence;  the  former  caufes  only  hurt  and  pain,  the 
latter  death. 

Befides  proportionate  and  lawful  means,  defence 
mud:  not  be  carried  to  excefs ;  which  is  the  cafe  when 
we  bring  more  evils  upon  an  injurer  than  are  neceflary 
for  reparation  and  fecurity ;  for  as  thefe  are  the  ends 
for  which  defence  may  be  juftly  exercifed,  it  follows, 
that  an  extended  profecution  of  that  right  is  deftitute 
of  a  juft  caufe,  and  therefore  ceafes  to  be  a  right.  All 
acts  of  violence  thus  extended  beyond  their  juft  limits, 
become  kwlefs  aggreiilons. 

It  is  therefore  an  important  duty,  that  we  undertake 
no  defence  without  a  jure  caufe. 

It  is  likewife  a  duty,  in  exercifing  the  right  of  juft 
defence,  that  we  do  not  exceed  its  limits,  by  making 
ufe  of  unlawful  means,  or  carrying  the  ufe  of  fuch  as 
are  lawful  to  excefs^ 

Sch.  i. — The  principles  of  juftice,  humanity  and  prudence  re- 
quire, in  making  ufe  of  the  right  of  defence,  that  we  d® 
not  dived  ourfelves  of  internal  friendfhip. 

ScJi.2. — In  forming  an  eftimate  of  our  own  conduct,  we  can- 
not be  too  ftri6t,  whilft  that  of  a  neighbour,  even  that  of  an 
enemy,  has  a  claim  to  our  charity.  In  all  cafes  of  defence 
proceeding  from  a  juft  caufe,  we  ought  to  make  allow- 
ances, and  confider,  not  fo  much  what  the  real  danger  of 
the  defender  has  been,  as  what  he  himfelf  conceived  it  to 
be.  There  may  be  inftances  where  paffion  has  had  the 
better  of  judgment,  and  confequently  defence  is  carried 
too  far;  but  is  it  not  in  fome  meafure  owing  to  the  aggrcf- 
for,  that  the  defender  has  been  put  into  fuch  a  Hate? 

A  defender  tranfgreffing  the  limits  of  juft  defence, 
becomes  an  aggreflbr  as  far  as  he  brings  unneceilary 
evils  upon  his  adverfary,  or  more  than  are  fufneient  for 

his 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


J9: 


his  own  reparation  and  fecurity.  In  this  cafe,  there- 
fore, he  is  bound  to  make  amends  for  fuch  an  excefs 
of  unlawful  violence. 

A  perfon  may  remit  his  right  of  defence,  for  it  is 
his  own. 

On  that  very  account  he  cannot  be  compelled  to  de- 
fend himfelf. 

Sch.  i. — It  is  to  be  obferved,  that  we  treat  here  of  thofe  rights 
and  duties  which  individuals  might  exercife,  and  would 
be  held  to  obferve  amongft,  one  another  in  the  abfolute 
focial  flate,  where  they  are  confidered  as  fellow  men,  and 
where  each  is  in  the  pofTeffion  of  all  his  natural  rights,  and 
entitled  to  their  full  exercife. 

Sch.  2 — When,  on  the  contrary,  men  are  confidered  in  a  ftate 
of  civil  fqciety,  where  natural  rights,  and  amongft  them 
the  rights  of  defence  and  war,  and  more  efpecially  the  ex- 
ercife of  them,  is  in  a  greater  or  lefs  degree  lodged  with 
the  government  of  that  fociety;  it  is  evident,  that  thefe 
natural  rights  mull:  undergo  many  modifications. 

Sch.  3. — Citizens  may  remit  or  exercife  all  thofe  natural  rights 
which  are  not  delegated,  and  as  far  as  the  exercife  of  thpm 
is  not  lodged  in  the  hands  of  government. 

Sch.  4.— Government,  on  the  other  hand,  has  the  difpofal  of 
the  exercife  of  the  delegated  rights  of  citizens,  as  far  as 
that  exercife  is  delegated ;  it  may  remit  and  pardon,  where 
civil  duty  points  out  to  citizens  the  way  of  interceffion. 

Sch.  5. — As  individuals  muft  exercife  the  right  of  remiffion, 
or  of  profecution  of  defence  in  conformity  to  dutv,  fo 
government  may  not  exercife  arbitrary  power  in  that  re- 
fpe£t,  iince  it  is  a  duty  incumbent  upon  it  to  ufe  all  dele- 
gated rights  for  the  welfare  and  fecurity  of  civil  focietv 
in  general. 

A  remiflion  of  the  right  of  defence  becomes  our  duty 
when  it  produces  greater  and  more  univerfal  felicity 
than  would  refult  from  a  ftridl  profecution  thereof. 

But  it  cannot  be  lawful,  at  leaft  in  the  forum  of  con- 
fcience,  if  fuch  remiffion  has  a  bad  tendency,  or  pro- 
duces- 


1£,6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

duces  bad  effects,  or  if  it  proceeds  from  finifler  mo* 
rives,  or  endangers  the  fecurity  of  others. 

Sch.  i. — As  the  general  confequences  of  the  exercife  of  the 
rights  of  defence  and  war  among;  individuals  would  render 
a  ftate  of  fociety  either  impoffible,  or  at  leaft  extremely 
unhappy,  we  fee  the  great  canfe  why  thofe  rights  are  to  a 
certain  extent  very  wiiely  lodged  in  the  hands  of  govern- 
ment, and  the  exercife  of  them  intrufted  to  its  care. 

Sfh.  2. — It  is  for  the  fame  reafon,  that  a  remiffion  of  the  right 
of  defence,  in  cafes  where  the  good  of  fociety  is  at  (lake, 
cannot  remain  at  the  difpofal  of  individuals.  If  each  man 
has  a  right  to  withdraw  himfelf  from  the  defence  of  his 
country  when  he  pleafes,  fociety  cannot  fubfift. 

Sch.  3. — Whilft  we  conclude,  from  thefe  and  other  weighty 
principles,  that  no  member  of  civil  fociety  can  have  a 
folid  objection  to  an  exercife  of  the  right  of  repelling 
force  by  force,  particularly  when  that  exercife  is  necelTary 
for  the  affiftance  of  our  fellow  citizens  and  the  preferva- 
tion  of  the  public  good  of  our  country;  we  think  it 
commendable  in  government  to  mitigate  its  public  right 
with  refpeel  to  perfous  who  pretend  fcruples  of  con- 
icience,  io  far  as  is  confident  with  public  good. 

pfk.  4.— Should  lenity  clafh  with  public  good,  there  is  no 
doubt  but  that  the  latter  fhould  fuperfede  all  other  confide- 
rations.  Upon  the  whole,  if  perfons  have  a  claim  upon 
the  humanity  of  government,  it  is  very  obvious  that  the 
latter  can  in  no  wife  condpfcend  to  any  thing  lefs  than  a 
reasonable  equivalent. 

Violent  defence  is  fo  near  akin  to  war,  that  nothing 
more  is  required  for  conitituting  the  latter,  than  that 
the  former  become  reciprocal. 

War  may  be  defined  to  be  that  {late,  where  men 
reciprocally  refort  to  the  right  of  defence,  committing 
violence  again  ft  one  another,  determined  to  repel  force 
<by  force. 

The  oppofite  of  war  is  peace.     Peace,  therefore, 
rnay  be  defined  to  be  that  deferable  ftate  where  no  re- 
ciprocal 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  l$f 

ciprocal  injury  has  taken  place*,  where  men  do  not  look 

upon  one  another  as  aggreiTors,  and  confequently  ab- 

ifoiin  froin  acts  of  reciprocal  violence. 

Sth.  i.-— According  to  thefe  feveral  definitions  of  peace,  it  is 
manifeft,  that  thofe  have  the  beft  profpect  of  enjoying  its 
bleffmgs,  who  carefully  refrain  from  acts  of  injury,  and 
are  confcientioufly  fcrupulous  of  giving  every  one  his 
due  •  for  fuch  conduct  leaves  not  even  a  pretence  for 
committing  an  act  of  violence. 

Sch.  z. — As  perfection  in  human  affairs  cannot  be  expected, 
and  as  the  beft  difpofed  neighbour  may  commit  an  act 
injurious  to  another,  ftill,  even  in  this  cafe,  a  perfon  fet- 
ting  a  proper  value  upon  peace  will  rather  fubmit  to  the 
juft  right  of  the  injured,  than  refill,  and  thus  render  vio- 
lence reciprocal. 

§:h.  3. — Confidering  the  imperfections  of  human  nature,  and 
the  various  temptations  furrounding  men  in  their  inter- 
courfe  with  one  another,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that 
injuries  take  place;  but,  as  men  are  prone  to  aggreflion, 
is  it  not  a  matter  of  furprife  that  they  are  unwilling  to 
make  conceffions,  or  even  reparation?  JNfotwithftanding 
the  frailties  of  nature  and  the  great  variety  of  interefts 
and  fentiments  in  fociety,  peace  and  harmony  might  ftill 
prevail,  and  human  intercourfe  more  frequently  prefent 
us  with  the  pleafant  fight  of  beholding  brethren  in  unity, 
if  a  folicitude  to  prevent  or  immediately  to  repair  injuries 
fhould  become  general  among  the  children  of  men :  all 
caufe  for  war  would  thus  be  done  away. 

ScL  4.- — War  amongft  brethren  is  a  thing  in  itfelf  fo  horrid, 
and  its  confequences  fo  dreadful,  that  even  a  remiflion  of 
our  right,  when  confident  with  higher  duties,  is  not  too 
great  a  facrifice,  if  peace  may  thereby  be  cultivated  and 
prefer  ved, 

Scfi.  5. — This  being  the  cafe,  how  careful  mould  we  be,  when 
higher  obligations  make  the  exercife  of  our  right  of  de- 
fence neceffary,  to  ufe  it  with  all  poffible  prudence  and 
moderation,  and  to  guard  againft  the  bias  of  pafiion,  left 
we  become  guilty  of  carrying  defence  beyond  its  juft  li- 
mits, and  thereby  give  caufe  for  refiftance,  and  provoke 
war,  which  both  duty  and  intereft  require  us  to  avoid  as- 
much  and  as  long  as  pciSble. 

"      F  Set. 


%Q% 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


Sch.  6. — We  need  only  fubftitute,  in  the  definitions  of  peace 
and  of  war,  the  term  nations  for  that  of  men,  in  order  to 
have  an  adequate  idea  of  public  peace,  the  greater!  na- 
tional bleffing  on  earth,  and  of  public  war,  the  greateft 
calamity  that  can  befai  a  nation.  Public  peace  may  be 
defined  to  be  that  ftate  among  nations,  where  there  is 
neither  actual  aggreffion  nor  real  danger  of  an  intended 
one:  public  war,  on.  the  contrary,  takes  place  when  na- 
tions diftrefs  and  reciprocally  commit  violence  againft 
one  another. 

$ch.  7. — Although  we  may  not  here  enlarge  on  the  public  rights 
of  peace  and  of  war  amongft  ftjtes  and  nations,  a  fubject 
which  is  referved  for  another  part  of  this  treatife,  yet  it 
ought  to  be  obferved,  that  all  that  has  been  or  may  be  faid 
with  refpect  to  the  juft  exercife  of  perfect  rights,  of  re- 
paration, defence  and  war,  between  individuals,  is  the 
very  bafis  and  foundation  of  what  is  right  or  wrong  in  the 
conduct  of  focieties,  ftates  and  nations,  in  their  inter- 
courfe  with  one  another.  We  allow  that  there  is  a  great 
and  very  material  difference  between  public  and  private 
concerns,  with  refpect  to  confequences,  effects  and  ex- 
tent; but  there  cannot  be  any  formal  or  internal  difference 
with  regard  either  to  juftifving  the  caufe  for  beginning, 
or  the  juft  mode  of  conducting  acts  of  violence  and  com- 
pulilon;  becaufe  nations  are  men,  and  as  fuch  are  in  the 
fame  natural  relation  in  which  individuals  are  placed,  to 
wit,  fellow-citizens  of  the  earth,  fubject  to  the  fame  go- 
vernment of  the  Moft  High,  and  equally  bound  to  obey 
his  majeftic  commands.  The  fame  rights  may  therefore 
be  exercifed  by  nations  in  a  ftate  of  aggreffion  and  hofti- 
htv,  which  the  principles  of  nature  point  out  as  the  pro- 
per line  of  conduct  for  individuals;  and  the  fame  duties 
are  to  be  obferved  by  nations,  which  individuals  have  to 
perform  in  confiftency  with  the  laws  of  nature,  jufticc 
and  equity. 
In  order,  therefore,  to  learn  with  precision  what  conduct 
public  bodies  of  men  mould  obferve  towards  one  another, 
in  cafe  of  injury,  aggreffion  and  iniecurity,  we  muft  care- 
fully examine  the  rights  of  individuals  in  fuch  ftates. 

jjkfc;  8. — It  is  true,  in  the  prefent  ftate  of  things  men  may  very 
feldom  be  conn'dered  in  their  abfolute  focial  ftate,  as  they 
are  generally  members  of  fociety,  and  as  fuch  have  tranfr 

ferreg1, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  I99 

ferred,  in  fome  degree  or  other,  their  rights  of  reparation, 
defence  and  war,  particularly  the  exercife  of  them,  to  the 
direction  of  government.  But  if  thefe  rights  are  to  be 
exercifed,  they  muft  be  known  ;  for  without  this,  both 
citizens  are  ignorant  of  what  they  have  to  expect  from 
government,  and  government  is  unable  juftly  to  conduct 
the  exercife  of  rights  which  are  unknown  and  undeter- 
mined. 

Sch.  9.— As  citizens  have  now  to  exercife  their  natural  rights' 
of  reparation,  defence  and  war,  by  the  laws  and  directions 
of  government,  it  is  evident,  that  fuits  and  actions  are 
fubftituted  for  the  natural  mode  of  exercifing  thofe  rights. 
Hence  the  neceffity  of  good,  falutary  and  energetic  laws; 
and  of  a  faithful  and  impartial  adminiftration  of  them, 
in  order  to  afford  citizens  that  protection  and  fecurity  to 
which  they  have  a  natural  right. 

,  Sch.  10. — -Laws  which  have  that  tendency  and  effect,  are 
worthy  of  the  higheft  efteem,  and  a  juft  adminiftration  of 
them  is  a  public  bleffing.  An  obiequious  compliance 
with  their  precepts  and  prohibitions,  as  it  conftitutes  one 
of  the  moft  excellent  traits  in  the  character  of  a  good 
citizen,  fo  it  is  the  bell  poffible  mode  for  the  exercife  of 
thofe  perfect  rights  with  which  citizens  are  invefted. 

There  is  fuch  a  thing  as  the  right  of  making  war; 
for  we  have  a  right  to  repel  an  unjuft  aggrerTion,  in  or- 
der to  live  in  peace  and  fecurity.  This  right  cannot  be 
defeated  by  the  lawlefs  reiifcance  of  an  aggrefTor:  if  this 
were  the  cafe,  there  would  be  no  moral  poflibility  of 
directing  things  which  are  our  own  for  the  attainment 
of  our  felicity :  but  fince  it  has  been  proved,  that  this 
would  be  contrary  to  the  firil  principle  of  natural  laws, 
it  follows,  that  we  have  not  only  a  right  to  make  a 
juft  war,  but  that  it  is  even  our  duty  in  every  cafe 
where  avoiding  it  would  interrupt  our  felicity  or  be 
contradictory  to  our  happinefs. 

Between  the  right  of  peace  and  that  of  war  there  is 
this  difference,  that  the  former  is  abibhitely  natural, 

the 


200  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  other,  on  the  contrary,  hypothetically  fo.  It  is 
evident  from  our  own  nature  and  the  natural  order  of 
things,  that  we  mould  enjoy  our  own  undifturbed  by 
any  other  mortal.  But  the  right  of  war  prefuppofes  a 
Fad,  to  wit,  interference  and  disturbance  by  another  in 
thofc  things  which  are  at  our  free  difpofal  for  the  end 
of  our  exigence,  our  own  happinefs  and  that  of  others, 
and  for  the  glory  of  our  Maker. 

The  ftate  of  nature,  confidered  in  itfelf,  is  therefore 
not  a  ftate  of  war,  but  of  peace. 

Sck,— Rights  of  peace  and  war  are  taken  in  different  fignifica- 
tions :  fomelimes,  as  is  the  cafe  here,  they  are  taken  for 
qualities  in  perfons ;  when,  on  the  other  hand,  they  fre- 
quently denote  thofe  rules  for  conducing  the  affairs  of 
peace  or  war  which  refult  from  the  precepts  and  prohibi- 
tions of  the  law  of  nature,  or  reft  upon  ufages  which  have 
obtained  the  force  of  laws. 

From  the  nature  of  the  rights  of  peace  and  war  it  is 
evident,  that  no  right  of  war  can  take  place  without 
previous  diflurbance  in  what  is  our  own;  for  there 
cannot  be  a  right  to  commit  violence  where  there  is  no 
injury. 

That  war  hjuft  which  has  a  juft.  caufe  and  is  juftly 
conducted  :  war,  on  the  contrary,  is  unjuft,  when  it  is 
deltitute  of  a  juft  caufe  and  conducted  in  an  unjuft 
manner,  or  protracted  to  an  unlawful  extent. 

A  juft  war,  which  really  proceeds  from  a  difturbance, 
may  become  unjuft  with  refpect  to  the  mode,  manner 
and  extent  of  its  being;  conducted. 

An  unjuft  war  may  be  juftly  conducted,  but  being 
founded  on  an  unjuft  caufe,  can  never  become  juft. 

Scfit  i. — Wars  without  a  juft  caufe  are,  in  the  fight  of  natural 
jaws,  nothing  but  methodical  robberies. 

Sck. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY*  201 

Sch.  2. — Suafory  caufes,  dilated  by  ambition,  felf-intereft,  a 
defire  of  fame,  for  the  purpofe^of  conqueft,  &c.  are  far 
from  juftifiable. 

Sch.  3. — The  pretence  of  placing  nations  in  a  better  ftate  with 
refpe£t  to  religion  or  civil  liberty,  is  i'o  far  from  being  a 
juft  caufe  for  war,  that  it  is  barefaced  tyranny  under  the 
garb  of  fcandalous  hypocrrfy. 

Since  aggreflion  only  can  be  a  juft  caufe  for  war,  it 
follows,  that  perfons  or  nations,  before  they  undertake 
war,  ought  to  be  convinced  of  this  point,  left  they  fport 
with  the  rights  of  man,  tranfgrefs  the  natural  laws,  and 
become  the  difturbers  of  fociety, — hateful  to  their  fel- 
low creatures,  and  abominable  in  the  fight  of  God. 

Thofe  who  are  at  war  being  called  hoftile  enemies* 
it  follows,  that  this  term  is  applicable  to  the  aggrefted 
as  well  as  the  aggreftbr,  as  foon  as  acts  of  hoftility  are 
committed. 

Sch.  1. — In  the  fequel  we  underfland  by  the  term  enemy  fuch 
an  one  as  is  hoftile. 

Sch.  2.— Hence  it  follows,  that  from  another's  not  committing 
acts  of  hoftility  againft  us,  we  cannot  fafely  conclude  that 
he  is  our  friend  or  well-wiiher. 

Sch.  3. — With  refpect  to  local  fituation,  there  is  no  fuch  thing 
as  natural  enemies :  if  nations  or  men  are  fo  placed  that 
they  may  eafily  interfere  with  each  other,  a  good  under- 
ftanding  ought  to  be  earneftly  and  affiduoufly  cultivated 
between  them. 

The  diftinction  of  war  into  defenfive  and  offensive, 
may  be  referred  to  the  caufe  as  well  as  to  the  operations 
of  a  war:  with  refpect  to  the  former,  he  who  is  the 
aggreflbr,  that  is  to  fay,  who  is  the  moral  caufe  of  the 
injury,  whether  he  begins  or  provokes  hoftility,  carries 
on  an  offenfive  war  :  the  party  aggrieved,  on  the  con- 
trary,  is  on  the  defenfive,  whether  acts  of  hoftility  be- 
gin with  him  or  with  the  adverfary.     But,  when  refe- 

D  d  rence 


202  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

rence  is  had  to  operations,  he  who  invades  is  faid  to 
carry  on  an  ofFenfive  war,  and  the  invaded  is  faid  to  be 
pn  the  defenfive. 

Sch.  i.*— In  the  nrft  fignincation  of  the  terms,  offenfive  war  is 
unjuft,  whether  the  operations  be  offenfive  or  defenfive. 

Sch.  i. — According  to  the  fecond  acceptation  of  the  terms,  an 
offenfive  war  may  be  juft  and  a  defenfive  unjuft,  and 
vice  verfa. 

Sch.  3. — With  refpecl  to  the  general  conduct  of  a  war,  the 
operations  are  liable  to  change:  he  who  invades  to-day 
may  be  invaded  to-morrow  ;  an  offenfive  war  may  there- 
fore become  defenfive,  and  vice  verfa. 

It  is  our  duty  to  cultivate  peace  as  long  as  poffible ; 
for  it  is  our  duty  to  injure  no  perfon.  By  avoiding  the 
commiffion  of  injury  and  acts  of  aggreflion,  we  avoid 
giving  caufe  for  war:  by  avoiding  caufes  we  avoid 
their  effects.  If,  therefore,  we  are  careful  to  do  no 
injury,  and  to  give  others  their  due,  we  do  all  that  is 
requifite  for  avoiding  war.  But  as  by  this  care  and  fo- 
licitude  we  are  faid  to  cultivate  peace,  it  follows,  not 
only  that  this  is  a  great  duty  incumbent  upon  all,  but 
alfo,  that  cultivating  peace  as  long  as  pofiible  is  the 
fureft  means  to  avoid  being  involved  in  ruinous  war. 

Suppofe,  which  may  be  the  cafe,  that  fuch  a  peace- 
able conduct:  cannot  fecure  us  againft  ambition,  male- 
volence, and  acts  of  injuftice  •,  what  is  then  to  be  done  ? 
The  duties  of  humanity  dictate  forbearance  as  long  as 
It  is  morally  pofiible ;  but  when  fubmiffion  to  acts  of 
inhumanity  and  injuftice  dailies  with  higher  duties, 
which  we  owe  to  God,  to  ourfelves,  to  our  houfhold 
and  to  others  •,  if  it  becomes  injurious  to  the  peace  and 
fecurity  of  fociety  *,  if  the  caufe  of  juftice  mould  there- 
by fuffer,  whilft  the  caufe  of  injuftice  is  fupported*, 
then  indeed  it  is  not  optional  with  us,  whether  we  will 

defend 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  203 

defend  our  rights,  or  bafely  furrender  them.     It  is  our 
duty  to  refill. 

He  who  wifhes  us  ill,  that  is,  one  who  is  an  enemy 
in  the  general  fenfe  of  the  term,  if  not  prevented,  will 
naturally  become  hoftile.  If  we  cannot,  therefore, 
foften  him  by  our  beft  endeavours  to  cultivate  peace, 
our  own  fafety  makes  it  a  duty  for  us  to  endeavour,  by 
all  lawful  means,  to  prevent  him  from  commencing 
acts  of  hoflility,  by  laying  fuch  obftacles  in  his  way 
as  will  deter  him  from  fuch  a  refolution. 

As  fear  is  found  to  have  a  powerful  influence  on  the 
human  mind, '  even  affecting  thofe  who  are  deaf  to  the 
voice  of  reafon  and  humanity,  and  too  obdurate  to  be 
fenfibly  affected  by  the  noble  principle  of  love,  it  fol- 
lows, that  we  muft  think  of  means  calculated  to  ftrike 
him  with  fear,  or  keep  him  under  apprehenfion  of  the 
dangerous  confequences  which  may  refult  from  his  at- 
tempting acts  of  violence. 

There  is  no  doubt  but  his  apprehenfions  will  be  fuch, 
if  he  fees  that  our  power  is  equal  or  fuperior  to  his  own : 
we  ought  therefore  to  put  ourfelves  into  a  proper  ftate 
of  defence. 

If  it  becomes  a  duty,  under  certain  circumftances,  to 
endeavour  to  gain  over  to  our  intereft  many  and  power- 
ful friends,  it  will  be  particularly  requifite,  that  we 
proceed  with  the  greater!:  pofTible  circumfpection,  mo- 
deration and  delicacy,  left  we  give  provocation,  and 
by  fuch  conduct  excite  our  enemy  to  acts  of  hoftility, 
which  might  be  warranted  by  his  right  of  defence ;  for 
by  going  too  great  lengths,  we  juftify  fufpicion  con- 
cerning our  difpofition,  and  thus  give  a  juft  caufe  for 
defence  and  war. 

ScL 


204  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sch.  i. — We  need  only  make  the  enemy's  cafe  our  own,  in 
order  to  be  convinced  of  the  juftice  and  propriety  of  the 
foregoing  obfervations. 

Sch.  2. — As  thefe  things  have  a  particular  reference  to  national 
affairs,  they  may  ferve  to  throw  light  upon  many  political 
maxims  obferved  among  the  nations  of  the  earth. 

Since  injury  is  the  fole  caufe  of  war,  it  follows,  that 
no  war  may  be  profecuted  to  an  improper  length, 
though  it  is  even  founded  on  juft  principles;  for  if 
actual  injury  ceafes,  if  the  impending  aggrelTion  is 
averted,  if  there  is  no  invaiion  to  be  dreaded,  there  is 
not  one  justifying  caufe  for  the  commilTion  of  an  act  of 
violence  or  hoftility :  but  where  there  is  no  caufe  for 
ads  of  hoftility  and  violence,  there  a  ftate  of  peace  and 
fecurity  exifts :  confequently  no  war  can  be  carried  on 
juftly,  if  the  aggrefTed  can  obtain  fuch  terms  of  peace  as 
will  fecure  reparation  and  fafety. 

Sck.  i. — The  right  of  war,  where  the  aggrefTed  has  to  propofe 
the  terms  of  peace,  is  therefore  naturally  limited.  But 
fuppofe  theaggrefTor  is  victorious,  fo  that  the  injured  can- 
not obtain  terms  calculated  to  make  reparation,  but  muft 
rifk  his  fafety  and  fecurity  to  the  highefl  degree,  if  he  does 
not  fubmit  to  the  terms  propofed  by  the  victor:  in  this 
cafe,  is  the  right  of  war  on  the  defender's  fide  alfo  limited? 
We  anfwer  in  the  affirmative;  for  what  is  phvfically  im- 
pofiible  leaves  us  under  an  unavoidable  alternative,  and 
impofes  the  duty  to  chufe  of  two  evils  the  leaft. 

Sch.  z. — In  cafe  the  party  who  has  juftice  on  his  fide  confents 
to  the  terms  of  pacification  propofed,  he  is  held  ftrictly 
to  obferve  them  as  long  as  the  other  party  faithfully  keeps 
within  the  bounds  of  that  pacification. 
No  infidious  ambiguities,  but  candour  and  honefty  fhould 
dictate  the  terms  of  peace,  and  a  ftrict  adherence  to  juftice 
infure  the  obfervance  thereof.  Where  reparation  and 
reftiiurion  cannot  take  place,  there  is  room  for  amnefty  ; 
and  an  act  of  amnefty  is  to  be  held  facred,  as  we  ourfelves 
have  thereby  gained  fecurity  and  peace. 

CHAPTER 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHY.  205 

CHAPTER  VI  i 

Of  the  duties   of  fpeech. 

JL  RUTH,  the  principal  object  of  the  duties  of 
fpeech,  is  in  its  nature  harmony  and  confirrency,  which 
are  co-eternal  with  the  internal  pofTibility  of  the  ef- 
fences  of  things  :  its  effects  are  order,  beauty,  con- 
nedtion,  and  mutual  dependence,  in  all  that  exifls :  its 
tendency  is  moral  excellency,  and  its  object  the  com- 
pafs  of  all  that  can  render  life  happy,  fupport  us  under 
the  vicifTitudes  of  time  and  chance,  and  bear  up  the 
foul  with  the  fure  hope  of  immortality. 

It  is  diftinguifhed  into  metaphyseal,    logical,  and 

moral  \    or,  in  other  terms,  into  the  truth  of  things, 

of  words,  and  of  thoughts. 

Sc/i. — Metaphyseal  truth  may  alfo  be  called  ejjentlal;  that 
which  is  here  itiled  logical,  is  more  generally  known  by 
the  appellation  of  real. 

All  evidence  of  truth,  of  whatever  kind  it  may  be, 
ultimately  depends  upon  thefe  two  infallible  criteria, 
or  felf-evident  principles : 

i .  It  is  impojjible  that  a  thing  be  and  be  not  at  the 
fame  time  and  under  the  fame  circumftances. 

2.  Whatever  is  either  poffible,  exiftent,  or  conceivable 
in  the  mind,  mufi  have  a  f  efficient  caufe  for  being  fo  and 
not  otherwife. 

Sch. — It  is  true,  the  fecond  of  thefe  principles  bears  not  im- 
mediately that  incontrovertible  evidence  which  the  former 
cannot  fail  to  produce;  but  it  may  be  deemed  felf-evident, 
becaufe  it  is,  as  it  were,  the  immediate  confequence  of 

that 


2C6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  firft  principle  of  all  human  knowledge.  Suppofe 
but  for  a  moment  a  thing  of  any  description  whatever  to 
be  without  a  Sufficient  caufe;  would  it  not  follow,  that  it 
might  be  and  not  be  at  the  fame  time?  The  perfon,  there- 
fore, who,  from  the  circumftance  that  we  cannot  plainly 
perceive  the  caufes  of  lb  me  things,  mould  conclude  that 
they  are  deflitute  of  a  fuificient  caufe  or  caufes,  would 
fall  into  the  fame  abfurdity  with  him  who  afTerts  that  a 
thing  is  and  is  not  what  it  really  is,  that  black  is  ivhite,  or 
that  day  is  night y  &c. 

Hence  we  lay  down  thefe  proportions  as  infallible 
maxims,  and  as  lure  criteria  for  diflinguiihing  truth 
from  fal/hood: — That  which  is  contrary  to  thefe  and 
other  felf-evident  principles  of  human  knowledge,  is 
falfe,  impoflible  and  abfurd ;  that,  on  the  contrary, 
which  evidently  flows  from  them,  is  poffible  and  true. 

Things  are  faid  to  be  ejjentially  or  met  aphyfiic  ally  true, 
if  their  predicates  are  confident  with  their  efTences: 
thus,  it  is  efientially  true  that  God  exifts,  that  he  has 
created  the  world,  that  he  is  almighty,  omniprefent, 
omnifcient,  infinite  in  power,  wifdom,  juftice,  goodnefs, 
&c-  for  theie  predicates  are  confident  with  the  erTence 
cf  an  infinite  being.  But  it  is  metaphysically  falfe, 
that  the  world  exiiis  of  itfelf,  that  fin  is  a  thing  indif- 
ferent, that  the  ungodly  can  be  happy ;  for  thefe  pre- 
dicates are  contradictory  to  the  eflence  of  the  v/orld,  to 
the  nature  of  fin  and  ungodlinefs,  and  to  the  perfec- 
tions of  the  Deity. 

Sc/i.  i. — Metaphyfical  truth  is  unchangeable,  and  co-eternal 
with  the  efTences  of  things.  The  eflence  of  the  infinite 
being  includes  necefiary  exigence;  but  the  efTences  of  all 
finite  beings  have  been  metaphyfically  true  before  they 
have  exifted;  nay,  fuch  efTences  are  true  as  never  lhall 
exift.  Eut  let  not  this  be  an  objection  to  the  necefiity  of 
a  careful  invefcigation  of  metaphyfical  truth:  we  have 
gained  a  great  deal  if  we  have  an  adequate  idea  thereof: 
it  is  a  fhield  againfl  innumerable  errors,  deceptions  and 

dclufions. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  20J 

tkiuiibns.  There  are  things  which  are  true,  though  we 
are  unable  to  attain  a  diirinct  knowledge  of  them:  foul 
and  body  co-operate  with  one  another;  the  loadftone  at- 
tracts iron ;  there  is  a  ftate  of  future  blifs  and  glory,  &c. 
though  the  nature  of  that  co-operation,  attraction,  hap- 
pinefs,  &c.  cannot  be  fully  comprehended.  What  our 
faculties  cannot  reach,  other  beings  may  fee  clearly ;  what 
is  now  hidden  from  our  appreheniion,  we  may  hereafter 
comprehend  with  full  perfpicuity. 

If  metaphyseal  truth  had  been  properly  attended  to,  we 
(hould  net  have  a  continual  war  againft  feeptjeifm  and 
unbelief:  a  thoufand  tales  and  ftories  would  never  have 
found  credit:  the  itcries  of  fpirits  appearing,  of  ftatucs 
or  ftone,  of  wood,  &c.  performing  human  or  fupernatural 
actions,  &c.  would  never  have  met  with  patronage  among 
the  children  of  men. 

We  have  onlv  to  bring  things  to  the  teft  of  the  afore-rnen- 
tioned  principles,  in  order  to  fee  whether  they  are  beyond 
the  reach  of  reafon,  or  contradictory  to  it.  Whiift  thip£? 
of  the  former  kind  are  objects  of  faith,  truth  commands 
us  to  reject  the  latter  as  incredible,  impoffible  and  abfurd, 
though  the  higheft  authority  of  men  mould  join  in 
patronage  and  fupport.  Where  we  cannot  clearly  difco- 
ver  the  nature  of  the  relation  of  things  to  the  above  prin- 
ciples, there  is  caufe  why  we  fnould  fufpend  our  judg- 
ment rather  than  imprudently  precipitate  ourfelves  into 
errors  and  miftakes. 

Sc/i.  i. — All  works  of  fancy,  epic  poetry,  the  drama,  romance?, 
fables, ~"&c.  are  to  reft  upon  metaphyseal  truth,  in  order 
to  preferve  that  probability  and  propriety  which  are  ef- 
fentially  neceflary  for  pieaiing  the  fancy  and  entertaining 
the  imagination,  in  which  the  principal  merit  of  the^a 
kinds  of  performances  con  lifts.  Thus  Homer,  fufferiuor 
his  heroes  to  come  into  difficulties  too  arduous  and  intri- 
cate to  be  removed  by  human  wifdom  and  ftremnh,  in- 
troduces his  fabulous  deities,  in  order  to  reconcile  the 
mind  of  the  reader  to  his  fictitious  narrations. 

Truth  of  words,  or  real  truth,  has  reference  to  things 
WhicK  exit!',  and  is  the  confiftcncy  of  our  ideas,  or  words, 
with  the  tilings  themfelves,  their  qualities,  properties, 

relations, 


208  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

relations,  and  the  particular  modes  of  their  exigence; 
for  jnftance,  if  we  judge  or  call  that  gold  which  is  really 
fo;  if  we  reprefent  that  as  good  and  excellent  which  in 
its  nature  and  tendency  has  a  beneficial  influence  on 
human  happinefs.  The  contrary  of  real  or  logical 
truth  is  logical  falfijood;  for  inflance,  if  brafs  be  taken 
for  gold,  things  of  pernicious  tendency  for  good  and 
excellent,  &c. 

Nothing  is  of  higher  importance  to  mankind,  nor 
any  object  more  worthy  the  diligent  refearches  of  the 
human  mind,  than  logical  truth.  We  fcan  heaven, 
analyfe  the  component  parts  of  bodies,  of  matter, 
air,  &c.  in  order  to  inveftigate  things  as  they  are,  and 
to  acquaint  ourfelves  with  the  falutary  or  pernicious 
effects  of  their  properties.  Without  knowing  the 
real  truth  of  things,  uncertainty  would  hold  its  difmal 
reign,  mutual  truft  and  confidence  would  find  no 
place,  juftice  could  not  be  adminiftered ;  the  voice  of 
inftruction,  of  animation,  of  confolation,  could  not  be 
heard;  morality  would  remain  flothful  indifference, 
hope  would  be  impofiible,  and  there  would  be  no  prof- 
peel:  of  felicity  •,  nay,  there  would  be  no  fecurity  for  our 
life  and  health,  as  wholefome  food  could  not  be  difcerned 
from  that  which  is  pernicious  and  poifonous.  In  fhort, 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  real  nature  and  properties 
of  things,  human  intercourfe  would  be,  like  the  earth 
without  the  enlightening  beams  of  the  fun  and  the  re- 
flected light  of  the  heavenly  luminaries,  chaos  and 
confufion ! 

Sch. — He  who  difcovers  a  new  truth,  beneficial  to  fociety, 
merits  well  of  mankind,  and  deferves  to  be  held  in  high 
eftimation,  more  lb,  perhaps,  than  a  difcoverer  of  new 
couritrii 

The 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY*  20£ 

The  real  truth,  like  hidden  treafure,  is  often  diffi- 
cult to  be  come  at ;  but,  notwithftanding  this,  it  is 
attainable  in  many  things  which  are  necefTary  for  the 
comforts  of  this  life,  and  for  a  well  eftablifhed  hope 
of  a  better. 

We  can  form  diftincT:  ideas  of  various  objects,  which 
involve  no  contradiction:  by  this  way  we  come  at  the 
knowledge  of  the  very  efTences  of  things,  though  ever 
fo  remote  from  our  apprehenfion :  thus  we  have  diftincT: 
ideas  of  God,  of  his  exiftence,  attributes  and  works — * 
of  the  contingency  of  the  world — of  our  own  nature, 
faculties,  deftination,  &c. 

Sch. — We  can  clearly  delineate  in  the  mind  a  complicated  ma- 
chine before  it  exifts:  we  have  diftinct  ideas  of  the  ma- 
thematical figures  and  their  efiential  properties,  though 
they  never  exifl  by  themfelves  in  nature,  being,  only  the 
efiential  properties  inherent  in  things  which  really  exift. 

Our  ideas  are  ftill  more  palpable  and  finking  in  fuch 
things  as  have  exiftence :  we  may  become  as  certain  of 
their  properties  and  ufes  as  we  are  of  our  own  exift- 
ence, v/ants  and  inclinations. 

It  is  not  only  in  idea,  but  alfo  in  the  connection  of 
various  reprefentations,  that  is,  in  judgments,  in  pro- 
portions and  reafoning,  that  logical  truth  can  be  di£ 
covered;  for  all  reafoning  conftfts  of  judgments,  and 
muft  be  true  if  thefe  are  fo,  and  if  there  is  confiftency 
in  the  mode  of  drawing  inferences  or  conclufions. 

Thofe  proportions  are  true  the  predicates  of  which 
are  confiftent  with  their  fubjecTs  •,  as,  for  inftancc,  God 
is  a  fpirit  -,  men  are  liable  to  miftakes. 

The  truth  of  proportions  refts  fometimes  upon  an 
internal  criterion^  but  often  upon  an  external  only ;  and 

E  c  there 


)2lO  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

there  are  many  proportions  which  are  fupported  by 
both. 

Thofe  proportions  have  the  internal  criterion  of  truth 
where  the  confiftency  of  the  predicates  with  their  fub- 
jects  can  be  diftinctly  feen ;  that  is,  where  we  plainly  dis- 
cover that  the  oppofite  of  them  implies  impoflibility  or 
abfurdity ;  as,  God  is  almighty  •,  men  are  liable  to  error. 

In  other  proportions  we  muft  reft  contented  with 
the  evidence  of  {cpSc  and  the  well  eftabliflied  experience 
of  others ;  that  is,  we  can  only  have  the  external  crite- 
rion of  truth:  according  to  this,  that  proportion  is  true 
the  predicate  of  which  is  conMent  with  the  nature 
and  properties  of  the  Subject,  as  difcovered  by  well 
eftablifhed  experiments, 

Sck.  i. — For  inftance:  the  loadftone  attracts  iron,  the  needle 
points  to  the  north  pole,  the  human  body  and  foul  have 
a  reciprocal  influence  upon  each  other,  &c.  We  cannot 
fo  diftinctly  perceive  the  confiftency  of  predicates  with 
their  refpective  fubjects  as  to  be  able  to  fliew,  from  the 
nature  of  either  the  one  or  the  other,  that  the  oppofite  of 
them  is  impoflible. 

Sck.  2. — But  notwithstanding  this,  we  have  a  very  finking  and 
fufficient  evidence  of  the  truth  of  fuch-like  proportions; 
becaufe  it  is  evident,  that  the  oppofite  of  them  would  be 
contradictory  to  fenfe  and  experience,  which  are  far  more 
obvious  and  familiar  to  our  apprehenfion  than  the  nature 
of  things. 

ScJu  3. — The  truth  of  propofitions  which  reft  upon  internal 
evidence,  may  be  brighter  than  that  which  depends  upon 
the  external :  the  latter,  however,  is  more  ftriking  and 
forcible,  and  more  eafily  attained. 

There  are  many  proportions  the  truth  of  which  refts 

both  upon  the  internal  and  external  criterion  •,  that  is, 

reafon,  fenfe  and  experience  confpire  in  convincing  the 

mind  of  the  conrftency  of  their  predicates  with  the 

fubject* 

-  Sck* 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  211 

$cJt.—~ This  is  the  higheft  poflible  degree  of  evidence  in  nature: 
thus  it  is  true,  that  men  are  liable  to  miftakes.     The  con- 
fiftency  of  the  terms  of  this  propofition  flows  from  the 
nature  of  things.  Our  eyes  have  often  witnefled  the  errors 
and  miftakes  of  all  forts  of  characters;  and  the  report  of 
hi  (lory   perfectly  coincides  with  our  own  experiences. 
This  degree  of  evidence  attended  the  wonders  of  Chrifh, 
with  refpect  to  thofe  who  faw  them  and  had  the  discretion, 
to  compare  their  experiences  with  the  fcriptures :  there 
facts  took  place  which  mofl  evidently  befpoke  almighty 
power  in  the  agent;  the  eyes  o,f  friends  and  enemies  be- 
held the  agency;  and  the  nature  both  of  the  agent  and  of 
thofe  acts  had  been  predicted  and  attefted  by  many  wit- 
nefles,  who  derived  their  teftimony  from  divine  infpira- 
tion. 

Truth,  with  refpect  to  the  ways  by  which  it  become* 
evident,  is  diftinguifhed  into  experimental,  rational 
snd  hiftorical. 

We  are  faid  to  experience^  or  perceive  things,  when 
we  obtain  reprefentations  of  them  by  means  of  our 
fenfes :  thus  we  have  experimental  truth  in  things  that. 
we  fee,  hear,  tafte,  fmell  or  feel. 

Rational  truth  is  that  evidence  which  is  derived  by 
a  proper  mode  of  argumentation  from  firft  principles. 

Hiftorical  truth  depends  on  the  teftimony,  that  isy 
on  the  experiences  of  others :  thofe  who  declare  their 
experiences  to  others  are  called  witnejfes,  and  the  decla- 
ration itfelf  has  obtained  the  name  of  teftimony. 

We  diftinguifh  ocular  from  hear/ay  witneifes:  the 
former  declare  their  own  experiences,  the  latter  thofe 
of  others. 

The  receiving  another's  teftimony  as  true  is  called 
affent:  affent  to  a  well  eftablifhed  teftimony  \%  faith. 

Whether  a  teftimony  is  well  eftablifhed,  and  con(e- 
(juently  deferves  full  credit  and  faith,  is  an  enquiry  of 

great 


21-2  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY*. 

great  importance,  as  it  is  often  attended  with  many  in* 
tricacies  and  difficulties.  Here  two  extremes  are  to  be 
avoided  :  we  may  contract  the  guilt  of  incredulity,  or 
incur  the  imputation  of  credulity,  by  denying  our  afTent 
to  teftimonies  fufficiently  well  eftablifhed,  or  giving  it 
to  any  report,  however  badly  fupported. 

All  the  merit  of  teftimonies  depends  upon  thefe  par- 
ticulars :  i .  that  the  things  terrified  be  not  metaphyfi- 
cally  falfe:  2.  that  thofe  who  teftify  have  the  character 
of  good  witneffes. 

A  good  witnefs  is  one  who  is  both  capable  and  willing 

to  teftify  the  truth  as  it  is. 

Sch. — All  that  is  matter  of  fact  refts  upon  experimental  or  hif- 
torical  truth ;  but  all  that  can  be  inferred  from  indubitable 
principles  is  an  object,  of  rational  truth. 

From  what  has  been  explained  it  follows,  that  there 
are  truths  which  are  only  objects  of  reafon  •,  as,  the 
exiftence  of  a  God,  the  foul,  &c.  others  again  which 
are  objects  of  reafon  and  fenfe  -,  as,  the  mortality  of  the 
i>ody  :  and  others  which  are  experimental  or  hiftorical, 
or  perhaps  both  •,  as,  that  there  was  fuch  a  thing  as  the 
city  of  Jerufalem,  that  the  cities  of  Rome,  Paris,  New- 
York,  &c.  exift. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  there  are  different  criteria  by 
which  each  clafs  of  truths  muft  be  examined;  for  to 
deny  the  exiftence  of  fpirits,  becaufe  we  cannot  fee 
them,  would  be  as  imprudent  as  to  deny  our  eye-fight 
becaufe  we  cannot  demonftrate  it. 

The  criterion  of  rational  truth  is  this  propofition : 
that  is  indubitably  true  which  is  juftly  inferred  from 
indubitable  principles,  or  when  the  oppofite  thereof  is 
metaphyiically  falfe,  abfurd,  or  impofTible. 

The  criterion  of  experimental  truth  is  this  maxim :  if 

the 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2I£ 

the  mind  is  attentive  and  vigilant,  the  fenfory  organ 
found,  the  mean  and  mode  ordinary,  that  is,  fuch  as 
they  ought  to  be  for  the  purpofe  of  making  experi- 
ments of  the  kind,  the  object  of  fenfation  within  a  pro- 
per diftance,  and  its  appearances  to  our  fenfes  always 
the  fame  •,  then  things  really  are  what  they  appear  to 
be,  or  in  other  words,  then  our  fenfations  are  true. 

The  criterion  of  hiftorical  truth  is,  as  has  been  faid, 
this  proportion:  if  a  fact  is  not  metaphyfcally  falfe, 
and  is  fupported  by  a  well  eftablifhed  teftimony,  it  is 
then  true,  and  deferves  our  faith. 

Since  a  well  eftablifhed  teftimony  requires  capability 
and  fincerity  in  the  witnefs,  it  is  necefiary  to  fix  upon 
fuch  criteria  as  may  render  it  certain  that  a  witnefs  is 
able  and  willing  to  teftify  the  truth, 

The  criterion  for  the  capability  of  a  witnefs  is,  that  he 
has  been  an  eye-witnefs^  that  he  himfelf  has  experienced 
the  things  of  which  he  teftifies,  and  that  his  experience 
has  been  attended  by  all  or  fuch  of  the  criteria  of  ex- 
perimental truth  as  the  objeel:  of  the  teftimony  would 
admit  of. 

The  criterion  for  the  fincerity  of  a  witnefs,  that  is> 
his  readinefs  to  fpeak  the  truth  as  he  knows  it,  is,  that 
he  has  not  or  cannot  have  from  his  teftimony  any  ex- 
pectation of  honour,  riches  or  preferment,  either  for 
himfelf  or  his  friends,  tils  fincerity  is  ftjll  more  evi- 
dent when  the  objeel:  of  his  teftimony  is  oppofed  to  his 
own  prejudices  and  interefts,  when  it  involves  him  in 
difficulties,  caufing  him  reproach,  contempt,  perfecu- 
tion  and  even  death. 

As  the  criterion  of  the  capability  of  witnefles  is  a  teft 
oi  logical  truth,  fo  that  of  their  fincerity  is  a  fufficient 

evidence 


214  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

evidence  for  the  moral  truth  of  what  they  teftify  *,  and 
both  taken  together  leave  no  rational  doubt  with  refpect 
to  the  real  or  hiftorical  truth  of  their  teftimony :  for  it 
is  a  maxim  as  infallible  as  a  demonftration,  that  he  cer- 
tainly fpeaks  the  truth  who  is  both  able  and  willing  te 
/peak  it. 

Sch. — When  we  have  the  criterion  of  the  fincerkv  of  a  witnefi^ 
then  we  become  certain  that  he  fpeaks  the  moral  truth. 

Moral  truth  is  the  confiflency  of  our  words  with  our 
Inward  thoughts,  fentiments  and  defires. 

Speech,  in  the  ftridfc  {en{&  of  the  term,  confifts  of 

words  fpoken  or  written ;  but,  as  words  are  the  moil 

common  figns  by  which  we  exprefs  our  thoughts,  we 

may  take  fpeech  for  the  exhibition  of  any  figns  by 

which  others  are  to  underftand  our  thoughts.     Not  to 

exhibit  figns  by  which  our  thoughts  may  be  under- 

fl:ood,  is  called  Jilence. 

Sch. — There  are  circumftances  in  which  filence  may  ferve  as  a 
general  fign  for  interpreting  our  thoughts;  nay,  common 
converfation  prefents  us  with  many  inftances  where  filence 
fpeaks  louder  than  words.  For  inftance;  if  a  perfon,  hav- 
ing o^cafioned  an  accidental  damage,  would  declare  the 
circumftances  and  confefs  the  faft,  we  fhould  feel  our- 
f elves  more  reconciled  to  the  lofs  fuftained,  than  if  we 
muft  take  the  author  upon  a  conftruction,  which  perhaps 
warrants  the  fufpicion  that  he  has  done  the  mifchief  wil- 
fully, with  a  bad  intention,  or  from  finifter  motives,  &c. 

Signs  by  which  our  thoughts  may  be  communicated 
and  interpreted,  are  either  original  or  arbitrary:  the 
former,  men  are  led  by  inftinct  to  employ  and  to  inter- 
pret •,  for  inftance,  the  various  tones  of  the  voice,  the 
different  changes  of  features  and  geftures,  naturally 
calculated  to  exprefs  the  internal  affections  of  tender- 
ness, forrow,  fympathy,  joy,  pleafure,  grief,  furprife, 
terror,  hope,  anger,  refentment,  contempt,  &c. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2  15 

Scti. — The  abfence  of  fuch  figns  is  an  indication  of  an  even, 
placid  temper  of  mind. 

Arbitrary  figns  are  called  conventional,  becaufe  they 
reft  either  upon  a  tacit  or  explicit  convention  among  the 
parties  converfing  with  one  another  by  means  of  them. 

Converfation  by  way  of  tacit  convention  is,  when  we 
make  ufe  of  common  language,  or  fuch  mute  figns  as 
are  generally  underftood  to  denote  affirmation,  appro- 
bation, information,  accufation,  &c.  or  the  contrary; 
as,  looks,  pointing  with  the  finger  or  hand,  nodding, 
making  the  head,  &c. 

Parties  by  explicit  convention  may  converfe  by  a  par- 
ticular ufe  of  words,  mute  figns,  or  hieroglyphic  cha- 
racters, agreed  upon  for  the  purpofeof  communicating 
their  thoughts  to  one  another  in  fuch  a  manner  as  to 
render  it  impracticable  for  other  perfons  to  underitand 
the  fubject  of  their  converfation. 

In  whichever  of  thefe  ways  we  fpeak,  it  is  clear  that 
we  give  figns  whereby  others  may  apprehend  our 
thoughts :  fpeech  is  therefore  an  action  in  which  others 
are  more  or  lefs  interested,  and  is  under  the  cognizance 
of  the  fame  laws  which  form  the  rules  for  cofcdu&ing 
our  actions. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  we  muft  obferve  duties  in 
fpeaking  as  well  as  in  filence;  arid  that  the  fame  laws 
which  regulate  our  duties  to  God,  to  ourfelves  and  to 
others,  prefcribe  alfo  the  rules  according  to  which  thofe 
duties  ought  to  be  conducted. 

We  may  therefore,  for  the  direction  of  our  conduct 
in  fpeech,  lay  down  as  an  infallible  maxim  this  proposi- 
tion :  dire  it  fpeech  or  filence  to  the  glory  of  God,  to  t, 
evjn  bappinefs  and  that  of  others-,  and  carefully  avoid 
>vhe  contrary. 


2i6  moral  philosophy^ 

Sch. — Wc  treat  here  of  fpeech  under  the  idea  of  moral  actions^ 
for  there  is  fuch  a  thing  as  fpeaking  which  is  not  moral, 
and  therefore  comes  not  under  the  cognizance  of  laws 
and  of  duty:  for  inftance,  that  of  madmen,  infant  chil- 
dren, expreflions  of  perfons  in  a  paroxyfm  of  ficknefs,&c> 

From  this  principle  it  immediately  follows,  that  as 
it  is  on  one  hand  an  indifpenfible  duty  for  us  to  fpeak 
the  truth  and  the  whole  truth,  or  in  other  words,  to 
exhibit  fuch  figns  as  are  fully  confident  with  our 
thoughts,  where  the  glory  of  God  can  thereby  be  ma- 
nifefled,  and  our  own  happinefs  and  that  of  others 
promoted;  fo  it  is  on  the  other  hand  abfolutely  requi- 
iite,  that  the  truth  be  keptfecret  in  all  thofe  cafes  where 
the  djfclofing  of  our  thoughts  would  be  in  any  wife 
repugnant  to  thefe  great  and  defirable  ends. 

As  a  proclivity  of  the  mind  to  fpeak  the  truth,  in  all 
cafes  where  the  glory  of  God  and  the  good  of  mankind 
require  it,  is  called  veracity,  and  as  a  ftedfaft  refolu- 
tion  to  keep  it  fecret,  when  thofe  ends  render  it  necefla- 
ry,  is  known  by  the  name  taciturnity,  it  follows,  that 
it  is  a  high  duty  for  us  mod  faithfully  to  exercife  thofe 
virtues,  in  everv  inftance  and  occurrence  of  life  where 
the  glory  of  God  and  the  good  of  fociety  render  either 
the  one  or  the  other  neceffary. 

Sch.  i. — Since  veracity  can  be  exercifed  only  in  thofe  cafes 
where  the  glory  of  God,  the  duties  we  owe  to  ourfelves, 
and  the  good  of  fociety  require  that  we  mould  fincerely 
difclofe  our  thoughts,  it  is  evident,  that  thofe  have  no 
pretence  to  this  amiable  virtue  who  divulge  every  thing 
they  know,  though  it  be  oppofed  to  the  duties  of  religion, 
difgraceful  to  their  own  character,  incompatible  with  the 
principles  of  equity  and  humanity,  contrary  to  decency, 
detrimental  to  the  perfons  whom  they  addrefs.  and  inju- 
rious to  thofe  whole  actions  are  the  fubjeft  of  fuch  im- 
prudent and  indifcreet  converfation. 

Sch  2. — Suppofe  it  poflible,  which  can  hardly  ever  be  the  cafe, 
that  the  bufy  hoft  of  tale-bearers  confine  themfelves  ta 

what 


:.;oral  PHILOSOPHY.  2i;/ 

-vlut  is  true,  without  adding  to  or  taking  from  their  frock 
of  knowledge,  and  without  going  fo  far  as  pretending  to 
know  the  defigr.s  and  intentions  of  the  victims  of  their 
loquacity:  fuppofe  their  tales  ftrie'Uy  true  and  innocent  in 
that  refpecl;  what  good  end  is  thereby  obtained?  you 
divulge  what  the  glory  of  God,  your  own  character  and 
the  good  of  mankind  require  to  be  kept  to  yourfelves,  or 
what  perhaps  you  yourfelf  mould  communicate  directly 
to  the  agent,  or  impart  only  to  fome  particular  perfons. 
Confider  the  confequences  of  indifcreet  loquacity :  von 
trifle  away  your  time:  by  being  bufied  with  others,  you 
forget  yourfelf:  you  might  have  had  opportunities  to 
fpeak  things  more  innocent,  more  edifying:  you  intrude 
upon  your  neighbour's  patience  and  time :  you  degrade 
your  character  by  betraying  the  otneioufnefs  of  a  tale- 
bearer: you  become  guilty  of  (lander:  you  create  mif- 
chief  in  families,  diftruff.  in  fociety:  you  fpeak  to  fpread 
abroad  mifery:  you  delight  in  the  frailties  and  faults  of 
others:  you  fport  with  charity,  fympathy  and  humanity  2 
you  lay  fnares  and  temptations  for  your  fellow  creatures, 
who  would  have  retained  their  innocence  had  they  been 
fuffered  to  think  well  of  perfons  of  an  indifferent  charac- 
ter, &c.  You  fpeak  the  truth,  but  can  your  conduct  be 
innocent?  can  it  even  be  indifferent?  I\o:  you  become 
either  an  indirect  or  a  malicious  flanderer;  the  former,  if 
you  have  not  the  intention  to  render  your  neighbour  mi- 
ferable;  the  latter,  when  your  tongue  is  employed  for  the 
purpofe  of  creating  mifchief.  The  end  being  unjuil,  the 
mean  you  make  ufe  of  cannot  be  rendered  innocent.  If 
the  truth  is  told  for  the  purpofe  of  warning  and  cautioning 
your  neighbour,  then  it  is  confident  with  the  good  of 
mankind  as  well  as  with  the  glory  of  God  and  the  duty 
of  veracity. 

Sch*  3. — Suppofe  you  deviate  from  the  truth,  you  attribute  to 
your  neighbour  intentions  and  dengns  which  he  had  not, 
or  you  do  not  know  all  the  particular  circumftances  of  the 
action,  or  culpably  or  malicioufly  conceal  them;  you 
mingle  untruth  with  truth:  who  is  able  to  calculate  the 
mifchief  which  is  caufed  by  that  officious  loquacity  fo 
prevalent  in  human  converfation  ? 

Sch.  4. — There  are  therefore  innumerable  occurrences  in  life, 

where  a  man  of  candor,  fincerity  and  veracity  muft  keep 

Ff  the 


21  8  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  truth  fecret,  in  order  to  be  faithful  to  God  and  to 
himfclf,  juil  and  humane  towards  his  fellow-creatures. 
Sc/j.  5. — Not  every  inftance  of  a  referred  conduct  in  conver- 
fation  is  therefore  commendable:  there  is  a  time  to  fpeak, 
and  there  are  circumftances  which  require  filence  and  re- 
fervednefs:  there  are  a  variety  of  objects  which  may  be 
proper  fubjects  for  converfation,  whilft  many  others  are 
highly  improper  and  hurtful.  Thofe,  however,  who 
carry  referve  to  excefi?,  and  thereby  become  unfociable, 
are  not  liable  to  half  the  mifchiefs  which  loquacity  pro- 
duces. 

Thofe  who  hold  that  moral  truth  is  of  a  character 
peculiarly  facred  and  inviolable,  (o  that  it  may  not,  un- 
der any  circumftances  whatever,  undergo  any  modifica- 
tions, have  not  fufriciently  considered,  that  on  the  one 
hand  they  derogate  from  the  facred  character  of  other 
moral  actions,  which  are  under  the  controul  of  the  fame 
laws  according  to  which  our  converfation  with  refpect 
to  fpeech  and  filence  muft  be  regulated,  and  on  the 
,  other  aflert  what  is  impollible  in  the  nature  of  things. 
Why  mould  I  not  fpeak  as  I  ought  to  act?  or  what 
greater  degree  of  morality  or  immorality  is  fpeech  ca- 
pable of  than  any  other  kind  of  moral  actions  ?  Is  there 
a  greater  end  to  be  purfued  in  fpeech  or  filence  than  that 
which  mould  be  the  ultimate  fcope  of  all  our  actions  ? 
Is  there  a  greater  end  pofTible  than  the  glory  of  God, 
our  own  felicity  and  that  of  others  ?  Certainly  not. 
The  confequence  then  is,  that,  if  we  will  have  it  in  our 
power  to  do  our  duty  at  all,  fpeech  and  filence,  in  cafes 
of  colliiion,  muft  undergo  modifications  and  exceptions 
as  well  as  other  actions,  and  that  thefe  modifications  and 
exceptions  muft  be  made  according  to  a  juft  eftimation 
of  our  obligations,  laws  and  duties,  and  in  fuch  a  man- 
ner as  that  the  greater  will  always  fuperfede  the  lefs. 

Sch.  i. — From  thefe  confiderations  we  may  judge  of  the  juftice 
and  propriety  of  thofe  inftances  and  rules  which  authors 

have 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2IQ, 

have  laid  down  as  juftlfiable  exceptions  to  the  exercife  of 
the  virtues  of  veracity  and  taciturnity  under   particular 
circumftances. 
Si,/;.  2. — Before  we  proceed  to  quote  fomc  of  thofe  Ipftances, 
it  is  necefTary  to  obferve,  that,  in  our  opinion,  deviations 
from  moral  truth  are  not  fufficiently  diftinguifhed-;  hence 
it  is,  that  what  one  author  calls  a  falfhood,  another  ftiles  a 
lie;  hence  itlikewife  is,  that  we  meet  not,  in  any  fubjeet 
of  morality,  with  more  difficulties,  intricacies  and  confu- 
fion,  than  in  that  of  the  duties  of  fpeech.     In  authors,  as 
well  as  in  common  cenverfation,  no  other  diflinction  is 
oblerved  than  truth  or  a  lie,  the  latter  palling  for  a  term 
perfectly  fynonimous  with  a  moral  falfhood.     It  is  true, 
we  cannot  pretend  to  teach  the  proper  ufe  of  a  language 
in  which  we  candidly  acknowledge  our  deficiency:  how- 
ever, it  ought  to  be  remembered,  that  things  different  in 
their  nature  and  tendency  mull  be  materially  different; 
that  fpeech  and  filence,  as  moral  actions,  muft  admit  of 
various  degrees  of  morality  or  immorality,  from  the  effects 
which  they  produce  and  the  difference  of  intention  from 
which  they  proceed.    It  is  well  known,  that  perfons  com- 
mit faults  by  a  culpable  conduct,  and  run  into  crimes 
through  malicious  purpofe  and  defign. 

Why  is  it,. then,  that  the  lead  deviation  from  truth  is  a  falfe- 
hood  or  a  lie?  Are  there  in  fpeaking  no  intermediate  de- 
grees of  defect  of  moral  rectitude?  Is  it  the  peculiar  na- 
ture of  this  kind  of  actions  that  they  admit  only  of  ex- 
tremes? If  a  breach  of  promife  is  a  lie,  what  name  is 
left  to  fignify  the  moll  injurious  falfhood? 

Are  there  particular  laws  that  prohibit  innocent  recreations, 
neceffary  diverfiens  in  converfation,  that  is,  in  fpeech  r— 
Nay,  the  nature  of  things  requires,  that  fpeech  or  filence 
be  referred  to  imperfect  obligations  and  laws  as  well  as  to 
thofe  which  are  perfect.  .  And  is  not  that  reference  necef- 
fary for  obtaining  a  true  and  liable  criterion  of  what  is  juft 
or  unjuft,  honeft  or  diihoneft,  fincere  or  infincere,  human 
or  inhuman,  decent  and  proper  or  indecent  and  improper 
in  fpeech  or  filence?  Is  there  not  both  a  material  and 
formal  difference  beween  a  breach  of  duty  and  an  injury  ? 

Would  it  not,  'therefore,  be  more  confident  with  logical 
truth,  that  deviations  from  moral  truth  which  do  not 
amount  to  a  breach  of  duty,  where  others  either  do  not 

or- 


2  20  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

or  have  no  right  to  expect  that  we  {hould  fpeak  the  truth, 
be  denominated  untruths;  whilft  thofe  untruths  which  are 
repugnant  to  imperfect  obligations  and  laws  fhould  be 
Called  faljitoodsi  and  that  falfhoods  committed  contrary  to 
perfect  obligations  and  laws  mould  be  branded  with  the 
appellation  of  lies  of  different  degrees  of  heinoufnefs,  ac- 
cording as  the  author  has  ailed  with  greater  or  lefs  culpa- 
blenefs  or  malice  ? 
Sch.  3. — All  thofe  authors  on  morality  whom  we  have  had  an 
opportunity  to  confult  agree  in  this  particular,  that  the 
duty  of  taciturnity  requires  our  thoughts  to  be  kept  fecret 
where  the  great  ends  before  mentioned  render  that  fecrecy 
neceflary ;  but  they  differ  with  refpect  to  the  ufe  of  means. 
Some  will  admit  of  no  other  than  bare  filence,  making  no 
allowance  for  occurrences  where  filence  fpeaks  louder 
than  words,  even  ferving  to  heighten  the  deception,  and 
where  it  is  apt,  as  in  cafes  of  fufpicion,  to  conitrue  inno- 
cence into  guilt,  a  culpable  action  into  the  greateft  malice. 
Others  juftly  allow  the  ufe  of  pretexts,  or  the  exhibition 
of  figns  whereby  the  truth  may  be  concealed,  when  we 
are  intruded  with  fecrets  on  which  the  welfare  of  our 
country  or  of  our  neighbour  and  perhaps  the  fafety  of  our 
lives  depend,  and  where  bare  fufpicion  would  have  a  fatal 
or  a  pernicious  effect:  but  thefe  alfo  differ  with  refpect  to 
the  particular  cafes  and  circumftances  as  well  as  with  re- 
gard to  the  means  and  manner  by  and  in  which  the  inward 
thoughts  and  fentiments  of  our  hearts  may  be  concealed 
from  others  confidently  with  the  dictates  of  the  law  of 
nature.    There  are  fome  who  admit  a  falfhood  to  be  made 
ufe  of  for  that  purpofe;  others  again  forbid  it,  and  advife 
a  careful  fearch  after  equivocations. 

Sch.  4. — But  it  is  time  that  we  mould  give  their  particular  opi- 
nions on  this  fubject: — u  There  are  falfhoods  which  are 
not  lies,  that  is,  which  are  not  criminal;  as, 

*'  1.  Where  no  one  is  deceived,  which  is  the  cafe  in  para- 
bles, fables,  novels,  jefts,  tales  to  create  mirth,  ludicrous 
embellifhments  of  a  ftory,  where  the  declared  defign  of 
the  fpeaker  is  not  to  inform  but  to  divert;  compliments 
in  the  fubfeription  of  a  letter,  a  fervant's  denying  his 
mafter,  a  prifoner  pleading  not  guilty,  an  advocate  afTert- 
ing  the  juflice,  or  his  belief  of  the  juftice  of  his  client's 
caufe.  In  fuch  inftances  no  confidence  is  deftroyed,  be- 
E   ■  caufe 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  22  % 

caufe  none  was  repofed;  no  promife  to  fpenk  the  truth  is 
violated,  becaufe  none  was  given,  or  underftood  to  be 
given. 

"  2.  Where  the  perfon  to  whom  you  fpeafc  has  no  ri^ht  to 
know  the  truth,  or  more  properly,  where  little  or  no  in- 
conveniency  refults  from  the  want  of  confidence  in  fuch 
cafes;  as,  where  you  tell  a  falfhood  to  a  madman  for  his 
own  advantage,  to  a  robber  to  conceal  your  property,  to 
anauaffin  to  defeat  or  to  divert  him  from  his  pnrpofe",  &c. 
It  is  upon  this  principle  that,  by  the  laws  of  war,  it  is  al- 
lowed to  deceive  an  enemy  by  feints,  falfe  colours,  fpies, 
falfe  intelligence,  and  the  like;  but  by  no  means  in  trea- 
ties, truces,  fignals  of  diftrefs  at  fea,  or  fignals  of  capitu- 
lation." Vide  Paley's  Principles  of  Moral  and  Political 
Philofophy,  chap.  5.  Vide  alfo  for  further  information, 
Hutchefon's  Moral  Philofophy,  Part  II.  ch.  10.  §  7,  &c. 
Sc/i.  5. — The  reader  will  obferve,  that  according  to  our  diftinc^ 
tion  all  the  cafes  which  have  been  laid  down  by  thofe  au- 
thors come  under  the  predicament  of  moral  untruths; 
we  may  therefore  lay  down  the  following  maxims  as 
guides  to  diretf:  our  fteps  through  the  irkfome  difficulties 
with  which  converfation  is  befet : — 

1.  It  is  a  duty  to  fpeak  the  truth  as  it  is,  when  it  muft  ne- 
cefTarily  be  known  for  promoting  the  glory  of  God,  our 
own  happinefs  and  that  of  others. 

2.  We  ought  to  keep  the  truth  fecret,  when  a  declaration 
thereof  would  be  repugnant  to  thefe  great  ends. 

3.  Great  care  is  neceflary,  that  both  fpeech  and  filence,  re- 
fpe&ively  warranted  by  thefe  ends,  be  feafonable  with 
refpect  to  time,  place  and  other  circumftances. 

4.  Where  taciturnity  is  neceiTary,  we  are  allowed  to  make 
ufe  of  thofe  means  which  areneceffarv  for  concealing  the 
truth.  "  & 

5.  It  can  never  be  neceflary  for  us  to  fpeak  what  we  have 
defined  to  be  a  falfhood,  'much  Iefs  a  lie,  in  order  to  con- 
ceal a  truth.  If  the  duties  of  taciturnity  have  for  their 
object  the  glory  of  God,  how  can  an  action  contrary  to 
the  natural  laws,  which  we  have  proved  to  be  divine,  be 
confident  with  that  glory? 

6.  No  deviation  from  truth,  contrary  to  imperfect  obliga- 
tions and  laws,  or  even  thofe  which  are  perfect,  provided 

the 


222  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  agent  in  the  latter  cafe  has  not  a&ed  malicioufiv,  is  or 
ran  with  propriety  be  called  a  falfhood  or  a  lie,  when 
higher  laws  or  duties  fuperfede  them ;  that  is  to  fay,  if  the 
one  or  the  other  is  either  phyfically  or  morally  impcffible. 
Should  we  accufe  a  man  of  a  falfhood  or  a  lie  who  has 
difappointed  us  in  a  meeting,  or  in  lending  money,  or 
making  a  payment,  which  he  had  prom  i  fed;  when  the 
difappointment,  the  trouble,  expence,  or  lofs  we  have 
fuftained,  is  caufed  by  his  ficknefs,  by  a  robbery  com- 
mitted upon  him,  or  by  his  forcible  detention  in  capti- 
vity ? 

4 

j.  In  cafes  where  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  is  for  the  glory 
of  God  or  for  our  own  happinefs  and  that  of  others,  that 
we  fpeak  or  conceal  the  truth,  it  will  be  well  to  examine 
the  object  of  fpeech  or  filence,  the  time,  place,  &c.  by 
the  various  rules  of  human  rectitude.  Isitjufr,  honeft, 
confident  with  uprightnefs,  with  humanity,  and  with  a 
good  confcience?  Is  it  confident  with  decency  and  pro- 
priety? What  will  be  the  proximate,  what  the  remote 
confequences,  &c. 

8.  No  man  who  fets  a  value  upon  a  good  confcience  will 
indulge  himfelf  with  unneceflary,  much  lefs  with  wanton 
deviations  from  truth. 

9.  It  ought  to  be  obferved,  that  the  duties  of  fpeech  deferve 
our  mod  careful  vigilance;  for  deviations  from  a  ftrict 
obfervance  of  them  are  peculiarly  hurtful  and  dangerous, 
flnce  the  evil  effects  of  them  are  not  fo  eafily  perceived  or 
avoided  as  the  confequences  of  other  actions.  Falfhoods 
and  lies,  like  the  peftilence,  walk  in  darknefs,  and  invade 
when  no  danger  is  expected;  like  the  father  of  lies  they 
aflume  various  forms — the  form  of  truth,  of  friendship, 
&c.  they  wound  and  kill  at  a  diftance ;  they  are  weapons 
eafily  concealed,  foon  unfheathed,  always  at  hand,  and  in 
every  one's  poffeffion. 

We  have  defined  moral  falfhood  to  be  that  deviation 
from  truth  by  which  we  act  contrary  to  our  neighbour's 
imperfect  right. 

It  is  our  duty%  to  abhor  and  to  avoid  moral  falfhood, 
becaufe  it  is  our  duty  to  avoid  all  manner  of  deceit, 

impro- 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2  2J 

impropriety,  infincerity,  diffimulation  and  inhumanity; 
in  a  word,  it  is  our  duty  fmcerely  to  obey  impericcl 
obligations  and  laws,  carefully  to  refped  the  imperfect 
rights  of  others,  and  confcientiouily  to  avcid  a  breach 
of  duty. 

Sch. — If  an  indifcreet  declaration  of  the  truth  is  fo  unbecoming 
the  human  character,  what  idea  fliall  we  form  of  the  au- 
thors of  falfhood,  of  thofe  who  countenance  calumny,, 
and  of  thofe  who  propagate  it?  Ail  that  can  be  faid  is 
this,  that  falfhoods  have  their  different  degrees  of  turpi- 
tude, according  to  their  etfects  and  various  other  circum- 
itauces,  with  reference  to  the  intention  of  the  agent,  the 
abettor,  the  propagator,  &c. 
Let  it  be  remembered,  that  a  wilful  falfhood  has  in  it  fo 
much  of  the  malignity  of  a  lie,  that  it  can  hardly  be  dif- 
tinfniifhed  therefrom,  except  that  it  was  not  in  the  power 
of  the  calumniator  to  perpetrate  the  injury.  Characters 
who  deal  in  falfhood  invite,  the  contempt  of  the  difcreet 
part  of  mankind;  envy  and  malice  are  therefore  as  impo- 
tentas  they  are  reftlefs.  The  character  of  the  honefr  and 
upright  man  is  invulnerable. 

A  moral  falfhood,  whereby  another  furTers  injury 
and  damap-e,  is  a  lie. 

As  by  fpeaking  we  underhand  the  exhibiting  any 
figns  of  our  thoughts,  it  is  plain,  that  we  can  both  act 
and  fpeak  lies. 

By  exhibiting  figns  whereby  others  are  deceived  or 
.injured,  we  are  faid  to  become  guilty  of  the  crime  of 
falfifying. 

Falfifying  by  other  actions  than  words  fpoken  or 
written,  as  the  term  is  taken  in  its  moft  common  ac- 
ceptation, is  called  real,  and  comprehends  forging, 
coining,  counterfeiting,  and  other  injurious  adultera- 
tions. Falfifying  by  words  fpoken  or  written  is  filled 
verbal,  and  extends  to  lies,  libels,  and  other  kinds  of 
injurious  defamations, 

Sch* 


2?4  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ScL  i. — A  well  written  fatire  is  fo  far  from  being  of  a  defama- 
tory nature,  that  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  necelfary  veracity, 
exercifed  not  againft  perfons,  but  againft  vice,  inhu- 
manity, &c. 

Sch.  2. — The  appellation  lie  is  fo  very  offensive  and  fo  general- 
ly abhorred,  that  it  would  juftify  a  prefumption  that  this 
vice  has  no  abiding  place  on  earth.  We  really  might 
wifh,  both  for  the  honour  and  for  the  good  of  mankind, 
that  fraud,  calumny,  traduction,  &c.  would  never  dare  to 
rear  their  heads.  What  a  forrowful  afpect  do  electioneer- 
ing cabals  commonly  prefent  us ! 

Sch.  3. — It  is  juftly  obferved,  that  lies  may  be  acted  :  for  iri- 
ftance ;  the  man  deeply  in  debt  is  flrutting  along  in  the 
finefl  drefs  at  the  coft  of  his  creditors :  the  man  poflefled 
of  a  competency,  or  perhaps  blefTed  with  great  abun- 
dance, is  always  complaining  of  want,  or  lives  in  a  pe- 
nurious manner,  and  is  not  free  to  impart  of  his  fuper- 
fluities  to  his  indigent  neighbour. 

Since  it  is  poflible  that  figns  foreign  or  even  oppoflte 
to  the  thoughts  of  the  fpeaker  may  be  exhibited,  it 
follows,  that  we  cannot  always  with  certainty  infer  the 
moral  truth  from  what  is  fpoken  or  written;  for  as 
little  as  figns  are  naturally  calculated  to  mew  with  in- 
dubitable precision  the  inward  fentiments  of  the  heart, 
fo  little  are  we  able  to  penetrate  into  the  thoughts  of 
him  who  exhibits  fuch  figns.    We  may  be  deceived. 

However,  as  it  is  abfolutely  necerTary,  in  many  oc- 
currences of  life,  that,  for  the  glory  of  God  and  for 
our  own  felicity  and  that  of  others,  we  fhould  know 
whether  our  neighbour  fpeaks  the  truth  or  deviates 
from  it,  and  as  thefe  are  the  very  cafes  in  which  our 
neighbour  is  bound  ftrictly  to  exercife  the  duty  of  ve- 
racity, it  follows,  that  we  have  not  only  a  right  to 
require,  but  that  he  alfo  is  under  particular  obligations 
to  give  us  a  convincing  proof  or  teft  of  his  fincerity 
and  veracity. 

Actions 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  22£ 

A&ions  or  declarations  ufed  as  a  teft  of  our  fincerity 
and  veracity  in  {peaking  the  moral  truth,  are  called 
ajfeverations. 

AfTeverations  are  diftinguifhed  into  the  improper? 
the  unnecejjary,  and  the  necejfary. 

Sch.  i. — To  make  ufe  of  improper  afTeverations,  by  curling, 
f wearing,  &c.  is  a  folly,  and  a  ltriking  mark  of  a  mind 
as  indifcreet  and  rude  as  it  is  impious. 

Sch.  2. — The  ufing  unneceflary  afleverations  not  only  betrays 
meannefs  in  the  fpeaker,  but  may  be  taken  for  a  pretty 
fure  fign  of  his  want  of  fincerity. 

Sch.  3, — The  neceflary  afleverations  are  again  diftinguifhed 
into  the  ordinary  and  the  foltmn;  the  former  ought  to  be 
conducted  with  prudence  and  propriety,  and  mould  ferve 
for  the  purpofe  of  private  transactions;  as  the  expreffions, 
it  is  certain,  you  may  depend  upon  it,  it  is  true,  upon 
my  honour,  &c. 

Sch.  4. — The  folemn  are  principally  ufed  in  tranfactions  of  a 
public  nature. 

No  affeveration  is  better  calculated  for  a  teft  of  our 
fincerity,  or  more  folemn  and  awful,  than  when  the 
fpeaker  calls  upon  God  as  witnefs  of  his  thoughts,  and 
as  avenger  in  cafe  he  fwerves  from  moral  truth.  This 
folemn  and  awful  affeveration  is  called  an  oath. 

By  the  external  folemnities  of  an  oath  we  underftand 
certain  external  acts,  whereby  the  mind  of  the  juror 
may  be  deeply  imprefTed  with  a  fenfe  of  the  omni- 
fcience,  omnipotence  and  juftice  of  the  Deity,  and 
whereby  he  mews  to  others  that  he  confiders  himfelf 
in  a  moft  particular  manner  in  the  prefence  of  him  who 
is  the  fearcher  of  hearts,  the  righteous  judge  of  the 
earth,  who  can  and  will  punifh  the  wicked  and  thofe 
who  are  guilty  of  falfifying. 

Sch.  1. — There  are  different  folemnities  in  vogue,  concerning 

the  propriety,  neceffity  and  lawfnlnefs  of  which  much 

G  g  controv  erfy 


2  lb  -MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

controverfy  has  taken  place.  There  is,  however,  a  pretty 
general  agreement  with  refpect  to  the  necefiity  of  external 
lclemnities,  as  there  are  cafes  where  we  ought,  by  fome 
act  or  another,  to  be  convinced  of  a  perfon's  veracity  and 
iincerity,  before  it  can  be  expected  that  we  mould  give 
aflent  to  his  teftimony.  But  the  fubject  of  the  controverfy 
is,  which  are  thofe  particular  acts?  for  it  does  not  follow 
from  that  general  necefiity,  that  thofe  adopted  by  one 
clafs  of  people  are  more  necefTary  than  thofe  advocated  by 
another.  With  refpect  to  the  propriety,  it  ought  generally 
to  be  obferved,  that  fuch  are  molt  eligible  as  are  heft  cal- 
culated both  for  convincing  us  of  the  juror's  veracity,  and 
for  imprefiing  his  mind  with  a  lively  fenfe  of  the  omni- 
fcience,  omnipotence  and  juftice  of  God.  However,  as 
a  variety  of  external  acts  may  produce  fuch  effects,  and 
as  thefe  may  in  a  great  meafure  depend  upon  different 
cuftoms,  habits  and  fentiments,  it  follows,  that  the  pro- 
priety of  folemnities  muff  be  left  optional  and  undeter- 
mined, with  this  provifo,  that  they  be  not  naturally  un- 
lawful, that  is  to  fay,  not  indecent,  not  contradictory  to 
the  ends  for  which  folemnities  have  been  proved  to*  be 
necefTary;  thev  muft  confequentlv  not  be  trifling,  divert- 
in^  the  mind  of  the  juror  from  a  ferious  consideration  of 
the  awful  iituation  in  which  he  is  making  his  appeal  to 
the  omnifcieuce  of  God  and  the  righteous  judgment  of 
him  who  is  infinitely  powerful,  juft  and  holy. 

&•/,,  2. — There  are  likewife  folemnities  necefTary  in  tendering 
the  oath.  It  is  highly  reprehenfible  when  the  folemnities 
prefcribed  by  the  refpective  laws  of  countries  are  exhibit- 
ed or  performed  in  a  carelefs  or  flight  manner,  as  if  fwear- 
\w?  were  but  an  indifferent  and  ordinary  tranfaetion. 
How  can  we  expect  that  the  mind  of  the  juror  is  properly 
impreffed  with  a  fenfe  of  his  awful  iituation,  when  he 
who  tenders  the  oath  fhews  hardly  any  fymptom  of  feri- 
oufnefs? 

Sc/i.  3. — Since  the  greater  or  left  propriety  of  the  different  kinds 
of  folemnities  in  vogue  do  not  eflentially  conftitute  the 
oath,  but  are  only  necefTary  concomitants  thereof,  it  fol- 
lows, that  indulgence  from  the  party  who  tenders  the  oath 
is  as  commendable  as  accommodation  and  moderation 
on  the  part  of  the  juror.  Things  of  this  kind  indeed  come 
with  the  beft  grace  from  thofe  who  fill  the  ftations  of  fa- 
thers 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  22^ 

thers  of  the  people:  the  perlliring,  however,  In  a  parti- 
cular mode  on  the  part  of  thofe  who  are  under  the  con- 
troul  of  the  law  of  the  land,  mows  that  prejudice  pre- 
ponderates. 

Sch.  4. — The  internal Jolemnity  of  an  oath,  or  its  efTence,  con- 
lifting  in  an  appeal  to  the  omnifcient,  omnipotent  and 
righteous  God  as  witnefs  and  avenger,  it  follows,  that,  if 
that  appeal  is  finccre  and  our  testimony  morally  true,  ano\ 
as  it  is  exprefTed,  the  whole  truth,  it  is  lawful,  however  it 
may  have  been  modified  with  refpecl  to  outward  folemni- 
ties:  if  that  appeal  is  infincere,  and  the  juror  does  not 
fpeak  t-he  truth  and  the  whole  truth  as  far  as  he  knows  it, 
it  is  unlawful  under  whatfoever  folemnities  it  may  have 
been  taken.  The  folemnities  do  not  change  the  nature 
of  truth;  they  cannot  render  that  right  which  is  wron^.; 
and  vice  verfa. 

There  is  another  folemn  afTeveration,  known  with 
us  under  the  appellation  of  affirmation,  where  the 
ipeaker  makes  only  a  bare  declaration,  fanctioned  by 
the  folemnity  of  the  act  itfelf,  that  what  he  fpeaks 
proceeds  from  the  itneerity  of  his  heart,  and  is  the 
moral  truth,  and  the  whole  truth  as  it  is  known  to  him. 

Our  laws,  for  particular  reafons,  admit  of  fuch  an 
affirmation  inftead  of  an  oath,  and  attribute  to  it  all 
the  juridical  effects  which  an  oath  produces.  They 
very  juflly  contemplate  it  as  an  expedient  well  calcu- 
lated to  accommodate  the  fcruples  of  confeience  which 
fome  perfons  have  contracted  from  m interpretations  of 
feveral  pafTages  of  fcripture,  where  mention  is  made 
of  feveral  improper  modes  of  fwearing;  which  panages, 
however,  can  be  as  little  againfb  the  taking  a  necefTary 
and  lawful  oath,  as  the  facred  writings  can  contradict 
themfelves.  We  call  the  accommodation  on  the  part 
of  government  juft,  becaufe  nothing  is  more  becoming 
its  dignity  than  lenity,  wherever  it  can  be  exercifed 
in  a  manner  confident  with  juftice  and  (he  public  good. 

°  No 


228  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

No  perfon,  we  truft,  can  entertain  a  doubt  but  that  the 
admiifion  of  affirmation  in  thefe  and  many  other  cafes 
is  eligible,  as  it  Kas  all  the  internal  folemnities  of  an 
oath.  Though  no  exprefs  appeal  is  made  to  God, 
ftill  the  very  act  fully  amounts  to  it ;  for  it  is  a  decla- 
ration made  before  an  omnifcient,  omnipotent  and  juft 
God,  who  punifhes  faliifiers :  no  formal  appeal  can 
give  him  a  new  or  an  additional  right. 

Affirmation  may  therefore  be  confidered  as  an  oath 
made  without  the  external  folemnities  thereof :  nay, 
where  it  is  directed  or  permitted  by  law,  the  very  act 
and  the  very  expreflions  whereby  it  is  made  muft  be 
confidered  as  the  external  folemnities. 

Sck.  i. — A  celebrated  author  has  juftly  obferved,  that  the  ob- 
fcure  and  elliptical  forms  of  oaths,  together  with  the 
levity  and  frequency  with  which  they  are  fometimes  ad- 
miniftered,  have  been  the  caufe  of  a  general  inadvertency 
to  their  obligations.  He  willies,  that  in  many  cafes  fome- 
thing  which  might  anfwer  the  purpofes  of  a  convincing 
afleveration  fhould  be  fubftituted  for  the  formal  oath  in 
all  its  folemnities.  We  fhall  not  determine  which  of  the 
modes  is  molt  eligible,  whether  the  expedients  that  author 
advifes,  or  the  affirmation,  or  the  practice  obferved  in 
ibme  countries,  where,  for  inftance,  the  judge  afking, 
Can  you  te/iify  this  upon  your  good  faith,  by  giving  me  your  hand 
in  lieu  of  an  oath?  the  deponent,  by  anfwering  yes  and 
giving  him  his  hand,  has  given  a  full  teftimony  as  to  ju- 
ridical effects,  in  all  cafes  which  are  not  of  great  moment 
or  ferious  confequences.  Vide  Paley's  Moral  Philofo- 
phy,  chap.  1 6. 

Sell.  2. — However  much  it  is  to  be  wifhed  that  oaths  might 
become  lefs  frequent,  ftill  it  ought  to  be  obferved,  that 
what  can  be  juftly  affirmed  may  be  juftly  corroborated  by 
an  oath;  the  one  is  confequently  as  facred  as  the  other. 
Let  him,  therefore,  who  fwears  or  affirms,  always  remem- 
ber that  he  calls  God  to  witnefs,  and  that  he  is  bound  to 
fpeak  the  moral  truth  as  far  as  he  knows  it. 

ScL 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2  2Q 

ScL  3. — There  is  a  general  complaint  againft  the  taking  of 
oaths  for  eftablifhing  the  truth  in  cafes  of  little  conie- 
quence;  as,  for  inftance,  where  the  object  of  controverfy 
is  the  lofs  of  one,  two,  &c.  (hillings.  Many  an  honeft 
man  chufes  rather  to  loie  five  times  the  fnm  than  to  take 
an  oath.  But  in  this  there  is  more  fpecinufnefs  than  jus- 
tice and  truth.  Is  it  the  value  of  money,  or  the  caufe  of 
juftice  and  truth  that  renders  an  oath  neceflary?  Is  not 
the  greateft  opprefiion,  injuftice  and  falfnood  very  fre- 
quently committed  in  tranfactions  where  confidence  has 
been  placed  in  the  honefty  of  perfons,  becaufe  they  have 
been  confidered  as  able  and  willing  to  fulfil  engagements 
which  are  not  of  great  moment?  Should  we  be  delicate 
in  cafes  where  the  caufe  of  injury  and  injuftice  can  boaft 
of  triumph  over  virtue  and  honefty? 

Befides  the  criteria  heretofore  explained  of  the  wil- 
lingnefs  of  perfons  to  fpeak  the  moral  truth,  the  mak- 
ing oath  or  affirmation  mull  be  taken  for  particular 
tells  of  the  deponent's  fincerity  and  of  the  moral  truth 
of  his  depofition.  No  immediate  inference,  however, 
can  be  drawn  either  from  the  one  or  the  other,  that 
what  is  fpoken  is  logically  or  really  true ;  for  the 
fincerefl  and  bell  difpofed  perfons  may  be  midaken  in 
their  ideas,  and,  notwithstanding  their  veracity,  may 
happen  to  tellify  a  logical  fallhood. 

Sch.  1. — It  cannot,  therefore,  be  immediately  inferred  from  an 
arTertion  morally  true,  that  it  is  logically  fo.  It  is  poffible, 
too,  for  a  perfon  to  fpeak  logically  true  and  morally  falfe. 

Sch.  2. — For  inftance:  a  perfon  over-hearing  the  converfation 
of  others,  where  mention  is  made  of  a  ten  pound  bill, 
cannot  fay,  confiftently  with  moral  truth,  that  a  ten 
pound  bill  has  been  given  in  payment:  the  denomination 
of  dollars  might  have  been  miftaken  by  the  party  for  that 
of  pounds:  but  he  fwears  morally  true,  if  he  teftifies  that 
he  heard  mention  made  of  a  ten  pound  bill. 

Sch.  3. — But  from  the  moral  truth  we  may  in  many  inftances 
collect  the  real  circumftances  of  particular  fads;  for, 
being  thereby  convinced  of  the  fpeaker's  fincerity,  no- 
thing remains  but  to  afcertain  his  capability  to  fpeak  the 

real 


23O  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

real  truth,  in  order  to  be  convinced  of  the  reality  of  the 
particulars  of  his  testimony. 
Sc/i.  4. — Hence  the  propriety  of  examining  as  many  witnefles 
as  we  can  have;  for  the  circumftance  of  many  perfons 
agreeing  in  their  depofitions  leaves  lefs  doubt  with  re- 
fpeft  to  the  veracity  of  the  witnefles  as  well  as  the  reality 
of  the  object  of  their  teftimony. 

Sch.  5. — As  it  is  poiftble  for  witnefles  in  thefe  cafes  to  difagree, 
fome  not  having  been  in  a  fituation  to  acquire  that  expe- 
rience which  others  have  obtained;  fome  again  not  hav- 
ing paid  that  ftriCt.  attention  to  every  circumftance,  or 
not  retaining  the  full  recollection  thereof,  which  others 
have;  we  mav  not  from  this  difaereement  infer  inlinceri- 
ty,  or  charge  perfons,  from  contradictory  teftimonies, 
with  moral  untruth:  for  we  are  not  fworn,  in  all  aflertory 
teftimonies,  to  fpeak  the  real  truth;  no  authority  can 
bind  us  to  a  phylical  impoflibility ;  but  we  are  fworn  to 
fpeak  the  moral  truth,  all  that  we  know,  and  as  it  is 
known. 

Sch.  6. — It  is  an  important  duty  that  we  teftify  the  moral  truth, 
even  when  we  are  not  called  to  witnefs,  if  for  want  of  our 
evidence  the  innocent  mould  be  wronged  or  opprefTed. 
Our  neighbour  may  often  not  know  that  we  have  any 
knowledge  of  certain  tranfaCtions;  in  fuch  cafe  we  ought 
to  offer  our  teftimony. 

Sch.  7. — It  is  therefore  highly  criminal,  and  the  agent  certainly 
cannot  efcape  the  imputation  which  is  confequent  upon 
the  commifiion  of  wrong,  if  he  prevaricates  or  endea- 
vours to  evade  giving  his  teftimony. 

Sch.  8. — A  moft  facred  regard  for  the  caufe  of  truth  becomes 
us  as  men  and  as  chriftians :  we  fhould  have  no  refpeCt  of 
perfons,  neither  confult  our  own  eafe  or  popularity,  when 
the  caufe  of  juftice  and  truth  calls  for  the  exercife  of  the 
duty  of  veracity. 

The  validity  of  oaths  is  diftinguifhed  into  natural 
and  legal. 

The  natural  validity  of  oaths  confifls  in  their  internal 
Solemnities,  that  is  to  fay,  in  the  juror's  or  affirmant's 
acknowledgment  of  an  omnifcient,  omnipotent  and  juft 

God, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2^1 

God,  who  will  by  no  means  hold  guiltlefs,  but  will 
punifh  thofe  who  take  his  name  in  vain. 

Idolaters  and  fuperftitious  perfons,  who  attribute  to 
their  fictitious  deities  thofe  perfections,  can  fwear  an 
oath  which  is  morally  and  naturally  valid,  though  it  is, 
in  a  theological  point  of  view,  improper  and  falfe. 

Theoretical  atheifts,  and  fuch  of  the  tribe  of  deifts 
as  deny  the  providence  of  God,  cannot  fwear  an  oath 
which  is  naturally  valid. 

An  oath  is  faid  to  be  legally  valid  when  it  produces 
a  juridical  effect,  and  when  tendered  and  taken  under 
the  external  folemnities  eftablifhed  by  the  laws  of  the 
country. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  no  immediate  inference  holds 
good  from  the  natural  validity  of  oaths  upon  that 
which  is  legal,  and  vice  verfa. 

Atheifts,  and  the  afore- mentioned  deifts,  complying 
with  the  external  forms  of  oaths  or  affirmations,  fwear 
legally  valid ;  for  they  exhibit  figns  which  induce  others 
to  believe  that  they  acknowledge  the  omnifcience,  om- 
nipotence, juftice  and  providence  of  God. 

Oaths  are  diftinguifhed  into  promiffory,  affertory, 
neceffary,  judicial,  voluntary,  and  purgatorv. 

By  the  promiffory  oath  we  confirm  our  unalterable 
refolution  to  ftand  to  our  engagements. 

By  that  which  is  called  affertory,  a  fact  is  certified. 

If  a  party  before  a  court  refers  the  caufe  to  the  oath 
of  another,  it  is  called  judicial. 

An  oath  is  faid  to  be  voluntary,  if  one  of  the  parties 
by  private  deed  refers  his  came  to  the  oath  of  the 
other.- 

An 


232  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY* 

An  afTertory  oath  required  by  a  magiflrate  is  faid  to 
be  necejpiry. 

An  oath  is  faid  to  be  purgatory,  when  we  thereby 
refute  fufpicion  or  imperfect  proof. 

Perjury  is  that  horrid  crime  where  a  perfon  wilfully 
and  knowingly,  under  the  qualification  of  an  oath  or 
affirmation,  declares  an  untruth  to  be  true. 

ScL  1. — A  wilful  perjurer  is  a  blafphemer;  for  calling  God  to  . 
witnefs  what  he  knows  to  be  falfe  is  virtually  attributing 
to  him  imperfections. 

ScL  2. — The  perjurer  is  likewife  the  moral  caufe  of  all  the  con- 
fequencesrefulting  from  his  infincerity  and  falfifkation. 

ScL  3. — If  we  reflect  upon  the  general  confequences  of  this- 
horrid  fpecies  of  perfidy,  that  it  tends  to  deftroy  all  con- 
fidence among  mankind,  we  (hall  find  there  is  no  crime 
more  horrid  or  deteftable. 

ScL  4. — All  authors  of  afieverations  which  have  a  judicial  ef- 
fect are  guilty  of  this  crime,  though  they  have  not  for- 
mally fworn  or  affirmed. 

ScL  5. — From  which  it  follows,  that  perfons  who  offer  their 
oath  are  juftly  deemed  as  perjured,  if  they  have  thereby 
raifed  an  expectation  in  others  to  which  they  intentionally 
remain  unfaithful,  or  were  determined  at  the  time  they 
made  that  offer  to  deceive  the  confidence  placed  therein. 

No  oath  can  he  lawful  that  is  extorted,  particularly 
where  a  man  is  put  into  a  ftate  of  neceflity,  that  is  to 
fay,  forced  to  fwear  upon  pain  of  death. 

ScL  1. — In  this  cafe  feveral  queflions  arife  : 

1.  Whether,  under  fuch  circumftances,  a  perfon  ought  to 
have  taken  an  oath,  or  rather  ritked  his  life? 

2.  Whether  an  oath  taken  under  fuch  circumftances  ought 
to  be  kept  ? 

3.  Whether  the  breaking  fuch  an  oath  amounts  to  perjury? 
Sch.  2. — The  determination  of  thefe  queftions  principally  de- 
pends upon  the  confideration  whether  the  juror  was  really 
in  an  unjuft  manner  put  into  a  ftate  of  abfolute,  extreme 

or 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


233 


cr  refpeftive  neceffity,  and  whether  in  either  cafe  his  own 
agency  has  not  led  to  his  being  placed  therein. 
Referring  the  reader,  therefore,  to  the  explanations  which 
we  have  given  of  thefe  ftates,  we  willingly  leave  the  de- 
cifion  with  the  unfortunate  perfon,  rather  than  with  the 
dry  philofopher  and  difputant,  who  fits  at  his  fire-fide  rea- 
foning  on  what  he  never  has  experienced  and  parhaps 
never  (hall. — It  is  eaiy  faid,  rather  lofe  your  life  than  take 
fuch  an  oath. 

With  refpecl:  to  the  fecond  particular,  it  is  to  be  obferved, 
that  an  oath  may  confirm,  but  can  never  confritute  an 
obligation.  An  oath,  therefore,  cannot  bind  us  to  do 
what  is  wrong  and  contrary  to  all  manner  of  obligations. 

As  for  the  third  particular,  it  is  plain,  that  what  is  unlawful 
to  be  taken  and  unjufi  to  be  kept,  ceafes  to  be  a  crime 
when  difmified  as  foon  as  poilible. 

Sch.  3. — It  is  a  wrong  idea  to  fuppofe  that  an  oath  is  a  promife 
to  God. 

Sch.  4. — Extorted  oaths,  where  a  perfon  has  been  put  into  a 
ftate  of  unjufi  fear,  or  threatened  with  unjufi  violence, 
have  nothing  left  with  refpecl  to  moral  agency  in  the  op- 
prefled,  but  the  name  without  the  lean;  fhadow  of  validity. 

There  may  be  cafes  wherein  an  oath  lawfully  ten- 
dered and  taken  becomes  morally  impoftible  with  re- 
fpect  to  a  literal  performance  thereof:  for  inftance,  the 
oath  of  allegiance  binds  virtually  to  fincerity  and  faith- 
fulnefs  towards  the  ftate  or  nation  of  which  we  are 
members :  this  oath,  however,  may  be  literally  worded 
in  fentences  which  refer  to  the  perfon  or  perfons  a.dmi- 
niftering  the  public  affairs  of  that  ftate  or  nation.  Sup- 
pofe  fuch  perfons  become  ufurpers,  and  fubvert  public 
good;  are  we  bound  to  fupport  them  in  their  iniquitous 
deflgns  ?  No  rational  man  will  fay  fo.  No  oath  can  bind 
us  to  deftroy  the  rights  or  liberties  of  our  country. 


H  h  CHAPTER 


234  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Of  pa£Is  and  patlitious  rights. 

JljLS  long  as  we  depend  upon  the  help  and  afiiftance 
of  others,  on  the  tenure  of  imperfect  right,  fo  long 
our  felicity  in  that  refpect  is  uncertain  and  precarious ; 
for  others  may  withhold  or  withdraw  it  at  a  time  when 
it  may  be  mort  wanting :  our  happinefs,  therefore, 
would  be  better  confulted,  and  we  might  with  greater 
fecurity  and  eafe  enter  upon  purfuits  more  extenfively 
ufeful,  if  we  could  place  ourfelves  in  fuch  a  ftate  as  to 
obtain  a  perfect  right  to  demand,  and  in  cafe  of  refufal, 
to  compel  that  alliftance. 

It  is  therefore  a  duty,  that  we  think  of  lawful  means 
by  which  the  expectation  of  that  afliftance  may  become 
of  perfect  right  on  our  part,  and  of  perfect  obligation 
on  the  part  of  our  neighbour. 

Both  reafon  and  experience  know  of  no  other  lawful 
ways  of  obtaining  fuch  a  perfect  right  in  what  is  natu- 
rally our  neighbour's  own,  than  by  the  law  of  repara- 
tion, which  we  mail  in  future  call  the  law  of  forfeiture  y 
or  by  his  formal  and  determined  will  and  confent;  that 
is  to  fay,  there  is  no  mode,  beiides  forfeiture,  to  obtain 
a  perfect  right  in  our  neighbour's  property  or  perfon, 
but  by  way  of  'pafit. 

Before  we  can  well  underftand  the  nature  of  a  pact, 
we  muft  have  a  diftinct  knowledge  of  all  its  ingredients. 

The  ingredients  of  a  patl  are  thefe  four :  promife, 
confent,  acceptance,  and  transfer. 

By 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  235 

By  promife^  we  underftanoV  that  declaration  of  the 
will  by  which  we  fignify  to  another  our  intention  of 
performing  fomething  beneficial  to  him:  if  the  pro- 
mifee  offer  to  the  promifer  fomething  advantageous  in 
return,  the  promife  is  faid  to  be  mutual  or  reciprocal. 
Sch.  1. — No  mutual  promife,  or  claim  founded  upon  it,  can 
take  place  without  a  previous  jimple  promife,  or  the  per- 
formance thereof. 

Sch.  2. — It  is  to  be  obferved,  that  fome  authors  take  promife 
in  a  fenfe  quite  different  from  that  which  our  definition 
determines;  fome  even  defignate  pa£ts  by  that  name. 

Since  both  fimple  and  mutual  promifes  are  declara- 
tions of  the  will,  it  follows,  that  fuch  as  cannot  exercife 
their  will  cannot  make  lawful  and  binding  promifes. 

The  exercife  of  the  will  depends  either  upon  a  phy- 
fical  or  a  moral  poflibility. 

Thofe  are  deftitute  of  the  phyfical  poflibility  who 
cannot  exercife  their  underftanding,  or  have  not  the 
liberty  to  exercife  fpontaneity;  as,  children  of  a  certain 
age,  with  refpecl  to  a.great  variety  of  things;  lunatics 
and  madmen,  with  refpecl  to  all  manner  of  objects ; 
perfons  in  a  delirious  paroxyfm  of  ficknefs:  likewife, 
thofe  who  are  under  co-action,  or  particularly  in  a  ftate 
of  neceflity. 

A  moral  poflibility  to  exercife  underfTanding  and 
will  has  reference  to  the  lawfulnefs  of  the  object,  of 
promifes.  If  we  promife  a  thing  that  belongs  to  ano- 
ther, or  is  repugnant  to  law,  the  promife  is  ipfo  fatta 
void-,  that  is  to  fay,  it  is  wrong  to  make  it  and  unjuh: 
to  keep  it.  A  lawful  promife  may  likewife  become 
unlawful  with  refpect  to  the  eventual  performance 
thereof. 

There  is  alfo  a  phyfical   impoflibility   conceivable 

in 


2?6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


o 


m  promifes  with  refpect  to  their  objects,  if  fuch  objects 
are  not  in  our  power. 

ScL — In  this  cafe  we  may  diftinguifh  three  particular  circum- 
fiances:  i.  either  that  the  promifer  knew  the  impoffibility 
at  the  time  he  made  the  promife ;  2.  that  the  impoffibility 
not  then  forefeen  happened  by  the  wilful  act  of  the  pro- 
mifer; or,  3.  that  the  impoffibility  arofe  by  accident. 

In  the  firft  and  fecond  cafes  the  promifer  is  guilty  of  intend- 
ed fraud;  in  the  third  he  is  free  from  guilt. 

Since  it  is  the  nature  of  promifes  to  be  for  the  ad- 
vantage of  others,  that  is,  for  aiding  and  aflifting  them 
by  the  ufe  of  our  powers;  and  fince  our  powers  are 
various,  either  thofe  of  the  foul  or  of  the  body,  or  fuch 
as  may  be  derived  from  our  eftate  or  influence ;  nay, 
iince  by  each  of  them  our  neighbour  may  be  aided  and 
aflifted  in  an  innumerable  variety  of  ways,  and  in  va- 
rious degrees ;  it  follows,  that  promifes,  with  refpect  to 
their  objects,  muft  be  inconceivably  multifarious. 

In  whatever  manner  we  aflift  others,  the  confequence 
will  be,  that  they  poifefs  our  powers  as  far  as  that  af- 
fiftance  extends.  But  fince  promife  implies  an  intended 
ailiflance,  it  follows,  that  by  promifing  we  declare  our 
will  that  fome  of  our  powers  mould  become  another's 
own,  that  is  to  fay,  that  what  is  our  own  mould  be- 
come another's.  \ 

But  as  from  the  will  of  any  finite  being  no  imme- 
diate inference  can  be  drawn  of  the  existence  of  things, 
it  follows,  that  by  the  promife  of  any  finite  being  the 
object  thereof  does  not  become  our  own ;  the  bare 
promife,  therefore,  gives  the  promifee  no  perfect  right 
in  the  thing  which  has  been  promifed :  the  promifer, 
for  inftance,  may  change  his  mind,  or  the  promife,  with 
refpect  to  performance,  may  become  phyfically  or  mo- 
rally 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  237 

rally  impoflible :  it  is  likewife  pofiible  for  the  promifee 
not  to  be  willing  to  have  the  object  of  the  protnife.  So 
much  is  certain,  that  promifes  are  among  thofe  things 
which  are  not  and  indeed  cannot  be  obtruded. 

The  lead  that  is  required  on  the  part  of  the  promifee 
is  his  confent,  for  without  this  the  performance  would 
be  deftitute  of  an  object.  We  might  promife  to  the 
man  of  the  moon  as  well  as  to  a  perfon  who  rejects  our 
offer,  with  this  difference,  that  in  the  latter  cafe  we 
mew  more  difcretion,  and  act  from  principles  of  phi- 
lanthropy. 

Moral  confent  confifts  in  an  identity  of  will  declared, 
or  fuppofed  to  be  declared,  by  free  agents,  with  refpect 
to  the  enuring  or  rejecting  of  particular  objects. 

Perfons  not  having  the  phyrlcal  faculty  to  will,  can- 
not confent;  as,  children,  with  refpect  to  many  things ; 
lunatics  and  madmen,  in  all  cafes  •,  perfons  in  a  delirious 
ftate,  caufed  by  a  natural  derangement  of  their  faculties ; 
and  all  who  are  under  co-action,  particularly  in  a  Rate 
of  necerTity :  for  in  thefe  cafes  agents  have  not  the  ex- 
ercife  of  underftanding,  or  no  room  left  for  exercifing 
fpontaneity:  they  may  utter  words,  or  do  actions, 
which,  by  a  grammatical  contraction,  denote  what  may 
be  called  phyjical  confent  •,  but  as  no  moral  agency  takes 
place,  the  confent  is  not  moral,  and  consequently  void. 

Sell.- — There  is  a  vaft  diilin&ion  between  the  promife  or  con- 
feat  of  a  perfon  in  a  delirium  occafioned  by  ficknefs,  and 
that  of  perfons  who  have  placed  themfelves  in  fuch  a  itate 
by  intoxication  and  drunkennefs :  it  is  true,  in  both  cafes 
the  agents  know  not  what  they  do  or  ought  to  do;  but  in 
the  rirft  the  actions  are  not  moral,  and  in  the  laft  they  may 
have  different  degrees  of  immorality  and  guilt. 

Perfons  have  not  the  moral  poilibility  to  will,  when 
the  object  of  their  intention  is  unlawful :   we  may  not 

confent, 


238  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

confent,  that  what  belongs  to  others  fhould  be  made 
ufe  of  or  be  taken  away  ♦,  neither  may  we  confent  to 
things  which  are  repugnant  to  the  dictates  of  the  natu- 
ral laws :  fuppofe  things  which  are  lawful  mould  be- 
come, in  courfe  of  time  or  under  circumftances,  of  a 
contrary  nature  or  tendency,  it  cannot  be  juft  that  we 
continue  our  confent. 

Unlawful  confent,  with  refpect  both  to  its  origin  and 
continuance,  is  not  only  void,  but  alfo  criminal  and 
wicked,  with  reference  to  the  moral  caufe  as  well  as  to 
the  proximate. 

Perfons  who  do  not  under ftand  one  another's  mean- 
ing, cannot  exercife  an  identity  of  will  -,  confent,  there- 
fore, in  fuch  circumftances,  is  void :  if  it  proceed  from 
the  fpontaneity  of  one  or  the  other  party,  it  becomes 
more  or  lefs  criminal,  according  to  the  various  degrees 
of  immorality  flowing  from  the  intention  of  the  agent 
and  effect  of  the  deception. 

Since  an  identity  of  will  implies  a  purpofe  that  fomc 
effect  mould  take  place,  that  is  to  fay,  that  fomething 
.mould  be  brought  into  exiftence ;  and  flnce  nothing 
exifts  but  what  is  of  an  individual  nature;  it  follows, 
that  the  object  of  confent  muft  be  particularly  deter- 
mined, and  that  moral  confent  is  and  in  its  nature  mufl 
be  particular. 

Univerfal  confent  is  therefore  only  ideal,  and  may  be 

faid  to  find  place  where  a  latitude  is  left  with  refpect  to 

the  particular  actions,  as  well  as  the  modes  and  manner, 

by  and  in  which  a  purpofe  may  be  obtained  or  effected. 

Sch.  1. — Still  the  purpofe  is  always  fomething  of  an  individual 
nature:  if  the  end  is  juft,  we  may  be  fuppofed  to  confent 
to  all  juft  means  leading  to  that  end,  but  not  to  thofe 
which  are  of  a  contrary  nature:  for  inftance;  I  confent 

to 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  239 

to  let  a  perfon  have  a  certain  part  of  my  property,  pro- 
vided he  fatisfies  my  creditors;  he  may  do  that  by  paying 
cafh,  or  giving  other  fecurity,  &c.  But  fuppofe  he  robs 
another  perfon,  and  fatisfies  my  creditors  with  the  money 
he  has  thus  unjuftly  taken  away;  can  any  part  of  this 
wicked  deed  be  charged  to  my  account  upon  that  general 
or  univerfal  confent? 
Sch.  2. — If  we  reflect  on  the  legiflative  and  executive  powers 
of  government,  there  feems  to  be  an  univerfal  or  general 
confent  of  the  people  neceflary  for  the  exercife  of  thofe 
powers  in  enacting  and  putting  into  execution  public 
laws  and  ordonnances,  which  are  things  eventual,  and  of 
fuch  a  nature  that  they  cannot  be  determined:  however 
that  may  be,  it  ought  to  be  obferved,  that,  in  free  govern- 
ments, neither  the  perfons  adminiftering  thofe  powers, 
nor  the  effects  of  the  exercife  of  them,  with  refpect  to  the 
purpofe  and  ultimate  end  of  the  confent  of  the  people,  are 
things  of  a  general  nature.  The  purpofe  of  my  vote  at 
an  election,  with  refpect  to  the  reprefentative  body  of  the 
people,  is  eventually  for  that  individual  perfon  who  has 
obtained  the  majority  of  votes.  The  confent,  likewife, 
of  citizens,  with  refpect  to  laws,  becomes  fpecific  if  re- 
ferred to  each  particular  claufe  which  they  contain,  or 
rather  is  fpecific,  becaufe  it  concentrates  in  every  thing 
that  is  found  by  the  majority  to  be  moll  conducive  to  the 
public  good. 

Sch.  3. — Gentlemen  who  confer  the  title  my  cmfiituents  folely 
upon  the  county,  diftri<5t  or  ftate  from  which  they  derive 
their  political  exiftence,  or  who  confult  its  interefts 
feparate  from  the  intereft  of  the  whole,  have  not  fuifi- 
ciently  confidered  that  they  hold  their  ftaticn  by  the  con- 
fent of  the  country  in  general,  and  that  they  mult  confult 
the  public  happinefs  of  all  if  they  do  juftice  to  their  con- 
ftituents. 

Sch.  4. — The  regulations  and  fpecific  laws,  therefore,  in  all 
their  particular  claufes,  bind  every  citizen,  as  they  have 
taken  place  by  his  confent,  and  muft  remain  his  laws  as 
long  as  they  are  judged  by  the  majority  to  promote  the 
public  good. 

Where  there  is  no  identity  of  will,  there  cannot  be 
a  confent :  if,  therefore,  it  fliould  be  an  object  of  enqui- 
ry 


240  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ry,  whether  a  perfon  has  or  has  not  confented,  it  muft 
be  made  to  appear  that  he  is  or  has  been  willing,  or 
/nuft  be  fuppofed  to  be  either  the  one  or  the  other,  with 
refpect  to  fome  particular  effect  or  confequence. 

There  are  various  ways,  therefore,  by  which  the 
confent  of  perfons  may  be  inferred :  it  is  either  declared 
by  words,  that  is,  by  figns  which  are  in  common  ufe  for 
exhibiting  our  thoughts,  or  is  collected  from  actions 
and  figns  different  from  words ;  or  it  follows  from  the 
nature  of  things,  and  of  other  particular  circumftances. 
In  the  fii-ft.  cafe,  confent  is  called  explicit,  in  the  fecond 
tacit,  in  the  laft  it  is  laid  to  be  conftruffive. 

Sch.  i. — Both  explicit  and  tacit  confent  is  diftinguifhed  into 
certain  or  probable:  to  form  a  judgment  of  the  one  or  the 
other,  it  is  neceifary  that  words  be  interpreted  in  their 
moft  ordinary  fenfe,  or  in  the  fenfe  in  which  it  appears 
from  other  figns  that  they  were  intended  to  be  nfed. 
With  refpect  to  tacit  confent,  we  muft  judge  whether  an 
action  has  been  performed  with  a  view  to  raife  a  belief  in 
others  of  our  confent,  or  is  known  naturally  to  excite 
fuch  a  belief.  The  cuftoms  of  places  and  countries  and 
the  complexion  of  other  circumftances  will  be  a  great 
help  for  determining  whether  tacit  confent  is  ^certain, 
fuppofed,  or  only  pretended. 

Sch.  2. — Conftru£tive  confent  is  of  the  utmoft  importance, 
and  therefore  particularly  worthy  our  attention  :  it  is  by 
this  that  conftitutions  and  laws  are  binding  upon  pofteri- 
ty — a  fubje£t  which  a  late  writer  feems  to  have  ferioufly 
difputed,  denying  that  there  ever  has  been  any  binding 
force  upon  pofterity  in  any  thing  which  their  progenitors 
might  have  done.  Suppofe  but  for  a  moment,  that  there 
is  truth  or  propriety  in  this  aflertion ;  the  confequence 
will  be,  that  no  country  can  have  conftitutions  or  laws 
binding  any  perfons  at  all.  The  framers  of  a  conftitu- 
tion  are  perhaps  all  called  from  the  ftage  of  human  affairs: 
laws  exift,  the  authors  of  which  now  lie  in  the  duft;  a 
new  generation  has  taken  the  room  of  their  progenitors: 
if  they  .are  not  fubject  to  the  regulations  which  their  fa- 
thers 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  ?4I 

thers  made  by  conflruclive  confent,  how  can  it  be  proved 
that  they  are  fubject  at  all?  The  miilake  feems  to  pro- 
ceed from  the  erroneous  idea,  that  men  enter  life  in  an 
abfolute  natural  ftate,  having  no  connection  with  nor  re- 
lation to  others;  which  is  as  abfolutely  contradielorv  to 
experience,  as  it  would  be  impoflible  for  new  generations 
to  be  happy  without  provisions  of  this  kind  being  made 
by  their  ancefiors:  for  it  is  known,  that  men  come  upon 
and  withdraw  from  the  (rage  of  life  fo  imperceptibly  and 
fo  gradually,  that  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  pitch  upon 
a,  time  when  the  public  acts  of  the  prefent  day  would  not: 
have  as  profpective  an  influence  on  poflerity,  as  thofe  of 
our  forefathers  had  on  the  prefent  generation. 

As  long,  therefore,  as  pofterity  abide  under  that  conftitutiori 
and  thole  laws,  as  long  as  they  refide  under  their  govern- 
ment, fo  Ion?  they  mull  be  deemed  to  have  given  their 
confent.  We  allow  that  a  diflenter  may  withdraw  him- 
felf  from  the  country  which  is  under  the  jurifdiction  of 
thofe  laws,  but  we  do  not  deem  it  jufi  that  he  mould  have 
a  right  to  attempt  fo  hazardous  an  enterprife  as  to  change 
them  to  his  liking.  Let  the  majority  of  the  people  at  any 
time  make  ufe  of  that  better  eftabiimed  right  of  nature, 
by  which  a  community  may  govern  itfelf,  as  it  is  founcj. 
bed  for  the  advancement  of  'general  happinefs. 

ScL  3. — It  is  upon  tacit  and  conftru&ive  confent  that  the  laws 
and  conftitutions  are  binding  upon  each  individual  of  the 
flate:  a  ftranger  taking  up  his  refidence  in  a  country  is 
prefumed  to  be  willing  to  comport  with  its  laws:  he 
who  gives  free  accefs  to  his  houfe,  is  fuppofed  to  confenf 
to  a  free  departure  :  he  who  afks  in  a  tavern  for  victuals, 
drink,  &c.  is  fuppofed  to  haye  given  his  confent  to  pay. 

§ch.  4.— -It  is  upon  conftru6live  confent  that  we  claim  a  right, 
given  to  our  firft  parents,  to  the  creatures  of  the  earth  t 
it  is  upon  this  confent  that  we  have  been  parties  in  the 
covenant  of  works  concluded  with  them, 

Sf/i.  5. — Thefe  distinctions  of  confent  are  likewife  applicable 

■  to  promifes:  we  may  expreiTiy  promife  by  words  which 

render  the  promife  certain,  or  only  probable.     The  fame 

may  be  the  cafe  with  refpect  to  tacit  promife:   nay,  there; 

is  likewife  fuch  a  thing  as  conftructive  promifes. 

As  fpon  as  the  promifee  gives  his  confent  to  th§ 

I  j  proniifo 


242  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

promife,  he  declares  that  he  will  have  the  thing  pro- 
mifed  for  his  own ;  for  in  this  cafe  both  his  will  and 
that  of  the  promifer  meet,  and  without  it  no  confent 
could  take  place,  as  there  would  not  be  an  identity  of 
will. 

But  as  nothing  refults  from  confent  but  will,  it  i*s 
evident,  that  from  confent  to  promifes  a  perfect  right 
can  with  no  more  propriety  take  place,  than  a  promife 
made  can  put  the  promifer  under  a  perfect  obligation 
to  keep  it. 

It  is  no  more  than  imperfect  right  and  obligation, 
and  therefore  reds  upon  the  perfon's  own  difcretion  and 
choice,  whether  he  will  or  will  not  perform  it ;  that  is, 
there  is  no  force  or  compulsion. 

We  ft  and  to  our  promife  if  we  actually  and  finally  do 
for  another's  advantage  what  we  have  declared  to  be 
our  intention. 

We  are  mofl  facredly  bound  to  beware  of  all  man- 
ner of  improper  or  unlawful  engagements,  and  faith- 
fully to  perform  all  our  lawful  promifes;  for  it  is  a 
facred  duty,  that  we  act  conformably  to  the  precepts 
and  prohibitions  of  imperfect  obligations  and  laws,  and 
make  it  an  invariable  rule  to  fpeak  the  moral  truth. 

He  who  is  ftrict  in  obferving  his  promifes  is  a  man 
of  probity,  a  contrary  character  is  juftly  reckoned  des- 
picable: a  man  who  forfeits  his  word  is  either  guilty 
of  great  indifcretion,  or  is  a  difhoneft  impoftor-,  he 
defervedly  lofes  his  character  and  credit :  thefe  being 
gone,  there  remains  nothing  worthy  the  efteem  of  an 
honefl:  man. 

From  what  has  hitherto  been  explained  it  follows, 
that  if  promife  and  confent  refpectively  produce  perfect 

right 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  243 

right  and  obligation,  both  the  one  and  the  other  hiuft 
be  fupported  by  certain  adfcs  from  which  thefe  effects 
refpectively  rcfult. 

That  act  which  the  promifee  performs  in  confequence 
of  his  confent,  in  order  to  have  a  perfect  right  in  the 
thing  promifed,  is  called  acceptance. 

An  act  that  produces  fuch  a  right  mufr.  be  lawful ; 
but  no  acl,  whatever  its  other  qualities  may  be,  can  be 
lawful,  that  is  to  fay,  can  be  a  mean  by  which  we  law- 
fully acquire  a  perfect  right  in  what  is  another's  own, 
except  he  confents  to  it,  and  confequently  fupports  his 
promife  by  an  additional  act,  declarative  of  his  acquie- 
scence in  the  acceptance  of  the  promife.  Such  an  act 
on  the  part  of  the  promifer  is  called  transfer,  hccaufe 
his  will,  fupported  by  an  act  of  his  own,  is  a  fufHcient 
caufe  why  the  other  mould  have  compenfation  for  the 
trouble  he  has  taken  in  performing  acts  which  the  pro- 
mifer has  encouraged,  and  by  fubfequent  confent  has 
directed  and  appointed :  for  the  powers  by  which  he 
thus  acted  were  his  own,  and  non-performance  on  the 
part  of  the  promifer  would  naturally  amount  to  a  dif- 
turbance  in  what  would  be  the  property  of  the  promifee, 
for  as  fuch  the  fruit  of  his  labour  rauft  be  conhdered. 

The  promife,  on  the  part  of  the  promifer,  with  re- 
fpect  to  the  acceptance,  is  conditional ;  as  if  he  were! 
faying,  if  any  perfon  does  fuch  a  thing,  I  will  give  him 
fuch  a  thing  for  his  own.  If  the  promife  is  addrefled 
to  a  particular  perfon,  it  may  be  called perfonai,  becaufe 
the  promifer  confents  to  a  certain  act  under  this  exprefs 
condition,  that  the  promifee  be  the  particular  agent 
thereof:  but  if  it  be  addreiTed  in  general  to  the  per- 
former of  a  fpecifled  act,  the  promife  is  real,  becauie  an\ 
author  of  that  act  is  the  promifee,  or  rather  the  acceptor. 


&44  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  act  fpecified  in  that  condi- 
tion is  performed,  the  performer,  according  to  the  tenor 
of  that  condition,  is  to  look  upon  the  thing  promifed 
as  Ins  own,  as  the  fruit  of  his  labour;  that  is,  he  has 
obtained  a  perfect  right  in  it,  and  the  promifer  is  under 
a  perfect  obligation  to  make  good  his  promife. 

Where,  therefore,  there  is  acceptance  with  the  con- 
fent  of  the  promifer,  there  acceptance  is  effectual,  and 
transfer  has  taken  place. 

Sck. — It  ought  to  be  particularly  obferved,  that  confent  on  the 
promifer's  part  is  moft  elTentially  necefiary  for  rendering 
acceptance  effectual ;  for,  as  the  owner,  he  has  a  right  to 
direct  the  things  promifed  as  he  pleafes,  and  to  fpecify 
the  conditions  upon  which  he  will  part  with  his  property; 
if  the  promife  is  perfonal,  no  other  but  the  perfon  de- 
fcribed  has  a  right  to  acceptance;  if  it  be  real,  no  one  has 
a  claim  as  acceptor  except  he  who  has  done  that  particu- 
larly fpecified  act  which  the  promifer  has  engaged  to  take 
as  an  acceptance:  for  inftance;  if  a  father  tells  his 
Vourigel!  fon  that  he  will  give  him  a  watch  if  he  learns 
his  catechifm  within  fuch  a  time,  can  the  fervant  in  the 
houfe  or  any  of  his  other  fons  claim  the  promife,  if  the 
requihtion  has  been  complied  with  by  either  of  them  r  or 
if  you  engage  that  any  perfon  who  mould  be  able  to  give 
vou  notice  of  a  certain  ftrayed  horfe  mail  have  fuch  a  furri 
of  money,  are  you  bound  to  pay  one  who  comes  and  gives 
notice  of  another  of  your  horfes  which  had  not  ftrayed  ? 
Certainly  not. 

By  ftipulations  are  underftood  particular  actions  or 
forms,  which  the  laws  or  cuftoms  of  a  country  or 
place  have  introduced  for  the  purpofe  of  taking  the 
place  of  thofe  acts  by  which  acceptance  and  transfer 
are  performed. 

Qcfc  i. — Stipulation  is  a  word  of  Pvoman  origin,  and  is  derived 
from  their  particular  cuftom  of  accompliihing  pa6ts  and 
contracts:  it  was  thus:  two  perfons  toOka  piece  of  flraw^ 
broke  it  in  two,  and  then  exchanged  pieces.  Thus  ac- 
ceptance was  made,  confent  to  it  given,  and  the  requilire 

a£ts 


JtfORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  245 

afts  performed,  both  on  tlie  part  of  the  prornifer  and  of 
the  promifee,  for  transferring  perfect:  right. 

&•//.  2. — In  dead  of  the  ftipulations  of  the  Romans,  the  modern 
Ki.ropeans  havte  introduced,  for  the  moil  common  tranf- 
aciions  of  life,  certain  words,  expreflions,  orfigns;  as, 

'tis  a  tvor  J— done — may  1  depend  upon  it  T — you  may — -jhaking 
hands — nodding^ftrikrng  ivith  a  hammer  at  vendue — -giving 
an  earnejt — ajking  the  price  at  markets  or  in  flores,  and  con- 
fent ing  to  this  price,  &c. 

Sch.  3. — -Since  the  art  of  writing  has  become  general,  the  fti- 
pulations  requiiite  in  the  more  important  occurrences  of 
life  muff  be  done  in  writing;  fome  are  confined  to  this 
alone,  others  require  hand  and  feal,  and  others  again  $ 
befides  thefe,  a  certain  number  of  witneffes. 

From  what  has  hitherto  been  explained  it  appears, 
that  effectual  acceptance  includes  promife,  confent,  ac- 
ceptance and  transfer ;  that  is  to  fay,  all  the  requisites 
neceffary  for  constituting  a  pact :  a  pa£l  may  therefore 
be  defined  to  be  a  promife  effectually  accepted. 

There  are  various  denominations  or  fpecies  of  pacts*, 
as,  treaties,  compacts,  contracts,  covenants,  agrees 
ments,  bargains,  fales,  &c. 

That  pact  is  faid  to  be  formal,  which  comprehends" 
promile,  acceptance  thereof,  and  the  promifer's  con- 
fen  t  to  the  acceptance. 

That  pact  is  informal^  where  a  conftructive  promife 
or  confent  takes  place. 

Explicit  pacts  are  fuch  as  contain  explicit  promife 
and  confent  •,  but  thofe  in  which  tacit  promife  or  con- 
fent takes  place,  are  called  tacit  pacts. 

Perfons  who  cannot  promife  or  confent  cannot  be 
parties  to  a  formal  pact,  whether  tacit  or  explicit. 

A  pact  is  void  when  either  promife  or  confent  is  not 
in  the  power  of  either  party. 

Sck. 


24-6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.' 

SlL — If  the  impoflibility  of  performance  has  been  known  by 
the  promifer,  or  if  it  has  been  wilfully  caufed  by  him  af- 
ter the  pact  has  been  concluded,  he  is  guilty  of  perfidy, 
fraud  and  injury. 

A  pad  wherein  either  the  promife  or  confent  is  un- 
lawful, is  invalid  and  unlawful. 

If  the  terms  of  a  pact  admit  of  different  conftruc- 
tions,  the  performance  is  to  be  made  in  the  fenfe  which 
the  promifer  apprehended  at  the  time  the  acceptor  re- 
ceived it. 

Sch. — Having  laid  down  the  three  requisites  for  a  formal  pact, 
to  wit,  promife,  acceptance,  and  confent  to  this  accept- 
ance, or  what  is  called  transfer,  it  ought  to  be  obferved, 
that  we  do  not  in  all  tranfaetions  find  them  always  dif- 
tinctly  exhibited,  fo  that  it  requires  fome  deliberation  to 
determine  who  is  the  promifer  or  acceptor;  as,  for  in- 
ifcmce,  in  ftores  and  markets:  the  goods  or  provifions  ex- 
hibited are  doubtlefs  promifed  on  condition  of  acceptance, 
that  is,  a  certain  price  flipulated:  the  buyer  confents  by 
afking  the  price,  and  fupporting  it  by  paying  what  is  re- 
quired, the  bargain  is  concluded. 

In  all  cafes,,  except  that  of  forfeiture,  where  we 
make  ufe  of  another's  property  without  his  confent  to 
our  acceptance,  we  are  chargeable  with  ufurpation. 

A  p'otefi  is  an  explicit  declaration  of  our  difient  to 
certain  proceedings,  and  a  fuitable  and  neceffarv  expe- 
dient for  the  prefervation  of  our  rights,  particularly  in 
thole  cafes  where  filence  might  be  conrtrued  into  tacit 
confent. 

Since  by  the  rtipulations  of  a  pact  the  promifer  has 
transferred  his  own  to  another,  inverting  him  with  a 
perfect  right  to  difpofe  thereof  as  he  fnall  pleafe,  it 
ibllows,  that  the  former  is  under  perfect  obligation  to 
perform  what  he  has  thus  promifed  and  aliened. 

Hence 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  247 

Hence  ft  likewife  follows,  that  the  acceptor  has  a 
perfect  right  to  demand,  and  in  cafe  of  refufal,  to  com* 
pel  performance. 

Pacts  extorted  by  unjuft  fear,  or  by  the  violence  of 
one  of  the  parties,  are  void  for  want  of  moral  confent ; 
but  if  that  fear  has  been  occafioned  by  perfons  who  are 
not  a  party,  or  who  are  not  in  collufion  with  one  of  the 
parties,  both  parties  have  acted  freely,  and  the  pact  is 
valid  and  binding;  for  a  fault  committed  by  a  third 
perfon  cannot  be  prejudicial  to  one  who  is  guiltlefs. 

The  duty  of  performing  pacts  has  reference  folely  to 
fuch  as  are  lawful  ;  for  illicit  plots,  or  unlawful  agree* 
ments  or  combinations,  deferve  not  that  honourable 
name. 

Sen. — To  form  an  eftimate  of  the  lawfulnefs  or  validity  of  a 
pacTr,  we  muft  particularly  attend  to  the  nature  of  the  pro- 
mife  and  confent,  both  with  refpec!  to  the  parties  and 
their  objecls. 

The  perfect  rights  and  obligations  refulting  from 

pacts,    are  called   paclitious.      Partitions   rights    are 

reckoned  among  the  perfonal  rights  of  men. 

If  the  promifer  makes  a  declaration  that  he  has 
changed  his  will,  be  is  faid  to  revoke;  but  as  fuch  a 
revocation  cannot  juftly  take  place  when  the  promife  is 
effectually  accepted  of,  except  by  the  confent  of  the 
acceptor,  it  follows,  that  pacts  are  irrevocable. 

Pacts  are  dirtinguifhed  into  obligatory ',  libcratory,  and 
mixt:  by  the  firft  an  obligation  is  constituted;  by  the 
fecond  a  fubiifting  obligation  is  done  away ;  by  the  laft 
a  new  obligation  is  fubftituted  in  the  place  of  one  for- 
merly fubfifting  between  the  parties. 

There  is  likewife  a  distinction  of  pacts  into  pure  and 
conditional;  thofe  pacts  are  conditional,  where  the  pro- 
mife 


2A.S  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

mife  is  made  with  the  exprefs  provifo  of  its  becoming 

binding  upon  a  future  event,  the  exiftence  of  which  is 

uncertain.     The  obligation  of  performance  in  a  coiirr 

ditional  pa<5fc  depends  upon  the  exiftence  of  an  uncer-? 

tain  event;  as,  for  inftance,  ten  years  hence  if  I  live, 

©r  when  I   fhall  enter  upon   a  certain  inheritance  of 

which  I  have  fome  expectation,  &c. 

Sch. — A  certain  event  does  not  make  a  pa£t  conditional  tiiougfy 
it  be  ever  fo  diftant. 

Pacts  made  upon  an  impoflible  condition  are  void : 
if  the  promifer  knew  the  impofTibility,  or  if  he  is  the 
caufe  thereof,  he  is  guilty  of  fraud. 

A  pact  to  which  no  exprefs  condition  is  annexed, 
Is  pure. 

PuYe  pacts  are  binding  immediately  upon  being 
concluded-,  the  conditional  only  when  the  condition 
takes  place. 

The  moft  notable  of  conditional  pacts  are  thofe 
which  come  under  one  of  thefe  forms :  do  ut  des,  io 
ut  facias,  facto  ut  des,  facio  ut  facias ;  that  is,  where 
the  parties  ftipulate  value  for  value,  value  for  work, 
work  for  value,  work  for  work-,  as,  money  for  goods 
or  for  victuals ;  money,  goods  or  provifions  for  labour 
or  fervices;  work,  labour  or  fervices  for  money  or 
goods  -,  work,  labour  or  fervice  for  another  kind  of 
work,  labour  or  lervice,  or  perhaps  for  the  fame  a£ 
another  time. 

Rights  are  temporary  or  perpetual :  the  former  are. 
redacted  with  refpect  to  time,  which  is  not  the  cafe 
with  the  latter. 

A  pact  by  which  temporary  rights  arc  transferred, 
ceafes  when  thole  rights  expire,  though   no    exprefs 

conditio!! 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  £49 

condition  be  annexed.  Parents,  for  inftance,  have  no 
right  to  bind  their  children  beyond  the  term  of  their 
minority:  an  indenture,  whether  conditioned  or  un- 
conditioned, has  no  binding  force  when  the  term  of 
minority  expires. 

He  who  is  obligated  by  a  pact  to  expedite  the  affairs 
of  another,  is  called  a  mandatary •,  whilfr.  the  latter  is 
filled  his  principal. 

No  one  can  claim  the  right  or  trufl  of  a  mandatary 
who  cannot  make  it  appear  that  certain  affairs  are  fpe- 
cifically  committed  to  his  care;  becaufe  the  principal's 
confent  muft  be  fuppofed,  and  there  is  no  fuch  thing  as 
univerfal  confent. 

As  the  mandatary,  by  undertaking  the  commifTion 
of  the  affairs  of  another,  is  under  a  perfect  obligation 
to  fulfil  his  charge;  (o  the  principal  has  a  perfect  ri^ht 
to  compel  fuch  commifTion,  and  in  cafe  of  non-per- 
formance or  mal-practice,  to  recover  damages. 

A  commijjioner  is  mandatary  in  all  that  is  fpecificaJly 
cntrufted  to  his  care,  and  the  principal  is  refponfible  for 
whatever  he  does  in  purfuance  of  this  truft,  but  is  clear 
of  all  whereby  it  is  exceeded. 

Sch. — The  fpecific  powers  are  either  explicitly  determined  bv 
credentials,  instructions,  &c.  or  are  deduced  from  tacit  or 
conftruftive  confent,  as  they  reft  upon  the  cufiom  or 
general  practice  of  tranfactions  of  that  kind,  or  flow  from 
the  nature  of  the  truft  itfelf. 

A  principal  may  conclude  valid  pacts  with  others 
by  the  agency  of  his  mandatary;  for  the  moral  and 
principal  caufe  can  produce  effects  by  others. 

Pacts  concluded  with  a  mandatary,  in  the  name  of 
his  principal,  are  binding  upon  the  latter  in  all  that  the 

K  k  former 


25O  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

former  has  done  in  virtue  of  fpecific  powers  for  that 
purpofe. 

There  are  fome  rights  transferred,  which,  in  their 
nature  or  under  particular  circumftances,  involve  the 
right  of  a  mandatary  •,  that  is  to  fay,  imply  fpecific 
truft:  what,  therefore,  a  perfon  does  in  purfuance  of 
fuch  rights,  is  as  binding  on  his  principal  as  if  he  had 
given  a  fpecial  commirTion  for  the  purpofe ;  as,  a  ge- 
neral in  procuring  fupplies,  furrendering  fortifications, 
confenting  to  a  temporary  armiftice,  &c.  a  fervant  fent 
abroad  with  a  waggon,  coach,  &c.  in  having  neceffary 
repairs  made,  &c. 

Pads  are  diftinguifhed  into  unilateral  and  bilateral. 
In  the  former  there  is  but  one  promifer,  and  acceptance 
is  juftly  fuppofed,  becaufe  no  reciprocal  engagement  is 
required.  Of  this  kind  of  pads  are  laft  will  and  tefta- 
ment,  legacies  and  donations,  which  for  this  reaibn 
have  obtained  the  name  of  gratuitous  paffs.  To  this 
kind  of  pads  likewife  moral ifts  refer  commirTions  un- 
dertaken gratuitoufly,  gratuitous  loans  for  ufe,  gratui- 
tous keeping  of  the  goods  of  others,  &c. 

In  bilateral  pads  there  is  reciprocal  promife,  confent, 
acceptance  and  transfer.  Acceptance  and  transfer  can- 
not here  be  fuppofed,  but  are  required  by  virtue  of 
perfed  right  in  both  parties.  Of  this  kind  of  pads 
are  treaties,  compadts,  contrads,  &c.  which  for  this 
reafon  are  called  onerous^  becaufe  fomething  is  required 
on  both  fides. 

There  may  be  pads  of  more  than  two  parties ;  for 
inftance,  the  triple  and  quadruple  alliances  recorded  in 
hiitory ;  the  combination  of  the  powers  of  Europe,  fo 
much  the  topic  of  converfation  at  this  time,  &c. 

Faditious 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  25I 

Factitious  rights  and  obligations  may  ceafe  in  various 
ways. 

In  a  conditional  pact  the  obligation  ceafes  when  the 
condition  becomes  impoflibLe. 

In  any  other  pad,  when  the  paditious  right  is  re- 
mitted. 

Pads  are  dijfolved  when  both  parties  remit  their  re- 
ciprocal paditious  rights:  the  diffolution  then  pro- 
ceeds from  mutual  confcnt. 

Perfidy  in  one  of  the  parties  to  a  bilateral  pad  frees 
the  other  from  obligation,  if  he  chufes  to  avail  himfelf 
of  that  expedient ;  if  he  is  otherwife  inclined,  the  pad 
is  ftill  binding  on  the  perfidious  party,  who  is  liable  to 
profecution  and  bound  to  make  reparation. 

In  a  matrimonial  contrad  there  are  various  caufes, 
both  with  refped  to  its  nature  and  tendency,  which 
render  it  indiflbluble  even  by  the  mutual  confent  of 
the  parties* 


k  AxvJ* 


PART     II. 


Sect.  II.    Comprehending  natural  jurifprudence. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Of  rights  in  things. 


w. 


E  are  faid  to  difpofe  of  things,  if  we  determine, 
by  an  act  of  our  will,  the  mode  and  manner  in  which 
they  are  to  be  ufed  by  others. 

Sck. — Thus  we  difpofe  of  lands,  of  houfes,  provifions,  ap- 
parel, &c.  if  we  fell,  leafe,  exchange,  or  make  a  prefent 
of  them,  &c. 

Thole  who  have  not  the  exercife  of  understanding, 
cannot  fignify  their  will  in  the  moral  fenfe  of  the  term, 
and  are  confequently  incapable  to  difpofe  of  things. 

Sch.  i. — In  the  forum  of  nature,  children  cannot  difpofe  of 
things  of  importance  before  they  arrive  to  years  of  dif- 
cretion ;  and  as  this  may  take  place  fooner  or  later  with 
refpect  to  different  individuals,  the  civil  laws,  which  ex- 
hibit general  rules  for  human  conduct,  have  affigned  a 
determinate  number  of  years,  antecedent  to  which  no 
difpofitions  of  youth  are  binding  or  valid:  no  male  per- 
fon,  for  inftance,  can  convey  landed  property  before  a 
certain  age,  though  he  may  lawfully  make  a  prefent  of 
fomething  belonging  to  his  perfonal  eftate,  &c. 

Sch.  i. — Lunatics,  madmen,  perfons  not  compos  mentis,  or  de- 
ranged in  their  minds  by  a  frantic  fit  of  ficknefs,  cannot 
make  any  valid  difpofitions  as  long  as  they  are  in  that 
ftate  of  natural  imbecility. 

Sch. 


Z'ji  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sch.  3. — Neither  can  fuch  difpofitions  be  lawful  where  the 
things  difpofed  of  are  in  themfelves  unlawful,  or  not 
our  own. 

Sck.  4. — Things  our  own  and  lawful  in  themfelves,  cannot 
render  a  difpofition  of  them  lawful  when  it  is  made  for  a 
bad  end ;  for  in  this,  as  well  as  in  the  two  preceding  cafes, 
we  have  not  a  moral  poflibiiity  to  wilL 

If  we  may  lawfully  difpofe  of  things,  we  are  faid  to 
have  a  right  in  them. 

The  things  of  which  we  may  difpofe  are  either  the 
actions  of  men,  or  the  necefTaries  and  conveniencies  of 
life,  and  what  contributes  thereto :  in  the  former  cafe 
our  right  is  ftiled  a  right  in  perfons  -,  in  the  latter,  a 
right  in  things. 

Sch. — Rights  in  things  are  diftinguifned  into  real  and  perform I: 
the  former  have  refpect  to  things  which  cannot  be  carried 
out  of  their  places,  as  lands  and  tenements ;  the  latter  take 
place  in  fuch  things  as  may  attend  the  owner's  peribn 
wherever  he  thinks  proper  to  go;  as,  money,  goods, 
horfes,  waggon,  utenfils,  furniture,  &c. 

Of  whatever  defcription  things  may  be,  there  are 
various  ways  in  which  they  may  be  difpofed  of  j  for 
things  have  their  fubitauces,  and  from  thefe  fubftances 
various  emoluments  may  be  drawn,  and  each  of  them 
may  be  difpofed  of  for  various  ends,  and  under  a  va- 
riety of  reftrictions ;  fo  that  it  would  be  an  endlefs 
work  to  enter  upon  all  the  particulars  which  laws  and 
cuftoms  have  introduced  concerning  the  nature  and 
modifications  of  the  rights  in  things,  and  in  confe- 
quence  of  them  have  been  and  for  the  moft  part  are 
jftill  in  vog-ue. 

We  mail  here  principally  confine  ourfelves  to  the 
consideration  of  the  right  of  property,  of  ufe,  and  of 
ufufruet,  and  the  right  of  coniuming  the  fubftanceof 
things. 

We 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY*  255 

,  We  have  the  right  of  property  in  a  thing,  when  we 

may  difpofe  of  its  fubftance  and  all  other  uies. 

Sch. — Thus  a  perfon  has  a  right  of  property  in  an  orchard, 
when  he  may  difpofe  of  the  trees  and  of  their  produce, 
and  when  he  can  extend  his  right  of  difpofal  to  the  de- 
struction of  the  trees  or  of  their  produce. 

In  the  right  of  property  we  may  diftinguifh  the 
moral  pofhbility  of  acting,  from  the  act  itfelf ;  a  perfon 
may  have  a  right,  and  not  exercife  it  of  his  own  accord, 
or  be  debarred  from  that  exercife  by  a  reftriction  in 
his  right.  This  is  what  moralifts  denote  when  fpeak- 
ing  of  a  right  in  afttiprimo  and  a  right  in  aftu  fecundo. 
Both  thefe  acts  together  constitute  perfect:  dominion, 
jiri  ft  property  1  where  one  may  difpofe  of  it  as  he  pleafes* 
in  a  manner  ccnfiftent  with  the  law  of  nature.  Im- 
perfect dominion,  on  the  contrary,  is  reftricted  with 
refpect  to  the  exercife  of  fuch  an  unlimited  difpofal ; 
as  is  the  cafe  with  minors,  who  by  law  or  devife  arc 
proprietors  of  an  eftate,  which  is  under  the  manage- 
ment of  others  until  they  become  of  age. 

Where  the  right  of  property  and  the  exercife  thereof 
are  in  different  perfons,  there  a  right  of  commonry 
refults,  extending  to  the  exclufion  of  all  others  from 
difpofing  both  of  fubftance  and  emoluments. 

When  the  right  of  property  and  the  exercife  thereof 
are  in  feveral  hands,  each  party  thus  interefted  mav 
exclude  all  thofe  who  have  no  intereft  in  it  from  dif- 
pofing of  the  iubftance  and  emoluments  :  but  copart- 
ners may  exclude  one  another  only  from  the  difpofal  of 
the  fubftance  and  from  hindrance  in  their  actual  ufes: 
a  tree,  for  inftance,  may  be  common  property,  and 
each  may  take  the  benefit  of  its  fhade ;  but  a  partner 
occupying  a  particular  fpot,  has  the  exclusive  right  to 
it  as  long  as  it  is  occupied  by  him. 

erions 


7$6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

PeiTons  having  a  ftricl:  right  of  property  in  a  thing 
may  retain  its  fubftance,  if  it  is  inconfumable  property, 
and  difpofe  of  the  emoluments  under  various  reftric- 
tions:  if  the  emoluments  are  for  the  own  and  proper 
ufe  of  the  party  to  whom  the  proprietor  has  conveyed 
the  property,  his  right  is  called  ufufruti,  and  he  him- 
felf  the  ufufruffuary ;  if  it  is  conveyed  for  the  benefit 
of  another,  he  has  the  right  of  ufe,  and  is  {tiled  the 
ufuary.  However,  as  we  do  not  intend  to  enter  upon 
particulars,  we  mall  hereafter  call  all  rights  in  the 
emoluments  of  things,  rights  of  ufe. 

In  cafes  where  the  ufe  or  ufufrucl:  cannot  be  drawn 
from  the  property  without  the  deftruction  or  con-* 
fumption  of  the  fubftance,  the  right  of  ufe  and  ufufrucl 
implies  the  right  of  confuming  the  fubftance. 

Sch. — We  cannot  make  ufe  of  fait,  flour,  &c.  without  con- 
fuming  the  fubftances  of  thofe  things:  we  fhould  draw 
but  indifferent  profits  from  a  rented  farm,  if  we  might 
nor  cut  the  limber  rieceflary  for  fences,  houfes,  fire- 
wood, &c. 

As  tht  rights  of  ufe,  ufufrucl  and  confumption  flow 
from  the  ftricl:  right  of  property,  it  follows,  that  things 
which  admit  not  of  an  exclufive  right  of  u{e,  ufufrucl: 
or  confumption,  are  not  fubjects  of  the  right  of  pro- 
perty; that  is,  no  property  can  be  had  in  them;  as, 
the  open  fea  to  a  certain  diftance  from  fhore,  inexhauf- 
tible  fisheries  which  fuch  fea  affords,  the  air,  &c. 

Ke  who  has  the  ftricl:  right  of  property  may  difpofe 
of  the  fabftance  and  its  emoluments  as  he  pleafes,  be- 
caufe  all  are  his  own.  What  is  commonly  laid,  that  a 
proprietor  in  difpofing  of  his  property  is  refponfible 
only  to  God  and  his  own  conference,  is  fo  far  true  as 
that  difpofition  is  confident  with  the  general  good  of 

mankind, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2.57 

mankind,  but  not  further;  for,  though  a  proprietor 
has  a  right  to  difpofe  of  his  property  as  he  pleafes,  (lilt 
he  ought  not  to  be  pleafed  with  any  thing  that  is  con- 
trary to  natural  laws  :  the  right  of  property  is  limited 
as  well  as  all  other  rights  of  men,  and  in  cafes  of  colli* 
fion,  mud  give  way  to  weightier  obligations  and  rights. 
It  is  the  eftablifhed  order  of  nature,  that  all  men  have 
their  fubfiftence  from  the  contents  and  produce  of  the 
earth  5  there  cannot,  therefore,  be  a  natural  right  to  fe$ 
up  an  ownership,  or  to  difpofe  of  the  things  of  the 
earth  in  a  manner  contradictory  to  the  general  good  of 
mankind :  nay,  a  right  of  property,  a  right  to  difpofe 
of  things  as  we  pleafe,  ceafes  to  be  natural  as  foon  as  it 
is  inconiiftent  with  the  general  rights  of  mankind, 

ScL  1. — Hence  it  may  be  feen,  that  perfons  may,  confidently 
with  the  principles  of  natural  law,  make  difpefidons  or* 
their  property  and  other  rights,  which  take  effect  after 
their  deatn.  in  behalf  of  their  children  and  neareft  rela* 
tives  and  friends;  becaufe  fuch  difjpofitions  are  perfectly 
confident  with  the  general  rights  and  obligations  o£  man- 
kind, and  are  required  by  that  dutv  of  love  which  nature 
has  enjoined  to  men  in  that  intimate  relation, 
Cch.  2. — -A  difpofition,  on  the  contrary,  by  entailment,  is  un» 
natural,  becaufe  it  is  inconfiftent  with  that  love,  fince  tha 
difpofer  fuiFers  himfelf  to  be  fwayed  by  unnatural  par-* 
tiaiity,  and  lays  the  foundation  of  fervitude  and  domina- 
tion, of  ft  rife  and  difcord,  among  his  own  houflio'.d, 
among  the  children  of  one  father,  among  natural  bre-> 
thren.  In  order  to  render  one  independent,  he  makes 
the  reft  of  his  children  dependent,  and  throws  them  upon 
the  public:  he  is  not  prompted  by  love  to  his  children  or 
country,  but  by  an  ambition  that  proves  injujjous  to 
both. 
Sch.  3.— -It  ought  to  be  obferved,  that  unlimited  andsxclufiva 
right  in  things,  mentioned  in  the  fequel,  is  always  to 
be  underftood  under  this  limitation,  that  it  muft  be  con-* 
fiftent  with  the  order  of  nature,  and  of  confequence  witl; 
the  eternal  principles  of  natural  law.. 

L  1  As 


2 § 3  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

As  the  proprietor  is  vefted  with  a  perfect  and  ex- 
clusive right,  with  refpect  to  the  fubftance  and  emolu- 
ments of  his  property,  lb  all  the  rights  which  he  con- 
veys are  of  a  perfect  and  exclufive  nature. 

If,  therefore,  he  has  once  conveyed  any  right  con- 
nected with  his  property,  thofe  perfons  who  are  vefted 
therewith  have  not  only  a  right  to  exclude  others,  but 
even  the  proprietor  himfelf,  from  interfering  in  their 
refpective  rights.  It  is  on  this  account  that  not  only 
common  converfation,  but  even  treatifes  on  the  fubject 
of  rights  in  things,  attribute  to  the  rights  of  ufufruct, 
of  ufe,  and  of  many  other  kinds  of  tenures,  the  name 
of  property. 

At  this  rate,  the  ufufructuary  has  a  right  of  property 
ill  the  ufufrucl:,  the  ufuary  in  the  ufe,  &c. 

As  the  proprietor  is  injured  if  the  ufuary  or  ufu- 
fructuary wafte  his  fubftance  in  an  unneceflary  manner, 
fo  the  latter  may  be  injured  by  the  proprietor,  when 
hindered  from  the  fubftance  abfolutely  necefTary  for 
the  exercife  of  their  refpective  rights:  befides  this, 
they  have  a  peremptory  right  to  exclude  the  proprietor 
and  all  others  from  interference  in  the  emoluments  to 
which  their  rights  entitle  them. 

As  the  right  of  property  is  immediately  connected 
with  the  right  of  pojfeffion,  the  right  of  reclaiming  pof- 
fejjion^  when  others  unjuftly  retain  propery  for  their 
own  ufe,  and  the  right  of  alienation  \  fo  are  the  one 
or  the  other,  or  both  of  the  former,  connected  per 
fe  with  the  rights  of  ufe  and  ufufruct,  when  the 
emoluments  cannot  be  drawn  without  poffeftion,  but 
not  otherwife:  the  right  of  alienation  cannot  extend 
farther  than  their  rights  extend,  and  it  is  poflible  that 

the 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  2$$ 

the  proprietor  has  granted  thofe  rights  under  the  ex- 

prefs  reftriction  that  they  fhould  not  be  transferred. 

Sch. — If  a  farm  is  rented  to  a  perfon  and  his  affigns,  he  can 
alienate  the  ufufruct  as  far  as  it  is  given  him  and  for  the 
term  of  his  leafe:  but  if  affigns  are  not  expreflly  men- 
tioned, the  civil  laws  will  not  permit  the  right  of  aliena- 
tion, becaufe  fuch  things  ought  to  be  expreflly  ftipulated 
for  the  prefervation  of  peace  in  the  community  ;  while, 
on  the  contrary,  natural  law  would  permit  fuch  alie- 
nations as  far  as  they  are  not  prejudicial  or  injurious  to 
the  proprietor. 

With  refpeet  to  the  various  tenures  of  rights  in 
things,  thofe  authors  may  be  confulted  who  have  ex- 
prefsly  treated  of  them.  So  much  feems  necefiary  to 
be  here  obferved,  that  all  thofe  rights  which  are  in 
vogue  amongft  Europeans,  are  of  a  feudal  complexion, 
with  this  difference,  that  the  fmaller  parcels  of  landed 
property  are  held  for  the  confederations  of  rent,  or  part 
of  the  produce,  when  the  more  extenfive  poflefnons  are 
in  the  ancient  form  of  fer vices. 

By  the  feudal  fyftem,  the  conqueror,  in  whofe  place 
modern  times  have  fubftituted  the  higheft  authority  in 
a  ftate,  conveyed  property  under  a  certain  refervation 
of  right.  He  obtained  the  appellation  of  Lord  Para- 
mount: the  latter  was  (tiled  fimply  Lord,  or  VaJJal. 

Sch.  i. — When  the  King  of  Great-Britain  had  jurifdictioa  over 
the  country  now  the  United  States  of  America,  he  gave 
whole  provinces  to  certain  proprietors,  referving  to  him- 
felf  and  his  fucceflbrs  a  pepper  corn,  a  beaver  (kin,  &c. 
as  an  acknowledgment  of  his  foyereignly  and  their  de- 
pendence: the  dependent  lords  parted  in  a  fimilar  mannei- 
with  their  property,  for  a  certain  confideration  and  for  an 
annual  quit-rent.  Our  flate  referves  all  mines  and  pre- 
cious metals,  &c. 

Sch.  2. — The  feveral  manors  which  are  extant  in  the  United 
States,  and  the  thoufand  lordfhips  which  are  in  embryo 
and  threaten  this  wsftern  world  of  freemen  with  tenantry 

an<4 


.CO  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  dependence,  make  it  worthy  the  attention  of  fotfttf 
able  pen,  a  friend  of  mankind,  to  bring  to  public  view 
the  fatal  confluences  of  feudal  laws  and  cufforos.  Of 
freeholders  it  may  be  faid  what  Virgil  extends  to  the  ufe* 
ful  clafs  of  hufoandmen  in  generai: 

"  0!  nimium  fortunaios,  fua  fi  bona  ncrint, 
il  Agricolas 

Sch.  3. — Thofe  who  cannot  be  freeholders,  and  of  corfe- 
quence  are  tenants,  might  live  free  and  independent  as 
well  as  the  former  in  this  country,  where  all  citizens  are 
on  an  equal  footing,  if,  as  the  poet  fays,  they  knew 
their  advantages;  if  they  would  fer  a  proper  value  upon 
their  rights  of  citizenfhip,  and  not,  like  Efau,  fell  them 
for  a  fmile  of  their  landlord.  Is  it  not  fu  indent  that 
you  pay  your  rent  and  make  good  what  the  proprietor  of 
the  foil  has  a  right  to  demand?  Should  you  deliver  up 
to  him  your  rights  of  thinking  and  of  enuring  for  your- 
selves? Indignant  boaft!  that  men  peremptorily  pro- 
claim that  they  can  procure  fo  many  hundred  votes  at  an 
election;  that  another  fpeaks  of  his  great  influence,  &c. 
Let  every  freeman  learn  to  know  his  own  importance  j 
let  him  learn  to  know  his  rights;  let  free  Americans  learn 
to  fcorn  the  man  who  pretends  to  influence  at  the  price 
of  their  own  character:  for  what  is  the  man  who  fuffers 
himfeif  to  be  fwayed  and  led  as  others  think  proper? 
T  anfwer,  fo  little  a  freeman,  that,  in  fnch  iniiances,  he 
renders  it  doubtful  whether  he  is  a  free  or  a  moral  agent* 


CHAPTER  IL 

Of  the  originary  mode  of  acquiring  rights  in  things 
efpecially  the  right  of  property. 

JL  HERS  cannot  indeed  be  fitch  a  thing  as  ftrift 
property  by  a  right  derived  from  nature  considered  in 
itfelf;  for  prefuppofing  here  what  may  be  clearly  (ten 
hy  reafon,  and  is  exprefsly  declared  by  fcripture,  that 

the 


".•ORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  l6l 

the  earth  and  the  various  kinds  of  the  produce  there- 
of are  proximately  deftined  by  the  creator  and  preferver 
of  the  whole  univerfe  for  the  ufe  of  man-,  frill  there 
is  nothing,  either  in  the  nature  of  men  or  in  that  of 
things,  which  warrants  that  fole  and  perfect  dominion 
which  one  man  claims  and  exercifes  over  the  things  of 
this  world  exclttfive  of  the  right  of  others. 

All  that  can  be  inferred  from  both  thefe  fources  is, 
that  the  individuals  of  the  human  race,  as  thev  have 
the  fame  nature,  labour  under  the  fame  neceflities  and 
wants,  and  feel  the  fame  defires,  have  an  equal  right 
in  the  fubflance  and  ufes  of  all  thofe  things  which  are 
provided  by  the  Moft  High  for  the  necefiary  fupport 
of  their  exiitence  on  earth,  or  which  are  calculated  to 
afford  them  the  conveniences  of  life. 

Men,  therefore,  confidered  in  their  abfolute  focial 
ftate,  as  fellow  citizens  of  the  earth,  have  a  natural 
right  of  commonry,  where  no  man  may  exclude  others 
in  a  defpotic  manner  from  occupying  the  fubflance  of 
things,  or  from  ufing  their  emoluments,  except  it  be 
in  confequence  of  fuch  reftrictions  as  flow  from  the 
invariable  order  of  nature,  eflahlimed  by  the  infinite 
wifdorri  and  power  of  God,  whofe  will  is  the  fupreire 
law  for  the  regulation  of  the  conduct  of  men,  in  the  ufe 
they  make  of  thofe  things  which  the  heavenly  Father 
hath  been  pleafed  to  place  under  their  dominion  and 
direction. 

As  according  to  that  order  of  nature  men  fuccefiively 
fee  the  light  of  the  world,  fo  the  laws  of  nature  re~ 
fulting  from  that  wife  efiabii  lament  of  the  fovereign 
Lord  of  the  univerfe,  do  not  permit  a  fucceeding  gene- 
ration to  occupy  what  is  already  occupied,  to  deffroy 

the 


262  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  labour  and  work  of  their  predecefTors,  or  to  inter- 
rupt the  peaceable  ufe  and  pofTeflion  of  thofe  things 
upon  which  they  have  beflowed  their  diligence  and 
care ;  for  fuch  a  conduct  would  be  palpably  wrong  and 
injurious. 

Hence  it  evidently  appears,  that  there  is  an  exclufive 
Tight,  which  refults  from  the  order  and  nature  of  things, 
by  which  the  firft  occupant  may  exclude  others  from 
oppofing  him  in  the  ufe  and  pofTeffion  of  thofe  things 
which  he  has  occupied,  as  long  as  this  ufe  and  occu- 
pancy laft. 

Sc/i. — The  hiftory  of  the  world  informs  us,  that  there  has  been 
property  in  things  moveable,  when  the  earth  was  yet 
confidered  as  a  common,  and  all  men  equally  entitled  to 
its  produce.  Thus  Abraham  claimed  property  in  a  well, 
becaufe  he  had  digged  it. 

But,  when  objects  of  occupancy  became  fcarce,  fuch 
tranfient  property  could  not  fecure  the  peace  of  man- 
kind :  when  the  wants  of  the  children  of  men  became 
multiplied,  it  was  found  neceflary  to  make  the  foil  it- 
felf  fixed  and  permanent  property  •,  by  means  of  which 
one  peribn  mip;ht  convey  to  another  the  fruits  of  his 
labour  and  induftry,  or  a  father  transfer  his  right  to  his 
children,  &c. 

Thus,  from  the  natural  right  which  each  man  has 
in  the  fruits  of  his  labour  and  induftry,  flows  his  ex- 
clufive right  in  the  very  fubftance  improved  by  his 
labour  and  particular  care,  and  hence  it  fufficiently 
appears  why  he  rather  mould  difpofe  thereof  than 
another. 

The  right  of  ftrict  property  is  therefore  hypotheti- 
cally  natural  -,  that  is  to  fay,  depends  upon  fome  par- 
ticular act  cr  deed  of  the  firft  occupiers  and  things 

thus 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  363 

thus  appropriated  to  his  own  ufe  are  exelufively  his 
own,  till  fuch  time  as  he  does  Tome  other  act  by  which 
he  mews  his  intention  to  abandon  itj  that  is,  leaves 
property  in  the  ftate  in  which  it  was  before  occupation, 
or  till  it  counteracts  the  general  good  cf  mankind. 

Sch.  1. — There  is  no  doubt  but  the  method  of  one  man's 
abandoning  his  property,  and  another  feizing  the  vacant 
pofleffion,  if  ever  it  had  place,  did  not  long  fubfift  in 
fact,  not  only  becaufe  a  pofTeflbr  of  property  would  find 
it  more  eligible  to  exchange  his  improvements  for  an 
equivalent,  and,  in  coniequence  thereof,  would  chufe 
to  transfer  them  by  grant,  fale  and  conveyance,  rather 
than  to  relinquifh  them;  but  more  principally  becaufe 
the  powerful  motives  of  that  particular  affection  which 
is  the  natural  effect  of  the  ties  of  blood  between  parents 
and  children  forbid  a  conduct  fo  incongruous  to  that 
tender  relation. 
To  affert  that  the  occupant  abandons  his  property  by  death, 
is  to  allow  to  that  king  of  terrors  rather  too  much  power: 
it  is  true,  death  feparates  the  owner  from  his  pofisfiions, 
but  cannot  feparate  the  effects  of  tendernefs  and  love 
which  a  parent  feels  for  his  children,  or  defeat  the  rights 
naturally  refulting  from  the  tender  ties  of  that  intimate 
connection.  Who  fhould  have  a  greater  claim  to  the 
fruits  of  the  labour  of  parents,  than  thofe  for  whofe  ad- 
vantage they  find  both  the  greateft  incitement  and  plea- 
sure to  undergo  any  fatigue  and  arduous  undertaking? 
Death  cannot  take  away  the  intention  of  moral  agents ; 
and  that  father  who  dies  without  an  intention  that  his 
chilcrren  fhould  be  veffed  with  rights  in  his  things,  does 
not  die  as  a  father,  or  his  children  have  forfeited  that 
amiable  name  by  enormous  a£ts  of  difobedience  and 
ingratitude. 

The  objection,  that  if  a  father,  cr  any  perfcn,  ha  a1  a  right  to 
difpofe  of  Jus  acquiftions  one  moment  heynvd  his  life,  he  alfo 
would  have  a  right  to  direfl  their  difpojalfor  a  million  of  ages 
after  him,  and  the  abfurdiiy  and  inconfjlency  dreaded  from 
fuch  a  right,  appear  to  us  to  have  more  fpecioufnels  than 
force ;  for  there  is  a  great  rationality  in  that  difpofition. 
As  it  is  the  prerogative  of  our  nature  to  have  a  profpeel: 

into 


fcd^  Moral  philosophy. 

into  futurity,  fo  mod  of  ov.r  deareft  interefts  He  that 
way.  Suppofe  a  man  had  engaged,  by  pact,  to  conlent 
to  a  transfer  at  a  certain  n\ed  term,  fay  fix,  twelve,  £rc, 
months  to  come;  fuppofe  death  to  have  terminated  that 
man's  exigence,  does  the  right  of  the  other  therebv 
ceafe  ?  can  death  difTblve  the  eternal  laws  of  juftice?  If 
a  perfon  makes  a  wife  and  rational  difpofition  for  the  be- 
nefit  of  his  neareft  and  deareft  friends,  he  follows  the 
dictates  of -natural  laws,  and  does  what  every  man  feels 
an  inclination  to  do;  he  provides  for  thofe  whom  he  by 
nature  is  bound  to  love  before  all  other  perfons;  he  does 
not  fta.no  upon  a  level  with  the  indifcreet  and  foolifh 
man  who  builds  difpofitions  in  the  air,  makes  and  does 
not  make  difpofition;  for  inch  would  be  difpofitions,  if 
they  fhould  compafs  even  a  term  far  lefs  than  a  million 
of  ages.  Difpofitions,  it  mould  be  thought,  muft  have 
a  fpecific  object ;  and  can  a  perfon  know  whether  at  fuch  a 
diftance  of  time  any  of  his  pofterity  will  exift?  So  much 
is  certain,  that  by  the  difpofition  of  a  deceafed  no  perfon 
is  injured,  if  that  difpofition  was  lawfully  made  in  his  life-, 
time;  if .  otherwife,  it  ceafed  before  death  clofed  the 
career  of  the  difpofer. 

v,  is  it  not  generally  the  cafe,  as  parents  provide  for 
their  children,  that  thefe  again  provide  for  them  in  the 
davs  of  their  infirmity  ?  Do  not  children  befrow  their 
labour  and  care  upon  things  in  which  their  parents  have 
their  rights,  and  thus  mingle  that  which  is  naturally  their 
own  with  the  property  of  their  parents?  Can  it  be, 
that  they  fhould  have  no  other  natural  right  than  that 
of  being  the  firfi  occupants?  At  this  rate,  death  would 
not  only  rob  the  dead,  but  the  living  alfo  o£  their  natu- 
ral right. 
Cch.  i. — The  affertion,  that  ail  property  mujl  ceafe  upon  the  death 
of  a  perfon,  cannot  hold  good  with  refpect  to  uifpofitions 
which  are  made  in  his  life-time,  for  this  very  reafon,  that 
men  cannot  be  conlidered  as  abfolute  individuals,  but  are 
fellow  citizens  of  the  world,  naturally  dependent  upon 
one  another  for  mutual  duties  and  happinefs,  though,  in 
the  flrict  fenfe  of  the  term,  unconnected  with  civil fpciety. 
We  need  not  curtail  men  of  their  deareft  natural  rights  in 
order  to  fhew  the  unnatural  tendency  of  entailments  and 
feudal  tenures;  for  the  injuftic©  of  fuch  inftitutions  is 

Efficiently 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY*  2% 

fufficiently  manifeft  from  this  particular,  that  they  are 
repugnant  to  the  general  rights  of  mankind. 
Thofe  civil  inftitutions,  therefore,  come  neareft  to  the  duties 
of  natural  law,  which  order  the  property  of  parents  to 
devolve  upon  their  children  in  equal  proportions,  be- 
caufe  they  are  equally  entitled  to  parental  care  and  affec- 
tion ;  they  alfo  very  wifely  leave  room  for  exprefs  difpo- 
fitions,  which  proprietors  may  make  in  their  life-time 
concerning  the  ufe  which  fhall  be  made  of  their  property- 
after  their  deceafe. 

Sck.  3.— -Whilft  we  allow  that  civil  inftitutions  and  municipal 
laws  have  reduced  the  rights  in  things  to  general,  fixed 
and  permanent  rules,  for  the  wife  purpofes  of  prefervino- 
the  peace  of  fociety,  an  object  highly  neceffary  and  de- 
firable;  we  maintain,  that  fuch  rules  ought  not  to  be  ar- 
bitrary, but  mould  be  the  refult  of  a  juft  and  wife  mo- 
dification of  the  natural  rights  of  men,  as  thefe  confti- 
tute  the  only  true  bafis  of  the  very  right  to  pr'efcribe  and 
enforce  fuch  rules  5  for  here  is  the  enquiry,  not  what  the 
municipal  laws  have  introduced,  but  whether  the  deter- 
minations thereof  are  founded  in  nature. 

Sch.  4.— We  need  only  to  attend  to  the  ufe  of  the  inftitution 
of  property,  as  laid  down  by  a  certain  author  on  morality, 
in  order  to  be  convinced  that  even  the  natural  law,  which 
commands  both  the  individual  and  the  public  happinefs 
of  mankind,  furnifhes  a  foundation  for  all  the  wife  and 
beneficial  regulations  which  civil  laws  have  adopted  for 
the  conduct  of  fociety.     According  to  him 

1.  Property  increafes  the  produce  of  the  earth; 

2.  It  preferves  the  produce  of  the  earth  to  maturity,, 

3.  It  prevents  contefts. 

4.  It  improves  the  conveniency  of  living,  add  encourage:. 
induftry,  the  arts,  agriculture  and  commerce;  it  melio- 
rates the  condition  of  mankind  in  general. 

Fide  Pakfs  Mm:  Phil  Book  iii.  Part  1.  ch,  2, 

Things  in  general  may  be  diftinguifhed  either  into 
property  or  commonry,  or  things  which  belono-  to 
no  perfon.  In  the  two  former  kinds,  certain  perfons* 
have  an  exclunVe  right  of  difpofal)  but  fuch  a  rio-hc 

M  m  finds 


l6S  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

finds  no  place  with  refpect  to  the  laft,  unlefs  forhe  aft 
or  deed  take  place,  from  which  an  exclusive  right 
may  refult;  that  is  to  fay,  from  which  may  be  under- 
flood  why  the  agent  mould  have  a  right  to  difpofe  of 
fuch  a  thing  rather  than  another. 

In  order,  therefore,  to  prove  that  we  have  acquired 
a  right  in  any  thing,  we  mull  in  the  firfl  place  make  it 
appear,  that  we  have  performed  a  certain  lawful  action 
towards  appropriating  it  to  our  own  ufe,  and,  fecondly, 
mew,  that  the  action  thus  performed  contains  a  fufri- 
cient  caufe  why  we  mould  have  it  for  our  own,  exclu- 
sive of  others. 

Actions  thus  performed  are  filled  modes  of  acquijt- 
tion  \  and  if  fuch  an  action  contains  a  fufficient  caufe 
of  an  appropriation  thereby  made,  it  is  faid  to  reft 
upon  a  good  title. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  without  a  lawful  mode  of 

acquisition  and  a  jufl  title,  no  right  in  things  can  be 

lawfully  acquired. 

Sch.  i. — A  robber  forcibly  againft  my  will  and  with  my  know- 
ledge appropriates  my  money;  but  he  has  no  right  of 
property  or  of  ufe  in  it,  becaufe  the  mode  of  acquisition 
is  unlawful — his  title  is  unjuft. 

Sch.  2. — I  buy  an  eftate,  which  is  encumbered  by  a  mortgage 
or  a  judgment,  give  my  money  for  it,  have  regular  con- 
veyances made;  the  mode  of  acquisition  is  lawful,  but 
the  title  is  unjuft,  for  my  purchafe  and  payment  contain 
not  a  fufficient  caufe  why  I  fhould  rather  difpofe  of  the 
eftate  than  thofe  who  had  an  intereft  in  it  before  my  pur- 
chafe. 

Sch.  3. — The  proof  of  our  right  in  things  refts  upon  fyllogiftic 

argumentation;  as, 
He  who  has  performed  fiieh  an  action  has  acquired  a  right 

in  fuch  a  particular  thing. 
The  perfon  N.  N.  has  performed  that  action; 
Therefore  N.  N.  has  a  right  in  that  thing. 

The 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHY.  26? 


The  firft  and  only  originary  mode  of  acquiring 
rights  in  things  is  by  way  of  occupancy,  by  which  we 
underftand  the  feizing  a  thing  belonging  to  no  body., 
with  an  intention  to  appropriate  it  for  our  own  ufe. 
Three  things,  therefore,  are  requisite  for  constituting 
a  title  by  occupancy :  Firft,  that  the  thing  which  is 
the  object  thereof  belong  to  no  body;  fecondly,  that 
the  occupier  have  the  intention  of  appropriating  it  to 
his  own  ufe-,  thirdly,  that  in  confequence  of  fuch  in- 
tention he  actually  takes  it  into  poSTeSTion. 

If  one  occupies  a  thing  belonging  to  no  perfon,  he 
thereby  commits  no  injury;  the  action  is  confequently 
lawful :  and  as  it  is  conceivable  from  that  very  action 
why  the  occupier  mould  difpoSe  of  the  object  of  his 
occupancy  rather  than  others,  who  either  were  igno- 
rant of  or  unconcerned  about  it,  the  occupier  has  a 
juft  title  for  his  appropriation. 

Occupancy,  therefore,  is  at  once  a  juft  mode  of 
acquisition,  and  a  juft  title. 

Sch. — Since  God,  by  creation  and  prefervation,  is  the  Sove- 
reign Lord  of  the  whole  Univerfe,  it  is  evident,  that  the 
originary  right  of  occupancy  has  only  reference  to  out* 
fellow-creatures;  but  if  refpect  be  had  to  God,  he  has 
the  originary  right,  and  occupancy,  by  certain  acts  of 
men,  is  of  a  derivative  nature.. 

Things  are  (aid  to  be  reHnqyiJbed,  when  the  occu- 
pier gives  up  his  intention  of  having  property  there- 
in, and,  in  confequence  thereof,  quits  the  pofieflicn  ; 
property,  thus  relinquished,  returns  to  the  original 
Stock  of  tilings  belonging  to  no  body,  and  of  confe- 
quence becomes  the  property  of  the  firft  occupant. 

But  it  is  not  fo  in  things  which  lie  wafte*  that  is, 
fuch  as  are  not  preferved  or  kept  as  things  of  that 

nature 


$6%  moral  philosophy. 

mature  require ;  for  here  is  a  defecl;  with  refpect  to 
pofTeiTion,  but  the  owner  has  not  given  up  his  inten- 
tion. Things  lying  wafle  continue,  therefore,  to  be 
property,  and  may  not  be  occupied. 

Sch. — A  plough  in  the  field,  a  waggon  in  a  wood,  where  the 
owner  is  accuftomed  to  fetch  his  fuel,  a  bee-hive  in  a 
yard,  &c.  do  not  lie  wafle ;  for  things  of  that  nature 
mult  be  k#pt  in  fuch  a  manner:  but  the  owner's  coat  lies 
wafle  when  it  is  in  the  field,  his  axe  when  that  lies  in  the 
woods,  the  bee- hive  when  it  is  placed  in  the  midfl  of  a 
high-way,  &c. 

Neither  can  occupancy  take  place  in  things  found 
which  were  loft ;  that  is,  whereof  the  owner  has  acci- 
dentally and  againft  his  will  ceafed  to  preferve  his 
pofTeilion,  for  he  retains  the  intention.  Things  found 
mufl:,  therefore,  be  reftored  to  the  owner  if  he  can 
be  known  :  confequently,  no  finder  has  a  right  to  ufe 
any  thing  that  is  found,  except  it  be  of  fuch  a  nature 
as  to  become  worfe  by  not  ufing,  or  as  the  owner 
would  fufFer  detriment  thereby  ;  for  inftance,  provifion 
liable  to  fpoil,  a  horfe  that  mould  have  ftrayed,  and 
the  keeping  of  which  would  incur  the  owner  a  high 
expence :  even  in  cafes  like  thefe  the  finder  is  held  to 
make  reafonable  compenfation  for  his  ufe. 

Sch.  1.— r-Things,  of  which  no  owner  is  or  can  be  found,  are 
deemed  to  belong  to  no  perfon ;  the  finder  confequently 
becomes  the  occupant  until  the  owner  prove  and  reclaim 
property. 

Sch.  2. — It  is  therefore  necefTary  that  a  finder  of  property  en- 
deavour to  invefligate  its  owner,  by  giving  fufFicient 
public  notice  that  fuch  property  is.  in  his  pofTeilion. 

$$.  3. — In  fome  cafes  it  is  very  difficult  for  the  lawful  owner 
to  diflinguifh  his  property  ;  as,  coins  of  the  fame  value 
and  impreffion.  Here  the  time  when  and  the  place  where 
things  are  loft,  with  other  concomitant  circumflances, 
snav  ferve  to  afcertaio  the  owner» 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  269 

Sch.  4. — If  things  found  and  kept  in  life  by  the  finder  fliould 
have  an  increafe  whilit  they  are  in  his  pofleflion,  a  quef- 
tion  arifes,  whether  the  owner  or  the  finder  has  a  right  to 
that  increafe;  for  inftance,  a  colt  or  a  calf  of  a  (frayed 
mare  or  cow. 
The  decifion  of  this  queflion  depends  upon  the  care  and 
trouble  which  the  finder  has  had  in  the  raifing  of  that 
increafe,  as  well  as  upon  an  enquiry  whether  he  has 
done  what  he  ought  to  have  done  in  #rder  to  difcover 
the  owner. 

Things  admit  of  an  increafe :  an  increafe  attending 
our  property  is  called  an  acceffion :  as  acceflion  may  re- 
mit from  the  nature  of  our  property,  or  from  our 
induftry,  or  from  both  alike,  it  may  be  diftinguifhed 
into  natural,  into  that  which  is  acquired  by  our  induftry, 
or  into  that  which  partakes  of  both,  and  may  be  called 
mixt. 

Sch.  1. — To  natural  acceflion  may  be  referred  the  increafe  of 
cattle,  of  land  gradually  produced  by  the  overflowing  of 
a  river,  a  fea  or  a  bay,  conftituting  the  limits  thereof. 

Sch.  2. — The  fecond  kind  of  acceflion  comprehends  improve^ 
ments  of  land,  clearing,  fencing,  manuring,  building, 
hunting,  fifhing,  &c. 

Sch.  3. — Under  the  head  of  mixt  acceflion  mav  be  brought 
planting,  fowing,  engrafting,  &c. 

When  an  acceffion  to  property  is  the  natural  effect 
thereof,  it  is  evident  that  the  owner  of  the  pro- 
perty is  entitled  to  the  acceffion  *,  as,  for  inftance,  the 
young  of  animals,  &c. 

If,  by  an  event  in  nature,  another's  property  ac- 
cedes to  our's,  fo  that  the  former  can  be  diitinguifhed 
and  precifely  known,  the  acceffion,  or  as  much  there- 
of as  may  be  thus  diftinguifhed,  remains  the  property 
of  the  firft  proprietor ;  as,  when  a  river  has  fuddenly 
formed  a  new  channel, 

But 


2/0  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

But  if  the  accefTion  be  gradual,  a  bank  of  our  pro- 
perty enlarged,  or  an  ifland  formed  fo  that  the  parti- 
cles cannot  be  known,  and  confequently  not  claimed 
as  the  property  of  others  •,  fuch  enlargement  or  ifland 
mud  be  confidered  as  belonging  to  no  perfon  ♦,  and 
the  owner  of  the  bank  to  which  <the  accefTion  is  made, 
or  contiguous  to  which  the  ifland  is  formed,  is  deemed 
to  have  the  beft  title  to  the  accefTion,  becaufe  he  has 
the  beft  opportunity  for  occupancy. 

Sch. — Things  of  this  nature  are  under  particular  regulations, 
provided  for  by  civil  and  national  laws,  as  thev  now-a- 
days  chiefly  intereft  the  claims  of  territory  and  the  jurif- 
diction  of  dates  and  nations. 

With  refpecl  to  acceffion  by  induftry,  we  diftin- 
guifh  thefe  two  cafes  :  the  one,  where  the  thing  ac- 
ceded to  is  the  property  another;  the  fecond,  where  no 
other  has  a  right  in  the  acceffion.  In  the  flrft  of  thefe 
cafes  there  cannot  be  any  room  for  making  an  acquisi- 
tion of  the  accefTion,  becaufe  there  is  no  room  for 
occupancy:  in  the  laft,  the  perfon  producing  the  in- 
crease is  by  that  very  ad  the  occupant  and  the  owner 
thereof. 

But  an  accefTion  may  take  place  by  our  induftry  on 
another's  property.  Here  we  muli  diilinguifh  two 
cafes,  for  that  accefTion  may  either  exift  by  itfelf, 
within  or  upon  faid  property,  or  is  intermixed  there- 
with. In  the  firft  of  thefe  cafes  accefTion  is  faid  to 
be  by  adjunfition;  in  the  latter  it  is  either  fpecification 
or  comtnixion%  as  we  give  another's  property  a  new  form 
or  fnape,  or  unite  and  intermix  with  it  things  of  a 
diftinci  quality. 

Sen.  i. — Acceffion  bv  adjunction  comprehends  buildings  and 
all  other  improvements  which  may  be  taken  away  with- 
out injuring  the  foil  or  property. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2*71 


ScJi.  2.— That  by  fpecification  has  reference  to  orchards,  in- 
grafting, walling  up  banks,  &c.  Here  improvements 
cannot  be  taken  away  without  injuring  the  property. 

Sc/i.  3. — Commixion  may  be  inftanced  in  manuring,  &c 
where  the  improvements  are  fo  intermixed  that  they  can- 
not be  taken  away  without  injuring  the  property. 

As  by  the  natural  laws  the  improver  is  entitled  to 
the  acceflion  produced  by  adjunclion,  fo  the  proprietor 
of  the  foil,  according  to  thofe  laws,  becomes  the 
owner  of  it  by  fpecification  and  commixion. 

Sch. — Prudence  dictates  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  improver 
provide  for  indemnification  before  he  beftows  his  induftry 
upon  another's  property;  juftice  requires  on  the  other, 
that,  if  fuch  improvements  have  been  made,  the  proprie- 
tor make  a  reafonable  fatisfaction. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Of  thofe  derivative  modes  of  acquifition  which  may  take 
effecl  during  the  life  of  the  owner. 

jLjlLL  rights  in  things  which  are  held  in  property 
or  commonry,  muft  be  derived  from  particular  acls 
on  the  part  of  the  owners,  from  which  it  may  appear 
why  another  fnould  now  difpofe  of  them  rather  than 
they  themfelves. 

Since  there  cannot  be  another  mode  naturally  law- 
ful by  which  we  may  difpofe  of  what  is  another's 
than  by  his  will  and  confent,  or  where  the  law  of  re- 
paration entitles  us  to  fo  much  of  our  neighbour's 
pofTefTions  as  is  fufficient  to  make  good  damages  fuf- 
tained,  or  where  the  withholding  of  fuch  things  would 
create  a  damage,  and  of  confequence  give  us  that 

right, 


2J1  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

riorht;  it  follows,  that  there  are  different  kinds  of  de~ 
rivative  modes  of  acquiring  rights  in  the  property  of 
others. 

The  mode  of  acqiiifitien  by  will  and  confent  of  the 
owner,  is  by  pacts  of  one  kind  or  another. 

With  refpedt  to  the  mode  of  acquifition  by  the  law 
of  reparation,  we  diftinguifh  damage  which  has  ac- 
tually taken  place  from  that  which  would  take  place 
in  cafe  of  refufal :  the  former  of  thefe  modes  we 
call  the  mode  of  acquifition  by  forfeiture 3  the  latter, 
that  by  law. 

When  pacts  are  confummated,  that  is  to  fay,  when 
In  unilateral  pacts  the  promife  is  performed  on  one 
ilde,  and  when  in  the  bilateral  both  parties  have  ful-. 
filled  their  engagements,  then,  as  has  been  fhewn  in 
its  place,  adfcual  transfer  is  made  by  the  promifer  to 
the  promifee.  The  different  pacts,  therefore,  by 
which  a  transfer  may  be  made  of  our  own,  are  as 
many  modes  of  derivative  acquisitions  whereby  ano- 
ther may  obtain  a  lawful  right  in  our  property. 

But  there  are  two  general  kinds  of  pacts  ;  the  uni- 
lateral, where  the  promifer  acts  without  expectation 
of  receiving  any  thing  in  return,  and  the  bilateral* 
where  each  party  is  held  to  perform.  As  the  former 
comprehends  all  the  fpecies  of  gratuitous  pacts,  fo  the 
latter  implies  all  thofe  which  are  reciprocal  or  onerous. 

To  the  gratuitous  modes  of  acquifition  are  reckon- 
ed  gifts,  grants,  laft  will  and  teftament.  Between  the 
two  former  there  is  this  difference,  that  gift  is  a  gra- 
tuitous pact  without  even  the  mention  of  any  expec- 
tation or  confideration  being  made  in  return;  but 
grant  is  a  gift  without  the  outward  appearance  thereof, 

as 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY^  273 

as  a  confideration  is  expreffed,  which,  however,  is 
not  taken  or  demanded  -,  for  instance,  a  pepper-corn, 
five  millings,  &c. 

Sch.  1. — Of  wills  and  teftaments,  and  other  gratuitous  de- 
vices of  a  deceafed  peribn,  we  mall  treat  in  a  particular 
chapter. 

Sch.  2. — Reciprocal  or  bnerous  pacts  are  more  generally 
known  under  the  appellation  of  contracts. 

Sc/i.  3. — Gifts  and  grants,  which  latter  have  the  outward  form 
of  contra&s,  are  naturally  as  binding  as  any  contract 
may  be;  but  civil  laws,  for  the  purpofe  of  preventing 
frauds,  by  which  others,  creditors  for  inftance,  may  be 
injured,  do  not  allow  to  them  that  obligatory  power  in 
the  civil  forum  which  contracts  have,  that  is,  where  a 
confideration  is  given. 

Sc/i.  4. — Among  thofe  considerations  which  are  efleemed  as 
valuable,  the  municipal  laws  admit  that  of  blood  or 
natural  affection  between  near  relations,  provided  no 
perfon  is  thereby  injured. 

Contracts,  that  is  to  fay,  reciprocal  pacts,  become  as 
many  modes  of  acquifition  as  there  may  be  transfers  of 
rights  in  things  made  in  the  different  forms  of  onerous 
pads,  of  which  we  have  treated  under  the  head  of 
pads. 

Thus  the  form  do  ut  des  comprehends  all  contracts 
where  money  is  given  for  money,  property  for  pro- 
perty, goods  for  goods ;  as,  money  loaned  upon  bond 
or  promife  of  payment,  barter  or  exchange  either  of 
money,  property  or  goods,  and  all  fales  of  goods  for 
a  price  exprefsly  ftipulated  or  implied,  where  the  buyer 
tacitly  confents  to  give  as  much  as  they  are  worth. 

The  form  facio  ut  des  has  reference  to  contracts 
where  work  is  performed  for  a  certain  price,  either 
fpecincally  mentioned  or  left  to  the  determination  of 
the  law ;  as,  a  fervant  hiring  himfelf  to  a  mailer  for 

N  a  certain 


274  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

certain  wages,  or  a  labourer  or  tradefman  engaging  to 
work  for  the  current  wages,  or  for  a  compenfation  for 
a  piece  of  workmanfhip,  &c. 

The  form  do  ut  facias  has  refpedf.  to  contracts  where 
the  matter  hires  his  fervant,  the  landlord  employs  a 
labourer,  or  engages  a  piece  of  workmanfhip  with  a 
mechanic,  &c. 

The  formfacio  ut  facias  extends  to  contracts  where 
I  engage  with  a  man  to  do  his  work  if  he  will  do  mine ; 
or  where  two  perfons  agree  to  enter  the  matrimonial 
flate,  or  to  perform  certain  acts  on  both  /ides;  or  it 
may  be  that  one  forbear  on  one  fide  if  fomething  is 
done  on  the  other  in  confideration  of  that  forbearance ; 
as,  a  landlord  giving  up  his  rent  upon  condition  that 
the  tenant  inclofe  a  field  with  a  good  fence;  or  it  may 
be  for  mutual  forbearance  on  both,  fides ;  as,  one  mer- 
chant engages  not  to  trade  to  Lifbon  if  the  other  will 
not  trade  to  Marfeilles.  Vide  Black.  Comment.  Book  ii. 
chap.  30. 

Sch.  1.- — Befides  thefe  modes  of  acquiring  property,  there  arc 
others  arifing  from  the  fame  principles,  which  have  refe- 
rence to  a  transfer  of  the  rights  of  ufe  and  ufufruct ;  as, 
giving  in  truft,  hiring,  lending,  borrowing,  &c. 

Sch.  2. — Authors  who  have  treated  thefe  fubjeets  in  detail 
diftinguifli  contracts  into  thofe  of  fale,  of  hazard,  and 
of  lending  either  inconfumable  property  or  money,  and  of 
labour  by  fervice,  commiflions,  partnership,  or  offices. 

Sch,  3. — Indeed,  all  manner  of  trulls,  fecurities,  pledges,  pawns, 
mortgages,  bonds,  promiflbry  notes,  and  the  different 
kinds  of  indentures,  reft  upon  the  principles  of  pact,  and 
import  paclitious  rights  and  obligations. 

As  we  do  not -intend  to  treat  of  thefe  fubjects  in  de- 
tail, it  may  fuffice  to  obferve,  that  the  determination 
of  what  is  right  or  wrong  in  the  transfer  of  property, 

or 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  ly 5 

or  of  ufe  and  ufufruct,  in  the  natural  forum,  refts  upon 
the  erTential  requisites  of  pacts,  which  have  been  ex- 
plained in  a  preceding  chapter. 

It  therefore  deferves  our  particular  attention,  whe- 
ther a  pretended  contract  is  founded  in  a  lawful  pro- 
mife,  confent,  acceptance  and  transfer,  or  whether  each 
of  them  is  accomplifhed  in  its  proper  meaning  and  in- 
tention, without  any  ambiguity  or  prevarication :  for 
a  contract  defective  with  refpect  to  one  or  the  other  of 
thofe  requifites  is  void ;  and  the  contracting  parties  of 
a  juft  contract  act  perfidiously  towards  each  other  if 
they  do  not  fulfil  every  Stipulation  in  its  true  fenfe  and 
meaning. 

Sch. — The  municipal  laws  of  different  countries  have  intro- 
duced into  this  fubject  different  and  various  modifica- 
tions, which  have  refpect  both  to  the  publicity  and  the 
neceffary  evidence  which  muft  attend  the  various  tranfac- 
tions  of  a  pactitious  nature,  in  order  to  give  them  legal 
validity,  and  to  obviate  fraud,  litigation  and  confufion  : 
for  inftance;  a  bond  muft  be  figned,  fealed  and  delivered 
in  the  prefence  of  two  witneffes,  a  laft  will  and  teflament 
in  the  prefence  of  three,  &c. 

A  right  to  compel  an  owner  to  transfer  fo  much  of 
his  right  in  things  as  is  necefTary  to  repair  a  damage 
done  by  him,  is  called  the  right  of  forfeiture. 

The  right  of  forfeiture,  if  conducted  according  to 
the  dictates  of  natural  law,  is  confequently  a  juft  mode 
of  acquisition,  and  extends  to  the  right  of*  making 
feizures. 

The  right  of  forfeiture  by  feizure,  where  it  is  exer- 
cifed  by  public  authority  for  the  benefit  of  a  citizen 
who  has  fuftained  fuch  damage,  is  called  execution,, 
which  is  always  to  be  preceded  by  a  judgment.  But 
when  civil  government  has  fuflained  a  damage,  and 

lazes 


2j6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.' 

feizes  for  the  ufe  of  the  public,  then  the  right  of  for- 
feiture is  {tiled  that  of  confifcation. 

There  is  another  mode  of  acquifition  derived  from 
law,  by  which  we  may  claim  as  much  right  in  another's 
property  or  perfon,  as  is  fufficient  to  compenfate  for  the 
expence  or  trouble  to  which  we  have  been  put  by  his 
neceflary  fupport,  or  by  other  exigencies  in  his  behalf, 
This  mode  is  diftinguifhed  from  that  of  forfeiture  in 
this  particular,  tPiat  the  latter  prefuppofes  injury  and 
damages  a£r.ually  committed,  whereas  the  former  leads 
to  fomething  which  is  to  be  done,  to  wit,  compenfation 
to  be  made,  left  an  injury  and  damage  might  enfue. 

The  mode  by  which  we  may  lawfully  demand,  re- 
tain or  feize  fo  much  of  our  neighbour's  property,  or, 
an  default  thereof,  of  his  perfonal  fervices,  is  called 
acquifition  by  law,  as  this  fupplies  us  with  forcible  re- 
medies in  cafes  where  juft  compenfation  is  refufed;  for 
inftance,  where  children  are  brought  up  by  their  pa- 
rents, where  minors  depend  for  fupport  and  education 
upon  provifion  made  by  their  guardians,  or  where 
poor  and  fatherlefs  children  are  taken  into  families. 
Parents  are  by  law  entitled  to  the  fervices  of  their 
children,  independent  of  the  duty  of  gratitude,  which 
jnould  moft  principally  prompt  them  to  all  manner  of 
refpect  and  obedience:  guardians  have  a  claim  upon 
the  property,  and,  in  default  thereof,  upon  the  fervices 
of  their  wards  :  thofe  who  have  beftowed  their  fub- 
illance  to  bring  up  the  indigent  and  fatherlefs,  have  the 
claim  of  natural  parents. 

Civil  laws  mention  a  mode  of  acquifition,    which 
refts  folely  on  what  is  called  immemorial  porTeiTion,  that 
is,  a  fpecified  number  of  years  :   thefe  years  laws  take 
for  a  time  immemorial,  beca^ufe  it  is  deemed  imprac- 
ticable 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  277 

ticable  to  prove  a  right  in  things,  after  fuch  a  number 
of  years,  with  that  precision  which  laws,  and  indeed  the 
peace  of  fociety,  require.  This  mode  is  called  the  right 
of prefcription^  and  is  varioully  determined  in  reference 
to  the  different  objects  which  may  thereby  be  claimed ; 
but  in  the  forum  of  nature  it  might  be  considered  as 
the  finder's  right,  in  things  found  of  which  the  owner 
does  not  appear,  or  cannot  prove  his  right,  rather  than 
a  distinct  natural  mode  of  acquisition. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

The  derivative  modes  of  acquifition  of  rights  in  things 
by  will  and  teftament,  and  by  adminiftration,  or  in- 
heritance ab  inteStato. 

x\MONG  the  natural  rights  of  making  difpofition 
of  the  fubftance  and  emoluments  of  things,  we  have 
taken  notice  of  the  right  of  alienation,  which  vefts  the 
right  of  property,  of  pofleSTion  and  other  ufes,  in  per- 
sons after  the  owner's  deceafe. 

Such  a  difpofition,  made  by  the  owner  in  his  life- 
time, muft  be  considered  as  an  unilateral  and  beneficent 
pact,  where  confent  and  acceptance  are  constructive,  and 
where  death  Stamps  the  unalterable  confent  of  the  pro- 
mifer  upon  that  prefuppofed  acceptance  of  the  promi- 
fee,  and  thus  gives  the  pact  its  full  validity. 

He  who  makes  fuch  a  difpofition  of  his  property  is 
called  a  t  eft  at  or  \  the  property  itfelf  is  filled  an  inhe- 
ritance \  the  perfon  who  is  designated  as  the  new  owner 
thereof  has  obtained  the  appellation  of  an  heir:  the 

whole 


278  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

whole  tranfaClion  taken  together  is  called  a  teftator's 

loft  will  and  t  eft  anient. 

Sch. — Thofe  who  treat  on  this  fubjeft  in  detail  make  a  diffe- 
rence between  will  and  tefiament,  confining  the  former 
to  the  difpefition  of  perfonal,  and  reitricting  the  latter  to 
that  of  real  eftate. 

Since  will  and  teftament  maft  be  confidered  as  an 
unilateral  and  purely  beneficent  pact,  where  confent  and 
acceptance,  though  fuppofed,  cannot  take  place  before 
the  teftator's  deceafe,  it  is  evident,  that  wills  and  tefta- 
ments  may  be  altered  or  revoked  as  long  as  the  teftator 
lives,  but  obtain  their  confummation,  and  confequently 
become  irrevocable  at  the  moment  of  his  death. 

It  being  the  nature  of  love,  that  we  wifh  to  render 
thofe  for  whom  we  have  a  particular  affection  as  happy 
as  poffible,  it  follows,  that  a  teftator,  designing  the 
inheritance  to  a  particular  perfon  or  perfons,  declares 
thereby  that  he  loves  fuch  a  perfon  or  perfons  in  a  par- 
ticular manner  above  others. 

It  is  therefore  as  equitable  as  it  is  congruous  to  the 
nature  of  things,  that  the  laws  of  the  land  direct  the 
inheritance  of  one  who  dies  inteftate,  to  fall  to  fuch 
perfon  or  perfons  whom  he  ought  to  have  loved 
before  others. 

Thofe  who,  by  this  conftruclion  of  natural  and  thofe 
civil  laws  which  take  nature  for  their  guide,  become 
vefted  with  the  inheritance,  are  heirs  ab  inteftato,  heirs 
at  law.  The  difpofition,  as  it  proceeds  from  law,  is 
called  legitimate^  tfhifft  that  which  depends  upon  the 
will  of  the  teftator  is  ftiled  t  eft  anient  ary. 

Since  an  heir  fucceeds  to  the  rights  of  the  former 
owner,  it  follows,  that  he  comes  under  his  obligations, 
as  far  as  he  is  heir  -,  an  heir  mull,  therefore,  fulfil  the 

engagements 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


279 


engagements  of  the  deceafed,  as  far  as  he  is  enabled 
by  the  inheritance,  and  not  farther. 

SuccefTion,  ab  inteftato,  conformably  to  the  law  of 
nature,  is  to  be  confidered  in  this  manner :  if  no  de- 
claration of  the  laft  will  of  the  deceafed  can  be  produced? 
or?  which  amounts  to  the  fa?ne,  is  not  authenticated,  he  or 
they  will  be  entitled  to  the  inheritance  whom  the  deceafed 
was  bound  by  nature  to  love  particularly  above  others: 
for  it  is  a  well  eftabliihed  maxim  in  morality,  that 
what  is  natural  muft  be  prefumed  until  the  contrary 
is  proved. 

From  thefe  and  other  principles  it  is  therefore  evi- 
dent, that  wife  and  children,  and  after  them  the 
nearer!:  relations,  and  among  thefe  firft  the  lineal,  and 
then  the  collateral,  and  in  default  of  each  of  them  the 
country  of  the  deceafed,  or  rather  the  place  wherein 
the  inheritance  lies,  have  a  legitimate  claim  to  the  in- 
heritance. 

Sch. — The  laws  of  our  ftate  follow  thefe  principles  with  great 
exaclnefs,  and  allow  the  widow  in  fome  cafes  the  third 
part,  in  others  the  half  of  an  inheritance:  the  former 
takes  place  where  children  are  left  by  the  deceafed;  after 
the  portion  allowed  to  the  widow,  the  children  are  to  di- 
vide the  remainder  in  equal  lliares. 

A  laft  will  and  teftament  is  then  necefTary,  if  a  per- 
fon  intends  another  divifion  of  his  property  than  that 
which  the  law  directs,  orwifhes  others  to  be  his  heirs 
than  thofe  which  are  heirs  at  law. 

No  laft  will  is  therefore  entitled  to  any  notice,  which 
is  not  folemnly  declared  as  fuch  by  the  teftator,  and 
fufficiently  proved  by  witnefTes;  becaufe,  nothing  that 
is  vague  or  uncertain  can  have  force  to  fet  afide  direc- 
tions exprefsly  preferred  by  law. 


28o  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.' 

Sch. — This,  perhaps,  has  been  the  caufe  why  the  Juftinian  law 
requires,  that,  befides  the  (even,  witnefTes  neceflary  for 
the  proof  of  a  will,  the  teftator  fhould  expreffly  mention 
the  heirs  at  law,  and  leave  to  each  a  certain  proportion, 
as  what  is  called  their  legitimate,  with  this  provifo,  that 
without  a  ftridt.  attention  to  the  latter,  the  will  ihall  not 
be  valid. 

By  the  folemnities  of  a  laft  will  and  teftament,  be- 
fides  thofe  things  which  ferve  exprefsly  to  declare  the 
teftator's  intention  with  refpect  to  the  difpofkion  of 
his  property  after  his  deceafe,  are  underftood  fuch  ex- 
ternal acts  as  are  fuflicient  to  prove  that  fuch  a  decla- 
ration was  really  made. 

Thofe  folemnities  which  declare  the  teftator's  inten- 
tion, we  call  internal-,  but  fuch  as  ferve  as  proofs  of 
the  declaration  thereof,  are  external. 

A  laft  will  and  teftament,  if  it  be  confident  with  it- 
felf,  that  is,  not  contradictory  or  unintelligible,  has  the 
internal  folemnities  requisite  for  an  act  of  fo  great  im- 
portance :  the  teftator,  when  he  declared  his  will,  rauft 
have  been  of  found  mind  and  memory,  and  the  difpo- 
iition  free  and  of  his  own  accord. 

There  are  alfo  external  folemnities  requisite,  to  wit, 

a  fufftcient  teftimony  of  witneffes,  who  can  prove,  in  a 

fatisfactory  manner,  that  the  teftator  was  in  a  ftate  of 

ability  to  make  a  valid  difpoftion,  and  that  the  difpo- 

lition  made  or  proferred  has  been  declared  by  him  to 

be  his  laft  will  and  teftament. 

Sch. — Thofe  who  think  that,  in  the  internal  forum,  the  hand- 
writing of  a  teftator  would  be  a  fufficient  proof  of  his  laft 
will  and  teftament,  do  not  conlider,  that  from  a  perfoirs 
hand  it  cannot  be  proved  that  he  acted  freely  and  of  his 
own  accord,  that  fear  or  force  had  no  interference,  &c. 

The  municipal  laws  of  different  countries  have  va- 

rioufly  determined,  both  with  refpect  to  heirs  at  law, 

and 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2%% 

and  to  the  number  of  witnefles  neceflkry  to  give  a  laft 
will  and  teftament  fufficient  authenticity. 

Our  laws  require  at  leafi  three  witnefles  prefent  when 
the  teftator  acknowledges  the  feal  affixed  to  the  inftru- 
ment  containing  his  will,  and  figns  his  name  thereunto, 
with  the  explicit  declaration,  that  the  contents  of  the 
inftrument  thus  figned  and  fealed  are  his  laft  will  an4 
teftament :  they  alfo  order,  that  the  witnefles  flgn  their 
names  as  witnefles  prefent  when  thefe  tranfaclions  have 
been  performed  by  the  teftator. 

Sch.  i. — The  witnefles  muft.  all  be  prefent  at  the  fame  time  5 
each  muft  fee  not  only  the  teftator,  but  alfo  the  other  wit- 
nefles fign  their  names  or  affix  their  marks. 

Sch.  2. — If  failure  be  made  in  any  of  thefe  folemnities,  the  will 
is  fet  afide,  and  the  laws  of  the  land  order  adminiflratioa 
to  take  place. 

Nuncupative  wills,  that  is,  fuch  as  are  declared  by 
word  and  mouth,  are  not  admitted  by  law,  except  in 
very  extraordinary  cafes;  for  inftance,  when  perfons 
are  at  fea,  foldiers  in  the  army,  &c. 

If  a  perfon  who  would  have  been  heir  at  law  is  by 
will  excluded  from  a  portion  of  the  inheritance,  he  is 
faid  to  be  difinherited. 

A  perfon  constituted  heir  may  remit  his  right  before 
he  enters  upon  the  exercife  thereof;  but  having  once 
afllimed  that  right,  he  is,  as  far  as  the  inheritance  ex- 
tends, under  all  the  obligations  of  the  deceafed :  he 
muft,  for  inftance,  pay  all  lawful  debts,  becaufe  nothing 
can  be  confldered  as  the  inheritance  but  what  remains 
over  and  above  all  juft  demands, 


Q  o  PART 


PART     II. 


Sect.  III.    Comprehending  general  ceconomy. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Of  rights   in  perfens. 

OINCE,  as  has  already  been  fhewn,  duties,  obliga- 
tions and  rights  are  of  a  correlate  nature,  fo  that  the 
latter  depend  upon  the  former  as  effects  upon  their 
caufes,  it  evidently  follows,  that  we  cannot  lawfully 
have  or  claim  any  rights  in  perfons  which  are  inconfift- 
ent  with  our  duties  towards  God,  towards  ourfelves 
and  fellow  creatures :  for  any  action  whatever  that  is 
contradictory  to  either  of  thefe  duties,  is  repugnant  to 
our  natural  obligation,  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  natu- 
ral law,  and  confequently  wrong,  impious,  unnatural 
and  unjuft. 

The  following  maxims,  which  may  be  confidered  as 
the  infallible  criteria  of  right  or  wrong  in  the  focial  in- 
tercourfe  of  mankind,  of  whatever  defcription  or  extent 
it  may  be,  flow  from  thefe  undeniable  principles : — 

i.  No  perfon  can  have  a  frrict  right  of  property  in 
another ;  for  no  man  can  ceafe  to  be  a  moral  agent, 
but,  as  fuch,  is  under  the  dominion  of  God,  and  re- 
fponfible  to  him  for  all  his  actions  :  being  efientially 
different  from  brutes  and  things  inanimate,  he  cannot, 

confidently 


.2§4  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

confidently  with  his  nature,  become  an  object  of  pro- 
perty. 

Sck.— rlt  is  unnatural  and  impious  to  deal  in  human  flefh,  to 
treat  man  as  a  beafi:  of  burden,  or  to  hold  him  in  equal  or 
in  lower  eftimation  than  things  of  an  inanimate  nature; 
for  it  is  inconfiftent  with  the  duties  we  owe  to  God,  to 
ourfelves  and  to  others. 

1.  Rights  in  perfons  can  only  amount  to  the  right 
of  directing  their  actions ;  for  fuch  a  right  only  is  con- 
iiftent  with  the  nature  of  a  moral  agent,  and  with  that 
natural  relation  by  which  mankind  are  dependent  upon 
each  other  for  mutual  happinefs. 

Sch. — A  right  in  perfons  extended  farther  than  to  the  direction 
of  the  actions  of  others  confident  with  the  nature  of  a 
moral  agent,  would  amount  to  a  ftrict  right  of  property— 
a  right  which  has  juft  been  proved  to  be  as  unnatural  and 
inhuman  on  the  part  of  the  claimant,  as  it  would  be  de- 
grading and  difgraceful  to  the  fubjecl  of  fuch  unnatural 
claim;  with  this  difference,  that,  like  the  wolf  and  the 
lamb,  the  latter  moves  our  fympathy,  whilft  the  lawlefs 
ufurper  excites  our  difguft  and  indignation. 

3.  No  perfon  has  an  unlimited  perfedh  right  in  ano- 
ther, fo  that  he  may  arbitrarily  direct  his  actions  as  he 
pleafes ;  becaufe,  he  who  fubmits  to  fuch  a  right  ceafes 
to  conduct  himfelf  confidently  with  the  dignity  of  a 
being  endowed  with  a  moral  nature-,  and  the  claimant 
deprives  him  of  his  unalienable  natural  right,  with 
which  he  is  vefted  as  a  member  of  the  univerfal  ibciety 
of  mankind. 

4.  No  perfon  may  lawfully  claim  even  a  limited  per- 
fect right  in  others,  except  for  lawful  purpofes ;  for  a 
contrary  conduct  would  be  repugnant  to  the  duties  we 
owe  to  God,  to  ourfelves  and  to  others,  and  would 
eonfequently  be  impious,  unnatural  and  unjuft. 

5.  Na 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2$5 

£.  No  perfon  may  lawfully  have  an  abfolute  natural 
right,  however  limited,  and  however  good  the  purpofes 
may  be ;  for  what  is  abfolutely  natural,  flows  from  na- 
ture confidered  in  itfelf  *,  and  men,  considered  in  them- 
felves,  have  the  fame  nature,  and  confequently  can 
poffefs  no  perfect  rights  in  one  another,  but  fuch  rights 
only  and  fuch  claims  as  are  in  every  refpect  equal. 

6.  Rights  in  perfons  muft  confequently  be  hypo- 
thetically  natural,  adventitious  •,  that  is  to  fay,  fome 
ads  are  necefTary,  by  which  it  may  appear  why  perfons 
of  the  fame  nature,  members  of  the  fociety  of  mankind, 
mould  have  perfect  rights  in  one  another,  and  why 
fome  mould  have  the  right  to  direct  the  actions  of 
others,  whilft  the  latter  are  under  perfect  obligations  to 
follow  and  obey  thofe  directions. 

7.  Rights  in  perfons,  therefore,  which  are  pcrfeft 
and  affirmative,  that  is,  by  which  we  require,  and  in 
cafe  of  refufai  compel,  others  to  follow  our  directions, 
muft  refult  from  a  juft  mode  of  acquisition,  and  reft 
upon  a  juft  title. 

Sch, — By  nature,  and  without  any  previous  a<t  either  on  our 
part  or  on  that  of  another,  we  have  negative  perfeft  rights 
in  all  perfons;  for  from  our  nature  and  from  the  nature 
of  things  it  follows,  that  others  fhould  do  us  no  injury 
or  damage. 

There  is  no  originary  mode  of  acquisition  by  oc- 
cupancy; for,  as  man  is  not  only  endowed  with  moral 
agency,  but  is  likewife  a  fellow  member  of  the  uni- 
verfal  fociety  of  mankind,  a  fellow  fubject  of  the  go- 
vernment of  the  Moft  High,  he  is  under  the  dominion 
of  God,  and  cannot  be  confidered  as  a  thing,  much 
lefs  a  thing  belonging  to  no  perfon:  he  is  naturally 
vefted  with  a  right  in  himfelf. 

Since, 


2$6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Since,  then,  all  derivative  modes  of  acquiring  rights 
refult  from  certain  acts,  we  may  diftinguifh  three  gene- 
ral modes  by  which  rights  in  perfons  may  be  acquired, 
to  wit,  either  by  acts  on  the  part  of  the  claimant,  or 
on  that  of  the  obligee,  or  both  alike.  In  the  firft  cafe, 
we  acquire  rights  in  others  by  the  title  of  law  \  in  the 
fecond,  by  that  of  forfeiture  \  in  the  laft,  by  the  title 
of  paff. 

Rights  acquired  in  perfons  by  the  title  of  law,  take 
place  with  parents  in  their  children,  with  guardians 
in  their  wards,  and  indeed  with  any  perfon  who  un- 
dertakes and  is  faithful  in  the  performance  of  parental 
duties;  for  here  the  eftablifhed  order  of  nature,  or 
rather  the  law  and  will  of  God  direct,  that  perfons 
beftow  much  care  and  labour  upon  others,  whofe  very 
exiftence  and  happinefs  are  made  immediately  depen- 
dent upon  their  faithful  exertions.  But  the  laws  which 
impofe  duties  grant  likewife  a  right  to  all  things  ne- 
cefTary  for  the  performance  of  thofe  duties.  The 
confequence  is,  that  parents,  and  thofe  who  are  under 
parental  obligations,  mud  not  only  have  rights  in 
children,  but  fuch  rights  muft  alfo  be  perfectly  con- 
fident with  their  duties  to  God,  to  themfelves  and  to 
others.  Parents  have  confequently  perfect  rights,  not 
only  to  direct  the  actions  of  children  in  a  manner 
which  will  comport  with  the  glory  of  God  and  their 
own  happinefs,  but  likewife  to  require  them  to  make 
compenfation  for  the  care,  trouble  and  expence  be- 
llowed upon  them . 

Sch.  i. — Perfect  rights,  founded  in  ju'ftice,  may  be  well  exer- 
cifed  bv  parents;  for  it  is  perfectly  confident  with  the 
ture  of  children,  that  they  mould  make,  for  benefits 
received  in  the  days  of  helplefs  infancy,  all  poffible  com- 
pen  fat  ion  of  their  own  accord,  left  they  heighten  the  in- 
jury 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  287 

jury  they  commit  in  refufing  obedience,  by  the  molt  un- 
natural vice,  that  of  ingratitude. 

Sck.  2.— Neither  is  it  incompatible  with  the  ftate  of  infancy, 
that  parents  exercife  perfeft  rights  in  directing  their  ac- 
tions: thefe  rights,  however,  undergo  natural  modifica- 
tions, keeping  pace  with  the  improvement  of  their  moral 
faculties. 

Sch.  3. — A  non-fubmiflion  to  the  rights  of  parents,  guardians, 
&c.  by  the  title  of  law,  renders  the  recufant  liable  to  the 
right  of  forfeiture. 

By  the  right  in  pcrfons,  in  virtue  of  the  title  of  for- 
feiture, acts  which  have  caufed  injury  and  damage  on 
the  part  of  the  obligee  are  prefuppofed.  In  defect:  of 
property  by  which  reparation  may  be  made,  the  injurer 
is  held  to  make  it  by  his  labour. 

Sck. — Such  a  right  is  both  compatible  with  the  principles  of 
natural  juftice  and  with  the  nature  of  a  moral  agent:  as 
the  former  requires  that  reparation  be  made,  fo  the  jatter 
fhould  feel  inclined  to  make  it  as  far  as  is  in  his  power. 

By  the  title  of  pact,  acts  on  both  fides  are  required ; 
that  is  to  fay,  as  one  intends  to  have  a  right  in  another, 
'fo  the  confent  of  each  is  required  for  fuch  a  claim  to 
become  lawful.  The  feveral  fpecies  of  pads,  there- 
fore, whether  explicit,  tacit  or  conftructive,  heretofore 
explained,  are  modes  of  acquiring  rights  in  perfons, 
with  this  exception,  that  nothing  can  find  place  which 
is  incompatible  with  the  nature  of  a  moral  agent  and 
the  natural  rights  of  man. 

Having  hitherto  attended  to  the  perfect:  affirmative 
rights  in  perfons,  under  the  appellation  of  rights  in 
perfons,  it  is  proper  that  we  fpeak  of  thofe  imperfect: 
rights  which  men,  as  fellow  creatures,  as  fellow  citizens 
of  the  government  of  the  Mofl:  High,  have  in  one  ano- 
ther by  virtue  of  their  nature,  and  particularly  by  this 
their  natural  relation.     Thefe  are  not  only  negative, 

but 


288  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

but  alfo  affirmative,  and  may  be  claimed  in  all  perfons 
whatfoever ;  for,  as  by  that  natural  relation  men  are 
bound  by  mutual  obligations  to  promote  the  general 
happinefs  of  mankind,  fo  they  have  likevvife  mutual 
rights  to  require  all  thofe  things  which  are  necefTary  to 
be  done  for  the  attainment  of  that  happinefs.  It 
would  be  impoflible,  on  the  one  hand,  to  do  our  duties, 
if  we  had  not  a  right  in  perfons  to  expect  and  to  re- 
quire that  they  mould  act  conformably  to  them.  How 
mould  we  be  able  to  perform  the  duty  of  hofpitality 
to  a  ftranger,  if  we  had  not  the  right  to  recommend 
him  ?  How  mould  we  be  able  to  cultivate  true  friend- 
fhip,  if  we  had  not  the  right  to  rebuke,  to  exhort,  or 
to  vifit  a  friend  ?  How  could  parents  love  their  chil- 
dren, if  they  had  not  rights  to  advife,  to  reprimand, 
to  chide,  or  to  put  them  to  fome  ufeful  employment  ? 
We  have  a  right,  on  the  other  hand,  to  expect  for 
our  friendly  offices  fincerity  and  gratitude  from  a 
friend.  Parents  have  a  right  to  require  love,  reve- 
rence, gratitude,  obedience  and  afTiftance  from  their 
children. 

Since  our  imperfect  rights  refult  from  imperfect  ob- 
ligations, it  is  plain,  that  as  thefe  are  ftronger,  the 
more  intimate  our  natural  relations  are;  fo,  likewife, 
our  rights  in  perfons  become  more  forcible  tht  nearer 
the  relation  is  in  which  we  ftand  towards  them.  Thus 
parents  have  the  ftricteft  poifible  right  in  the  perfons 
pf  their  children ;  nothing,  therefore,  can  be  more 
impious  and  horrid  than  difobedience  and  ingratitude 
in  children  to  their  parents. 


CHAPTER 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  289 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  general  laws  of  fociety, 

JL3Y  fociety,  in  the  ftrict  fenfe  of  the  term,  \re  un- 
derfland  that  ftate  in  which  a  perfon  has  a  perfect  affir- 
mative right  in  others :  the  perfons  living  in  this  per- 
feci:  fecial  ftate  are  members. 

Sch. — As  there  are  many  focieties  among  the  children  of  men 
which  reft  upon  imperfect  rights  and  obligations,  and 
admit  only  of  a  directory  government,  fo  that  they  are 
<juite  of  another  nature  than  thofe  which  refult  from  per- 
fect affirmative  rights;  it  is  proper  that  the  reader  be 
apprifed,  that  what  is  faid  in  the  iequel  with  refpect  to 
focial  rights  and  obligations,  is  only  applicable  to  focieties 
which  reft  upon  perfect  rights  and  refult  from  perfect 
obligations. 

Since  there  are  not  only  a  variety  of  actions,  hut 
alfo  many  and  different  ends  to  which  they  may  be 
directed-,  fince,  likewife,  directions  may  be  inftituted 
and  conducted  by  various  means,  and  under  different 
modifications,  with  refpect  to  time,  place,  the  imme- 
diate object  and  individual  circumstances ;  it  follows, 
that  there  are  a  variety  of  focieties  poffible,  which  ei- 
ther differ  in  kind,  or  only  in  fome  other  qualities. 

All  focieties  which  have  for  their  object  the  fame 
end,  are  materially  the  fame,  that  is,  focieties  ef  the  fame 
kind-,  but  fuch  as  have  for  their  object  different  ends, 
are  materially  different,  or  focieties  of  different  kinds. 

Societies  of  the  fame  kind  may  differ  with  reipedl 
to  other  qualities  •,  as,  for  inftance,  the  different  go- 
vernments on  earth — the  various  charitable  and  politi- 

Pp  cal 


%i^O  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

cal  focieties  now  in  vogue — the  different  profeffions  of 
religion,  &c. 

As  fpecies  are  contained  in  kinds,  fo  one  general 
fociety  may  contain  many  fpecific,  and  thefe  again  va- 
rious individual  focieties.  There  are,  therefore,  not 
only  many  and  various  focial  ftates  poffible  among 
men,  but  individuals  may  alfo  be  members  of  feveral 
and  different  focieties. 

Since  perfect  affirmative  rights  muft  neceffarily 
ftand  in  a  natural  correlation  with  perfect  affirmative 
obligations,  it  follows,  that  two  parties  muft  be  dif- 
tinguifhed  in  a  fociety,  to  wit,  one  veiled  with  a  right, 
the  other  under  a  perfect  obligation  to  act  conformably 
to  that  right. 

Since  rights  in  perfons  cannot  be  lawfully  claimed 
without  a  proper  mode  of  acquifition  and  a  juft  title, 
it  follows,  that  all  reciprocal  claims  of  a  perfect  nature 
which  perfons  make  upon  one  another,  not  founded 
in  the  right  of  acquifition  by  law,  forfeiture  or  pact, 
are  tyrannical  and  repugnant  to  natural  law,  under 
whatever  fpecious  name  fuch  claims  may  be  made. 

AfTociations,  likewife,  which  are  formed  for  un- 
lawful ends,  deferve  not  the  name  of  focieties,  but 
that  of  lawlefs  combinations,  of  banditti,  of  nuifances 
and  pefts  of  fociety  \  difgraceful  as  they  are  dangerous 
and  deteftable, 

A  fociety  becomes  defpotical,  if  the  claimant  of  the 
focial  right  extends  it  to  all  that  the  obligee  pofleffes ; 
but,  if  the  latter  has  fomething  left  to  himfelf,  inde- 
pendent of  the  focial  right  on  the  part  of  the  claimant 
or  any  other  member,  it  is  limited. 

Sch. — In  limited  focieties  there  are  reciprocal  rights  and  obli- 
gations on  both  Ikies, 

.A  defpotic 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2^t 

A  defpotic  fociety,  whether  we  confider  it  with  re- 
fpect  to  inftitution  or  execution,  is  as  inhuman  as  it  is 
irrational  and  unnatural  ♦,  for  here  the  obligee  is  confi- 
dered  not  as  a  moral  agent,  but  as  a  brute  or  thing  of 
an  inanimate  nature. 

Sch.  i. — Such  fhameful  defpotifm  is  to  be  met  with  in  the  go- 
vernments of  the  eaftern  parts  of  the  globe,  efpecially  in 
the  treatment  of  the  female  fex.  Of  that  nature  was  the 
barbarous  right  allowed  to  parents  to  expofe  or  put  to 
death  their  children.  The  (late  wherein  perfons  are  de- 
prived of  all  their  rights,  is  a  ftate  of  Jlavery. 

Sch.  2. — In  that  abject  miferable  flate  captives  in  War  were 
held  by  the  Greeks  and  Romans  of  old,  who  looked  upon 
themfelves  as  exclufively  entitled  to  the  honour  of  civili- 
zation and  humanity,  calling  all  others  barbarians. 

Sch.  3. — -Though  among  civilized  nations  the  right  over  the 
death  and  life  of  flaves  is  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  private 
perfons,  yet  flavery  itfelf,  where  perfons  may  be  dealt 
with  in  all  other  refpects  as  brutes,  does  not  ceafe  to  be 
inhuman,  unnatural  and  difgraceful  to  mankind. 

Sch.  4. — How  far  the  right  of  forfeiture  may  reduce  a  moral 
agent,  is  a  queftion  which,  to  the  honour  of  humanity, 
has  of  late  been  much  agitated  among  the  learned  of  dif- 
ferent nations.  That  men  who  have,  by  an  abandoned 
conduct  of  life,  voluntarily  debafed  themfelves,  mould 
be  juftly  conlidered  as  nuifances  and  pelts  of  focietv,  and 
confined  or  put  to  hard  labour  until  they  have  expiated 
their  crimes  and  made  reparation,  is  perfectly  confonant 
to  reafon  and  the  principles  of  natural  law  :  but  in  juili- 
fying  the  right  of  taking  away  their  lives,  reafon  is  as 
much  at  a  lofs  as  philanthropy  and  humanity,  fince  the 
violent  death  of  fuch  wretches  can  neither  be  conlidered 
as  an  atonement  to  the  public,  nor  to  thofe  individuals 
who  have  become  the  objects  of  their  lawlefs  excefTes. 

Sat.  5.— Capital  punifhments  in  many  inftances  prevent  the 
poffibility  of  reparation,  and  in  this  refpeet  are  far  from 
being  naturally  lawful. 

3th.  6. — If  the  argument  drawn  from  the  force  of  the  victims 
becoming  proper  examples  for  deterring  others  from  wan- 
ton tranfgreffions  of  the  hw,  be  brought  into  contraft 

with 


2^2  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

with  the  experience  of  ages,  it  proves,  that  human  im- 
molations at  the  fhrine  of  juftice  fhouid  either  ceafe  or, 
become  lefs  frequent. 

ech.  7. — Be  it  remembered,  that  government  can  have  no 
l'ights  but  fuch  as  are  delegated,  and  that  the  individuals 
of  a  fociety  cannot  delegate  more  than  they  have :  if, 
therefore,  a  fociety  is  not  in  a  ftate  of  abfolute  or  extreme 
necellity,  which  can  hardly  be  the  cafe  in  a  well  regulated 
government,  there  is  no  caufe  for  extending  the  right  of 
felf-prefervation  to  life  and  limb  :  nay,,  fince  even  a  ftate 
of  necellity,  with  refpect  to  individuals,  does  not  juftify 
the  taking  away  of  life,  if  the  duty  of  felf-prefervation 
may  be  otherwife  fatisfied,  it  appears  very  plain,  that  ca- 
pital punifhments  in  many  inftances  contradict  the  prin- 
ciples of  natural  laws. 

Seh.  8. — It  is  even  queftionable,  whether  taking  away  the  life 
of  a  criminal  in  the  cafe  of  murder  is  in  itfelf  conform- 
able to  natural  law ;  or  whether  it  fhouid  not  rather  be 
ranked  among  thofe  pofitive  laws  which  derive  their 
force,  with  refpect  to  particular  circumftances,  from  the 
law  of  felf-prefervation,  upon  which  all  right  of  life  and 
death  ultimately  depends.  It  is  upon  the  ftrength  of  this 
law  that  we  may  account  for  the  words,  Whojoever  Jlied- 
dcth  man's  blood,  by  manjliall  his  blood  be  jlied,  as  well  as  for 
other  crimes  made  capital  when  Ifrael  was  in  the  wilder- 
nefs ;  whilft  the  death  of  AbeJ,  of  Uriah,  &c.  was  fuffered 
to  go  unrevenged,  no  capital  punifhments  having  been 
inflicted  upon  thofe  who  were  guilty  of  taking  away  the 
lives  of  thefe  innocent  perfons.  It  is  on  the  fame  account 
that  martial  laws,  in  times  of invafion  and  in  the  field,  may 
be  put  into  execution  with  more  rigour  than  would  be 
juftifiable  in  any  other  fituation  of  public  affairs. 
Let  us  therefore  conclude,  that  murder  and  other  enormous 
crimes  militating  agamft  the  law  of  felf-prefervation,  may 
*  lawfully  be  punifhed  with  death,  when  this  great  duty 
cannot  be  fatisfied  by  punifhments  lefs  rigorous.  Let  it 
be  remembered,  that  we  cannot  have  rights  inconfiftent 
with  the  duties  which  we  owe  to  God,  to  ourfelves  and 
to  ethers,  and  that  cafes  of  colliiion  call  for  prudent,  jufl 
and  equitable  exceptions. 

In  a  defpotical  fociety,  the  paradoxical  maxim  can 

only 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  295 

only  be  applied,  that  a  human  being  can  do  no  wrong  \ 
for  that  fociety  leaves  no  right  m  the  other  party:  but 
as  limited  focieties  alone  are  recognized  by  the  infalli- 
ble principles  of  nature,  it  is  in  them  that  either  or 
both  parties  may  do  wrong.  The  members  of  a  fo- 
ciety may  injure  one  another,  either  when  the  claimant 
of  the  focial  right  extends  it  farther  than  he  ought  to 
do,  or  when  the  focial  obligee  falls  jfhort  in  the  per- 
formance of  his  obligation. 

To  an  attentive  obferver  of  perfons  and  things  it  is 
obvious,  that  from  the  intricacy  of  human  concerns, 
and  from  the  various  affections  of  the  human  heart, 
arifing  from  the  imperfection  and  imbecility  of  our  na- 
ture, innumerable  feuds  and  animofities  mud  necefTa- 
rily  take  place  amongft  members  of  fociety,  if  the juft 
proportion  of  focial  right  and  obligation  mould  reft 
upon  the  aflertions  and  arbitrary  claims  of  the  parties — 
claims  often  as  whimfical  as  they  are  felflm  and  unjuft. 

It  is,  therefore,  for  the  happinefs  of  mankind,  that 
in  this  refpect  we  have  nature  for  our  guide ;  that  is  to 
fay,  principles  refulting  from  the  nature  of  juft  focie- 
ties, as  infallible  as  nature  itfelf.  The  very  effence  of 
fociety  is  the  fcope  and  end  for  which  it  is  inftituted: 
this  end,  therefore,  is  the  true  criterion  of  what  is  right 
or  wrong  in  the  conduct  of  members. 

The  end  of  focieties  we  call  the  common  good;  bc- 
caufe,  as  no  fociety  is  naturally  lawful  which  has  not  a 
good  for  its  object,  fo  it  is  abfolutely  reqnifite,  that  that 
good  be  common  •,  that  is,  the  members  mud  in  fome 
manner  or  other  be  interefted  in  it ;  for,  if  the  contrary 
mould  be  the  cafe,  the  fociety  would  be  defpotical,  un- 
natural and  unlawful. 

Whenever 


;4  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Whenever  the  claimant  of  the  focial  right  extends 

his  claim  farther  than  is  confident  with  the  common 

good,  he  injures  the  focial  obligee :  when,  on  the  other 

hand,  the  latter  does  not  perform  all  his  obligations  to 

fuch  an  extent  and  in  fuch  a  manner  as  the  common 

good  requires,   he  injures  the  former :  in  either  cafe* 

the  end  of  the  fociety  is  fruftrated,  and  the  members 

refpe&ively  incur  the  guilt  of  perfidy. 

ScL — The  pofition,  that  all  lawful  focieties  mud  have  a  com- 
mon good  for  their  objeci",  holds  good  even  in  cafes  where 
perfons,  on  account  of  injuries  and  damages  committed 
by  them,  are  deprived  of  their  liberty  and  put  to  hard 
labour;  becaufe  they  enjoy  as  much  right  as  their  ftate  of 
guilt  admits  of,  and  have  this  interefl  in  that  ftate  of  fer- 
vitude  and  conftraint,  that  they  make  that  reparation 
which  the  natural  laws  in  fuch  cafes  require. 

There  is  fuch  a  thing  as  focial  morality  or  immorality 'y 
for,  in  all  manner  of  focieties,  that  isjuit,  right  and  be- 
neficial which  comports  with  the  common  good :  that, 
on  the  other  hand,  which  is  repugnant  thereto,  is  un- 
jud:,  wrong  and  evil. 

This  leads  us  to  the  univerfal  focial  law  contained  in 
this  proportion  \  Direli  your  anions  fo  that  the  common 
good  of  the  fociety  be  attained^  preferved  and  promoted^ 
and  carefully  avoid  the  contrary. 

This  law  binds  both  the  claimant  of  the  focial  right 
and  the  focial  obligee :  all  actions  of  the  members  of 
fociety  among  one  another,  which  comport  with  this 
law,  are  juft,  right  and  good-,  all,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  is  contradictory  thereto,  is  unjuft,  wrong  and  evil. 

Since  obligations  for  certain  ends  imply  the  per- 
formance of  all  thofe  duties  which  are  necefTary  for  the 
attainment  of  thofe  ends,  it  follows,  that  the  members 
of  a  fociety  are  bound  to  perform  all  thofe  focial  duties 

which 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.'  295 

which  are  necefTary  for  the  attainment  of  the  common 
good  thereof.  Hence  it  likewife  follows,  that  the 
claimant  of  the  focial  right  may  lawfully  extend  his 
claim  to  all  fuch  actions  as  are  abfolutely  necefTary  for 
the  attainment  and  prefervation  of  the  common  good 
of  the  fociety. 

Sch. — Of  the  importance  of  this  natural  connection  between 
ends  and  means  we  have  already  fpoken,  and  fhewn  the 
neceffity  of  a  careful  diftin£tion  between  necefTary  ends 
and  fuch  as  may  be  ptherwife.     Vide  page  33. 

Thofe  actions,  rights  and  things  which  members  of 
fociety  enjoy  independent  of  their  focial  character,  and 
which  they  may  confequently  direct  to  their  own  ad- 
vantage, conftitute  what  is  called  their  private  good. 

The  private  good  of  the  members  of  fociety  may 
concern  their  temporal  or  their  eternal  felicity :  fince 
the  latter  is  a  good  which  man,  as  a  rational  creature, 
cannot  on  any  account  facrirlce,  fo  no  fociety  can  law- 
fully require  that  facrince  under  any  circumftances 
whatever.  But  temporal  private  good  may  come  intq 
a  collifion  with  the  common  good  of  the  fociety;  and 
in  cafe  of  fuch  a  collifion,  it  is  a  focial  duty  to  prefer 
the  common  intereft  to  our  private  eafe  and  conve- 
nience. 

Amongft  the  many  things  which  require  the  molt 
careful  attention,  and  which  murt  be  confidered  as  the 
efTential  ingredients  of  the  common  good  of  fociety,  are 
liberty  and  internal  and  external  fecurity :  for,  without 
them-ft,  members  have  no  intereit  in  the  common  good 
of  the  fociety,  at  leait  not  as  much  as  they  ought  to 
have,  and  the  fociety  becomes  more  or  lefs  defpotical 
and  unjuit:  without  internal  and  external  fecurity,  in- 
riividuals,  nay,  perhaps  the  whole  focietv  is  in  a  ftate 


2g6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  fear,  which  is  one  of  its  moft  unhappy  fituations, 
except  that  of  inteftine  war  and  invafion  from  without. 

In  fociety  the  natural  liberty  of  members  muft  be 
reftrained;  for,  without  fuch  a  reftraint  they  may  not 
only  injure  one  another,  but  alfo  others  not  belonging 
to  their  body  -,  and  the  confequence  would  be,  that  the 
fociety  could  neither  be  internally  nor  externallyfecure. 

It  is  therefore  a  focial  duty,  that  no  member  injure 
a  fellow  member  or  any  other  perfon,  left  the  fecurity 
of  the  fociety  be  thereby  difturbed  or  endangered. 

Societies,  with  refpect  to  the  acquisition  of  rights, 
may  be  diftinguifhed  into  necejfary  or  voluntary:  the 
former  refult  from  the  titles  of  law  and  of  forfeiture  -, 
the  latter  from  pact  and  mutual  confent. 

There  is  another  important  diftinction,  which  has 
reference  to  the  focial  obligation ;  for  this  may  arife 
from  the  nature  of  the  fociety,  or  depend  upon  the 
claim  of  the  perfon  vefted  with  the  focial  right.  In 
the  former  cafe,  focieties  are  faid  to  be  equal-,  in  the 
latter  they  are  unequal. 

Unequal  focieties  are  unnatural,  and  are  therefore, 
in  the  forum  of  nature,  unlawful  and  defpotical. 

In  equal  focieties,  many  and  great  inequalities  may 
take  place  in  many  refpects,  becaufe  the  nature  of  fuch 
focieties  requires  or  admits  of  them.  There  muft  be 
members  who  exercife  particular  rights,  whilft  others 
are  under  correfponding  obligations;  for  without  fuch 
a  fubordination  the  end  of  fociety  cannot  be  obtained, 
or  that  order  and  harmony  preferved  which  are  fo  efTen- 
tially  neceftary  for  the  prefervation  of  the  fociety  and 
the  happinefs  of  its  members.  As  in  this  refpect  a 
difference  muft  take  place,  refulting  from  the  nature  of 

the 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  Q^J 

the  fociety,  To  members  may  be  differently  fituated 
with  refpect  to  their  private  interefts :  with  thefe,  as 
has  been  explained,  the  common  good  does  not  inter- 
fere ;  but,  in  cafes  of  collifion,  requires  the  united  ex- 
ertions of  the  members,  according  to  their  feveral 
abilities. 

The  principle  of  equality,  therefore,  fo  much  the 
object  of  controverfy  at  this  day,  if  well  underftood,  is 
far  from  that  levelling  fyftem  which  faps  the  foundation 
of  all  order  and  fubordination  in  fociety,  and  lays  prof- 
trate  all  right  of  lawful  pre-eminence  and  property. 
There  muft  be  rulers  in  fociety,  and  there  muft  and 
will  be  a  difference  among  men,  with  refpect  to  talents, 
induftry  and  poffeffions :  but  let  the  rulers  derive  their 
right  from  the  nature  of  the  fociety,  and  let  this  right 
be  exercifed  for  the  common  good  thereof-,  let  the  wife 
and  the  virtuous  be  preferred  to  the  adminiftratjon  of 
the  fociety,  as  they  are  both  able  and  willing  to  ftudy 
its  advancement  and  profperity ;  let  the  poor  reft -con- 
tented under  the  care  and  protection  of  the  fociety,  and 
cheerfully  contribute  for  the  fupport  of  the  common 
good,  whilft  thofe  who  are  more  wealthy  affift  in  pro- 
portion to  their  poiTeffions. 

A  right  to  difpofe  of  the  actions  of  the  members  of 
fociety,  for  the  attainment  of  the  common  good  thereof, 
is  called  government :  perfons  adminiftering  govern- 
ment are  laid  to  be  in  authority :  thofe  members  of  fo- 
ciety who  are  in  authority  are  known  by  the  name  of 
rulers,  whilft  fuch  as  are  under  that  authority  are  called 
the  ruled. 

Since  the  actions  of  moral  agents  are  to  be  directed 
by  motives,  and  as  a  connection  of  motives  conftitutes 
moral  obligations,  it  follows,  that  rulers  have  a  right 

Q.q  to 


2^8  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  prefcribe  to  the  members  of  a  fociety  fuch  rules  as 
may  import  their  focial  obligations  \  that  is  to  fay, 
each  government  is  inverted  with  the  natural  right  of 
enacting,  promulging  and  putting  into  execution  laws 
for  the  conduct  of  the  members  of  fociety,  and  thefe 
are  bound  to  conduct  themfelves  conformably  to  thofe 
laws. 

Laws  which  are  naturally  entitled  to  the  obedience 
of  the  ruled,  muft  be  confident  with  and  have  for  their 
^end  the  common  good  of  fociety,  for  it  is  for  this 
purpofe  only  that  government  is  veiled  with  legislative 
rights.  If  the  contrary  mould  take  place,  obligations 
would  be  conftituted  which  refult  not  from  the  nature 
of  fociety,  but  depend  upon  arbitrary  difpofal  \ — the 
fociety  would  become  unequal  and  defpotical.    ■ 

The  determination,  whether  laws  are  confiftent  with 
the  common  good  of  the  fociety,  cannot  reft  upon  the 
opinion  of  the  rulers,  nor  upon  that  of  particular  per- 
sons' amongft  the  ruled  •,  for  in  the  former  cafe,  the  fo- 
cial obligation  would  reft  with  the  claimants  of  the  fo- 
cial right  ♦,  in  the  latter  the  focial  right  would  be  made 
dependent  upon  the  focial  obligee,  who  might  have  a 
private  intereft  to  biafs  his  judgment  to  the  prejudice  of 
the  rulers  as  well  as  of  the  common  good  of  the  whole 
fociety.  In  both  thefe  cafes  obligations  would  be  con- 
ftituted which  do  not  flow  from  the  nature  of  the  fo- 
ciety, and  the  confequence  would  be,  that  the  fociety 
would  ceafe  to  be  equal  and  lawful. 

The  nature  of  equal  and  limited  focieties  is,  that  they 
have  for  their  end  a  common  good.  But  a  good  is 
common  if  all  or  the  greater  part  of  the  members  are 
interefted  in  it.  The  determination,  therefore,  whe- 
ther laws  are  for  the  benefit  of  the  fociety  or  of  a  con- 
trary 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  299 

trary  tendency,  refts  with  all  the  members,  or,  where 
the  confent  of  all  cannot  be  obtained,  with  the  majority : 
for  in  either  of  thefe  cafes  the  focial  duty  is  preferved 
by  which  members  are  bound  to  prefer  the  common 
good  to  their  private  intereft. 

It  is  pofTible,  and  indeed  frequently  the  cafe,  that  the 
majority  of  a  fociety  commit  errors  and  miftakes,  by 
approving  and  adopting  what  is  detrimental  thereto : 
but  as  they  have  their  mare  in  the  evil  confequences  of 
their  errors,  fo  they  have  an  opportunity  of  being  foon 
convinced  of  them,  and  the  remedy  to  find  relief  is  in 
their  own  hands. 

.  Laws  of  a  fociety  have  therefore  a  binding  force 
upon  all  its  members,  as  long  as  a  majority  approve 
or  acquiefce  in  them. 

As  long  as  focieties  are  ruled  by  men,  fo  long  there 

is  no  fecurity  againft  a  poflibility  of  being  burthened 

with  unnecefTary  and  grievous  laws :  the  members  of 

a  fociety  have  therefore  a  natural  right  to  watch  the 

conduct  of  their  rulers,  to  ftate  their  grievances,  and 

to  apply  proper  remedies  for  redrefs:  the  rulers  are 

under  natural  obligations  to  grant  redrefs  as  often  as 

their  meafures  militate  againft  the  common  good. 

Sc/i. — For  further  particulars  on  this  fubje<5t  fee  pages  31 — 34, 
and  48 — 50. 

Societies  become  fubordinated,  when  the  common 
good  of  one  is  fo  modified  as  to  become  a  fuitable 
mean  for  obtaining  the  common  good  of  another. 

Thofe  focieties  which  arife  from  fuch  a  fubordination 
are  compound \  and  thefe  again  more  or  lefs  general,  as 
the  fubordination  comprehends  a  greater  or  lefs  number 
of  individual  focieties. 

Members 


300  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Members  of  a  compound  fociety  muft  exercife  their 
focial  rights,  and  perform  their  focial  obligations  in 
fuch  a  manner  and  to  fach  an  extent  as  the  common  good 
of  the  more  general  fociety  requires  •,  for  in  refpect 
of  the  latter,  the  focial  rights  and  obligations  of  the 
members  of  fubordinated  focieties  mud  be  confidered 
as  their  private  good. 

As,  therefore,  in  each  fociety  private  good  muft  be 
difpenfed  with  where  it  is  found  to  be  inconfiftent  with 
the  common  good,  fo  the  common  good  of  fubordi- 
nated focieties  muft  be  difpenfed  with,  as  far  as  it  is 
found  to  militate  againft  the  common  good  of  the  ge- 
neral fociety. 

Sch. — The  mod  general  fociety  is  the  civil.  Civil  focieties 
are  known  by  the  names  of  ftates,  nations,  &c.  In  a 
ftate  all  focieties  and  interefts  muft  be  fubordinate  to 
public  good;  where  that  is  not  the  cafe,  the  political  pa- 
radox takes  place,  imperium  in  imperio,  or  flatus  injlatu. 

The  rule  that  the  common  good,  in  cafes  of  colli- 
fion,  muft  be  facrificed  to  the  more  general,  or  what 
is  commonly  called  the  public  weal,  cannot  extend  to 
the  fpiritual  good  of  focieties ;  that  is,  their  religious 
fentiments  and  modes  of  worfhip  •,  except  where  thefe 
fhould  actually  endanger  the  welfare  of  fociety,  and 
members  on  this  account  oppofe  the  public  good,  fo 
that  no  other  remedy  is  left.  In  cafe  therefore  of  ne- 
cefllty  only,  the  fociety  has  a  right  to  check  the  effects 
of  fuch  dangerous  innovations. 

Sch. — If  a  fociety  holds  it  unlawful  to  make  ufe  of  war  or 
violent  defence,  the  general  fociety  has  a  right  to  check 
the  progrefs  of  fuch  tenets,  that  they  may  not  become 
general,  if  there  be  caufe  to  fear  that  effect;  but  if  fuch 
perfons  may  otherwife  contribute  to  the  general  defence, 
and  there  be  not  an  abfolute  neceffity  for  their  actual 
fervice,  it  would  be  imprudent  and  improper  to  meddle 
with  their  tenets  at  all. 

In 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  3OI 

In  all  other  refpe&s  well  regulated  focieties  require 
not  a  facrifice  of  the  liberty  of  confeience-,  for  their 
primary  fcope  is  temporal  felicity,  that  is,  the  higher!: 
poflible  degree  of  liberty,  joined  with  both  internal 
and  external  fecurity:  but  for  the  enjoyment  of  the 
firft,  liberty  of  confeience  is  effentially  neceffary  •,  and 
in  well  regulated  communities  falutary  laws  provide 
for  the  internal  peace  of  fociety,  which  is  generally 
very  fafe  with  refpecl  to  confeientious  perfons.  As 
for  the  external  fecurity  of  fociety,  experience  has 
evinced  that  the  number  of  thofe  who  have  adopted 
tenets  unfriendly  to  its  effectual  fupport  in  times  of 
imminent  danger,  has  been  comparatively  fmall  at  all 
times,  fo  that  its  fafety  is  by  no  means  injured  by  ex- 
ercifing  towards  them  all  poflible  moderation. 

The  oftenfible,  or  public  characler  of  a  fociety,  con- 
fids  in  the  rulers  thereof-,  for  as  long  as  a  majority 
acquiefce  in  their  proceedings,  the  approbation  of  the 
fociety  is  {tamped  on  thefe  proceedings,  and  the  con- 
fequence  is,  that  the  rulers  are  held  up  as  perfons  who 
are  vefted  with  the  power  of  maintaining  the  rights  of 
the  fociety  at  large.  Things,  therefore,  done  or  fuf- 
fered  by  rulers  in  their  focial  capacity,  are  deemed  to 
be  done  or  fuffered  by  the  fociety  at  large. 

Hence  it  is  that  different  focieties  injure  one  ano- 
ther, if  the  rulers  of  the  one,  either  direcliy  or  indirectly , 
impede  the  rulers  of  the  other  in  the  purfuit  or  in  the 
enjoyment  of  the  common  good  of  their  own  fociety : 
the  former  will  be  the  cafe  if  the  injury  arifes  from  the 
proceedings  of  the  rulers  -,  the  latter  when  it  is  caufed 
by  a&s  of  the  members,  with  the  knowledge,  con- 
nivance or  approbation  of  the  government  of  their 
fociety :  for  in  both  thefe  cafes  the  rulers  of  the  one 

are 


302  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

are  the  moral  caufe  of  injuries  committed  againft  the 
i*uJers  of  the  other  fociety. 

The  government  of  a  fociety  may  be  injured  in  an 
immediate  or  in  a  mediate  manner;  the  former  if  the 
direct  or  indirect  injury  is  committed  againft  the  rulers ; 
the  latter  if  the  one  or  the  other  has  befallen  an  indi- 
vidual, fo  that  he  has  been  impeded  in  purfuing  or 
enjoying  the  common  good  of  his  own  fociety. 

From  thefe  diftinctions  the  following  maxims  may 
be  inferred  for  determining  what  is  injurious  or  other- 
wife  between  focieties : 

i.  Injuries  committed  by  the  rulers  of  one  fociety 
againfl:  the  government  of  the  other,  are  ipfo  faclo 
public ;  that  is  to  fay,  they  concern  the  whole  fociety. 

2.  Injuries  committed  by  any  member  of  a  fociety 
againft  the  government  of  another,  become  only  pub- 
lic on  the  part  of  the  former,  if  fatisfaction  is  denied 
when  required,  the  injurer  countenanced  or  protected, 
or  the  act  approved  of,  &c. 

3.  Injuries  which  members  of  one  fociety  commit 
againft  the  members  of  another,  become  public  if  the 
injury  concerns  the  public  good,  and  if,  reprefentations 
being  made  by  one  government  to  the  other,  fatisfac- 
tion is  refufed,  and  the  injury  thus  countenanced. 

4.  A  member  injuring  the  rulers  of  the  fociety  of 
which  he  is  a  member,  commits  a  public  offence 
againft  the  fociety  at  large. 

Societies  are  bound  by  natural  laws  not  to  injure 
others  either  directly  or  indirectly,  whether  in  a  me- 
diate or  in  an  immediate  manner;  for  by  doing  an  in- 
jury, they  give  caufe  for  violent  defence  and  war,  and 
endanger  their  own  fecurity. 

In 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  303 

In  times  of  common  danger,  the  members  of  a  fo- 
ciety  are  perfectly  bound  to  afford  aid  and  afiiitaiice  to 
one  another,  and  make  defence  a  common  caufe. 

Social  connections  are  deiiroyed  when  focial  obliga- 
tions and  rights  ceafe:  we  may  diftinguifh  various 
ways  in  which  either  of  thefe  will  be  the  cafe. 

Death  puts  an  end  to  focial  connections  •,  mutual 
confent  dijfolves  them  •,  they  become  extincl  if  prohi- 
bited by  law,  or  where  their  end  is  rendered  impoflibie ; 
they  expire  when  the  time  is  elapfed  which  was  to  de- 
termine their  duration. 

We  conclude  this  chapter  by  obferving,  that  focial 

connections  have  no  pretence  to  a  longer  continuance 

than  the  caufe  of  their  inftitution. 

Sch. — Allegiance  is  a  focial  duty  as  long  as  protection  is 
afforded. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Introduction  to  the  relative  duties  of  man,  which  flow  from 
the  confitution  of  the  f exes. 

JLXLL  focieties  of  a  fpecific  nature,  which  may  take 
place  among  men,  ultimately  refult  from  the  fame 
fource  and  origin  from  which  the  various  affociations 
of  all  beings  of  an  animate  nature  arife,  to  wit,  from 
the.  natural  constitution  of  the  fexes,  and  that  inftinc- 
tive  affection  between  them,  which,  accompanied  by 
an  infuperable  defire  and  love  of  offspring,  are  defin- 
ed by  the  Moft  High  as  means  to  preferve  and  con- 
tinue in  existence  their  refpective  fpecies. 

T!:e 


304  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  brute  creation,  feem  to  have  accomplished  the" 
defign  of  Providence,  when,  following  inftindt  and 
fenfe,  by  affociations,  for  the  mofr.  part  periodical  and 
promifcuous,  they  procreate  offspring,  beftowing  on 
them  that  fhort-lived  care  and  folicitude  which  the 
protection  and  prefervation  of  their  young  require. 

But,  blefTed  be  God,  there  is  a  vaft  difference  with 
refpect  to  human  nature  •,  his  providences  towards 
the  children  of  men  are  not  only  more  extenfive  than 
this  tranfitory  life,  but  likewife  infinitely  more  glo- 
rious. Man,  befides  the  enjoyment  of  animal  life, 
and  the  innumerable  bleffings  it  affords,  is  blefTed  with 
a  moral,  fpiritual  and  immortal  nature ;  his  destina- 
tion is  not  confined  to  time  or  tranfitory  enjoyments, 
but  extends  to  permanent,  lafting,  nay,  everlafting 
happinefs.  To  be  guided  by  inftinct,  to  follow  fenfe, 
to  be  fatisfied  with  fenfual  gratifications,  comports  with 
the  nature  and  is  the  condition  of  brutes.  To  fub- 
ject  them  to  reafon,  to  ufe  them  in  conformity  to  the 
will  of  the  glorious  Creator,  and  in  confiftency  with  the 
defign  for  which  they  are  given  -,  to  feek  real  and 
everlafting  happinefs,  by  a  conduct  rational  and  con- 
formable to  the  fupreme  law  and  will  of  God,  is  the 
duty  of  man — his  glory — his  prerogative. 

The   flave   of  paffion   fins  both  againfr.  God  and 

himfelf  ;  thofe  who  fubmit  to  the  incitements  of  in- 

ftinct  only,  forget  the  high  deftination  of  nature,  and 

are  infenfible  of  their  awful  refponfibility  to  their  God 

and  Maker,  for  the  ufe  they  make  of  all  the  faculties 

and  gifts  beftowed  upon  them :   the  leaf!  that  can  be 

faid  of  fuch  a  conduct,  is,  that  it  degrades  man  to 

the  claffes  of  brutes,  or  perhaps  finks  him  below  their 

condition. 

Sch 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  305 

..//.— Here  would  be  the  place  to  fpeak  of  difaraqeful  con- 
nexions, and  of*  acts  unnatural,  which  conltitute  crimes 
without  a  name  ;  becaufe  too  difgraceful  to  be  fuppofed 

to  obtain  ::  place  among  the  actions  ol  men. 

Quid  men  be  fatisfied,  that  aflbciations  have  the 
function  of  natural  inftinct  ?  Ought  they  not,  as  mo- 
ral agents,  to  look  forward  to  the  will  of  their  Crea- 
tor,  and  consider  the  confequences  of  their  actions  ? 
Moil  certainly ;  fo  far  from  rendering  himfelf  a  brute, 
man  ought,  before  all  other  considerations,  to  enquire, 
Is  it  right  ?  is  it  confident  with  the  dignity  of  a  moral  na- 
ture and  with  the  will  of  God  ?  is  it  lawful  ?  Thus  con- 
ducting himfelf  he  acts  becoming  the  deftination  of  a 
being,  blefled  with  an  immortal  fpint,  which  cannot 
be  fatisfied  by  tranfitory  gratifications  and  empty  In  (Is, 
and  ought  therefore  to  feek  for  rational  pleafures,  lad- 
ing and  permanent,  calculated  to  advance  that  happi- 
nefs  which  is  the  ultimate  defign  of  all  the  providences 
of  the  Deity  towards  men. 

Since,  then,  God  has  implanted  powerful  inftincts 
in  human  nature,  rendering  thofe  aflbciations  eligible 
which  he  has  ordered  for  the  prefervation  of  mankind, 
it  certainly  follows,  both  from  the  nature  of  man  and 
his  high  deftination,  that  he  is  under  the  mo  ft  {acred 
obligations,  neither  blindly  to  follow  nor  wantonly  to 
fupprefs,  but  rationally  to  controul  the  influence  of 
them,  by  determined  refolutions,  taken  from  the 
weighty  motives  of  piety,  juftice,  humanity  and  de- 
cency, that  they  become  not  obftacles  to  the  purfuit, 
but  means  for  the  attainment  and  advancement  of  hu- 
man happinefs. 

Sch. — It  is  a  juit  obfervation,  that  man  differs  not  fo  much 
from  brutes  by  reafon  as  by  religion.  What  avails  it  to 
have  the  former,  and  not  to  exercife  it,  or  to  reject  its 
falutkrv  counfc  Is 

R  r  The 


306  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  molt  lively  fenfe  of  duty  mould  therefore  impel 
man  to  improve  thofe  ftrong  affections  implanted  in 
his  nature  into  habits  of  true  love,  and  a  lofting  friend- 
Jhip,  founded  in  a  fincere  and  indefatigable  defire  to 
promote,  as  much  as  poffible,  one  another's  happinefs. 
Without  fuch  a  moral  union  of  will  and  affection,  there 
cannot  be  {lability  in  a  common  intereft*,  happinefs 
cannot  fubfirt,  and  a  connection  of  the  fexes  cannot  be 
confident  with  the  general  welfare  of  mankind  or  be- 
coming the  dignity  of  human  nature;  iince  the  condi- 
tion of  the  parties  muft  be  precarious  and  pitiful,  and 
that  of  their  offspring  miferable,  forfaken  and  deftitute. 

How  long  do  children  continue  to  be  extremely 
tender,  helplefs  and  weak !  and  what  would  be  their 
condition,  if  thofe  who  have  been  inftrumental  in  their 
exiftence  mould  withdraw  their  affirtance  for  the  pro- 
tection and  prefervation  of  their  lives  ? 

How  ftrong,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  affection, 
how  nearly  is  the  happinefs  of  parents  connected  with 
that  of  their  children  !  How  great  then  the  affliction, 
and  how  grievous  the  injury  to  a  fellow  parent,  if  one 
of  the  parties  mould  withdraw  his  affection,  and  de- 
prive what  is  his  own  flefli  and  blood  of  fo  neceffary 
an  affiftance! 

Hence  it  is  evident,  that  connections  which  are  not 
founded  in  true  love,  where  perfons  have  not  formed 
one  common  interert  with  the  deflgn  of  promoting  one 
another's  happinefs,  where  they  continue  not  in  a 
perpetual  ftate  of  friendfhip  neceffary  for  their  mu- 
tual comfort,  as  well  as  for  the  faithful  performance 
of  parental  duties  to  children,  who  are  generally  the 
natural  confequence  of  fuch  affeciations,  are  unbe- 
coming the  rationality  of  human  nature,   contrary  to 

the 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  %OJ 

the  happinefs  of  the  parties  as  well  as  the  children, 
and  therefore  utterly  repugnant  to  the  dictates  of  na- 
tural law,  which  requires  of  man  that  his  principal 
duty  mould  be  to  promote  his  own  happinefs  and  that 
of  others,  and  carefully  to  avoid  the  contrary. 

Sell. — Befides  the  powerful  arguments,  that  God  firft  made  one 
man  and  one  woman,  and,(ince  creation, has  ordered  things 
fo,  that  the  number  of  males  and  females  mould  continue 
as  nenrly  equal  as  poffible,  the  neceflity  of  one  common 
intereft  and  perpetual  friendfiiip  between  perfons  con- 
nected for  their  own  happinefs  and  for  that  of  their  chil- 
dren, is  a  ftrong  argument  againft  polygamy  :  the  former 
mews  the  injuftice  thereby  committed  againft  the  general 
rights  of  mankind;  the  latter  evinces  the  fins  which  per- 
fons by  fuch  conduct  commit  againft  God,  againft  t'hem- 
felves  and  their  offspring. 

It  is  delightful  indeed  to  contemplate  the  ways  of 
the  wifdom  of  God  in  his  government  over  the  human 
race,  for  they  are  wifely  diftributed  and  full  of  mercy. 
Children  receive  their  exiflence  by  powers  which,  ac- 
cording to  the  univerfal  order  of  nature,  are  implanted 
in  the  conftitutional  frame  of  mankind :  their  fupport, 
and  more  efpecially  their  education,  that  is,  all  that  con- 
cerns their  felicity  here  and  hereafter,  is  founded  on 
natural  affection,  and  chiefly  on  thofe  principles  of  jus- 
tice and  equity  which  the  wifdom  of  the  Moil  High 
lias  planned,  and  which  his  finger  has  engraven  on  the 
hearts  of  men  for  the  direction  of  their  conduct;  and 
the  promotion  of  their  happinefs. — Man  is  made  de- 
pendent on  his  fellow  creatures  for  the  firft  dawn  of 
life :  the  human  race  is  linked  together  by  ties  of  blood 
and  ties  of  duties:  all  men  labour  under  the  fame 
wants  and  infirmities,  and,  in  conformity  to  the  will  of 
their  common  Father,  are  fubjedfc  to  the  fame  laws  for 
promoting  their  happinefs  and  extending  their  benevo- 
lence* 


308  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

lence  to  one  another,  and  efpecially  to  thofe  who  are 
related  to  us  by  blood  and  more  ftrictly  intrufted  to 
our  care. 

Let  thofe  who  have  unluckily  learned  the  art  of  con- 
tracting a  callous  infenfibility  to  the  dictates  of  reafon, 
and  who  are  even  dead  to  the  inftinctive  calls  of  nature, 
take  example  from  the  affectionate  care  and  folicitude 
which  brutes  never  fail  to  exert  towards  their  young, 
as  long  as  their  condition  requires  protection  and  aflift- 
ance:  here  they  will  fee  the  horror  of  lawlefs,  loofe 
and  promifcuous  connections. 

But  let  us  draw  a  veil  over  human  converfation  not 
guided  by  religion,  where  a  creature  endowed  with 
reafon  is  deaf  to  the  gentle  voice  of  virtue,  and  turns 
an  enemy  to  the  delights  of  innocence  and  its  conco- 
mitants, peace  of  mind  and  true  happinefs,  the  appro- 
bation of  God  and  of  men. — Let  us  behold  the  beau- 
tiful fight  of  perfons  who  have  given  up  all  their 
worldly  intereits  for  their  own  mutual  happinefs  and 
for  that  of  their  offspring,  dwelling  in  unity,  each  en- 
deavouring to  prevent  the  other  in  ail  things  which  are 
confident  with  virtue  and  with  their  common  good. 
United  by  intereft,  they  are  not  only  one  body,  but 
one  heart  and  one  foul.  Their  affection  refts  upon 
virtuous  love,  which  increafes  with  every  effort  that  is 
made  to  advance  their  mutual  happinefs.  Behold 
their  joint,  unceafing  endeavours,  not  only  to  protect, 
but  to  educate  their  children  !  how  affduous  to  tit  them 
for  the  duties  of  life!  how  ftrenuous  and  mediant  to 
do  all  in  their  power  to  qualify  them  for  the  promotion 
of  their  own  felicity  and  that  of  others  !  It  is  both 
their  vvifh  and  delight  to  caufe  their  offspring  to  be- 
come good  fathers,  good  citizens,  bleffed  inftruments 

for 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  309 

for  promoting  the  glory  of  their  Maker  and  the  felicity 

of  mankind.      It  is  (aid,   Nuptitf  declare  the  father-, 

but  let  it  be  obferved,  that  it  is  the  good  education 

that  realizes  the  declaration.     What  excellency  is  there 

in  the  name  of  a   father  or  mother,  if  parents  have 

been  but  inurumental  'in  bringing  children   to   light, 

iince  it  is  Weil  known  that  the  beafts  of  the  foreft  do 

the  fame  after  their  kind  ?     Suppofe  fuch  parents  give 

\t  children  the  needful  fupport,  by  doing  lb  they 

can  only    exceed  the  dumb  creature  in   the  neccilary 

length  of  time.      It  is  altogether  inftinct  with  both, 

with  this  difference,  that  the  effect  of  that  inftinct  is 

more  lading  on  the  part  of  man  than  on  that  of  the 

brute  •,  becaufe  it  is  God  who  has  ordered   it  fo,  the 

natural  weaknefs  of  children  requiring  that  provifion 

for  their  protection  and  prefervation  which  even  the 

degeneracy  and  wickednefs  of  the  human  heart  can 

feldom  impair. 

Sch.  1. — How  cruel  and  unnatural,  then,  niuft  be  the  conduct 
of  thofe  who  can  deny  children  their  natural  rights,  and 
leave  them  deftitute  and  unprovided  for? 

Sch.  2. — How  detectable  is  fornication  and  adultery,  if,  befides 
the  internal  turpitude  and  a  thoufand  other  crimes  con- 
fequent  to  them,  this  one  is  confidered,  that  a  parent  de- 
nies his  own  fiefli  and  blood,  or  leaves  it  to  all  the  mife- 
ries  of  want,  difgrace  and  fiiame? 

$ch.  3. — We  juftly  diftinguilh  parental  love  from  natural  ten- 
dernefs  and  fondnefs,  fince  the  former  is  guided  by  rea- 
fon  and  directed  in  conformity  to  the  precepts  and  prohi- 
bitions of  natural  law,  whilft  the  lattdf  degenerate  into 
reprehenfible  neglect  of  duty,  and  caufe  more  harm  than 
defpotic  rudenefs  and  feverity.  Love  is  true,  if  the  hap- 
pinefs  of  children  is  its  invariable  object  and  purfuit. 
Of  true  parental  love  it  may  be  juftly  faid,  that  it  is  fit- 
as  death,  lafting  as  life.  It  rifes  fuperior  to  all  the  pains, 
troubles,  vexations  and  fufferings  .  duration  of 

linidrer  requires  from  parents^ 

Parental 


3  10  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Parental  duties  are  indeed  exceedingly  complicated, 
arduous  and  difficulty  but,  behold  the  merciful  provi- 
dences of  the  Mod  High !  they  are  not  only  made  to- 
lerable, but  pleafant,  fweet  and  delightful !  It  is  a  great 
gratification  to  parents,  that  they  can  render  the  ftate 
of  their  children  happy,  aflift  their  wants,  alleviate 
their  mifery,  and  fympathife  in  their  fufferings  !  It  is 
God  who  has  thus  placed  the  hearts  of  parents  in  uni- 
fon  with  the  concerns  of  their  children ;  nay,  the  power 
of  nature,  as  well  as  of  religion  and  humanity,  extends 
that  fympathy  to  others  •,  fo  that  children  who  are  des- 
titute of  the  affiftance  of  parents,  either  by  death  or  the 
omiiilon  of  parental  duties,  find  relief  and  comfort,  fa- 
thers and  mothers,  in  other  perfons.  God  has  con- 
nected the  happinefs  of  parents  with  that  of  their  chil- 
dren, fo  that  it  is  morally  inftparable  therefrom:  no- 
thing but  death  fhould  be  ftrong  enough  to  difiblve 
parental  affection. 

Sch.  i. — Hence  we  fee  how  very  confident  it  is  with  human 
happinefs,  and  confequently  with  moral  law,  that  parents 
fhould  have  a  right  to  devife  their  property  to  their  chil- 
dren. 

Sch.  2. — What  then  is  hard  enough  to  ferve  as  a  reproach  for 
the  great  neglect  that  is  frequently  fuffered  to  take  place 
in  the  education  of  children?  How  unaccountable  is  it 
to  confign  them  in  their  tender  years  to  the  company  of 
rude  or  wicked  perfons — to  truft  them  entirely  to  a  mailer 
or  a  madam — to  fend  them  to  a  public  institution,  and  to 
be  lefs  concerned,  with  refpeel  to  their  progrefs-and  con- 
dud,  than  one  would  be  about  a  horfe  or  any  other  fa- 
vourite creature? 

Sch.  %. — The  very  little  concern  men  take  in  caufing  their 
children  to  have  a  proper  fenfe  of  religion,  and  their  neg- 
lect of  inculcating  thofe  fentiments  of  their  dependence 
on  God  for  all  they  have  or  may  expect,  which  are  fo 
\vell  calculated  to  make  ftrong  impreffions  on  their  ten- 
der minds,  and  early  habituate  them  to  the  practice  of 

virtue. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  3  I  I 

virtue,  form  another  aftonifhing  proof  that  the  prefent 
age  has  ftrange  notions  of  education.  We  mail  not  ani- 
madvert on  the  noify  crowds  of  idle  vagabond  children, 
who  obftruft  the  flreets  by  day,  and  particularly  bv  night. 
Still  we  are  republicans,  and  boaft  of  republican  man- 
ners ! 

The  fupport  and  education  of  children,  which  re- 
quire the  joint  efforts  of  parents,  are  therefore  further 
ftrong  arguments  to  prove,  that  no  other  connection 
of  the  fexes  can  be  naturally  lawful  but  that  which  is 
founded  upon  a  firm  and  permanent  union  of  the  parties 
in  one  common  intereft.  This  union  is  to  be  indijfohi- 
hie  \  nothing  but  the  death  of  one  of  the  parties  ought 
to  caufe  a  reparation. 

Unhappy  are  the  parties  connected  for  life,  who  have 
given  up  all  their  individual  interefts,  and  placed  their 
happinefs  in  mutual  ailiftance,  in  reciprocal  fidelity,  and 
in  joint  efforts  to  promote  the  end  of  their  afTociation, 
if  love  be  not  both  the  bafis  and  foul  of  that  union, 
and  if  there  mould  be  caufe  to  refort  to  the  perfect:  af- 
firmative rights  in  each  other's  perfon  which  are  natu- 
rally created  by  that  union. — The  moft  grievous  inju- 
ries mult  arife,  if  one  of  the  parties  fhould  forfake  tho 
other,  or  be  remifs  in  performing  thofe  duties  which  are 
neceflary  for  the  promotion  of  their  joint  happinefs  and 
that  of  their  children.  Nature  never  fails  to  give  rights 
adequate  to  the  duties  fhe  impofes :  perfons  cannot 
form  a  diftinct  fociety,  nor  lawfully  have  afeparate  in- 
tereft from  Others,  but  upon  the  ftrength  of  particular 
rights  required  by  the  end  of  that  fociety,  and  adequate 
for  the  fecurity  of  that  particular  intereft. 

There  are  likewife  perfect  affirmative  rights  re- 
quired, that  others  may  be  excluded  from  lawlefs  in- 
terference.    Injuries  attempted  or  committed  againft 

the 


-yl2  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  peace  of  the  union  or  the  attainment  of  all  its  oh 
jects,  muft  be  prevented,  warded  off  or  repelled.  Per- 
feci:  affirmative  rights  are  neceflary,  on  account  of  the 
frailty  of  human  nature,  that  fidelity  be  fecured,  in- 
ternal fecurity  eflablifhed,  and  injuries  corrected  which 
might  unfortunately  take  place  between  the  parties. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  no  connections  can  be  lawful 
which  are  not  voluntary,  refting  upon  and  proceeding 
from  the  mutual  ccnfent  of  the  parties  :  acts  of  vio- 
lence are  highly  criminal,  and,  by  the  laws  of  civilized 
countries,  offences  capital  and  felonious. 

Sch.  i. — The  fame  conclufion  flows  from  the  confederation, 
that  connections  cannot  be  lawful  which  are  not  founded 
on  true  love. 

Sch.  i. — Unwarrantable  as  it  is  in  children  to  flight  the  advice 
of  their  parents  and  friends,  in  concerns  which  have  the 
greateft  influence  on  their  happinefs,  and  as  much  as  grati- 
tude requires  that  they  fhould  afk  their  confent ;  fo,  little 
can  an  interference  be  recommended  which  is  dictated  by 
ambition,  avarice,  or  other  fordid  views  of  parents,  in 
matters  which  concern  the  peace  and  happinefs  of  their 
children. 

Sch.  3. — But  to  difapprove  and  oppofe  connections  with  wick- 
ed or  profligate  characters,  is  the  duty  of  parents;  and 
woe  unto  children  who  defpife  advice  fo  truly  parental! 

From  thefe  feveral  confiderations  it  follows,  that  a 
connection  between  the  fexes  naturally  lawful,  may  be 
confidered  in  one  refpect  as  a  voluntary  Jo ciety\  which, 
as  rights  and  obligations  flow  from  the  end  and  nature 
of  lawful  connections  hitherto  explained,  is  at  the  fame 
time  equal. — In  another  point  of  view,  this  connection 
has  the  form  and  comprehends  all  the  ingredients  ne- 
ceffary  to  a  lawful  pact;  for,  where  perions  mutually 
promife  the  moft  facred  fidelity  in  performing  all  that 
is  neceflary  for  the  happinefs  of  their  union  and  the 

advancement 


ItfORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  gi* 

advancement  of  its  objects,  and  make  a  tender  of  per- 
fect and  affirmative  rights  in  each  other's  perfon,  there 
is  both  acceptance  and  transfer,  confequently  a  con- 
tract. 

Although  lawful  connections  are  juftly  conftdered  as 
contracts  in  the  forum  of  nature,  as  Well  as  in  the  civile 
yet  there  is  in  them  this  Vaft  difference  from  all  other 
pacts  which  have  for  their  object  rights  in  things,  that 
they  mud:  be  confident  with  the  natural  rights  in  per- 
fons,  and  that  thefe  rights  muft  be  modified  by  the 
nature  and  ends  by  and  for  which  connections  of  the 
fexes  can  only  be  lawful.  There  cannot  be  a  claim  to 
arbitrary  and  defpotical  fway  or  flavim  fub'jection:  it 
cannot  confift  with  natural  law,  that  an  union  be  formed 
for  a  time,  or  difiblved  by  mutual  confent.  Concubinage^ 
even  where  children  are  (upported  and  educated,  can- 
not be  lawful,  becaufe  the  bond  of  perpetual  union* 
eflential  to  common  happinefs,  is  fet  afide. 

Whether  lawful  connections  be  confidered  as  con- 
tracts or  as  voluntary  equal  focieties,  they  ought  to  be 
attended  with  certain  external  folemnities,  giving  them 
publicity  to  others,  that  no  act  may  take  place  by  which 
the  peace  and  happinefs  of  the  union,  or  its  objects, 
may  be  diftufbed. 

Befides  this,  juftice,  decency  and  propriety  dictate 
that  deference  to  the  good  opinion  of  others,  which  is 
Que  to  our  fellow  creatures  and  ornamental  to  the  con- 
iiection. 

In.  both  cafes,  it  is  eafy  to  determine,  in  general* 
the  perfons  who  may  or  may  not  lawfully  adociate :— * 
Nature  undoubtedly  gives  that  right  to  fuch  as  can 
make  a  lawful  promife  or  give  a  valid  confent;   but  it 

Ss  <■:  nies 


314  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

denies  it  to  children,  to  lunatics,  and  to  all  fuch  as  have 
not  the  phyfical  or  moral  faculty  to  will  or  to  perform. 
Neither  can  perfons  form  a  lawful  connection  who  are 
pre-engaged,   or  where  any  moral  impediment  is  in 

the  way. 

We  rather  prefer,  however,  the  conflderation  of  this 
fuhject  under  the  idea  of  a  voluntary  equal  fociety, 
where  the  refpective  rights  and  obligations  of  the 
members  refult  from  the  nature  of  the  fociety,  not  from 
the  will  or  caprice  of  either  or  both  parties :  becaufe, 
if  an  union  is  blefled  with  children,  a  fociety  arifes, 
which  is  altogether  natural  in  its  foundation,  and  con- 
fequently  neceffary  •,  for  as  fuch  the  relation  of  parents 
and  children  muft  be  confidered. 

Before  we  conclude  thefe  general  principles  and 
proceed  to  the  feveral  ftates  of  men  which  reft  upon 
them,  it  will  be  neceflary,  for  the  fake  of  perfpicuity, 
to  reduce  them  to  two  principal  points  •,  the  one  de- 
pending upon  the  qualifications  of  perfons,  or  the  re- 
quires of  thofe  who  may  lawfully  afibciate ;  the  other 
referring  to  the  end  or  ends  for  which  afTociations 
made  can  only  be  lawful. 

1 .  No  connections  can  be  lawful  unlefs  they  proceed 
from  the  mutual  confent  of  the  parties,  and  are  form- 
ed upon  the  bafis  of  a  perpetual  union,  eftablifhed 
upon  true  love  and  affectionate  friendship,  and  fup- 
ported  by  perfect:  and  affirmative  rights  in  each  other's 
perfon,  for  the  more  effectual  attainment  of  its  object. 

2.  The  end  of  this  perpetual  union  muft  neceffarily 
be  the  common  and  joint  intereft,  the  promotion  of 
each  other's  happinefs,  and  the  propagation  and  edu- 
cation of  the  children  who  mould  derive  their  origin 
from  it. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  315 

Sfk,  1. — Since  this  end  is  not  always  attainable  in  its  full  ex- 
tent, children  being  a  bleffing  of  the  Lord,  not  in  the 
power  of  the  parties,  nor  the  exclufive  confequence  of  a 
lawful  connexion;  it  follows  in  this  cafe,  that  a  connec- 
tion is  lawful  which  extends  no  farther  than  a  perpetual 
union  for  promoting  each  other's  happinefs. 

ScL  2. — Connections  which  defeat  that  end  are  imputable  to 
the  moral  caufes,  are  extremely  inhuman  and  criminal. 

Sck.  3. — To  make  a  fingle  life  a  virtue  in  itfelf,  or  the  obje<ft 
of  religious  vows,  is  as  unjuft  and  barbarous  as  it  is  (in- 
fill and  fuperftitious. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  matrimonial  or  connubial  fociety. 

X  HE  end  for  which  a  lawful  connection  may  take 
place  is  a  perpetual  union  for  promoting  the  happinefs 
of  the  parties  :  it  likewife  extends  to  the  natural  con- 
fequences  of  that  union,  the  propagation  and  education 
of  children,  in  cafes  where  children  derive  their  origin 
from  that  connection. 

We  may  therefore  diftinguim  a  proximate  and  ulti- 
mate end :  the  former  is  in  the  power  of  the  parties 
to  obtain,  and  their  indifpenfible  duty  to  purfue,  by 
faithfully  performing  what  is  reciprocally  neceflary  for 
their  mutual  happinefs,  what  may  perpetuate  their 
friendfhip,  and  contribute  to  the  attainment  of  the 
objects  of  the  union,  as  far  as  is  pofiibie :  the  latter  has 
refpect  to  the  propagation  of  children,  for  which  the 
Mofl:  High  has  ordered  fuch  a  lawful  and  perpetual 
union  to  be  formed  and  conducted  in  confiflency  with 
the  deftination  of  human  nature,  and  conformably  to 
his  law. 

If 


Jf6,  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

If  perfons  veft.  one  another  with  perfect  affirmative 

rights  for  the  ends  of  mutual  happinefs,  the  propaga- 
tion and  education  of  children,  they  are  faid  to  enter 
into  the  matrimonial  ft  ate. 

The  matrimonial  ftate  is  diftinguifhed  into  the  con- 
niiblul  and  the  'parental. 

In  the  connubial  ftate  the  relation  is  considered  be- 
tween hujhand  and  wifey  in  the  parental,  that  of  pa- 
rents and  children. 

Both  the  connubial  and  parental  ftates  are  morally 
connected  where  they  are  naturally  fo-,  that  is  to  fay% 
when  hufband  and  wife  are  bleiTed  with  children,  they 
are  bound  to  the  performance  of  the  parental  duties, 
to  maintain,  protect  and  educate  them. 

If  one  of  the  parents  dies,  the  parental  rights  and 
duties  center  in  the  other;  if  both  fhould  be  called 
from  the  ftage  of  life,  thefe  rights  and  duties  naturally 
devolve  upon  thofe  of  the  nearefl  relations  who  are  beffc 
calculated  for  the  charge. 

If  parents  become  naturally  fuch,  by  begetting  chil- 
dren  without  having  entered  into  the  connubial  fociety, 
they  ought,  if  poifible,  to  become  moral  parents,  by 
forming  that  indiffoluble  union  upon  perfect  and  affir- 
mative rights,  which  vefts  them  with  the  rights  of  huA 
band  and  wife,  and  qualifies  them  for  the  performance 
of  thofe  duties  which  are  requifitefor  the  fupport  and 
education  of  their  children. 

Sch.  i .— Juftice  to  the  parties,  to  the  children,  to  relations^ 
and  to  fociety  at  large,  requires  that  this  kind  of  reparation 
be  made  in  all  cafes  where  it  is  phyfically  and  morally 
poiiible. 

Sch.  2. — Both  thefe  requifites  meet  in  fingle  perfons,  and  in 
fuch  cafes  where  the  condition  cf  the  parties  is  net  fuch, 

that 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  $lj 

that  a  greater  evil  would  arife  from  the  connection;  but 
then  certainly  the  poverty  or  "low  condition  of  one  of 
the  parties  cannot  be  among  the  caufes  that  render  the 
con  Sfcibhj ineligible.  Vices,  fraud,  deception,  and  the 
qneilion  whether  the  feducer  is  thereby  brought  to  a  bet- 
ter  condition,  are  of  more  confequence. 

ScJi.  3. — It  may  be  fu  ppofed  there-  is  not  a  better  mean  by 
which  feduftion  may  be  more  powerfully  di  farmed,  and 
the  iiuioce.'icf  ot  the  honeft  and  induflrious  poor  more 
e  .'...  protected,  than  to  compel  the  feducer  to  con- 

tra.:- I  .  connubial  ftate  with  the  object  of  his  criminal 
co.  :on. 

ScL  4. -  De  objected,'  that  this  would  be  founding  a  con- 

nee^,  )  .  ot  upon  true  love  and  real  friendfhip;  weanfwer, 
that  in  cafe  of  an  injury  and  a  heinous  crime,  the  firft 
queftion  is  the  making  reparation;  and  the  feoond,  which 
is  the  mod  fuitable  punifhment  for  an  offence  by  which 
the  laws  of  God,  of  men,  of  humanity,  piety  and  decency 
have  been  wantonly  tranfgrefled  ? 

Sch.  5. — Have  not  the  children  a  natural  claim  ?  Is  he  a  man 
who  can  deny  his  own  fiefh  ? 

.Sch,  6. — Reparations  of  this  kind  are  impoflible,  where  cither 
or  both  parties  are  under  the  obligations  of  a  connubial 
ftate;  and  this  irnpoffibility  muff,  be  coniidered  as  one  of 
the  caufes  why  adultery  is  of  infinitely  greater  turpitude 
and  malignancy  than  other  lawlefs  connections* 

However,  where  children  are  not  or  cannot  be  the 
confequence  of  the  connubial  ftate,  all  the  duties  of 
hufband  and  wife  center  in  the  reciprocal  rights  and 
obligations  which  have  for  their  object  mutual  happi- 
nefs  and  perpetual  union  -,  and  that  date  maintains  the 
fandkion  of  the  matrimonial. 

The  firft  cafe  has  reference  to  perfons  who  might 
naturally  have  expected  the  blefling  of  children ;  the 
fecond  relates  to  fuch  as  have  fo  far  advanced  in  life 
that  fuch  an  expectation  finds  no  place.  There  huf- 
band and  wife  are  bound  to  their  perpetual  union,  be- 
caufe  they  have  purfued  the  ends  o£ matrimony  as  far 

as 


3fl  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

as  was  in  their  power :  here  higher  obligations  may 
Juftify  and  render  a  connection  eligible  which  is  necef- 
iary  for  their  mutual  comfort  and  happinefs. 

Sch.  i. — But  let  it  be  obferved,  that  the  latter  cafe  cannot  be 
extended  fo  far  as  to  juftify  marriages  obvioufly  improper, 
between  perfons  of  too  great  a  difparity  of  years  for  even 
happinefs  to  be  thereby  expected. 

Sck.  2. — Thofe  who  have  become  parents  by  a  former  marriage 
btfght  to  avoid  fubfequent  connections,  which  are  inju- 
rious to  the  fuppcrt  and  education  of  their  children. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Of  the  more  fpecific  rights  and  duties  between  hufband 

and  wife. 


INCE  lawful  connections,  as  has  been  lhewn,  muft 
have  the  nature  of  voluntary  and  equal  focieties,  it 
follows,  that  the  matrimonial  or  lawful  connubial  fo- 
ciety  muft  be  equal-,  that  is,  no  rights  or  obligations 
can  take  place  between  hufband  and  wife  which  do 
not  flow  from  the  nature  and  fcope  of  that  intimate  re- 
lation. But  as  that  fcope  is  mutual  happinefs,  and  as 
happinefs  cannot  fubfift  without  order,  peace,  regula- 
rity, and  an  uniform  direction  of  their  joint  will  for  the 
attainment  of  the  objects  of  their  perpetual  union,  it 
will  be  necefTary  for  one  of  the  members  to  have  the 
general  direction. 

The  queftion  then  is,  whether  the  hufband  or  the 
wife  is  lawfully  vefted  with  that  right?  Among  the 
variety  of  caufes  affigned  for  the  appropriation  of  fa- 
mily government  to  the  male  fex,  we  think  this  the  mod 

material, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  $1Q 

material,  that  nature  has  formed  that  fex  for  thofe  con- 
cerns of  the  family  which  generally  lie  beyond  the  walls 
of  the  houfe  and  furpafs  the  limits  of  the  field  •,  whilir. 
the  wife  has  her  place  particularly  at  home,  where  her 
infant  children  (land  in  need  of  her  inceflant  care  and 
afliftance.  At  this  rate,  the  hufband,  who  has  his  bu- 
finefs  both  abroad  and  at  home,  mull  needs  acquire  a 
more  extenfive  knowledge  of  what  is  conducive  to  the 
promotion  of  the  intereft  of  his  family  •,  and  it  is  na- 
tural that  the  direction  of  affairs  mould  devolve  upon 
that  perfon  who  is  calculated  to  conduct  it  to  the  bed 
advantage. 

Sc/i.  i. — Happy  that  marriage  where  true  love  and  faithful 
friendfhip  bear  fway — where  hufband  and  wife,  guided 
by  virtue  and  piety,  vie  with  each  other  in  the  moil  affi* 
duous  efforts  of  benevolence. 

Sch,  2. — Family  affairs  and  family  government  ought  to  be 
conducted  upon  principles  of  humanity  :  defpotical  con» 
duel  in  a  hufband  is  barbarity — moderation  and  gentleneis 
his  greateft  ornament:  modefty,  fubordination  and  ra- 
tional obedience  in  a  wife  are  more  excellent,  more  in- 
valuable than  all  the  jewels  which  India  has  or  mall  ever 
produce:  but  flavifli  -fubjeftion  is  a  difgrace,  not  to  the 
poor  fufferer,  but  to  the  rude  barbarian  who  difhonours 
humanity. 

The  rights  and  obligations  between  hufband  and 
wife  are  mutual  or  reciprocal  -,  for  only  fueh  comport 
with  the  nature  and  fcope  of  the  connubial  or  matri- 
monial fociety. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  as  the  hufband  has  the  chief 
government,  fo  he  is  bound  to  conduct  it  only  for  the 
promotion  of  the  joint  intereft:  and  the  right  of  the 
wife  is  to  expect  or  to  have  maintenance;  that  is  to  fay, 
fuch  fupport  as  comports  with  the  good  of  the  family, 
and  is  proportionate  to  its  circumftances. 

Sek. 


10  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

Scfi.  i. — Our  laws  have  exceedingly  well  provided  both  for  the 
protection  and  fupport  of  a  wife;  but  it  is  a  pity  that  a. 
profligate  hufband  can  fruftrate  thofe  laws,  by  fquander  • 
ing  away  all  during  his  life-time,  except  where  the  family 
is  poileiled  of  a  real  edate. 

$c&.  2.-*-It  is  therefore  a  queftion,  whether  it  Would  not  be 
confident  with  good  policy,  as  well  as  with  the  eternal 
laws  of  judice,  that  drunkards,  gamblers,  &c.  be  redricted 
fo  as  not  to  have  it  in  their  power  to  difgrace  and  ruin 
their  families;  fince  fuch  perfons  are  unfit  for  family  go- 
vernment, and  deferve,  as  in  fome  countries  is  the  cafe, 
to  be  put  under  the  direction  of  trudees  appointed  by 
law  ? 

ocL  3. — The  right  of  ^maintenance  is  the  only  right  left  to  a 
wife  that,  according  to  the  laws  of  fome  countries,  is 
divorced  a  menfa  et  thoro* 

The  mutual  rights  and  duties  between  hufband  and 
wife  are  principally  of  the  imperfect  kind,  and  on  this 
account  are  unlimited  in  extent,  as  much  exceeding 
thofe  which  are  due  to  other  perfons  in*  intenfify,  as 
their  relation  is  the  nearer!  that  is  poflible  among 
mankind.  Is  love  in  general  of  an  accommodating 
nature?  is  it  benevolence  and  friendship  to  a  well- 
wifher  ?  is  it  regard,  efteem,  affability,  and  afTiduity 
to  pleafe  in  near  relations  and  equals  ?  is  it  fympathy, 
patience,  forbearance,  pity,  or  mercy,  wThere  mediocri- 
ty is  its  object,  or  where  infirmities  prefent  themfelves, 
errors  and  failings  take  place,  or  even  injuries  and 
wrongs  provoke  ?  What  is  it  that  conjugal  love  can- 
not effect:,  correct  or  endure  ? 

Even  the  perfect  rights  of  man  and  wife,  which  ex- 
tend to  all  that  is  necellary  and  in  their  power  to  pro- 
mote the  beii  interefts  of  the  union  and  the  happy 
attainment  of  its  objects,  mould  be  performed,  not 
from  the  low  confederation  that  the  partner  has  aright 
to  compel,  but  from  principles  of  love,  fympathy, 
piety  and  humanity* 

Much 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  $2\ 

Much  lefs  mould  room  be  left  for  correcting  the 
want  of  fidelity :  appearances,  even  fufpicion,  nay, 
any  thing  that  can  be  a  pretext  for  it,  ought  to  be 
avoided.  Actual  breach  of  fidelity  is  a  grievous  in- 
jury of  the  rnoft  heinous  nature,  and  acaufe  of  incon- 
ceivable mifchief  and  unhappinefs. 

There  is  no  doubt  but  that  there  are  injuries  poiTible, 
which  in  themfelves  would  be  fufficient  caufes  for  dif- 
folving  the  connubial  or  matrimonial  connection. 

The  legal  declaration  that  the  bond  of  matrimony 
is  dirTolved,  is  ftiled  divorce. 

The  relation  between  hufband  and  wife  may  be  en- 
tirely annulled,  or  the  laws  of  the  land  may  leave  to  a 
repudiated  wife  fome  of  the  rights  of  matrimony,  to 
wit,  the  right  of  maintenance.  In  the  former  cafe  the 
divorce  is  total,  in  the  latter  it  is  divortium  a  men  fa  et 
thoro. 

The  natural  laws  admit  not  of  total  divorces,  where 
innocent  children  are  affected  and  perfons  deprived  of 
all  their  dependence,  as  muft  be  the  cafe  with  a  repu- 
diated wife  -,  for  fuch  an  effect  cannot  be  reconciled  to 
the  nature  of  equal  focieties,  and  can  only  comport 
with  defpotic  fway  on  the  part  of  a  hufband. 

Neither  do  the  principles  of  eternal  juftice  require 
a  remedy,  which,  in  its  operation,  produces  more  evil 
than  good,  and  applies  not  to  an  impartial  adminiftra- 
tion  of  juftice.  What  would  become  of  the  conjugal 
fociety,  the  nurfery  of  church  and  ftate,  if  every  or 
even  any  injury  could  break  the  focial  union  ?  What 
a  temptation  to  frail  mortals  for  becoming  remifs  in  the 
exercife  of  the  duties  of  humanity,  if  the  moft  power-* 
ful  motives  for  mutual  compliance  between  the  parties 

T  t  be 


^22  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY". 

be  taken  away  !  Whilft,  on  the  other  hand,  the  con- 
fcioufnels  of  the  indiflblubifity  of  the  connection  muft 
be  a  conftant  fpur  to  their  afiiduity  in  performing,  with 
faithful  fincerity,  the  mutual  duties  of  benevolence, 
Sympathy,  and  even  forgivenefs.  He  that  fears  God, 
and  is  faithful  in  his  endeavours  to  promote  the  caufe 
of  vir.tue,  will  not  wim  to  be  freed  from  an  injury  at 
the  coft  of  humanity  and  to  the  detriment  of  human 
happinefs,  which  muft  be  the  confequence  when  a  difTo- 
lution  of  the  connubial  tie  can  be  expected. 

It  is  true,  that  adultery  on  the  part  of  a  wife  is  an 
aggravated  injury,  as  children  are  introduced  in  the 
family  to  the  injury  and  difgrace  of  the  hufband.  But 
mould  the  punifhment  of  infidelity  fall  only  on  the 
fide  of  the  wife  ?  Should  fhe  not  have  an  equal  right 
againft  a  faithlefs  hufband? 

Had  not  the  parties  their  choice  in  forming  the 
connection  ?  Does  it  not  very  much  depend  upon  the 
difcretion,  prudence  and  virtuous  intention  of  this 
choice,  that  the  fociety  be  eftablifhed  upon  virtuous 
love  ?  Does  it  not  generally  depend  upon  their  vir- 
tuous conduct  to  ftrengtfren  the  bond  of  union  ?  Are 
there  not  perfect  rights  to  check  what  is  obnoxious  to 
the  peace,  confidence  and  happinefs  of  the  parties  ? 
Are  there  not  a  thoufand  remedies  fhort  of  a  total  or 
partial  diflblution  ? 

So  much  is  certain,  that  it  is  often  the  punifhment, 
and  for  the  moft  part  a  jurt  one  too,  that  parties  fhould 
remain  bound  in  a  connection  begun  improperly,  and 
conducted  imprudently  and  impioufly. 

The  feducer  deferves  indeed  the  higheft  pnnifh- 
ment,  as  he  is  the  principal  and  moral  caufe  of  inex- 
prefTihle  mifchief,  and  an  irreparable  injury. 

Adultery 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  323 

•  Adultery  is  doubtlefs  one  of  the  greatefl  injuries 
that  can  happen  to  a  family,  if  committed  with  a  finglc 
perfon  •,  for  no  fatisfaction  can  be  made  without  adding 
to  the  damages  of  a  faithful  partner  :  but  when  this 
crime  is  committed  by  perfons  on  both  fides  bound  by 
the  facred  duties  of  a  connubial  fociety,  it  furpafies 
eftimation — the  damages  are  far  beyond  calculation. 

If,  notwithstanding  thefe  confiderations,  experience 
mould  render  legiflative  interference  eligible;  if  there 
mould  be  cafes  where  a  divorce  is  become  expedient, 
we  think  it  mould  not  be  extended,  on  the  fide  of  the 
woman,  further  than  divortium  a  menja  et  thoro.  No- 
thing appears  from  the  principles  of  nature,  why  the 
wife  mould  not  have  the  fame  r^ght,  together  with  a 
generous  maintenance  from  the  efete  of  her  hufband, 
in  cafe  he  mould  be  found  unfaithful  to  his  matrimonial 
engagements. 

What  may  be  faid  of  another  marriage,  with  refpect 
to  either  party,  is  very  difficult  and  precarious :  and 
even  this  intricacy  and  difficulty  is  in  favour  of  our 
principle,  that  a  divorce,  mould  not  be  fanctioned  by 
the  laws  of  the  land. 

There  is  another  queftion  with  refpect  to  the  con- 
nubial fete  of  perfons  who  cannot  form  lawful  connec- 
tions •,  but  we  have  here  no  occafion  to  {peak  of  di- 
vorce; the  bond  of  lawful  union  is  not  diflblved,  for 
there  was  no  fuch  thing  from  the  very  origin  or  the 
connection.  The  laws  of  the  land  mould  rather  en- 
deavour to  prevent  than  to  annul  them. 

Connections  are  annulled^  when  they  are  declared  by 
law  invalid  and  void. 

Thofe  marriages  are  void,  where  the  contract  is  made 

by 


§24  MORAL  FHILOSOPHV. 

by  perfons  who  have  not  the  phyfical  or  moral  faculty 
to  will  and  to  perform :  the  former  is  the  cafe  with  all 
who  have  not  the  exercife,  or  have  not  arrived  to  the 
maturity  of  their  understanding  -,  likewife  with  fuch  as 
are  bound  by  a  former  marriage :  the  latter  refers  to 
natural  infirmities,  and  to  fuch  perfons  as  cannot  per- 
form the  parental  duties  •,  alfo  to  cafes  where  the  con- 
nection is  contrary  to  the  fcope  of  the  connubial  and 
parental  ftates  •,  for  inftance,  confanguinity,  &c. 

There  are  no  other  prohibited  degrees  refulting  from 
principles  of  the  natural  law,  than  thofe  which  are  ex- 
£>refsly  laid  down  in  fcripture. 

Marriages  or  connections  within  the  prohibited  de- 
grees are  highly  criminal,  and  are  juftly  branded  with 
the  appellation  of  inceft. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Of  the  parental  fociety* 

X  HERE  is  no  doubt  but  the  relation  of  parents 
and  children  is  one  of  the  greater!:  blefTmgs  of  this 
life,  if  it  takes  place  in  confequence  of  a  happy,  firm 
and  eftablimed  union  of  parents  connected  in  a  lawful 
connubial  fociety :  their  common  intereft  becomes 
greatly  enhanced  by  having  thofe  who  are  their  flefh 
and  blood  the  particular  objects  of  their  care  •,  conjugal 
felicity  grows  with  their  growth  \  and  there  are  innu- 
merable endearments  attending  their  education,  which 
is  the  moft  important,  and  at  the  fame  time  the  fweeteft 

and 


Moral  philosophy. 

and  moft  delightful  duty,  requiring  the  joint  efforts  of 
botli  parents  who  are  blerTed  with  offspring. 

But  if  that  reftltion  takes  place  by  means  or  lavvlefs 
connection,  children  are  fo  far  from  being  a  bleftino- to 
the  guilty  tranfgreftbrs  of  the  law  of  nature  and  of 
nature's  God,  that  they  publifh  the  difgrace  and  pro- 
claim the  criminality  of  their  parents,  who  have  thus 
offended  againft  God  and  againft  man,  who  have  thus 
injured  both  their  own  character  and  that  of  their 
children. 

Sch.  i. — To  difgrace  is  added  imiferv  and  adeftitnte  condition  : 
children  often  do  not  know  their  fathers,  or  if  they  know 
them,  they  have  no  legal  claim  to  their  protection  and 
care. 

Sch.  2. — Hence  arifes  the  neceffity  that  parents  mould,  if  pof- 
fible,  take  upon  themfelves  the  duties  of  man  and  wife, 
by  entering  into  the  connubial  ftate. 

Sch.  3. — Behold  the  horrid  effects  of  adultery,  fornication,  a 
loofe  and  diforderly  life  !  Parents  fin  againft  their  own 
flefh  and  blood;  they  become  worfe  than  brutes! 

With  refpect  to  the  parental  fociety,  we  have  firft  to 
enquire  into  the  duties  and  rights  of  parents,  and  then 
confider  the  obligations  and  rights  of  children. 

Befldes  the  imperfect  duties  of  humanity,  which  in- 
deed have  no  limits  aligned  them  butthefe,  that  they 
muft  be  perfectly  confiftent  with  thofe  duties  which 
are  due  to  God,  to  themfelves  and  to  others,  parents 
owe  perfect  duties  to  their  children  •,  for,  next  to  God, 
they  are  the  authors  of  their  exiftence,  and  by  neglect- 
ing them  they  would  be  guilty  of  injuries  againft  their 
own  flefh  and  blood,  and  againft  the  whole  human  race. 

The  perfect  duties  of  patents  comprehend  the  main- 
tenance, protection  and  education  of  their  children ; 
for  it  is  the  defign  of  Providence,  that  parents  fnould 

promote 


%l6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

promote  the  happinefs  of  their  children,  by  endeavour- 
ing to  render  their  fouls  and  bodies  as  perfect  as  pofli- 
bJe,  and  by  procuring  them  thofe  means  by  which 
thtCG  ends  may  be  attained. 

Parents  muft  'maintain  their  children,  that  is,  give 

them  their  neceflary  fupport,  until   they  are  able  to 

iupport  themfelves:  without  this  their  life  and  health 

cannot  be  preferved,  which  however  are  amongft  the 

moil:  eflentlal  duties  which  parents  owe  to  the  bodies, 

and  are  prefuppofed  by  the  ftill  more  important  duty 

which  they  owe  to  the  fouls  of  their  children. 

Sc/i. — Parents  therefore  have  to  maintain  and  to  protect  their 
children,  and  to  render  their  bodies  and  fouls  as  perfect 
as  poflible. 

The  education  of  children  is  very  comprehenMve, 
and  naturally  co-extenfive  with  the  power  of  the  pa- 
rents, the  capability  of  the  children,  and  with  other 
iuitable  circumftances. 

The  moft  general  traits  of  this  great  duty  are,  flrfr, 
that  children  be  fitted  for  the  duties  of  life,  and  led  to 
an  honeft  and  ufeful  occupation,  for  which  they  feem 
beft  calculated  by  Providence,  that  they  may  fupport 
themfelves  :  fecond,  that  parents  do  all  in  their  power 
that  their  children  may  become  able  to  promote  their 
own  felicity  and  that  of  others.  Thus  the  defigns  of 
Providence  are  beft  promoted,  when  children  in  their 
time  become  good  parents,  good  citizens,  blefled  in- 
ftruments  for  fpreading  abroad  the  effects  of  benevo- 
lence, guarded  by  virtue  and  directed  by  piety. 

Sch.  1. — Need  parents  be  told,  that  idlenefs  is  the  bane  of  de- 
itruction  to  youth?  Can  there  be  occaflon  to  fhevv  their 
great  obligation  to  fend  their  children  to  fchooi? 

S:k  2. — It  may  be  right  that  parents,  in  a  collifion  of  obliga- 
tions, or  when  better  opportunities  offer,  transfer  thefe 
«  duties 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  32.7 

duties  to  others;  but  they  ought  to  be  fenfible,  thnt  the 
delegated  duties  are  their  own;  and  it  remains  an  import- 
ant, though  too  much  neglected,  obligation  with  them  to 
fee  that  the  truft  is  faithfully  difcharged. 
Sch.  3. — Parents  who  have  no  opportunities  to  have  their  chil- 
dren inftructed,  ought  themfelves  to  undertake  the  tail; 
of  giving  them  all  the  inftruction  in  their  power. 

The  duties  of  parents  cannot  extend  beyond  the 
ends  or  caufes  of  them ;  for*  as  all  that  parents  have  to 
do  refolves  itfelf  into  the  general  duty  of  aftiftance, 
which  ceafes  as  foon  as  perfons  can  help  themfelves, 
we  may  conceive  three  different  ftates  with  refpedt  to 
children,  of  which  the 

1  ft.  Is,  that  in  which  children  muh1  have  fupport 
from  their  parents  or  from  others,  the  ftate  of  child- 
hood. 

2d.  That  wherein  children  may  fupport  themfelves, 
the  ftate  of  their  minority. 

3d.  That  in  which  they  are  able  to  promote  their 
own  happinefs  and  that  of  others,  the  ftate  of  major 

The  duty  of  maintenance  ceafes  with  a  ceffation  of 

the  ftate  of  childhood  •,  that  of  education  with  the  cef- 

fation  of  the  years  of  minority. 

Sch.  1. — From  the  natural  conftitution  and  particular  frame  of 
the  mind,  which  is  very  different  in  individuals,  a  vaft 
difference  mr.fr  arife  with  refpecl  to  the  number  of  years 
to  which  each  of  the  above  mentioned  ftates  of  children 
is  confined:  much  alio  depends  upon  their  diligence,  ap- 
plication, good  conduct,  and  the  opportunities  they  may 
enjoy;  fo  that  it  is  difficult  to  draw  exactly  the  line  when 
and  at  what  particular  period  the  two  lafl  of  thefe  (tales 
begin  or  end. 

'.  2. — Among  the  various  determinations   concerning   the 
ftates  of  children,  and  their  rights  and  duties  in  co 
quence  of  them,  adopted  by  the  law  of  England,   which 
is  generally  followed   bv  the  le^illatures  of  the  United 

Stat*  , 


32S 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


States,  we  only  mention  thofe  which  feem  to  accord  beft; 
with  the  principles  of  nature,  to  wit,  that  children  be 
fuppofed  to  pofTefs  dijcretwi,  and  to  have  the  right  to 
chufe  for  themfelves  their  guardians,  at  the  fourteenth 
year;  that  they  have  their  full  age  at  twenty-one,  and  the 
right  to  difpofe  of  themfelves  and  of  real  eftates. 

Sell.  3. — According  to  the  principles  of  nature,  children  can- 
not have  the  direction  of  rights  in  things  or  in  perfons 
before  they  have  the  full  exercife  of  underftanding — - 
know  what  is  good  or  bad,  right  or  wrong:  otherwife 
they  might  make  difpofitions  contrary  to  the  dictates  of 
natural  law. 

Sch.  4. — Hence  refults  the  propriety  of  allowing  children  the 
right  of  difpofal,  with  reipect  to  things  of  which  they 
may  have  obtained  a  fufricient  knowledge,  whilft  they 
"  may  not  difpofe  of  others. 

Sch.  <j. — It  is  likewife  necefTary  for  the  happinefs  of  children, 
that  thev  may  difpofe  of  certain  things,  or  of  themfelves 
in  fame  degree,  before  the  term  fixed  by  law  for  their  full 
age,  or  the  ftate  of  their  majority. 

Sch.  6. — From  this  it  appears,  fhat  children  ought  not  to  enter 
into  the  matrimonial  ftate  without  the  confent  of  their 
parents  or  guardians,  under  the  fuppofition  that  they  do 
not  refift  higher  obligations,  which  render  fuch  a  confent 
exceptionable. 

Sch.  7. — But  it  is  not  at  all  confonant  to  reafon,  that  the  con^ 
fent  of  parents  mould  introduce  children  into  that  ftate 
before  they  have  the  exercife  of  their  underftanding. 

The  duties  of  maintenance,  protection  and  education 
undergo  various  modifications,  keeping  pace  with  the 
condition  of  children,  and  refpectively  ceafe  at  the  pe- 
riods of  childhood,  minority  and  majority,  that  is  to 
fay,  parents  have  no  occafion  to  maintain  and  protect 
their  children,  if  they  can  fupport  and  defend  them- 
felves •,  thev  are  free  from  the  duties  of  education,  if 
thev  have  done  fo  much  that  children  can  promote 
their  own  happinefs  and  that  of  others.  They  may 
then  confent  to  their  marriage,  andentruft  them  with 

the 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  329 

the  management  of  affairs,  when  they  are  calculated 
to  become  good  parents,  good  citizens,  &c. 

But  parental  love,  the  tendered  affection,  taking  a 
moft  lively  intereft  in  all  that  concerns  the  happinefs  of 
children,  cannot  ceafe  but  with  life,  and  ought  to  be 
vifible  in  its  effects  after  death.  We  fet  it  down  as  a 
parental  duty,  that  parents  leave  fome  of  their  effects 
to  their  children  after  their  deceafe.  It  is  on  this  ac- 
count chiefly,  that  nature  has  vetted  perfons  with  the 
right  of  property,  that  they  may  render  their  family 
ufeful  to  fociety :  and  the  greateft  good  the  father  of  a 
family  can  do  is  to  take  care  of  his  own  houfehold. 
So  far  then  is  the  right  to  difpofe  of  our  property  for 
the  benefit  of  our  children  from  being  an  infringement 
upon  the  general  rights  of  mankind,  that  a  contrary 
conduct  would  be  injurious  to  ourfelves,  to  our  children^ 
and  to  the  community  j  more  particularly  fo  when  our 
parents  have  rendered  our  condition  comfortable,  or 
when  our  children  have  faithfully  affifted  us. 

From  the  great  fondnefs  and  provident  care  which 
our  parents  feel  for  our  children,  it  feems  that  we  per- 
form ads  of  gratitude  to  our  parents  for  the  particular 
care  received  at  their  hands,  if  we  endeavour  to  render 
our  children  happy  here  and  hereafter. 

Sch. — Inftinct  and  duty  confpire  in  dilating  to  parent*  the 
juftice  to  beftow  benevolence  upon  their  children  with 
as  impartial  a  hand  as  poffible. 

The  rights  and  authority  of  parents  flow  from  their 
duties,  and  are,  in  every  other  refpect,  co-exten/ive 
with  their  obligations;  from  which  it  follows,  that 
fome  will  ceafe  when  the  ©blioations  ceafe,  others  will 
fee  cotemporary  with  the  parental  relation. 

U  u  Thofc 


330  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Thofe  rights  which  have  reference  to  the  duties  of 
maintenance,  protection  and  education,  in  all  their 
ftages,  undergo  various  modifications,  according  to  the 
advancement  of  children  towards  maturity,  and  ceafe 
when  they  become  of  age. 

Thefe  rights  constitute  the  parental  power,  and 
extend  to  neceflary  difcipline,  to  the  fervices  of  their 
children,  to  the  chuiing  for  them  occupations,  to  the 
giving  them  advice,  to  binding  them  to  an  apprentice- 
iliip,  to  placing  them  under  the  care  of  tutors  or 
guardians,  to  confenting  to  their  adoption,  &c. 

They  have  a  claim  to  the  love,  refpecl,  gratitude  and 
arTiftance  of  their  children  •,  for  which  caufe  the  muni- 
cipal laws  juftly  command  the  latter  to  maintain  their 
parents,  and  even  their  grand-parents,  if  they  fhould 
have  need  of  their  fuppott. 

The  rights  of  children  are  nothing  t\(e  than  the  ob- 
ject of  the  parental  obligations  hitherto  explained,  toge- 
ther with  thofe  unalienable  natural  rights  in  perfons 
upon  which  it  is  not  lawful  for  parents  to  trefpafs. 

The  filial  duties  are  love,  refpect,  gratitude  in  the 
higheft  porlible  degree,  with  all  thofe  marks  thereof 
by  which  the  fincerity  of  their  beft  endeavours  may  be 
manifested. 

During  the  time  of  their  non-age,  fubmifTion,  ftrict 
obedience  and  faithful  arTiftance  are  perfect  duties, 
which  oupht  to  flow,  not  from  a  dread  of  parental 
power,  but  from  a  principle  of  love,  refpect  and  gra- 
titude. 

Nothing  but  a  collifion  of  higher  duties  can  juftify 

even  the  appearance  of  backwardnefs  in  receiving  and 

following  the  advice  of  parents, 

Sck. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  331 

Sch. — Virtuous  parents  will  not  advife  children  to  do  evil,  nor 
bind  them  to  a  confent  which  is  inconliltent  with  their 
happinefs. 

The  leaft  that  children  can  do  by  way  of  retribu- 
tion, is  to  render  the  fituation  of  their  parents  as  eafy 
and  pleafant  as  poflible. 

Children  are  mod  facredly  bound  to  maintain  their 
parents :  if  fuch  a  mark  of  gratitude  is  neceflary^  they 
mould  give  it  with  delight. 

Teachers,  guardians,  &c.  are  under  parental  obliga- 
tions and  vetted  with  parental  rights  :  they  ought  to 
exercife  them  with  that  fincerity,  gentlenefs,  afliduity, 
faithfulnefs,  moderation  and  watchfulnefs,  requiflte  in 
fathers  who  truly  love  their  children. 

Wards,  and  thofe  who  enjoy  the  advantages  of  edu- 
cation by  others,  are  naturally  bound  to  pay  their  guar- 
dians, &c.  the  refpect,  obedience,  love  and  gratitude 
due  from  children  to  parents. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  the   herile  fociely. 

X.  HAT  fociety  where  one  member  has  perfect  af- 
firmative rights  in  the  perfons  of  others,  for  directing 
their  actions  to  the  promotion  of  his  particular  intereft, 
is  called  the  herile  ft ate-,  the  perfon  veiled  with  that 
right  is  called  mafter:  the  actions  to  be  performed  for 
another's  advantage  in  confequence  of  fuch  rights  are 
comprehended  under  the  appellation  offer-vices,  in  the 
ftrict  fenfe  of  the  word ;  and  the  perfons  under  obliga- 
tion to  perform  fuch  actions  are  ftiled  fervants. 

ScL 


332  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sch. — As  there  is  a  great  variety,  both  of  modes  and  actions, 
by  which  others  may  be  affifted  or  their  intereifs  promot- 
ed; and  as  innumerable  modifications  may  take  place 
with  refpeft  to  the  affirmative  rights  which  one  perfon 
may  have  in  another  for  that  purpofe;  it  is  evident  that 
there  is  a  great  variety  of  fervices,  and  that  the  principles 
of  the  herile  ftate  are  applicable  to  a  vait  number  of  ipe- 
cific  focieties,  where  the  relation  of  mailer  and  of  fervant 
takes  place. 

Since  daily  experience  evinces,  that  fervices  are  re- 
quired for  the  management  of  families  in  the  mainte- 
nance and  education  of  children,  it  follows,  that  per- 
fons  under  certain  circumftances  may  have  a  natural 
right  to  exert  themfelves,  confidently  with  the  dictates 
of  natural  law,  to  acquire  perfect  affirmative  rights  in 
others,  for  the  purpofe  of  promoting  their  particular 
interefts  :  that  is  to  fay,  perfons  under  certain  circum- 
ftances have  a  right  to  become  mafiers. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  the  fame  modes  by  which 
perfons  may  lawfully  acquire  rights  in  others,  are  the 
modes  by  which  perfons  may  lawfully  become  mafters 
of  their  fellow  creatures. 

Likewife,  perfons,  notwithstanding  their  abfolute 
natural  rights,  which  are  perfectly  equal  with  thofe  of 
their  fellow  creatures,  may  happen  to  be  in  a  ftate 
where  the  unalterable  principles  of  nature,  juftice  and 
equity  require  that  they  ihould  come  under  perfect 
obligations  to  aftift  others  by  their  fervices — if,  for  in- 
ftance,  they  can  thereby  render  their  ftate  more  perfect  % 
if,  having  been  guilty  of  committing  injury  and  da- 
mage to  their  neighbour,  they  have  no  other  or  not  a 
more  eligible  mean  left  whereby  reparation  can  be 
made  •,  or,  laftly,  if  injury  and  damages  would  accrue 
from  the  non -performance  of  fuch  fervices. 

Perfons, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  233 

Perfons,  therefore,  become  fervants  in  a  manner 
confident  with  the  principles  of  natural  law,  either  by 
pa5i,  by  the  right  of  forfeiture^  or  by  law.  In  the  nril 
cafe,  the  herile  fociety  is  voluntary,  and  reds  upon  the 
mutual  confent  of  the  parties  •,  in  the  fecond  and  third 
it  is  neceflary,  refting  upon  the  principles  of  natural 
law. 

The  herile  fociety,  however  it  may  be  modified, 
whether  it  be  voluntary  or  neceffary,  cannot  be  lawful 
except  it  be  equal  •,  that  is  to  fay,  except  the  focial  ob- 
ligations flow  from  the  end,  that  is,  from  the  nature  of 
the  fociety  :  becaufe  no  fociety  can  be  lawful  if  the  end 
thereof  is  contradictory  to  the  dictates  of  natural  laws, 
which  is  raoft  evidently  the  cafe  with  all  manner  of 
unequal  focieties :  for,  as  the  focial  obligations,  accord- 
ing to  the  definition  which  has  been  given,  depend 
upon  the  will  and  caprice  of  the  claimant  of  the  focial 
right,  a  fociety  would  take  place,  having  for  its  end 
the  humouring  and  fatisfying  the  will  of  a  mortal, 
whatever  he  might  direct  or  command,  good  or  bad, 
right  or  wrong.  Is  it  not  impiety  to  hold  up  fuch  a 
right  on  the  part  of  a  frail  creature,  liable  to  error,  a 
worm  of  the  earth;  when  only  the  Moft  High^  who 
cannot  err,  who  wills  the  happinefs  of  his  children, — 
when  he  only  is  entitled  to  fuch  fubjeclion,  to  fuch 
implicit  fubmifTion  ?  And  behold,  he  does  not  exer- 
cife  that  right  he  condefcends  to  the  indigent  creature ! 
he  demands  obedience  to  his  laws,  becaufe  that  obe- 
dience renders  his  creatures  happy. 

Can  a  moral  agent,  refponfible  to  God  for  all  his 
powers  and  faculties,  and  bound  by  the  mofl  facred 
duties  to  God,  to  himfelf  and  to  his  fellow  creatures — 
can  he,  confidently  with  the  dignity  and  high  dedina- 

tion 


334  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.' 

tion  of  his  nature,  confidently  with  the  law  of  nature 
and  with  the  will  of  God — can  he  render  himfelf  abject 
as  a  brute,  give  up  his  abfolute  natural  rights,  and 
idolize  him  who  is  but  duft  of  the  earth,  make  the  will 
of  a  man  his  fupreme  and  only  law  ?  No :  to  confent 
to  fuch  a  ftate  is  the  more  horridly  impious  in  a  perfon, 
as  he  fins  not  only  againft  God,  but  againft  himfelf  and 
againft  humanity. 

If  the  law  of  reparation  is  nature's  law  and  the  will 
of  God,  who  delights  in  righteoufnefs,  we  may  eafily 
inter,  that  reparation  cannot  be  exacted,  or  pretended 
to  be  made,  in  a  manner  inconfiftent  with  the  moral 
nature  of  men  and  with  their  refponfibility  to  God. 

Ail  fervitude,  therefore,  is  unnatural  and  unlawful, 
whether  founded  in  confent  or  on  force  and  compulfion, 
where  the  obligations  do  not  flow  from  the  nature  or 
the  fcope  of  a  herile  fociety,  where  they  are  inconfiftent 
with  the  dictates  of  natural  law  and  repugnant  both  to 
the  rights  in  things  and  in  perfons.  The  fowler  and 
the  encaged  bird,  the  ravenous  wolf  and  the  innocent 
iamb,  or  the  hawk  with  the  harmlefs  dove  in  his  ta- 
lons, might  as  well  be  faid  to  be  members  of  a  natural 
fociety,  as  thofe  inhuman  monfters  who  take  advantage 
of  the  fimplicity  or  impotency  of  their  fellow  creatures, 
and  domineer  over  them  with  defpotic  fway,  have  a 
claim  to  the  ftate  of  lawful  matters. 

Sck.  i. — Tyranny  is  not  to  be  looked  for  in  defpotic  govern- 
ments alone;  it  often  takes  root  and  exerts  its  fury  within 
the  walls  of  a  family.  Here  we  frequently  find  defpotic 
fway  under  the  mafk  of  parental  power,  and  tyranny  ex- 
ercifed  againft  fervants  bv  the  matter  of  a  familv,  and  not 
feldom  by  children.  The  nature  of  the  herile  fociety  is, 
however,  ftill  more  generally  forgot  on  the  part  of  fer- 
vants, and  that  fidelity,  induftry,  ceconomy,  humility, 
fobriety,  refpecl  and  gratitude  wanting,  by  which  their 

own 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  33$ 

own  happinefs  and  the  particular  interefts  of  their  mailers 
would  be  truly  and  effectually  promoted. 

Sd.  2.— If  nature  has  provided  rational  mafterfhip,  file  has 
like  wife  ordered  rational  obedience. 

A  voluntary  fervitude  lafts  as  long  as  the  members 
of  the  fociety  have  ftipulated  by  mutual  confent,  that 
the  relation  of  matter  and  fervant  fhall  fubttft,  and  of 
confequence'  may  be  temporary  or  perpetual. 

Temporary  fervitude,  which  is*  voluntary,  may  be 
determined  with  refpeel  to  a  certain  fixed  term  of  time, 
or  with  refpeel  to  a  certain  work  to  be  done :  the  latter 
cafe,  however,  rather  refers  to  the  fubjeel:  of  contracts 
under  the  forms,  do  ut  facias^  or  facio  ut  facias. 

The  necefTary  herile  fociety,  founded  upon  the  right 
of  forfeiture,  implies  a  fervitude  which  mull  be  equi- 
valent to  a  necefTary  reparation  of  damages,  and  may 
be  temporary  or  perpetual. 

But  it  is  generally  otherwife  in  cafes  where  the  fo- 
ciety refults  from  law :  the  fervices  of  children  to  their 
parents,  or  to  thofe  who  have  bettowed  upon  them  the 
parental  duties  of  maintenance  and  education,  ceafe 
when  they  amount  to  a  reafonable  compenfation  for 
the  trouble  and  expences  which  have  been  caufed 
thereby. 

Whatever  the  herile  fociety  in  this  refpeel  may  be, 
whether  temporary  or  perpetual,  the  matter  has  a  right 
to  direct  in  what  manner  he  is  to  be  attifted,  or  his  in- 
tereft  promoted:  this  right  flows  from  the  fcope  and 
nature  of  that  fociety,  if  care  is  taken  not  to  extend  it 
to  a  contravention  of  the  exprefs  ftipulations  agreed 
upon  in  voluntary  focieties,  or  to  what  is  unlawful  both 
with  refpect  to  the  rights  in  perfons  and  in  things. 

No 


2%6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

No  fervant  is  therefore  bound  to  obey  the  unlawful 
commands  of  a  m after ;  for  it  is  repugnant  to  his  mo- 
ral nature  and  refponfibility  to  God. 

Sch.  i. — A  fervant,  of  whatever  defcription  he  may  be,  lias 
therefore  no  excufe  in  obeying  his  mafter's  will  to  the  in- 
jury of  another  perfon. 

Sch.  2. — Behold,  then,  the  debafed  ftateof  a  mercenary  foldier! 

A  mafter  mav  not  burden  a  fervant  with  more  work 
than  is  confident  with  the  powers  of  fuch  fervant  to 
perform. 

A  mafter  is  bound  to  give  his  fervant  fufficient 
meat,  drink,  apparel,  time  for  refreftiing  his  body,  and 
for  performing  thofe  duties  to  God  and  to  himfelf 
which  are  incumbent  upon  him  as  a  moral  agent,  re- 
fponfible  to  his  creator:  befides  thefe  and  a  thoufand 
other  duties  of  humanity,  he  is  facredly  bound  to  pro- 
tect his  fervant  againft  injuries  from  others,  whether 
intended,  or  committed  by  fuch  as  are  a  part  of  his 
family,  or  by  ftrangers. 

A  mafter  is  bound  to  reward  his  voluntary  fervants, 
by  honeftly  paying  the  ftipulated  price  for  their  fervice. 

The  fervants  whom  he  holds  by  forfeiture,  and 
confequently  has  paid  before  hand,  he  ought  to  direct: 
with  humanity  and  command  with  gentlenefs:  hemuft 
likewife  render  their  fituation  as  comfortable  as  cir- 
cumftances  will  admit. 

The  mafter  has  a  right,  nay,  it  is  his  duty  to  re- 
ftrain  his  fervants  from  doing  evil,  or  from  committing 
injury,  for  all  mifchief  committed  by  them  is  imput- 
able to  the  mafter's  will,  if  he  cannot  make  it  appear 
that  he  has  done  his  part  to  prevent  it. 

That  mafter  can  hardly  fail  of  having  good  and 

faithful 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  337 

faithful  fervants,  who  fets  them  an  example  of  huma- 
nity and  virtue,  and  inftils  into  their  minds  the  fear  of 
God,  and  the  necefiity  of  preferving  a  good  confcience. 

Where  the  end  of  the  focial  connection  is  a  particular 
kind  of  fervice  or  truft,  the  matter  has  no  right  to  di- 
rect any  thing  contrary  thereto ;  for  inftance,  an  ap- 
prentice bound  to  a  trade,  &c. 

Where  no  flipulations  have  been  made  with  refpect 
to  the  particular  kind  of  labour,  either  in  regard  to 
quality  or  quantity,  the  known  cuftom  of  the  country 
determines  what  may  be  lawfully  exacted. 

The  duties  of  fervants  refolve  themfelves  into  the 
moft  ready  obedience,  unabating  induftry,  and  ftridb 
faithfulnefs  in  performing  all  the  lawful  commands  of 
their  mafter;  his  interert  muft  be  ftudied  in  all  their 
conduct,  and  they  muft  demean  themfelves  in  a  peace- 
able, orderly  and  grateful  manner,  and  omit  nothing 
that  may  render  them  worthy  his  efteem  and  good 
will,  as  well  as  that  of  his  family. 

Let  fervants  not  forget  their  accountablenefs  to  God 
for  all  they  do,  and  particularly  for  their  conduct,  and 
the  performance  of  the  duties  of  their  ftation.  That 
noble  refolution  of  Jofhua,  As  for  me  and  my  houJe\  we 
willferve  the  Lord,  (xxiv.  15.)  is  an  example  worthy 
the  imitation  of  mafters  and  fervants. 

Servants  are  bound  to  protect  their  mailer's  perfon, 

family  and  goods. 

Sc/i.  1. — The  unnatural  injuftice  of  flaverv,  both  with  refpect 
to  mafter  and  fervant,  has  already  been  {efficiently  fhewn; 
we  mould  therefore  have  laid  nothing  of  it,  were  it  not 
that  the  poor  victims  of  avarice,  kept  ignorant  with  re- 
fpect to  their  duties  to  God  and  to  men,  are  to  the  utmoft 
dangerous  in  debauching  the  manners  of  children,  who 
X  x  are 


33  8  MORAL  PHILOSOPHV. 

arc  careleHly  permitted  to  be  in  their  company,  where 
their  juvenile  follies  and  caprices  are  humoured  and  obey- 
ed with  the  fame  abject  fubmiflion  which  muft  not  fail  to 
be  paid  to  the  mailer  or  miftrefs  of  the  family  :  the  young 
mafter  and  mifs  foon  forget  that  they  have  to  do  with  the 
human  fpecies,  and  imbibe  the  love  of  tyranny  and  vice 
aim-oft  with  their  mother's  milk. 

Sch.  2. — The  idea  of  flavery  has  already  fo  far  advanced  in  our 
free  country,  that  even  the  children  of  the  farmer  refufe 
the  molt,  neceflary  work,  fuch  as  is  eflential  to  the  ma- 
nagement of  a  farm,  under  the  foolifli  notion,  that  it  is 
degrading  to  a  freeman,  and  an  occupation  only  fit  for 
(laves. 

Since  there  are  reciprocal  rights  and  obligations  in 
equal  focieties,  flowing  from  their  nature,  it  follows, 
that  it  is  poiTible  for  matters  and  fervants  to  injure  one 
another-,  the  former,  if  they  exact  more  fervices  than 
are  due,  deny  the  payment  of  juft  wages,  neglect  what 
is  neceflary  for  the  fupport,  protection  and  refrefhment 
of  the  fervants,  exceed  the  juft'  bounds  of  difcipline 
and  correction,  &c. :  the  latter  commit  injury  if  they 
perform  not  faithfully  all  lawful  fervices,  if  they  neg- 
lect to  affift  their  mafter,  idle  away  their  time,  fquan- 
der  away  their  mafter's  fubftance;  if  they  fubmit  not 
to  his  advice,  or  leave  his  fervice,  or  behave  diforderly 
.and  difturb  the  peace  of  their  mafter's  family,  &c. 

A  mafter  is  injured  when  others  feduce  his  fervants, 
or  have  any  commerce  or  converfation  with  them, 
whereby  the  end  of  the  herile  fociety  is  affected  or 
fruft  rated. 

A  mafter  may  lend  the  fervice  of  his  fervant  for  a 
time,  becaufe  it  is  conftftent  with  humanity  and  juftice 
that  others  be  aftifted. 

There  may  be  circumftances  where  a  mafter  may 
alienate  the  fervice  due  upon  forfeiture,  under  condi- 
tion 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  339 

tion  that  the  ftate  of  the  fervant  becomes  not  worfe : 
all  other  alienations  of  right  in  this  refpect  ought  to 
arife  from  exprefs  ftipulations  of  voluntary  focieties, 
or,  where  fuch  stipulations  cannot  be  made,  from  the 
mutual  confent  of  the  parties. 

No  perfon  can  be  born  a  Have,  becaufe  flavery  is 
utterly  contradictory  to  natural  law. 

It  is  poflible,  however,  that  one  may  become  by 
birth  a  temporary  fervant:'  for  inttance,  a  child  born 
of  a  woman  who  is  either  a  perpetual  fervant,  or  bound 
to  fervice  for  a  considerable  length  of  time:  the  child 
muft  be  fupported  and  maintained,  and  mould  even 
be  educated  by  the  matter  of  fuch  fervant :  whence  it 
will  be  necelTary,  that  the  child  in  the  firil  cafe  Should 
be  bound  by  the  principles  both  of  juftice  and  grati- 
tude to  indemnify  the  matter  for  his  care,  trouble  and 
expence ;  and  in  the  fecond,  either  the  fervant  or  child 
mutt  do  it.  Here  many  caufes  concur,  which  render 
it  confident  with  prudence  and  juttice,  that  the  mo- 
ther Should  confent  to  the  temporary  fervitude  of  her 
child,  particularly  when  there  is  on  this  fide  the  bett 
profpecl:  for  its  maintenance  and  education. 

Sch.  i. — Such  like  cafes  are  inftances  of  the  herile  Society 
founded  in  laiu. 

Sch.  2. — The  fervitude  of  children  to  their  parent?,  as  found- 
ed in  law,  cannot  extend  further  than  the  ftate  of  their 
minority,  and  ought  not  to  exceed  that  irate  with  refpecl: 
to  the  children  of  fervants,  except  the  expences  of  their 
maintenance  and  education  have  amounted  to  more  than 
the  fervice  of  fuch  a  fpace  of  time  can  reafonably  com- 
penfate. 

Sch.  3. — It  is  not  to  be  reconciled  with  natural  equity,  that  the 
children  of  fervants  fhould  be  bound  for  a  longer  term, 
becaufe  the  mafter  was  at  a  trouble  againft  his  will ;  for, 
if  it  be  confidered  that  the  children  cannot,  at  leaft  ought 

not 


340  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

not  to  expiate  injuries  committed  by  their  parents,  it  will 
be  plain,  that  they  cannot  be  held  in  fervitude  when 
compenfation  is  made  for  their  maintenance  and  educa- 
tion. 

Sch.  4. — It  is  more  confiftent  with  natural  laws,  that  the  mafler 
fhould  feel  an  inconveniency  from  that  which  in  many 
inftances  may  be  attributed  to  his  carelelfnefs  in  not  fuf- 
ficiently  watching  the  morals  or  giving  instruction  to  his 
houfliold. 

.•Both  the  rights  of  matters  and  the  obligations  of 
fervants  keep  pace  with  the  various  circumftances  of  the 
herile  ftate:  for  inftance  ;  in  the  military  fervice,  com- 
mand, in  time  of  an  invaflon,  muft  be  extremely  ftrict, 
and  obedience  almoft  implicit  \  becaufe  focial  rights  and 
obligations  flow  from  the  nature  of  the  fociety  as  well 
as  from  that  of  the  circumftances,, 


CHAPTER  VIIL 

Of  the  domeftic  fociety. 

X  HE  fociety  which  comprehends  the  connubial, 
parental  and  herile  ftates,  is  called  domeftic,  and  may 
be  defined  to  be  that  in  which  perfons  have  perfect  af- 
firmative rights  in  the  perfons  of  children  or  fervants, 
for  directing  their  actions  and  fervices  in  fuch  a  manner 
as  that  the  peace  and  fecurity  of  the  whole  fociety  may 
be  preferved,  and  its  happinefs  promoted. 

Perfons  vefted  with  that  right  are  called  the  heads  of 
the  family ;  thofe  who  are  under  perfect  obligations  to 
perform  actions  and  fervices  for  thofe  ends,  are  com- 
prehended under  the  appellation  of  the  houfhold. 

ScL 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  34I 

Sc/i. — The  houfhold  of  a  family  may  be  the  children  or  the 
fervants,  or  both:  in  the  firit  cafe  the  houfhold  is  incom- 
plete; in  the  laft  it  is  complete. 

Since  the  right  of  directing  the  actions  of  others  to 
a  certain  end  is  called  government,  it  follows,  that 
thofe  who  are  the  heads  of  families  are  veiled  with  fa- 
mily government. 

The  parents  in  a  family  are  by  nature  its  heads,  and 
have  the  right  of  family  government ;  for  parents  have 
a  right  to  direct  the  actions  of  children,  as  well  as  the 
right  lawfully  to  endeavour  to  obtain  perfect  affirma- 
tive rights  in  fervants,  for  directing  their  actions  fo  that 
they  may  be  afllfted  in  the  duties  of  maintaining  and 
educating  their  children,  and  for  having  their  intereft, 
with  that  of  their  connection  and  its  objects,  promoted. 
But,  either  children  or  fervants,  or  both  alike,  confti- 
tute  the  houfhold:  they  confequently  are  fubjected  to 
the  heads  and  governors  thereof. 

The  domeftic  fociety  is  compound,  for  it  confifts 
of  the  connubial,  the  parental,  and  the  herile. 

It  is  likewife  equals  for  thefe  are  equal. 

The  right  of  the  heads  of  a  family,  or  their  power 
and  government,  cannot  be  defpotical,  but  is  limited. 

A  right  to  direct  the  actions  of  others  implies  au- 
thority for  enacting  laws,  and  for  publiming  and  put- 
ting them  into  execution  •,  becaufe  the  nature  of  free 
agents  is  fuch,  that  they  ought  to  be  fo  directed  as 
that  motives  mould  be  connected  with  their  actions. 
From  a  connection  of  motives  refult  obligations,  and 
rules  importing  thefe  are  laws. 

Family  government,  therefore,  is  not  a  government 
of  arbitrary  will,  but  a  government  of  laws. 

Since 


342  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Since  no  laws  can  be  juft  which  have  not  a  good  for 
their  object,  it  follows,  that  no  family  laws  can  be  juft 
except  they  have  the  good  of  the  whole  family  in 
view. 

The  common  good  of  a  whole  family  will  be  con- 
fulted,  if  the  ends  of  the  herile,  the  parental  and  the 
connubial  hates  are  fo  modified,  that  they  be  in  the 
greater!:  poiTible  harmony,  and  that  each  particular 
fociety  finds  its  greateft  advantage  in  the  union  for  a 
common  intereft. 

Since  the  principal  ends  of  the  connubial  and  pa- 
rental ftates  are  the  mutual  happinefs  of  the  parents 
in  a  perpetual  union,  and  the  propagation  and  educa- 
tion of  children  •,  and  fince  the  fcope  of  the  herile  fo- 
ciety, on  the  one  hand,  comprehends  the  fervices  of 
children  or  of  fervants  neceflary  for  the  promotion  of 
thefe  ends,  and  on  the  other,  requires  the  necefTary  fup- 
port,  refrefhments,  protection  and  juft  retribution,  as 
the  cafe  may  be-,  that  is,  requires  the  happinefs  of  the 
parties;  it  follows,  that  the  domeftic  fociety  muft  have 
for  its  end  a  common  good,  wherein  all  its  members 
are  interefted,  and  the  felicity  of  all  the  ftates  of  which 
it  is  compofed  fecured  and  augmented. 

Since  all  the  laws  of  a  family  muft  center  in  the 
common  good  of  all  the  members  thereof,  it  follows, 
that  we  may  lay  down  as  the  fundamental  law  of  family 
government,  this  propofition :  Direct:  you  actions  fo 
that  the  common  good  of  the  whole  family  may  be 
obtained,  preferved  and  promoted. 

Sch. — What  is  repugnant  to  this  law  is  unjuft  and  unreafon- 
able,  whether  the  aclion  proceed  from  the  head  of  the  fa- 
mily or  from  any  member  of  the  houfhold. 

There 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  343 

There  are  various  things  neceffary  as  means  for  the 
fupport  and  convenience  of  a  family :  fome  of  thefe 
have  a  direct,  others  an  indirect  influence  on  all  its 
members;  but  all  ferve  to  promote  the  common  good 
of  the  whole  fociety,  if  care  is  taken  that  they  do  not 
interfere  with  one  another;  that  is  to  fay,  if  that  order 
is  obferved,  with  refpect  to  time,  place  and  other  cir- 
cumftances,  which  the  fcope  of  the  fociety  and  the  na- 
ture of  thefe  circumflances  require. 

The  head  or  heads  of  a  family,  therefore,  may  make 
rules,  nay,  even  transfer  the  direction  to  others,  for 
the  regulation  of  the  fervices ;  and  the  fervants  are 
bound  to  follow  thofe  rules. 

The  laws  of  a  family  cannot  bind  to  things  unlaw- 
ful, nor  to  fuch  as  are  not  in  the  power  of  fervants,  or 
are  contradictory  to  their  unalienable  natural  rights. 

A  family  cannot  be  happy,  where  there  is  caufe  to 
dread  evil  within  or  injury  from  abroad. 

The  heads  of  a  family  muft  therefore  make  rules 
for  the  internal  peace  of  the  fociety,  and  for  its  protec- 
tion agaimt  injuries  from  abroad. 

Servants  are  perfectly  bound  to  obey  fuch  rules : 
they  muft  not  injure  any  of  the  family,  or  any  other 
perfon  or  fociety  ;  for  by  the  former  the  peace  of  the 
family  is  interrupted  •,  by  the  latter  others  may  have 
caufe  to  difturb  its  fecurity. 

As  the  ftate  of  a  houfhold  becomes  infecure  and  un- 
happy when  the  heads  of  a  family  injure  others,  it 
follows,  that  heads  of  families  injure  their  houfhold 
if  they  do  not  endeavour  to  prevent  the  enmity  of  then- 
neighbours. 

If 


344  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.' 

If  the  heads  of  families  be  therefore  the  aggrefTors, 
the  houfhold  are  prohibited  by  higher  obligations  from 
fupporting  them  in  their  injuftice. 

On  the  contrary,  if  the  houfhold  are  injured  by  per- 
fons  abroad,  or  by  another  houfhold,  the  heads  of  the 
family  are  bound  to  protect  them. 

A  family  that  avows  an  injury  done  by  one  of  the 
houfhold  againft  another  perfon  or  houfhold,  or  a 
member  thereof,  and  refufes  reparation,  injures  that 
perfon  or  houfhold,  and  gives  a  juft  caufe  for  war. 

The  heads  of  a  family  engaging  in  a  jurt  defence  or 
war,  have  a  perfect  right  to  be  affifted  by  their  houfe- 
hold ;  for  without  that  affrftance  the  common  good  of 
the  family  cannot  be  preferved. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Of  communities. 


i 


T  may  be  for  the  happinefs  of  feveral  families  to 
enter  into  a  fociety  for  common  defence,  and  for  pro- 
moting their  local  interefts.  Here  the  heads  of  families 
may  meet  and  confult,  each  ordering  his  own  family  fo 
that  harmony  and  amity  be  preferved,  and  fuch  things 
performed  as  may  cement  their  union,  and  give  it 
ftrength  and  fecurity  againfr.  intruders  or  invaders. 

Such  a  ftate  we  may  call  a  community  \  of  which  moft 
of  the  Indian  nations  are  inftances. 

As  the  interefts  of  families  affociated  in  a  commu- 
nity, without  a  general  government  and  a  uniform 

conduct 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  345 

conduct  of  all  its  members,  cannot  but  frequently  clafh ; 
and  as,  in  cafes  of  common  danger,  defence  and  war 
muft  be  conducted  with  a  certain  degree  of  uniformity, 
and  under  the  direction  of  a  leader;  human  prudence, 
nay,  neceflity,  the  mother  of  wifdom  and  invention, 
muft  foon  point  out  the  danger  of  a  want  of  fyftem, 
and  the  propriety  of  coming  under  one  rule  and  under 
one  direction  for  the  peace  and  fecurity  of  the  whole 
community,  and  the  happinefs  of  each  of  the  confli- 
tuent  families. 

The  fame  caufes  which  flrft  prompted  a  confedera- 
tion of  families,  have  no  doubt  given  rife  to  commu- 
nities aflbciated  under  one  general  law  and  government. 

Communities  united  under  one  law  and  govern- 
ment are  the  conftituent  focieties  of  fiat es. 

Sch. — Inftances  of  fuch  focieties  are  the  incorporated  cities  or 
towns,  the  townfhips  or  difiricls  of  ftates — in  fine,  all 
manner  of  civil  focieties,  the  government  of  which  is 
local. 

That  general  fociety  which  comprehends  the  interells 
of  individuals,  of  families,  and  of  communities  fpread 
over  an  extenfive  tract  of  country,  is  called  the  civil* 


t  r  PART 


PART     II. 


Sect.  IV.    Comprehending  politics. 


CHAPTER  L 

Of  the  nature  and  difference  of  civil  focieties  or  ftates^ 

t± AVING  in  the  preceding  fection  briefly  explained 
the  principles  of  natural  juftice  and  equity,  with  re- 
fpect  to  the  conduct  of  perfons,  who  are  members  of 
the  moft  intimate  focieties  among  the  children  of  men, 
the  object  of  which  is  confined  to  the  particular  in- 
terests of  families  and  neighbourhoods ;  it  is  proper 
that  we  fhould  now  proceed  to  the  confideration  of 
that  general  fociety  which  comprehends  both  the  indi- 
vidual and  focial  concerns  of  a  van:  multitude  of  per- 
fons, families  and  communities,  having  for  its  ulti- 
mate end  the  public  good;  that  is  to  fay,  the  felicity  of 
all. 

This  great  and  general  fociety,  comprehending  the 
interefts  of  all  other  aflbciations,  and  having  for  its 
ultimate  object  the  felicity  of  all  its  members,  is,  by 

way  of  eminence,  ft i  led  civil. 

If  civil  focieties  are  confidered  in  their  relation  to 
one  another,  they  are  called  fiates :  thus  we  find  the 
globe  divided   into  various  empires,  kingdoms  and 
republics,  all  which  agree  in  this  their  general  cha- 
racter, 


348  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

rafter,  that  they  are  dates  under  different  forms,  mo- 
difications, laws  and  governments. 

Civil  fociety,  or  a  ft  ate,  may  be  defined  to  be  that 
general  fociety,  the  members  of  which  have  transfer- 
red their  will  and  power  to  a  certain  perfon,  for  the 
attainment,  prefervation  and  advancement  of  the  pub- 
lic good.  The  members  of  civil  fociety  are  called 
citizens. 

Sck.  1. — The  very  neceffity  of  the  cafe  renders  a  transfer  of 
that  nature  neceflary,  as  foon  as  the  extent  of  a  fociety 
is  too  great  to  admit  of  a  perfonal  attendance  of  all  the 
members  for  deliberating  on  thofe  things  which  are  ne- 
ceflary for  or  conducive  to  the  felicity  of  the  whole 
body. 

Sc/i.  2. — All  authors  on  morality  agree,  in  general,  with  re- 
fpect  to  the  transfer  of  will  and  power,  and  all  govern- 
ments act  upon  it ;  there  is,  however,  this  difference, 
that  whilft  the  former  have  much  controverfy  among 
themfelves  in  determining  the  originating  caufe  of  that 
transfer,  the  latter  are  very  apt  to  forget  the  fource  and 
foundation  of  their  power  and  political  exiftence,  and 
often  fubititute  their  own  will  for  that  of  the  whole  fo- 
ciety over  which  they  rule* 

Whether  fuch  a  transfer  of  the  public  will  and 
power  is  made,  or  fuppofed  to  be  made,  to  one  or  to 
a  certain  number  of  individuals,  the  confequence  is, 
that  a  moral  perfon  is  thereby  conftituted,  fo  that  fuch 
perfon,  or  perfons  as  the  cafe  may  be,  becomes  a  public 
perfon,  vetted  with  public  rights,  and  is  under  public 
obligations. 

Sc/t.  1. — From  the  modifications  of  the  moral  or  public  perfon 
in  a  ftate,  refult,  as  we  fhall  fee  hereafter,  the  different 
forms  of  governments,  the  monarchical,  the  ariftocratical, 
the  democratical,  &c. 
$c],m  2. — The  transfer  itfelf  may  be  varioufly  modified  and 
limitted  :  from  thefe  modifications  and  limitations  refult 
the  qualities  of  government;  whether  a  ftate  is  defpotical 

or 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  349 

or  limited,  whether  dependent  or  independent,  whether 
it  is  or  is  not  vefted  with  national  fovereignty. 
Sch.  3. — Thofe  who  hold  that  certain  forms  and  qualities  of 
ftates  or  governments  are  of  divine  institution,  pre- 
fuppofc  that  the  will  and  power  of  a  people  h  transferred 
by  God. 

Sclt.  4. — Others,  who  fee  the  abfurdity  of  fuch  a  fuppofition, 
hold  that  all  authority  in  a  ftate  is  and  ought  to  be  de- 
rived from  the  people. 

Sch.  5. — As  defpots  fubftitute  their  own  will  for  that  of  the 
people,  they  make  ufe  of  the  power  of  the  members  of 
the  itate  to  their  own  deltruction. 

Sch.  6. — Wife  and  good  governments,  whatever  their  form 
may  be,  will  always  refpect  the  people  as  the  main  object 
of  their  care,  and  the  iburce  of  their  authority. 

Sch.  7. — We  meet  the  objection  which  has  often  been  made 
againft  thefe  obvious  and  generous  ideas  of  good  govern- 
ment, from  mifconftruction  or  rather  mifapplication  of 
certain  pallages  of  fcripture,  with  an  open  and  candid 
acknowledgment  of  the  neceffity  of  civil  government  for 
the  general  felicity  of  mankind,  as  this  is  the  fum  of  all 
that  thofe  paffages  intimate.  Thus  far  we  hold  govern- 
ment to  be  an  ordinance  of  God,  that  we  believe  a  eood 
government  to  be  the  greateft  temporal  blefling  on  earth, 
and  that  there  is  nothing  more  conformable  to  his  will,  or 
more  conducive  to  the  happinefs  of  mankind,  nothing 
at  leaft  more  fuitable  to  the  profeffion  of  religion  and 
chriftianity,  than  a  faithful  obedience  to  all  that  is  law- 
fully commanded  by  civil  authority,  and  a  patient  for- 
bearance with  refpeft  to  thofe  public  proceedings  which 
have  not  that  falutarv  tendency  to  promote, as  they  fhould, 
the  felicity  of  mankind. 

The  public  perfon  in  a  ftate  has  a  right  to  direct 
the  will  and  power  for  the  attainment,  prcfervation 
and  advancement  of  tht  public  good;  for  it  is  for  that 
purpofe  that  the  public  will  and  power  have  been 
transferred. 

Sch. — To  pretend  a  right  to  rule  without,  or  repugnant  to  the 
will  of  man,  is  to  pretend  to  a  thing  that  is  unlawful  in 
itfelf,  and  contradictory  to  ths  nature  of  rights  in  per- 
forms j 


J/J®  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Tons ;  for  members  of  the  civil  fociety  cannot  ceafe  to 
be  men,  and  as  fuch  mud  be  ruled  in  a  manner  confiftent 
with  the  nature  of  a  moral  agent. 

A  right  to  direct  the  moral  actions  of  others  is 

called  government. 

Civil  fociety,  therefore,  neceifarily  requires  govern- 
ment. 

Thofe  who  exercife  civil  government  are  faid  to  be 
in  authority -,  and  are  ftiled  the  rulers  of  the  ft  ate  \  the 
perfons  directed  by  civil  government  are  faid  to  be 
lubject  to  public  authority,  and  are  ftiled  the  people, 
or  the  ruled. 

Since  the  members  of  civil  fociety  are  called  citi- 
zens, it  follows,  that  thefe  are  diftinguifhed  by  the 
rulers  and  ruled. 

Since  rulers  are  vefted  with  public  authority  to 
direct  the  will  and  power  of  the  people  in  all  that  is 
neceflary  for  the  attainment,  prefervation  and  advance- 
ment of  the  public  good,  it  follows,  that  the  ruled 
are  under  perfect  obligations  to  do  all  that  is  neceflary 
to  be  done  for  this  deflrable  end. 

From  this  it  immediately  follows,  that  both  the 
public  rights  of  the  rulers  and  the  public  obligations 
of  the  ruled,  flow  from  the  very  fcope  and  nature  of 
civil  fociety,  that  is  to  fay,  civil  society  is  equal. 

k.  i. — We  diflinguifh  equality  into  abfolute,   focial  and 
legal, 

'..  z. — /ibfolutc  ox  natural  equality  finds  place  between  man 
and  man,  conlidered  in  their  nature  or  under  the  fame 
circumftances.  This  equality,  as  we  flia.ll  fee,  is  the  na- 
tural ftate  of  nations  with  reipect  to  one  another. 
v!.  3. — Social  equality  refults  from  the  nature  of  focial  connec- 
tions; fome  of  which,  as  already  explained,  are  neceflary ^ 
others  agaia  voluntarv. 

Ia 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  35  £ 

In  neceffary  focieties,  the  directory  or  compulfory  right  is 
unalterably  vefted  in  one  member,  as  is  the  cafe  with  pa- 
rents and  mafters;  whilft  perfect  obligations,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  invariably  confined  to  the  ouher  party  of  the 
fociety,  as  long  as  the  focial  connection  remains  founded 
in  nature}  as,  obedience  and  fervices  on  the  part  of  chil- 
dren and  fervants  to  their  refpective  parents  and  mafters. 

In  voluntary  focieties  the  confent  of  the  parties  directs  who 
is  to  command,  and  who  are  bound  to  obey:  the  nature 
of  them  confequently  is,  that  whilft  rulers  have  to  direct 
the  affairs  of  the  fociety,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  ruled  to 
obey  them,  according  to  the  ftipulations  of  the  focial 
compact,  and  in  conformity  to  the  fcope  of  the  connec- 
tion. 

The  equality  of  the  refpective  members  of  focieties  is  there- 
fore by  no  means  favourable  to  the  idea,  that  there  is  no 
difference  between  the  ruler  and  the  ruled,  the  father  and 
the  child;  or  that  the  ruled  can  be  at  the  fame  time  ruler* 
or  the  mafter  a  fervant:  no  j  fuch  things  cannot  exift  at 
the  fame  time,  and  are  not  practicable  by  alternate  rota- 
tion, as  long  as  the  focial  connection  fubfifts  upon  the 
foundation  of  nature  or  pact.  Here  children  and  parents* 
fervants  and  mafters,  foldiers  and  generals,  the  ruled  and 
the  rulers  of  ftates  or  nations,  are  equals,  becaufe  their 
refpective  obligations  and  rights  are  not  arbitrary  imposi- 
tions, but  falutary  rules,  confiftent  with  nature,  and  ne- 
ceffary  for  the  general  happinefs  of  mankind. 

ScL  4. — By  legal  equality  we  do  not  underftand  a  levelling  fyf- 
tem,  depriving  men  of  their  juft  rights,  but  an  equal  ad- 
miniftration  of  juftice,  without  refpect  to  perfon,  rank* 
dignity  or  calling,  and  an  impartial  taxation,  according 
to  the  property  and  abilities  of  citizens. 

ScL  5. — It  may,  perhaps,  not  be  amifs  to  obferve  here,  that  it 
is  not  abfolutely  neceffary  for  reinftating  citizens  into 
their  natural  rights  of  equality,  to  pull  down  the  thrones 
and  the  eftabliflied  forms  of  government,  and  to  level  all 
the  conditions  of  citizens :  for  an  overbearing  fpirit  takes 
pofTeffion  of  men  who  have  drawn  their  origin  from  hum- 
ble cottages,  as  well  as  thofe  who  are  born  in  courts  and 
princely  palaces.  A  government  unequal  in  its  inftitu- 
tion  may  be  equally  adminifrered  j  whilft,  on  the  other 

hand, 


35-2  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

hand,  the  moft  equal  may  be  abufed,  and  the  powers  iri<« 
trufted  by  the  people  into  the  hands  of  men  of  theif 
choice,  perverted  to  the  ruin  of  the  ftate,  to  the  vexation 
and  oppreffion  of  its  citizens. 
Sen.  6. — If  fundamental  laws  have  intruded  the  reins  of  go- 
vernment into  the  hands  of  perfons  who,  like  the  heads 
of  the  neceffary  focieties,  are  invariably  fixed  as  the  rulers 
of  empires,  kingdoms,  &c.  which  is  the  cafe  in  hereditary 
ftates;  let  fuch  rulers  exercife  their  rights  in  confiftency 
with  the  fcope  of  the  fociety  ;  let  them  exact  no  public 
obligations,  but  fuch  as  are  pointed  out  by  the  public 
good  of  the  ftate;  nay,  let  no  citizen  claim  immunities 
to  the  prejudice  of  his  fellows;  let  the  neceflary  burdens 
fall  upon  all  citizens,  according  to  their  abilities  and  cir- 
cumfrances;  let  the  laws  be  no  refpecters  of  perfons,  Sec. 

$c/;.  y. — Behold  the  neceffity  and  nature  of  the  reforms  requifite 
in  many  governments  now  extant!  which  require,  on  the 
part  of  the  rulers  and  the  privileged  orders,  facrifices  well 
worthy  the  wifdom,  patriotiim,  juftice,  equity  and  hu- 
manity, in  which  great  minds  find  the  higheft  fatisfaction 
and  the  greateft  glory. 

Sck.  8. — We  cannot  difmifs  this  important  fubjecl  without  a 
moft  cordial  congratulation,  addrefled  to  the  free  and  in- 
dependent  citizens  and  electors  of  thefe  ftates,  founded 
upon  the  true  principles  of  civil  equality;  with  our  hearty 
wifhes,  that  thefe  glorious  inftitutions  of  civil  govern- 
ment may  continue  to  be  fo  happily  adminiftered,  that  the 
rulers  and  the  ruled  may  have  but  one  common  intereft 
at  heart,  the  general  good  of  the  neto-born  nation — placing 
the  glory  of  North-America  in  the  liberty  and  ha-ppinefs 
of  the  people. 

Public  good)  the  general  felicity  of  individuals,  what- 
ever their  ftate  or  fituation  may  be,  muft  neceflariJy  be 
of  a  vaft  extent,  as  it  comprehends  all  manner  of  ob- 
jects which  influence  human  happinefs  under  every 
circumftance  of  time,  chance  and  place.  To  find  out 
the  mode  and  manner  how  the  particular  and  focial  in- 
terefts  of  the  community  may  be  heft  attained,  fecured 
and  advanced,  under  all  circumftances,  is  the  ftudy  of 

the 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY*"  35$ 

the  ftatefman,  and  an  object  worthy  the  care  and  con* 
federation  of  a  government  imprerTed  with  a  defire  of 
promoting  the  public  good. 

Perfection,  however,  cannot  be  expected  where  frail 
men  have  an  agency.  Great  and  complicated  machines 
caufe  frictions,  and  carry  in  themfelves  obftructions  to 
their  power.  To  govern  a  ftate  is  a  vaft  undertaking : 
colliiions  and  difficulties  keep  pace  with  its  extent.  It 
will  remain  a  matter  of  controverfy,  both  in  public 
confultations  and  in  the  comments  which  the  ruled 
make  on  them,  whether  things  are  or  are  not  confiftent 
with  public  good. 

In  order  to  facilitate  our  enquiries  with  refpect  to 
this  important  fubjeet,  it  will  be  neceflary  to  felect 
fome  eftential  ingredients,  without  which  public  felicity 
cannot  fubfift,  from  other  things  which  have  but  a 
remote  influence,  and  are  not  always  attainable  •,  as,  an 
extenfive,  well-fituated  and  populous  territory,  or  ah 
abundance  of  materials  for  manufactories  and  com- 
merce. 

We  hold,  that  the  public  good  of  civil  fociety  ef- 

fentially  coniifts  in  the  enjoyment  of  civil  liberty ',  of 
internal  and  external  fecurity. 

Sch.  i. — We  here  confider  a  ilate  in  the  enjoyment  of  all  the 
rights  of  government  and  fovereignty;  that  is  to  fay,  both, 
in  its  political  and  national  character. 

Sch.  2. — The  political  character  of  a  ftate  comprehends  all  the 
rights  of  government  which  are  necefiary  for  the  enjoy- 
ment of  civil  liberty  and  internal  fecurity:  thefe  right* 
cenftitdte  what  we  fhall  hereafter  call  the  internal  fove- 
reignty of  a  ftate. 

Sch.  3. — There  are  flates  which  have  veiled  the  rights  of  go- 
vernment, with  refpect  to  external  fecurity,  in  a  confede- 
ration,, or  in  a  confolidated  general  government;   whiifr. 
Z  z  thev 


354  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY." 

they  enjoy  feparately  and  in  themfelves  all  the  rights  of 
internal  fovereignty  ;  that  is,  the  rights  which  are  neceflarv 
for  the  direction  of  their  internal  concerns,  their  feparat'e 
interefts,  and  their  internal  fecurity.  Such  ftates  are  in- 
ternally independent;  whilft  the  confederation,  or  the  general 
government,  maintains  external  or  national  independence. 

Note  i. — Thus  the  feven  united  provinces  of  the  Nether- 
lands, and  the  cantons  of  Switzerland,  are  free,  fovereign 
and  internally  independent  ftates  :  but  their  national  cha- 
racter, their  external  fovereignty  is  in  the  States  General, 
and  in  the  Helvetic  body. 

Note  2. — Thus  the  individual  ftates  of  the  American  union 
are  free,  fovereign  and  naturally  independent;  whilft  the 
general  government  exercifes  the  national  Jovereignty  of 
that  union. 

•  Sch,  4. — There  are  ftates  which  are  reftricted  with  refpect  to 
internal  fovereignty;  that  is,  fubject  to  the  controul  of 
another  ftate  in  the  direction  of  their  internal  concerns; 
as,  the  kingdom  of  Ireland,  theBritifh  and  other  colonies, 
where  the  laws  are  liable  to  the  controul,  or  even  rever- 
iion  of  the  refpective  courts,  &c. 

Sch.  5. — But  there  are  alfo  ftates  which  bear,  at  the  fame  time, 
both  the  political  and  the  national  character  of  ftates;  as, 
Great-Britain,  France,  Prufiia,  Ruffia,  Poland,  Sw.eden, 
&c. 

Sch.  6. — Thofe  nations  which  are  ftates  bearing  the  national 
character,  may  be  confidered  as  ftates  and  as  nations; 
that  is  to  fay,  both  in  their  political  and  national  cha- 
racter. 

Sch.  j. — Since  we  fhall  treat  of  the  law  of  nations  hereafter, 
let  it  be  obferved,  that  what  relates  to  their  political  cha- 
racter will  be  the  fubject  of  this  fection  ;  whilft  all  thofe 
things  will  be  referved  for  the  fubfequent  part  of  this 
treatke  which  refer  to  the  public  rights  and  obligations 
of  nations  among  one  another. 

Civil  liberty  necefTarily  imports  a  reftraint  upon  that 
natural  liberty  to  which  individuals  are  entitled  by 
nature  and  that  natural  relation  which  they  bear  to 
one  another  \  for  it  would  be  impoflible  that  one  com- 
mon 


MOHAL  PHILOSOPHY.  355 

moil  intereit.  could  fubfift,  or  the  public  felicity  be  ob- 
tained, if  every  man  might  exercife  his  natural  right  as 
he  would  wifh,  fince,  at  this  rate,  each  would  purfue 
his  own  interefts,  whether  they  were  or  were  not  con- 
fident with  the  felicity  of  all.  Hence  it  follows,  that 
for  the  attainment  and  prefervation  of  civil  liberty,  all 
thofe  natural  rights  muft  be  furrendered  which  are  in- 
compatible with  the  public  good  of  the  whole  fociety. 

Citizens,  as  fuch,  are  therefore  free,  when  they  enjoy 
all  thofe  natural  rights  which  are  not  neceflarily  furren- 
dered for  the  attainment,  prefervation  and  advance- 
ment of  the  public  good,  and  when  they  have  in  this 
good  their  jurt  and  proportionate  mare. 

Civil  liberty  is  therefore  defined  to  be  that  ftate  of 
citizens,  in  which  they  enjoy,  together  with  thofe  ac- 
quired rights  belonging  to  them,  as  members  of  civil 
fociety,  all  thofe  natural  rights  which  are  confident 
with  the  public  good. 

To  make  a  furrender,  in  the  hands  of  government, 
of  fuch  natural  rights  as  are  not  neceflary  for  the  pro- 
motion of  the  public  good,  would  be  both  foolifh  and 
unjuft:  foolijh,  becaufe  it  would  be  acting  without  a 
good  caufe,  without  a  rational  deiign ;  unjuft,  becaufe 
it  would  involve  a  contradiction  with  the  firrt  principle 
of  natural  law,  upon  which  all  civil  laws  and  obliga- 
tions ultimately  depend:  for  the  very  end  of  the  mfti- 
tution  of  civil  fociety  is  this,  that  the  ftate  of  all  the 
members  may  be  thereby  rendered  as  perfect  as  pof- 
fible. 

If,  therefore,  civil  focieties  are  properly  inftituted 
and  well  adminiftered,  the  citizens  will  be  gainers, 
fince  their  acquired  civil  rights  will  make  more  than 

fufKcient 


£$6  .  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

fufficient  amends  for  thofe  of  their  particular  natural 

rights  furrendered,  which,  in  their  hands,  could  have 

been  of  very  little  ufe,  if  not  altogether  ufelefs.    What, 

for  inftance,  avails  the  natural  right  of  compulfion  or 

defence,  when  your  ftrength  is  not  adequate  or  fuperior 

to  that  of  your  adverfary  •,  or,  if  he  finds  afTociates  in 

committing  injuries  againft  your  perfon  or  property  ? 

In  the  civil  ftate  the  ftrength  of  all  is  your  protection, 

your  fhield,  and  the  wifdom  of  the  whole  fociety  your 

guide.     If  the  public  good  is  promoted,  your  own 

felicity  is  advanced.    The  public  happinefs  and  ftrength 

of  the  ftate  difFufes  comfort,  happinefs,  peace  and  fe- 

curity  over  all  its  members. 

£c/i. — Civil  liberty  is  then  to  be  well  diftinguifhed  from  that 
which  is  natural.  A  fpirit  impatient  of  rational,  falu- 
tary  and  necefTary  controul,  is  not  liberty,  but  wan- 
ton licentioufnefs.  Public  good,  and  not  the  acciden- 
tal changes  of  time  and  circumftances  that  may  befal 
the  ftate,  is  the  true  ftandard  of  civil  liberty.  The  citi- 
zen is  not  lefs  free  in  the  day  of  public  danger,  when  the 
public  good  renders  his  perfonai  fervices,  the  ftricleft 
difcipline  and  fubordination,  nay,  even  the  facriflce  of 
his  life  and  property,  neceflary,  than  he  is  when  fur- 
rounded  by  the  funfhine  of  peace  and  external  fecurity, 
when  he  may  live  at  eafe,  and  dwell  under  his  own  vine 
and  fig-tree. 

There  is  indeed  nothing  in  the  public  concerns  of 
ftates  and  nations  which  requires  more  care  and  cir- 
cumfpeclioa  on  the  part  of  the  rulers  as  well  as  on 
that  of  the  ruled,  than  to  draw  and  keep  within  the 
precife  line  of  their  refpeclive  public  rights  and  obli- 
gations, fo  that  each  may  faithfully  perform  their 
public  duties  -,  for  every  ftretch  of  power  on  the  part 
of  government,  is  an  incroachment  on  the  civil  liberty 
of  the  ruled ;  and  every  default,  with  refpect  to  the 
performance  of  the  civil  duties,  on  the  part  of  the  lat- 
ter, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  ^^J 

ter,  is  an  injury  committed  againft  the  government,  a 
wanton  abufe  of  civil  liberty,  and  an  aft  of  licentiouf- 
nefs,  ending  with  the  fubverfion  of  the  flate  and  the 
deftruction  of  public  happinefs.  There  would  be 
caufe  to  lament  the  incefTantcontroverfies  on  this  point 
between  the  governors  of  free  ftates  and  the  go- 
verned, were  it  not  that  jealoufy,  diftruft  and  difcon- 
tent  feem  to  be  naturally  interwoven  in  the  conftitu- 
tions  of  ftates,  and  as  infeparable  from  free  govern- 
ments as  debilities  and  ficknefTes  from  the  frail  confti- 
tution  of  our  bodies. 

Befides  thefe  confiderations,  it  is  internal  fecurity^ 
that  is  to  fay,  fuch  provisions  as  are  neceftary  that  there 
be  no  caufe  to  dread  an  evil  within,  that  citizens  may 
live  peaceably  and  undifturbed  in  their  perfons  and 
property,  which  naturally  incroach  upon  the  liberties 
of  the  members.  In  the  multifarious  occurrences  of 
life,  and  among  fo  many  and  fuch  various  clamings  of 
private  and  focial  interefts,  it  far  furpaffes  the  wifdom 
and  fagacity  of  human  legislators  to  draw  the  exact  line 
and  to  determine  with  precision  where  laws  are  to  put 
a  reftraint  upon  the  citizen,  and  where  he  may  be  left 
to  follow  his  own  inclination  and  to  be  guided  by  his 
own  discretion,  What  the  foul  is  with  refpecr.  to  the 
exercife  of  our  faculties  as  men,  fuch  are  laws  with  re- 
flect to  the  body  politic  in  regard  to  the  conduct  of 
citizens. 

To  thefe  mud  be  added  the  various  provisions  ne- 
cefiary  for  the  external  fecurity  of  the  ftate :  citizens 
muft  be  retrained  from  committing  any  injury  againft 
other  ftates  or  their  citizens,  left  the  public  repofe  of 
the  ftate  be  thereby  endangered.  As  a  fociety  cannot 
enjoy  public  felicity  if  it  muft  be  in  a  continual  ftate 

of 


%$%  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  fear  and  danger,  the  citizens  muft  learn  the  ufe  of 
arms,  and  ftand  prepared  to  quell  an  infurrecTion  and 
defeat  a  rebellion,  as  well  as  to  repel  an  invafion  of  the 
ftate.  At  fuch  times  the  citizen  muft  come  under 
military  law — muft  leave  all  other  concerns,  folely  in- 
tent on  averting  the  public  danger  •,  he  mould  even 
make  a  facriiice  of  life,  limbs  and  property  at  the  facred 
ihrine  of  his  injured  country. 

Sch.  i. — Behold  the  various  and  theneceflary  modifications  of 
civil  liberty,  and  the  great  importance  of  public  good  I 
We  fet  down  civil  liberty  firfl  and  foremoft;  for  what 
will  all  laws  avail,  what  is  the  power,  the  fplendor  of  na- 
tional refpectability  and  grandeur,  when  the  former  are 
the  fhackles,  the  latter  the  bane  of  citizens? 

But  what  is  liberty  without  the  controul  of  falutary  and  ne- 
ceffary  laws — laws  which  have  public  good  for  their  ob- 
ject, and  are  not  the  arbitrary  edicts  of  unnatural  defpot- 
ifm? — What  will  liberty,  guarded  by  the  wifeft  and  bell 
of  laws,  finally  avail,  when  there  is  no  care  taken  for  the 
promotion  of  public  peace  and  fecurity  ? 

■Sch.  2. — Where  thefe  three  ingredients  to  the  public  good  are 
properly  fubqrdinated,  and  fo  poifed  that  they  fupport  one 
another,  the  happinefs  of  a  ftate  or  nation  will  ftand — 
will  be  lafting  and  permanent.  To  apportion  them  as 
times  and  circumftances  require,  is  the  greateft  art,  the 
mod  glorious  object  in  which  men  can  engage.  To  go- 
vern well,  to  render  ftates  and  nations  happy,  entitles 
rulers  to  the  auguft  diftinction  of  being  denominated  Gods 
on  earth.. 

Since  civil  fociety,  whatever  the  form  of  its  govern- 
ment may  be,  is  by  nature  equal,  and  fince  the  nature 
and  fcope  of  that  fociety,  that  is  to  fay,  public  hap- 
pinefs, is  the  ftandard  by  which  the  extent  of  the  public 
rights  and  obligations  of  all  the  members  muft  be  efti- 
mated  •,  it  follows,  that  civil  fociety  naturally  refts  on 
an  univerfal  fundamental  law,  whereby  both  the  rulers 

of 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  359 

of  ftates  and  nations,  and  the  refpective  citizens  under 
their  authority,  ought  to  regulate  their  conduct. 

This  fundamental  civil  law  may  be  exprefTed  in  this 
general  proportion:  Citizens  must  direct  their 

ACTIONS  SO  THAT  THE  PUBLIC  GOOD,  that  IS  to  fay, 
THAT  CIVIL  LIBERTY  AND  INTERNAL  AND  EXTERNAL 
SECURITY  MAY  BE  OBTAINED,  PRESERVED  AND  PRO- 
MOTED ;  AND  MUST  CAREFULLY  AVOID  THE  CON- 
TRARY. 

Sch. — What  contradicts  this  fundamental  law  is  civilly  unjuft; 
laws  and  ordinances  contrary  to  it  are  public  grievances, 
&c. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  origin  of  civil  foriety. 

1HE  origin  of  civil  fociety,  conlidered  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  has  given  rife  to  a  variety  of  opinions :  but 
as  opinions  cannot  affect,  the  nature  of  things,  we  may 
lay  afide  an  unprofitable  difcuflion  of  them,  and  proceed 
immediately  to  the  principal  point  of  the  controverfy, 
to  wit,  the  enquiry,  Whether  philofophical  deductions^ 
like  thofe  of  the  preceding  chapter,  "reft  upon  fittion^ 
or  are  founded  in  nature,  are  fomething  real  and  co- 
eval with  the  multiplication  of  the  human  race  ? — We 
think  reafon  is  on  the  fide  of  thofe  who  affert  the  latter ; 
for,  if  the  relation  of  rulers  and  the  ruled  is  not  natu- 
ral, how  can  we  account  for  the  general  reception  and 

eftablifhment 


%6o  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

eftabli  foment  of  one  kind  of  government  or  another* 
even  among  the  mod  barbarous  nations  of  the  earth  ? 
Have  not  the  freed  communities  among  the  Indians 
their  leaders  ?  Have  they  not  their  head  men,  who 
tranfact  public  bufinefs  in  the  name  of  their  tribes? 

Men* are  prone  to  counteract  both  perfect  and  imper- 
fect obligations :  in  confequence  of  this  barbarous  dii- 
pofition,  life,  as  well  as  the  undifturbed  enjoyment  o( 
the  things  necenary  for  its  prefervation,  muft  have  be- 
come extremely  infecure  and  precarious,  as  foon  as  the 
human  race  were  multiplied  to  a  considerable  extent. 
Neceliity,  therefore,  muft  have  foon  fuggefted  the 
greater  conveniences  and  fecurity  which  civil  focieties 

and  governments  afford, 

<_> 

Where  is  the  reafon,  we  may  afk,  that  men,  in  the 
early  ages  of  the  world,  have  been  fo  itrangely  fupine 
with  refpect  to  their  true  interefts,  and  fo  much  more 
inattentive  to  their  mod  urgent  neceflities  than  their 
fellow  creatures  in  fubfequent  days  ?  ,  Experience 
evinces,  that  the  apprehenfion  of  an  evil  places  us  in  a 
ftate  of  infecurity,  and  renders  our  Situation  unhappy. 
Is  it  not  the  nature  of  fear  to  excite  men  to  exert  them- 
felves  in  acquiring  repofe,  peace  and  fafety  ? 

Aflbciations  have  mod  undoubtedly  derived  their 
origin  from  the  fear  of  danger.  Natural  focieties,  the 
connubial  and  parental,  have  led  the  way  to  the  herile. 
The  deiire  of  peace  and  happinefs  has  cemented  fami- 
lies under  the  domeftic  irate ;  of  which  the  civil  is,  as 
it  were,  the  counterpart,  with  this  difference,  that  the 
latter  is  more  extenfive,  and  forms  the  fhield  under 
which  not  only  individuals,  but  families  and  commu- 
nities find  their  general  fecurity. 

We 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY..  36* 

We  fhould  not  feel  that  degree  of  anxiety  for  op- 
posing thofe  authors  who  affign,  as  the  firfr.  moving 
caufes  for  civil  focieties,  the  lint  of  power  and  dorni- 
nion>  or  fuccefsful  acts  of  violence  and  rapine,  the 
efTential  traits  of  which  the  experience  ,of  ages  has  not 
been  able  fully  to  take  away  even  among  the  poliihed 
nations  of  the  earth, — were  it  not  that  it  would  feem 
to  leave  them  the  boaft  of  victory,  as  it  were,  over  the 
fuperior  power  of  reafon  and  found  morality :  for,  de- 
crying the  principles  flowing  from  the  nature  of  God 
and  men,  from  the  nature  of  things  and  real  happinefs, 
as  a  fiction,  they  fap  the  very  foundation  of  political 
morality,  nay,  of  human  happinefs.  They  place  the 
origin  of  civil  fociety  in  lawlefs  and  unnatural  acts  ot 
violence  and  injuftice,  and  thence  draw  the  inconclufive 
inference,  that  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  mem- 
bers of  civil  fociety  cannot  be  reduced  to  ftable  and 
unalterable  principles  of  natural  law. 

Hiftory,  it  is  true,  furnifnes  us  with  frequent  in- 
fiances  of  ftates  which  have  had  their  origin  in  lawlefs 
ufurpation  :  but  thefe  inftances  are  fo  far  from  proving 
the  infufficiency  of  rational  principles  for  explaining  the 
true  nature  of  civil  focieties,  that  they  exhibit  powerful 
arguments  for  eftablifhing  both  the  right  and  power  of 
reafon  in  the  public  concerns'  of  ftates,  as  there  are  in- 
numerable examples  of  governments  founded  in  in- 
juftice and  fupported  by  Violence,  which  have  either4 
vanifhed  or  undergone  a  feries  of  changes  and  revolu- 
tions, vibrating,  as  it  were,  from  one  extreme  to  the 
other,  until  they  have  been  brought  under  modifica- 
tions as  near  to  the  principles  of  nature  as  the  circum- 
fiances  of  the  times,  the  improvements  and  the  genius 
of  the  people,  or  the  particular  fituation  cf  ftates, 
would  admit. 

A  a  a  Recent 


g62  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Recent  inftances  of  this  kind  are  exhibited  by  the 
genera]  government  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
particular  ftates  which  compofe  it — -inftances  which 
fufficiently  mew  that  it  is  practicable  to  eftablifh  go- 
vernments upon/the  bafis  of  natural  juftice. 

The  druggies  of  the  French  nation  have  been  con- 
fidered  in  the  ridiculous  light  of  a  vifionary  dream  ;  but 
in  fpite  of  all  oppofltion,  they  bid  fair  to  afford  us  an 
eflential  proof,  that  there  is  fome  reality  in  governments 
founded  on  the  principles  of  nature. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  different  laws,  rights  and  obligations  which  take 
place  in  civil  fociety,  and  the  different  capacities  and 
.  char  afters  of  the  citizens. 

J\  L  L  the  rights  and  obligations  of  citizens  have 
either  reference  to  civil  government,  or  are  confined  to 
the  concerns  which  citizens  have  among  one  another, 
in  the  former  cafe  the  rights  and  obligations  of  citizens 
are  called  public;  in  the  latter,  private. 

Perfons  who  are  vefted  with  the  right  of  civil  govern- 
ment are  public;  thofe  who  are  under  the  authority  of 
government  are  private  perfons. 

When  private  perfons  are  coniidered  in  their  relation 
to  government,  that  is  to  fay,  with  refpeel  to  their 
public  rights  and  obligations,  they  are  contemplated  in 
their  public  charafter;  but  when  reference  is  had  to  the 
relation  which  they  bear  to  their  fellow  citizens,  or 

when 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  363 

when  their  private  concerns  come  into  contemplation  y 
they  fuftain  a  private  char  after. 

Public  perfons  may  have  private  rights  and  obliga- 
tions, and  of confequence,  fuftain  a  private  character; 
for  inftance,  the  prefident  of  the  union,  the  feveral 
governors  of  the  United  States,  &sc.  have  private  pro* 
perty,  hold  real  and  perfonal  eftates. 

Thofe  laws  of  a  ftate  or  nation  are  public,  which 
have  for  their -object,  the  public  rights  and  obligations 
of  the  rulers  as  well  as  of  the  ruled  ;  but  the  municiv 
pal  lazvs  are  confined  to  the  cognizance  of  the  private 
concerns  of  citizens  among  themfelves. 

In.mort,  all  things  in  a  ftate  are  Riled  public,  which 
have  reference  to  the  government  thereof :  there  are 
fuch  things  as  public  property,  public  concerns,  public 
employ,  public  ftations,.  affairs,  offices,  fervices,  &c. 

Public  perfons,  or  citizens  engaged  in  public  fer- 
vice,  becaufe  they  alfo  fuftain  a  private  character,  are 
bound  to  regulate  their  conduct  in  perfect  conformity 
to  the  laws  of  the  land,  as  far  as  that  obedience  does 
not  clafh  with  the  weightier  concerns  of  government  : 
for  nothing  except  a  higher  obligation  can  excufe  the 
citizen  from  the  performance  of  the  duties-  he  owes  to 
his  fellow  citizens  as  men  and  as  citizens. 

Hence  it  appears  perfectly  confiftent  with  the  law 
of  nature,  that  perfons  whofe  fervices  are  eftentiallv 
necefTary  for  the  prefervation  of  the  public  welfare, 
.mould  not  be  amenable  to  the  municipal  law  as  long 
as  that  neceffity  exifts  :  as,  the  general,  the  officer,  the 
foldier,  &c.  on  an.  expedition,  fliould  not  be  liable  to 
arreft  for  debt. 

Public  perfons,  at  the  helm  of  government,  are  qt 

all 


364  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

all  times  engaged  in  public  affairs  ;  they  ought,  there- 
fore, to  he  exempted  from  the  power  of  the  municipal, 
laws,  as  long  as  their  adminiftration  lafts.  This  pri- 
vilege ought  likewife  to  be  extended  to  the  members 
of  the  legiflature,  during  its  feflion,  and  a  reafonable 
time  before  as  well  as  after  it. 

A  reafonable  expectation  may  be  formed,  that  per- 
fons raifed  to  an  exalted  ftation  will  not  fail  to  be  as 
faithful  in  their  private  as  they  ought  to  be  in  their 
public  characters, ' 

Thofe  who  abufe  fuch  privileges  to  the  prejudice  of 

their  fellow  citizens,  carry  the  mark  of  public  opprefibrs 

of  the  worft  kind  -,  becaufe,  under  the  fhield  of  Jaw» 

they  facrilegiouily  defeat  its  falutary  ends, 

Sch. — It  is  an  additional  argument  to  prove  the  propriety  of 
privileging  public  perfons,  that  it  is  poflible  for  defigning 
men  to  throw  an  obflacle  in  the  way  of  public  proceed- 
ings, by  vexatious  and  unfounded  actions  commenced 
againfl  public  perfons. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  invariable  f cope  of  all  public  and  municipal  laws  in  a 
ftate,  the  effential public  rights,  and  the  correlative  public 
obligations  between  the  government  and  the  people.. 


I N  C  E  the  fundamental  civil  law  requires  citizens 
to  direct  their  actions  fo  that  the  public  good  of  the 
ftate  or  nation  may  be  obtained,  preferved  and  promot- 
ed, it  follows,  that  all  public  laws  of  a  ftate,  as  well  as 
the  municipal,  muft  invariably  have  this  defirable  end 
for  their  object,  and  that  all  regulations  in  a  ftate  which 

have 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  365 

have  a  contrary  tendency,  are  improper,  grievous  and 
unjuft. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  government  cannot  have  any 
public  rights  which  are  inconfiftent  with  the  liberty  of 
the  people.  The  people,  therefore,  owe  no  obligation 
to  fuch  mandates  as,  in  themfelves,  have  a  manifeft  ten- 
dency to  deftroy  civil  liberty,  for  fuch  mandates  flow 
not  from  the  public  right,  but  are  abufes  of  the  power 
of  government. 

Sc/i. — We  fay  mandates  hi  themfelves,  becaufe  it  is  poffible  that 
other  and  higher  obligations  bind  citizens  to  forbear. 
Vide  p.  32—48,  &c. 

It  is  for  the  enjoyment  of  civil  liberty  that  govern- 
ment is  necefTary  and  civil  fociety  inftituted  :  civil  li~ 
berty  is  therefore  the  right  paramount  of  the  citizen, 
to  which  governments  owe  all  their  powers,  their  exig- 
ence and  authority,  and  on  this  account  are  bound, 
under  a  public  and  moft  facred  obligation,  to  refpect 
and  protect  that  right. 

Sch.  1. — Civil  liberty  is  that  facred  public  depofit  which  is  not 
to  be  touched  with  an  unhallowed  hand:  it  is  the  birth- 
right of  the  citizen:  he  who  is  deprived  thereof  is  not  a 
citizen,  but  a  (lave.  This  great  and  indefeafible  right 
implies  the  rights  to  the  necefTary  means  for  preferving  it 
again  ft  encroachments  and  daagers.  A  free  citizen  has 
the  right  to  have  arms,  and  is  entitled  to  a  free  communi- 
cation of  his  thoughts:  hence  the  liberty  of  the  prefs,  and 
hence  the  right  to  aflemble  with  fellow  citizens  in  a  peace- 
able manner,  for  confutation  with  refpect  to  the  concerns 
of  their  country, 

€eh.  2. — How  careful  ought  citizens  to  be  to  preferve  thefe 
rights!  how  folicitous  not  to  abufe  them,  fince  abufes 
whether  they  proceed  from  or  take  their  rife  among 
citizens,  provoke  meafures  of  the  moft  dreadful  effects 
and  the  moll  fatal  confequences! 

It  is  a  public  obligation  in  citizens  to  learn  to  know 

their 


§66  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 

fcheir  rights :  it  is  from  ignorance  that  the  people  m 
many  countries  have  loft  their  liberty  •,  and  it  is  from 
that  caufe  why  with  fome  it  has  only  exiftence  in  imagi- 
nation and  prejudice,  whilft  fuch  as  enjoy  it  fetno  value 
thereon,  or  become  guilty  of  abufing  it  to  the  mod 
outrageous  purpofes. 

Liberty  indeed  comprehends  avaft  deal;  but  the 
liberty  of  man  is  directed  by  the  laws  of  nature  and  of 
revelation;  that  of  the  citizen  becomes  modified  and 
determined  by  additional  reftraints,  neceiTary  for  the 
internal  and  external  fecurity  of  the  ftate.  To  perpe- 
trate injuries  againft  fellow  citizens,  to  invade  the juft 
rights  of  the  rulers  or  the  ruled,  is  not  liberty,  but 
the.  height  of  ■  anarchy  and  licentioufnefs,  the  greatest 
evil  that  can  befal  civil  fociety,  The  liberty  of  the 
citizen  is  restrained  by  neceiTary  and  directed  by  falu- 
tary  laws. 

It  is,  therefore,  a  public  right  of  government  to« 

enact  falutarv  laws,  which  are  necefTarv  tor  the  internal 

order,  peace  and  fecurity  of  the  ftate;    and  citizens 

are  under  the  moft  facred  public  obligations  to  obey 

them. 

Sch. — Behold  a  ftriking  criterion  of  a  good  government  and 
of  £ood  and  free  citizens! 

There  are  like  wife  public  rights,  veiling  government 
with  a  power  to  make  laws  directing  the  conduct  of 
citizens,  that  they  do  not  injure  other  civil  focieties  by 
any  adls  which  are  repugnant  to  the  perfect  rights  of 
their  members,  whether  they  be  rulers  or  the  ruled, 
left  the  external  fecurity  of  the  ftate  becomes  involved 
in  the  iflue  of  fuch  a  conduct. 

Befides  fuch  neceiTary  regulations  and  laws,  obedi- 
ence to  which  is  an  indifputable  public  obligation  on 

the 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  36*7 

"the  part  of  the  people,  the  government  has  the  public 
right  to  order  that  the  citizens  be  prepared  for  public 
defence  and  war,  againft  an  intended  or  actual  ag- 
grerTion;  likewife,  to  regulate  and  order  the  mode  of 
conducting  the  one  or  the  other,  to  afTent  to  terms  of 
accommodation  or  pacification,  &c. 

The  citizens  are  bound  to  fubmit  to  fuch  regulations. 
To  fupport  the  ftate  is  the  greater!:  privilege,  and  the 
principal  trait  in  the  character  of  a  free  citizen,  fince 
that  fupport  is  the  fureft  mean  to  preferve  the  liberty 
of  our  country. 

Sc/i.  i. — Almoft  all  nations  have  loft  their  liberty,  becaufe 
they  have  intruded  their  public  right  of  defence  to  fo- 
reigners, or  to  a  mercenary  foldiery. 

'Sc&.  i. — Patriotic  citizens  will  not  fuffer,  in  learning  the  mili- 
tary art,  that  ftrange  indolence  or  want  of  discretion,  on 
their  part,  fhould  give  a  handle  to  thofe  who  are  fond  of 
undervaluing  the  character  of  a  militia-foldier. 

Sch.  3. — Whillt,  with  heart-felt  gratitude,  we  recollect  the 
patriotic  and  heroic  perfeverance  of  the  continental  armv 
during  our  glorious  conteft  with  Great-Britain,  it  would 
be  criminal  to  forget  the  valour  and  affiduity  of  our  mi- 
litia: America  has  exhibited  inftances  that  a  citizen  fol- 
dier  is  invincible — to  recount  the  noble  exploits  of  in- 
dividuals would  certainly  be  worthy' the  pen  of  hiftorians. 

§ek.  4. — Let  pofterity  hear,  that  at  the  time  of  Herkemer's 
battle,  which  happened  the  6th  of  Auguft,  1777,  the 
valour  of  one  hundred  and  nTtv  militia-men.  commanding 
themfelves,  becaufe  their  leaders  had  fallen,  affifted  by 
the  intrepid  and  mo  ft  feafonable  fortie  of  a  Colonel 
Willett,  maintained  the  field  againft  the  mixt  hoft 
of  regulars,  refugees  and  Indians,  exceeding  four  times 
their  number.  Let  it  ftand  recorded  among  other  pa- 
triotic deeds  of  that  little  army  of  militia,  that  a  Jacob 
Gardiner,  with  a  few  of  his  men,  vanquiihed  a  whole 
plattoon,  killed  the  Captain  thereof,  after  he  had  kept: 
nim  for  a  long  time  by  his  collar,  as  a  mield  againft  the 
Walls  and  the  bayonets  of  the  whole  plattoon.   This  brave 

rnalitia 


$6$  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

militia  Captain  is  ftill  alive,  and  was  cured  of  thirteen 
wounds.  Neither  mult  it  be  forgotten,  that  William 
Wills  and  John  Harper,  who  at  that  time  of  general 
diftrefs  on  our  weflern  frontiers,  when  two  hundred  roy- 
alifts  and  Indians  had  advanced  into  the  heart  of  Scho- 
hary,  when  treachery,  affifted  by  the  panic  with  which 
the  inhabitants  had  been  ftruck,  had  almofl  accomplish- 
ed a  total  defection  among  the  inhabitants,  with  forty 
men,  collected  in  a  ftrong  brick-houfe,  braved  the  enemy, 
hindred  the  defection  from  taking  the  intended  effect, 
and  afforded  time  for  fuccour,  by  which  the  whole  defign 
of  the  enemy  was  defeated,  and  a  valuable  part  of  the 
frontier  preferved. 
It  is  a  certain  fact,  that,  after  the  above-mentioned  bloody 
day,  when  General  Burgoyne's  proclamation  was  fent 
amongft  the  intimidated  inhabitants  of  the  then  county 
of  Tryon,  by  a  flag  of  truce,  compofed  of  a  mixed 
group  of  run-aways  from  faid  county,  and  of  a  number 
of  Indians  yet  reeking  with  the  blood  of  their  benefactors 
and  neighbours — only  a  few  men  defeated  the  treacherous 
fcheme,  and  prevented  the  defection  of  that  county,  which 
continued  during  the  war  one  of  our  ftrongeft  barriers 
againit  the  weftern  invafions  of  the  enemy.  A  thoufand 
inftances  might  be  given  of  the  valour  of  militia-foldiers 
during  that  conteft,  which  might  be  adduced  in  refutation 
of  the  reafonings  lately  communicated  by  the  public  pa- 
pers, as  having  taken  place  in  a  great  public  affembly. 
Certainly  fuch  men  do  not  know  our  militia,  or  have  for- 
got their  fellow  citizens. 

Since,  then,  civil  liberty  is,  as  it  were,  the  refult  of 
neceflary  and  wife  modifications  of  all  the  individual 
and  other  focial  rights  of  the  citizens,  by  the  public 
obligations,  both  of  civil  rulers  and  the  ruled,  for  the 
prefervation  of  internal  and  external  fecurity;-  it  fol- 
lows, that  government  ought  not  to  put  the  people 
under  greater  reftraint  than  is  necefTary  for,  nor 
fhould  the  latter  pretend  to  more  freedom  than  is  con- 
fident with,  the  attainment  of  thefe  defirable  objects. 

On  the  contrary,  it  eflentially  interefts  both  the 

public 


MORAL  PHlLOSOP&W  $6& 

public  and  the  private  perfons  in  a  flate,  that  they 
join  their  beft  efforts  for  conducting  themfelves  fo,  that 
no  occafion  may  be  furnifhed  to  any  perfons,  whether 
citizens  or  ftrangers*  why  they  mould  entertain  any  de- 
signs, or  enter  into  any  machinations  prejudicial  to 
public  peace  and  tranquillity. 

The  tranquillity  of  a  ftate  or  nation  may  be  fafe> 
from  evil  defigns  againft  its  internal  fecurity,  when 
perfons  either  feel  no  inclination,  or  have  it  not  in  their 
power  to  diflurb  the  ftate :  the  former  may  be  rea- 
sonably expected,  when  there  is  either  no  caufe  for,  of; 
when  there  are  ftronger  motives  againft  the  railing  a 
difturbance. 

There  is  certainly  no  Caufe  for  dreading  dangerous 
innovations  when  the  love  of  virtue  and  good  order 
prevails,  when  the  citizens  are  feniible  of  their  public 
duties,  as  well  as  thofe  which  they  owe  as  individuals 
to  God,  to  themfelves*  and  to  their  fellow  creatures,, 
more  efpecially  to  their  fellow  citizens* — when  citizens 
are  not  only  contented  with  their  prefent  condition, 
but  alfo  when  there  is  not  any  juftifying  caufe  fof 
difcontent.  In  either  of  thefe  cafes,  thofe  who  would 
be  at  all  events  difpofed  to  caufe  diflurbances  would 
be  left  without  even  pretences  under  which  difcontent 
and  a  wanton  breach  of  order  might  find  plaufiblity 
or  excufe. 

Should  there  ftill  be  among  citizens  fuch  ignoble 
minds  as  that  confederations  of  public  virtue,  of  pa- 
triotifm  and  humanity  do  not  operate,  it  will  be  necef- 
fary  that  they  be  deterred  from  evil  by  laws,  fanctioned 
with  ignonimous  and  public  punifhment.  Fear,  it  muffc 
be  confeffed,  is  not  the  moft  laudable,  but  it  is,  not- 
withftanding,  a  powerful  principle,  nay,  perhaps  the 

B  b  b  only 


^7<0  ItfORAL  PHILOSOPHY". 

only  one  left  againfc  brutal  men,  whofe  minds  have  be- 
come too  callous  and  obdurate  to  yield  to  the  tender 
emotions  of  religion,  patriotifm  and  humanity. 

It  is  therefore  a  public  obligation  in  government, 
For  eftabliming  internal  and  external  Security  upon  the 
firmed  bafts,  that  they  make  ufe  of  their  authority  to 
order  all  things  in  a  ftate  in  fuch  a  manner  as  to  become 
means  for  exciting  the  minds  of  the  people  to  virtue 
and  patriotifm.  Such  a  conduct  on  the  part  of  the 
rulers  of  ftates  and  nations  cannot  fail  to  imprefs  them 
with  the  higher!  efteem  for  public  virtue,  and  a  due  re- 
fpect  to  thofe  who  eXercife  it.  Citizens  who  are  well 
informed  and  fenfible  of  their  public  obligations,  will 
view  difturbances  of  the  public  tranquillity  in  their  true 
light,  as  evils  of  the  moft  heinous  nature,  and  the  cha- 
racter of  the  authors  and  abettors  of  them  as  infamous 
and  deteftable. 

It  is  a  public  obligation  on  the  part  of  government, 
to  order  that  each  clafs  of  citizens  be  ufefully  employed* 
and  thereby  enabled  to  live  comfortably. 

Government  is  under  public  obligation  to  ufe  all  pot 
fible  care,  prudence,  moderation  and  circumfpection* 
that  the  private  good  of  individuals,  as  well  as  the 
common  interefts  of  the  lefs  focieties  within  the  limits 
and  jurifdiction  of  the  date,  be  properly  fubordinated 
to  the  public  good  of  civil  fociety,  from  which  they 
derive  their  protection. 

It  is  not  only  a  public  obligation  of  citizens  in  gene- 
ral, but  alfo  of  government  in  particular,  that  they  be 
extremely  careful  not  to  injure  other  ftates,  left  tlieex.-^ 
temal  fecuwty  of  the  ftate  be  thereby  endangered. 

Since  it  is  a  moft  important  public  and  national  obli- 
gation 


MORAL   PHILOSOPHY.  37 


gation  to  place  the  ftateon  the  fureft  foundation  againffc 
Foreign  aggrefhon  and  internal  infurrection,  the  govern- 
ment is  bound  to  order  all  things  (o  that  population, 
agriculture,  commerce,  arts  and  fciences  may  be  en- 
couraged and  cultivated— that  the  citizens  may  be  well 
acquainted  with  and  exercifed  in  all  that  pertains  to  the 
means  of  public  defence. 

To  crown  all,  the  public  rights  and  obligations,, 
which  form  the  bond  of  political  and  national  union 
between  the  rulers  of  dates  and  the  people,  mould  be 
fecured  and  determined  by  wife  and  falutary  laws, 
founded  on  the  eternal  principles  of  natural  juiface  and 
equity  •,  and  thefe  laws  ought  to  be  adminiftered  in 
conformity  to  the  duties  which  men  owe  to  God,  to 
themfelves,  and  to  their  fellow  creatures. 

Let  it  be  remembered,  that,  as  civil  fociety  is  equal, 
the  government  thereof  ought  to  be  a  government  not 
of  men,  but  of  laws  •,-— that  to  be  obedient  and  faithful 
to  fuch  a  government  is  the  higher},  degree  of  liberty 
$f  which  man  is  capable  with  refpec!  to  public  life. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Of  the  fipreme  power  or  fiver  eignly  in  a  ftaie^  and  th& 
principal  rights-  of  fiver  eigniy. 

X  H  E  fource  of  all  public  power  in  a  irate  is  th& 
people ;  all  authority  to  order  and  direct  the  actions  of 
the  citizens  for  the  attainment,  prefervation   and  ad- 
vancement of  the  public  felicity,  originates  in  the  tranf-  ■ 
fer  made  by  them.     The  fupreme  power  of  thQ  ftate 


is 


3JZ  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  therefore  eflentially  inherent  in  the  people  -,  but  the 
cxercife  thereof  is  transferred  to  the  moral,  or  public 
perfon  of  the  ftate,  whether  a  king,  a  fenate,  or  a  go- 
vernment  that  reprefents  the  people. 

Thofe  rights  which  immediately  flow  from  the  right 
of  civil  government,  conftitute  what  is  called  the  fo- 
vereignty of  a  ftate  or  nation :  the  public  perfon  vefted 
with  the  exercife  of  fuch  rights  is  ftiled  the  fovereign. 

Hence  it  follows,  that^  though  the  fovereignty  of  a 
ftate  or  nation  is  originally  and  eflentially  in  the  people, 
ftill,  when  civil  government  is  once  eftablifhed,  the 
exercife  of  it  is  the  right  of  the  public  rulers,  as  long 
as  that  eftabliftiment  mbftfts. 

The  eftabliftiment  of  a  government  refts  upon  a 
fundamental  law,  known  under  the  title  of  the  confti- 
tution. 

The  fovereigns  of  ftates  and  nations  are  fubject  to 
the  conftitutions  of  them,  whether  they  actually  exift 
or  are  only  fuppofed  to  exift.  Such  original  compacts 
between  the  rulers  and  the  people  remain  the  unalter- 
able rule  for  the  administration  of  government. 

To  alter  or  to  change  the  conftitution  of  a  ftate  or 

nation  is,  as  we  fhall  fee,  the  right  of  the  people. 

Sch. — We  have  already  obferved,  that  thofe  ftates  whofe  go- 
vernments are  not  vefted  with  all  the  neceflary  powers  of 
fovereignty,  are  dependent. 

We  diftinguifti  fovereignty  into  internal  and  external: 
the  former  might  be  ftiled  political •,  the  International. 

Internal  or  political  fovereignty  comprehends  all  the 
fights  neceflary  for  the  internal  concerns  of  a  ftate. 

National  fovereignty  has  reference  to  other  ftates 
$nd  independent  civil  focieties. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


373 


ScL  i. — Since  national  fovereignty  conftitute-s  the  character 
of  a  nation,  it  will  be  the  proper  fubjeft  of  the  law  of 
nations  to  inveftigate  the  nature  and  extent  of  thofe  fpe- 
ciMc  rights  which  conftitute  it. 

Sch.  2. — But  the  internal  concerns  of  nations  belong  to  their 
political  character,  which  is  the  fubje£t  of  politics;  though 
authors  who  have  treated  of  the  law  of  nations,  have 
likewife  taken  notice  of  them,  becaufe  a  treatife  on  that 
lalt  mentioned  fubjecf,  cannot  be  underfto'od  without  juit 
ideas  of  the  political  character  of  nations. 

Sck,  3. — Let  it  therefore  be  obferved,  that  what  has  been  hi- 
therto explained,  together  with  all  that  will  be  faid  in  the 
fequel  on  the  fubject  of  the  political  concerns  of  ftates, 
applies  fully  to  nations. 

ScL  4. — Thofe  things,  on  the  contrary,  which  have  particu- 
lar reference  to  external  fecurity  againft  the  machinations 
and  invasions  of  other  ftates,  belong  folely  to  the  national 
character  of  dates. 

Since  government  is  inftituted  for  the  attainment, 

prefervation  and  advancement  of  the  felicity  of  the 

flate  or  nation,  it  follows,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the 

fovereign  is  not  vefted  with  any  rights  of  fovereignty 

which  are  contrary  to  public  good;  and,  on  the  other, 

that  he  is  naturally  and  neceflarily  porTefied  of  all  thofe 

without  which  that  defirable  end  cannot  be  obtained, 

fecured  or  promoted. 

ScL — From  thefe  confiderations  a  judgment  may  be  formed 
whether  canftitutions  ftand  in  need  of  emendations  or  ad* 
ditions,  or  whether  they  deferve  the  character  of  falutaiy 
fundamental  laws. 

Perfons  within  the  borders  and  jurifdiction  of  a  ftate 
are  either  citizens  or  Grangers :  with  refpect  to  the 
former,  the  rights  of  the  fovereign  are  both  affirmative 
and  negative  •,  fince  citizens  are  bound  not  only  to  omit 
all  that  is  contrary  to  public  good,  but  muft  likewife 
perform  thofe  civil  duties  which  are  necelTarv  for  the 
prefervation  of  the  internal  and  external  peace  of  the 

fiate, 


574  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

&ate,  and  are  effential  to  its  public  felicity :  but  Gran- 
gers not  having  an  intereft  in  the  public  good  of  the 
ftate,  are  only  bound  by  negative  duties;  that  is  to  fay, 
die  fb vereign  can  only  interdict  fuch  actions  as  are  re- 
pugnant to  the  public  good  of  the  ftate.  This  ri^ht 
the  iovereign  pofTefTes  from  the  neceffity  of  the  cafe, 
becaufe  otherwife  he  could  not  exercife  the  rights  of 
sovereignty  neceffary  for  the  prefervation  of  the  public 
good. 

Of  the  various  rights  of  fovereignty,  with  refpect 
to  the  citizens  of  the  flate,  the  following  may  be  con- 
sidered as  the  principal,  becaufe  they  are  effentially 
neceilary  for  promoting  the  public  good  of  the  fociety. 

1.  The  right  to  make  and  promulge  laws  for  regu- 
lating the  conduct  of  citizens. 

2.  The  right  to  pafs  imputation  upon  the  conduct 
of  the  citizens,  according  to  the  direction  of  thofe  laws ; 
to  determine  rewards  and  punifhments,  and  to  put 
thofe  determinations  into  execution. 

3.  The  right  of  fufpending,  altering  or  repealing 
municipal  laws ;  and  of  adapting  and  modifying  natural 
laws  to  the  exigencies  of  the  ftate. 

4.  The  right  to  prohibit  all  things,  and  all  conducl: 
of  individuals  and  focieties,  which  are  contradictory  to 
tho.  internal  or  external  peace  of  the  community. 

5.  The  right  to  erect  courts  of  juftice  for  the  trial 
and  puniihment  of  crimes  committed  within  the  limits 
and  jurifdiction  of  the  ftate. 

6.  The  right  of  building  fortifications  and  harbours 
withm  the  territory  of  the  itate,  to  regulate  roads,  to 
exclude  it-angers  from  accefs  to  or  from  paiTing  through 
the  ftate,  or  to  grant  and  modify  fuch  privileges. 

7.  The 


MO&AL  PHILOSOPHY.  3^5 

7.  The  rights  to  make  war  and  peace ;  to  order  the 
mode  in  which  the  former  is  to  be  conducted,  and  to 
affent  to  the  terms  upon  which  the  latter  may  be  con- 
cluded. 

8.  The  right  to  prohibit  all  things  which  have  a 
tendency  to  produce  evil  habits  and  pernicious  confe^ 
quences. 

9.  The  right  to  fanction  all  that  may  incite  the  citi- 
zens to  virtue,  and  may  have  a  falutary  effect  upon 
the  manners  of  the  people. 

10.  The  right  to  order  things  fo  that  the  citizens 
may  be  ufefully  employed  and  enabled  to  live  com- 
fortably. 

11.  The  fight  to  order  that  the  citizens  may  learn 
and  be  exercifed  in  the  military  art. 

12.  The  right  to  prohibit  whatever  is  unfriendly  to 
population. 

Upon  the  whole,  the  right  of  fovereignty  extends  to 
all  that  is  neceffary  as  a  mean  for  promoting  and  pre- 
ferving  public  felicity* 

The  arTuming  rights  of  fovereignty,  which  are  not 
abfolutely  neceffary  for  public  good,  or,  which  ulti- 
mately amounts  to  the  fame  thing,  the  extending  the 
lawful  rights  of  fupreme  controul  farther  than  is  ne- 
ceffary for  that  end,  lead  to  an  abridgement  of  the  civil- 
liberty  of  the  citizens,  and  muft  be  ranked  among  thofc. 
claims  which  are  not  founded  in  natural  law. 

Rights  of  fovereignty  which  are  incompatible  with 
public  good,  though  warranted  by  certain  constitutions 
of  ftates,  are  in  the  forum  of  nature  nothing  leis  than 
high-handed  ufurpation. 

CHAPTER 


37&  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY* 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the  refources  of  a  ftate. 


B 


>Y  the  refources  of  a  ftate  are  generally  underftood 
all  the  means  which  the  government  may  make  ufe  of 
for  attaining,  advancing,  and  particularly  for  preferving 
the  public  felicity. 

Since  there  are  innumerable  things  in  a  ftate  which 
may  ferve  for  thefe  purpofes,  it  follows,  that  its  re- 
fources are  not  only  multifarious,  but  alfo,  that,  by  a 
proper  adminiftration  of  public  affairs,  they  may  be 
vaftly  increafed,  as,  by  a  contrary  conduct,  they  may 
be  neglected  and  diminifned. 

All  the  refources  of  a  ftate  are  reducible  to  thefe 
two :  the  ftrengtb  of  the  citizens  and  their  wealth. 

Thofe  who  place  public  ftrength  in  a  vaft  extent  of 
territory,  forget  that  a  country  is  ftrong  at  the  rate  of 
its  populoufnefs ;  that  a  compact,  thickly  fettled  terri- 
tory can  perform  what  may  be  expected  in  vain  from 
an  equal  number  of  inhabitants  fpread  over  a  territory 
too  extenfive  for  the  public  force  to  be  concentrated 
and  brought  to  act  with  united  efforts.     It  is  union, 
public  virtue  and  patriotifm  that  fupply  numbers:  it 
is  the  hardinefs,  courage,  difcipline,  induftry,  oeconomy, 
fobriety,-^-the  progrefs  in  arts  and  fciences,  the  united 
zeal  to  improve  the  advantages  which  a  country  affords 
into  means  of  private  and  public  happinefs,  which  ren- 
der a  comparatively  fmall  ftate  ftrong  and  vigorous. 
Indolence  and  corruption  of  manners,  on  the  contrary? 
weaken  a  people  in  proportion  to  numbers :  the  more 

numerous, 


Moral  philosophy.  37^ 

numerous,  the  more  extenfive  will  be  the  contagion,  the 
more  incurable  the  difeafe. 

That  country  is  certainly  deficient  in  the  moft  power- 
ful refources,  where  luxury  fupplies  the  place  of  fobriety 
and  induilry,  and  where  numbers  muft  ftand  in  the 
room  of  wifdom,  courage,  fortitude,  patriotifm  and 
perfeverance. 

The  wealth  of  a  date,  like  the  ftrteherrh  of  its  citi- 
zens,  is  a  comparative  relation.  GEconomy  and  in- 
duftry  may  compenfate  the  want  of  rich  mines,  of  £ 
rich  and  fertile  foil,  and  of  advantageous  fea-ports. 

That  ftate  is  wealthy,  where  the  citizens  have  the 
neceflaries  requiflte  for  the  fubfiftence  of  themfeives  and 
their  families,  and  for  the  means  of  defending  the  ftate. 

Money,  particularly  that  of  the  paper  kind,  is  the 
representative  of  wealth  •,  but  agriculture,  manufaftures 
and  commerce  are  the  real  wealth  of  a  ftate,  and  inex- 
hauftible  refources,  which  will  not  leave  government  at 
a  nonplus  in  the  day  of  public  danger; 

A  ftate,  therefore,  where  the  laws  are  properly  ad- 
ministered, where  liberty  and  virtue  reign,  where  agri- 
culture, arts  and  commerce  are  encouraged,  will  not 
be  defective  in  men  who  are  ready  to  ftand  forth  iri 
defence  of  the  ftate  from  a  true  principle  of  patriotifm, 
and  cannot  remain  deftitute  of  thofe  means  by  which 
they  are  enabled  to  fupport  and  maintain  that  defence. 

Though  countries  differ  in  natural  advantages,  it  is 
the  indilftry  and  genius  of  the  people  that  can  fuppjy 
the  deficiencies :  there  is  confequentiv  caufe  why  a  ftate 
mould  contentedly  purfue  its  own  felicity,  and  banifh 
the  idea  of  conqueft. 

G  c  c  CHAPTER 


37?  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  revenue  and  the  adminiflration  thereof. 

OlNCE  government  cannot  be  adminiftered  without 
expence,  it  is  neceiTary  that  a  portion  of  the  produce 
of  the  wealth  of  a  ttate  be  allowed  for  the  purpofes  of 
government;  for  government  is  instituted  for  public 
good,  and  the  will  and  power  of  the  members  of  a  ftate 
•are  transferred  to  government  for  the  promotion  and 
prefervation  of  that  great  end.  A  right  to  the  end  im- 
plies the  right  to  make  ufe  of  the  means  abfolutely  ne- 
cefiary  for  that  end. 

A  portion  of  the  produce  of  the  public  wealth  that 
may  be  applied  for  the  purpofes  of  government,  is 
comprehended  under  the  term  revenue. 

The  public  good  of  a  ftate  therefore  requires  a  re- 
venue. 

Since  revenues  are  drawn  from  the  wealth  of  a  {late, 
it  follows,  that  either  fome  public  property,  for  in- 
ftance,  demefne  lands,  or  that  a  certain  proportion  of 
the  private  property  of  the  citizens,  or  of  goods  im-. 
ported  from  abroad,  be  allotted  for  the  purpofes  of 
government. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  the  revenues  of  a  ftate  pro- 
ceed either  from  public  property,  or  from  private  pro- 
perty made  public,  that  is  to  fay,  allotted  to  the  pur- 
pofes of  government. 

It  is  a  right  of  fovereignty  to  difpofe  of  the  public 
revenue;  for  it  is  public  property  belonging  to  the 

whole 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  379 

whole  Hate-,  and  whatever  belongs  to  the  whole  date- 
is  under  the  direction  of  government. 

The  difpofal  of  the  revenue  is  not  left  optional  to 
the  fovereign  of  a  irate,  but  muft  be  in  perfect  confiit- 
ency  with  the  public  good,  otherwife  a  ftate  is  injured 
by  its  government. 

It  is  one  of  the  moft  momentous  rights  of  (bve- 
reignty,  connected  with  the  right  of  government,  to 
order,  in  cafe  public  property  be  not  farBcient  for  the 
exigencies  of  the  ftate,  that  a  certain  quantum  of  the 
produce  of  the  property  of  private  citizens,  or  of  the 
proceeds  from  imported  goods,  be  appropriated  to  the 
purpofes  of  government  •,  that  is  to  fay,  the  fovereign 
has  a  right  to  raife  a  revenue;  for  government  is  under 
perfect  obligation  to  do  all  that  is  necefTary  for  l\iq  pro- 
motion and  prefervation  of  the  public  good :  but  obli- 
gation to  ends  implies  the  right  to  the  necefTary  means. 

Sc/i.  1. — The  exercife  of  this  important  right  is  generally  at- 
tended with  many  and  great  difficulties,  as  it  affects  the 
private  property,  and  confequently  the  perfdhal  liberty 
of  the  citizen. 

Sch.  1. — It  ought  to  be  considered,  that  nothing  which  is  not 
abfolutely  necefTary  for  public  good  can  juftify  govern- 
ment in  interfering  with  the  private  interests  of  citizens. 

"  Sch.  3. — That  great  care  and  circumspection  is  necefTary  that 
the  impositions  mould  be  as  light  as  poffible:  they  muft 
not,  therefore,  be  laid  on  the  neceffaries  of  life,  or  on  the 
manu  factories  of  the  citizens,  if  any  other  refource  is  left. 

Sch.  4. — That  they  be  proportionate  to  the  abilities  of  the  citi- 
zens; that  is  to  fay,  equally  aiitlfed  according  to  the  re- 
fpective  circumftances  of  the  citizens. 

Sch.  5. — That  they  be  laid  on  the  luxuries  of  life,  particularly 
on  fuch  articles  as  are  imported  from  abroad. 

Sch.  6. — That  the  collection  be  the  Jeaft  burthenforrie  and  the 
leaft  expenfive  poffible. 

Sch. 


3 $0  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Set:.  7. — Since,  from  the  principles  of  nature,  it  cannot  in  any 
wife  be  made  out  that  a  public  debt  is  a  national  bleffing, 
it  is  a  high  and  important  duty  not  to  anticipate  the  public 
revenue,  except  in  cafes  of  abfolute  and  extreme  neceffity, 
and   then  to  reduce  it  as.  faft  as  is  confident  with  public 


good. 


The  right  to  apply  public  property  to  the  purpofes 
of  government  is  called  the  adminifiration  of  the  revenue. 

This  right  being  in  its  nature  a  right  of  fovereignty, 
it  follows,  that  the  fovereign  is  under  perfedt  obliga- 
tion to  direct  the  adminiftration  of  the  revenue  to  the 
advancement  and  prefervation  of  the  public  good  \  for, 
as  public  property  is  only  to  be  ufed  for  thofe  purpofes, 
fo  it  is  for  public  felicity  only  that  private  property 
may  be  made  public. 

The  right  of  adminiflration  implies  the  right  of 
eftablifning  the  necefTary  perfons  and  departments,  both 
with  refpecl  to  the  collection  and  the  expenditure  of 
the  public  revenue. 

By  taxation  is  underftood  the  determining  the  pro-^ 
portion  of  revenue  arifing  from  the  private  property  of 
citizens,  or  from  the  proceeds  of  occupations,  im- 
portation and  confumption  of  goods,  &c. 

The  proceeds  arifing  from  taxation  are  taxes,  cuf- 
toms  and  excife, 

Faxes  laid  upon  real  or  perfonal  eftate  are  called 
real  or  perfonal. 

Taxes  laid  upon  lucrative  occupations  have  obtained 
rhe  name  of  It c ernes. 

Taxes  laid  upon  manufactories  or  articles  of  con- 
fumption, are  comprehended  under  the  term  excife. 

Taxes  laid  upon  goods  imported  or  exported  are 
itiled  duties. 

The- 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  3  Si 

The  fovereign  pofTefTes  the  right  of  ufe  and  ufufi  uct 
In  the  property  of  citizens  as  far  as  the  neceflities  of  the 
flate  require,  but  no  further. 

In  a  flate  of  neceffity,  the  fovereign  may  difpofe  of 
the  property  of  a  citizen,  provided  he  gives  an  equi- 
valent •,  for  in  fiance,  when  a  certain  fpotof  land  is  requir- 
ed for  a  fortification,  for  a  harbour,  for  public  roads,  &c. 

Since  the  fovereign  has  a  right  to  order  that  the  citi- 
zens mav  live  comfortably,  learn  the  arts  and  fciences, 
Sec.  it  follows,  that  it  is  a  right  of  fovereignty  to  order 
orphan-houfes,  fchools,  colleges,  and  other  inflitutions 
to  be  fet  on  foot,  and  to  draw  for  thefe  purpofes  the 
necefTary  revenue  from  the  refources  of  the  flate. 

That  flate  wherein  a  perfon  is  under  perfect  obliga- 
tion to  execute  bufinefs  of  a  public  nature,  is  called  an 
office ;  and  the  perfons  who  are  under  that  obligation 
are  public  officers. 

As  fuch  offices  are  necefTary  for  public  good,  it  fol- 
lows, that  it  is  a  right  of  fovereignty  to  inflitute  the 
offices  necefTary  for  the  adminiflration  of  government, 
and  to  appoint  proper  perfons  to  fill  fuch  offices. 

If  the  fovereign  arrogates  to  himfelf  other  rights 

than  fuch  as  flow  from  the  nature  of  the  fovereignty, 

he  becomes  guilty  of  injuring  the  flate. 

Sch. — In  different  dates  the  eflablifhmcnt  of  the  fundamental 
laws  of  government  may  differ;  the  fovereign  of  one 
itate  may  confequently  lawfully  do  what  with  that  of  ano- 
ther would  be  a  public  injury. 

When  the  fovereign  of  a  Hate,  by  abufi  ng  the  rights 
pf  fovereignty,  endeavours  to  opprefs  the  flate,  he  de- 
generates into  a  tyrant. 

Tyranny  is  therefore  not  every  fault  in  government, 

not 


3^2  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

not  every  defect  in  rectitude  of  which  rulers  are  guilty, 
but  an  intentional  abufe  of  power. 

From  the  oppremon  of  a  few  citizens  that  of  the 
whole  ftate  cannot  be  inferred.  All  the  citizens  of  a 
ftate,  however,  are  deeply  interefted  in  the  fufFerings 
and  oppreflion  of  their  fellow  citizens,  and  juftifiable  in 
taking  prudent  and  lawful  meafures  for  bringing  about 
a  reform  and  preventing  a  repetition. 

The  granting  privileges  caufes  inequalities  between 
citizens,  and  mould  never  be  reforted  to  but  in  cafes 
where  the  public  good  is  not  attainable  without  it: 
for  inftance  -,  a  company  may  very  well  have  the  privi- 
lege of  a  canal,  if  there  was  no  other  mean  to  have  it 
cut  but  by  their  contribution. 

Sc/i. — Privileges  fhould  be  but  of  fhort  duration. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Of  the  public  obligations  and  rights  of  citizens  in  regard 

to  their  fovereign. 

I  HE  obligations  of  foreigners  and  Grangers  are 
of  the  negative  kind,  and  are  binding  upon  them  as 
foon  as  they  arrive  and  as  long  as  they  live  within  the 
territory  and  jurifdiction  of  the  ftate.  The  fovereign 
has  the  right  to  forbid  all  that  is  in  any  wife  repugnant 
to  the  public  good  •,  and  ftrangers  are  perfectly  bound 
to  regulate  their  conduct  fo  that  it  be  not  contradictory 
to  the  laws  and  ufages  of  the  land. 

But  citizens  are  under  the  moit  perfect  obligations. 
not  only  to  abftain  from  all  that  is  contrary  to  the  laws 

'    of 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  3S3 

of  the  land  or  repugnant  to  public  good,  but  alfo  to 
perform  all  things  which  the  fovereign  directs  in  con- 
fiftency  with  that  good. 

As  it  would  be  endlefs  to  particularize  all  the  public 
obligations  of  citizens,  and  as  it  is  impoflible  to  deter- 
mine every  particular  inftance  when  a  citizen  is  or  is 
not  ftrictly  bound  to  comply  with  all  the  regulations 
and  orders  which  the  fovereign  of  the  itate  has  made 
the  general  rule  for  the  conduct  of  citizens,  let  it  be 
obferved,  that  thofe  public  obligations  of  citizens  are 
in  every  refpect  correlate  to  the  j  lift  exercife  of  the  rights 
of  fovereignty,  and  that  they  deferve  the  utmoft  care 
and  attention  of  every  citizen,  fince  the  happinefs  of 
fociety  depends  as  much  on  a  faithful  obedience  to  the 
laws  as  on  a  juft  administration  of  them. 

There  are,  however,  two  important  duties  which 
deferve  to  be  particularly  noticed,  becaufe  upon  the 
one  the  internal  peace,  and  on  the  other  the  external 
fecurity  of  the  ftate  is  in  a  peculiar  manner  depending. 
The  nrft  of  thefe  is  this:  Citizens  mud  exercife  their 
natural  rights  of  defence,  war  and  compulsion,  by  the 
authority  of  the  fovereign,  and  in  the  mode  prefcribed 
by  him.  The  laws  of  the  land  forbid  perfonal,  but 
grant  ample  public  relief  for  all  that  might  be  done 
wrong  or  injurioufly. 

It  is  on  this  account  that  no  action  which  has  in- 
fluence on  public  good  mould  be  left  indifferent,  that 
the  laws  of  the  land  mould  compafs  all  the  individual 
and  focial  concerns  of  the  citizens.  There  is  no  danger 
that  natural  liberty  be  curtailed,  when  falutary,  intel- 
ligible and  beneficent  laws  and  regulations  direct  the 
conduct  which  citizens  fhould  obferve  ^o  one  another. 


-when 


3&4  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

— when  family  governments  are  well  directed,  and  do 
mefr.ic  peace  and  happinefs  promoted  and  preferved. 

Ignorance  is  faid  to  be  necefTary  to  keep  citizens  un- 
der fubjection ;  but  we  venture  ro  fay,  that  information 
will  be  more  beneficial  to  all  the  purpofes  of  a  happy 
fociety :  let  the  citizens  know  that  their  obedience  to 
law  is  the  mean  of  their  internal  peace  and  happinefs. 
When  a  people  is  bleft  with  a  happy  conftitution,  and 
governed  by  wife  and  falutary  laws,  nothing  is  want- 
ing but  information  and  experience  to  convince  them 
of  their  happy  fituation,  arid  to  render  them  a  virtuous., 
faithful,  peaceable  and  patriotic  people. 

The  fecond  public  obligation  of  citizens  is,  that 
they  faithfully  fupport,  and  courageoufly  defend  the 
ftate.  Let  citizens  confider  that  civil  liberty  is  not  to 
be  fported  withj  that  it  is  dangerous  to  truft  it  in  the 
hands  of  mercenaries,  and  that  an  armed  citizen  is  in- 
vincible. 

Rebellion  is  that  ftate  where  citizens  violently  refift 
the  laws  and  authority  of  government,  and  malicioufly 
endeavour  to  difturb  the  peace  and  fecurity  of  the 
Hate,  and  meditate  the  overthrow  of  its  eftablifhed 
government. 

Machinations  of  that  kind  are  treafon,  fedition  or 
infurretlion^  as  individuals  or  aflbciations  are  involved 
in  defigns  and  actions  which  have  a  tendency  to  raiie 
a  rebellion. 

Sch.  i. — It  is  poflible  that  the  government  may  rebel  againfl 
the  people,  bv  endeavouring  to  overthrow  the  conihtu- 
tion  of  the  ftate. 

Sch,  2. — However,  in  the  legal  fenfe  of  the  term,  rebellion 
is  violent  refinance  to  the  meafures  of  government,  whe- 
ther they  be  right  or  wrong:  the  coniequence  is,  that 
men  of  the  moll  excellent  character,  of  the  greateft  pub- 
lic 


JMQR.AL   PHILOSOPHY,  ^ S 

lie  virtue  and  undaunted  patriotifm,  have  been  branded 
with  the  name  of  rebels,  and  have  fuffered  capital  punifli- 
ment:  we  muft  therefore  make  a  wide  difference  between 
crimes  in  the  fight  of  iinjuft  laws,  and  in  that  of  fuch  as 
are  j uft  and  confident  with  the  eternal  principles  of  natu- 
ral juftice.  , 

As  citizens  are  under  the  mod:  facred  obligations  to 
refpect  government,  and  to  fubmit  to  all  falutary  laws 
and  regulations  i {Tiling  from  the  higher!:  authority  of 
the  ftate  and  from  its  fubordinate  officers ;  fo  they  have 
great  and  indefeafable  rights,  which  are  the  palladium 
of  their  civil  liberty.     Thefe  are, 

The  right  to  make  remonftrances : 

The  right  to  meet  in  a  peaceable  manner  for  the 
purpofe  of  confutation : 

The  right  to  ftate  their  grievances  to  the  govern- 
ment, and  to  make  them  known  to  their  fellow  citizens : 

The  right  to  expect  redrefs,  if  their  grievances  are 
real : 

The  right  to  expect  a  prompt  and  equal  adminiftra- 
tion  of  juftice : 

The  right  to  claim  and  to  enjoy  the  protection  of 
their  perfons,  property,  rights  and  character : 

The  right  to  make  appeals : 

The  right  to  enjoy  all  the  rights  and  franchifes  to 
which  citizens  are  entitled  by  the  confutation  of  the 
ftate. 

ScL — Moft  of  thefe  rights  are  infringed  if  the  prefs  is  not  left 
free. 

If  the  ftate  is  invaded  by  a  foreign  or  domeftic  ene- 
my, every  good  citizen  ought  moft  cordially  to  ailift  in 
relieving  government  and  the  ftate  from  imminent  d.an- 

D  d  d  ger. 


$$6  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ger.  Every  one  mould  offer  his  life  and  fortune  for 
the  prefervation  of  the  ftate,  its  rights  and  liberties. 
Bat  it  is  very  difficult  to  determine  what  line  of  conduct 
citizens  have  to  purfue,  if  the  fovereign  of  a  ftate  ihould 
invade  and  perfift  in  wicked  machinations  to  deftroy 
their  liberty. 

Let  it  be  obferved,  that  a  matter  of  fuch  magnitude 
and  importance,  teeming  with  confequences  dreadful 
in  their  nature  and  effects,  involving  the  fate  of  the 
prefent  generation  as  well  as  that  of  thofe  who  are  yet 
unborn,  ought  to  be  coolly  and  thoroughly  inveftigated ; 
feafonable,  proper  and  refpeclful  reprefentations  mould 
be  made,  and  all  lawful  means  purfued  in  order  to  bring 
about  a  reformation  in  government,  before  any  ftep 
be  taken  that  has  any  fymptom  of  violent  reiiftance. 

Should  it  happen  that  all  this  is  in  vain,— mould 
the  protection  of  the  laws  be  withdrawn,  public  juftice 
denied,  the  abfolute  natural  rights  invaded,  the  great 
end  of  civil  fociety  wantonly  fubverted  by  its  own  fo- 
vereign •,  what  other  remedy  is  left  to  citizens  than  that 
which  is  pointed  out  by  nature — the  return  to  their 
natural  ftate,  by  forming  themfelves  into  a  new  focie- 
ty, under  a  new  government,  upon  the  bafis  of  a  con- 
ftitution  calculated  to  enfure  the  permanent  enjoyment 
of  public  happinefs  ? 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Of  the  different  forms  of  government. 

UY  anarchy  is  underftood  that  ftate  of  civil  fociety 
wherein  there  is  no  government.     But  where  there  is 

no 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  3.^ 

no  government,  there  can  be  no  form  of  it.  Anarchy- 
is  therefore  juftly  reckoned  one  of  the  greateft  curfes 
that  can  befall  civil  fociety,  and  is  {tiled  a  monfter  in 
politics. 

SJi,  i. — This  mortal  enemy  to  public  peace  and  happinefs 
particularly  invades  free  governments  when  the  citizens 
exchange  the  honeft  manners  of  true  republicans  for  fel- 
"fifti  purfuits  and  the  arts  of  intrigue.  Sometimes  wor- 
shipping as  idols  the  work  of  their  own  hands,  then  im- 
patient of  the  fupreme  controul  which  their  free  confti- 
tutions  have  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  men  of  their  free 
choice,  they,  like  the  cameleon,  exhibit  complexions  fur- 
palling  the  power  of  description. 

Sch.  2. — Let  it  be  remembered,  that  it  is  not  the  momentary 
attachment  to  a  party,  the  wild  adherence  to  a  particular 
form,  &c.  purfued  by  adminiftration,  but  real  goodnefs,  a 
difcreet,  faithful,  active  performance  of  all  public  obliga- 
tions, that  conftitutes  the  good  citizen.  Names  may  be 
bait  for  the  ignorant  and  felfifh;  but  the  good  citizen  will 
look  for  reality,  for  merit,  parts,  honefty  and  public  virtue, 
and  efteem  any  perfon  who  poffefles  them,  whether  in  or 
out  of  office,  whether  a  federalift  or  an  antifederalift,  &c. 

Sch.  3. — It  is  therefore  difficult  to  determine  whether  free  en- 
quiries into  the  conduct  of  public  perfons  proceed  from 
principles  of  anarchy,  or  from  patriotifm.     But  fo  much 
is  certain,  that  patriotifm  ought  to  be  guided  by  wifdom, 
and  (hew  due  deference  to  government,  always  obfervino- 
a  proper  diftinction  between  men  and  meafures. 
Sch.  4. — When  I  behold  the  electioneering  mania,  which  be- 
gins to  grow  into  fafhion,  and  foon  will  be  of  the  force  of 
precedent,  (o  that  thofe  who  come  hereafter  will  take 
party  zeal  for  liberty,  I  cannot  but  fee  the  defcription  of 
Virgil's  monfter  realized  in  the  complexion  of  the  felf- 
conceited  leader,  who,  like  Polypheme,  threatens  to  de- 
vour what  comes  before  hirn.     "  Monftrum  horrendum, 
informe,  ingens,  cui   lumen  ademptum." — The  horrid 
monfter,  of  hideous  form,  too  unwieldy  for  rational  <*on- 
troul,  too  much  blindfolded  to  controul  himfelf. 

Ochlocracy  is  that  ftate  of  civil  fociety  where  it  is 
iplit  into  tribunal  factions,,  each  claiming  and  aflum*. 

ine 


388  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ingto  itfelf  the  right  of  government,  and  ufurping  the 
exercife  thereof  by  violence.  Here  we  are  prefented 
with  horrid  feenes  of  confuflon  and  public  calamity, 
but  with  no  form  of  government. 

'tyranny  and  defpotifm  are  fuch  ftates  of  civil  fociety, 
where  the  government  is  feized  and  continued  by  ufur- 
pation,  violence  and  unjuft  oppreffion, — where  obliga- 
tions are  laid  down  as  the  rule  for  the  conduct  of  the 
governed,  which  depend  upon  the  will  and  pleafure  of 
the  tyrant  or  defpot.  Thefe  however  we  dildain  to  call 
forms  of  government,  for  fuch  governments  are  con- 
tradictory to  the  dignity  of  human  nature  and  only  fit 
for  brutes.  Since  there  is  fomethino-  in  them  of  uni- 
formity,  rule  and  method",  let  us  call  them  methodical 
injuftice,  methodical  rapine  and  opprellion! 

Sch,  1. — It  has  been  often  obferved,  that  governments  and 
governmental  men  are  very  apt  to  lean  to  defpotifm. 
Want  of  experience  leaves  us  at  a  lofs  whether  this  phae- 
nomenon  proceeds  from  the  nature  of  government,  or 
irom  the  nature  of  man.  We  fuppofe,  however,  that 
thofe  come  neareft  the  mark  who  attribute  that  effect  to 
both  thofe  caufes;  for  it  is  natural,  in  procefs  of  time, 
for  government  to  comprehend  more  and  more  ends:  the 
confequence  will  be,  that  more  means,  new  refources 
in u ft  be  found  to  enable  the  perfons  adminiftering  go- 
vernment to  accompli fh  thofe  ends.  A  fimilar  caufe  in- 
cites men  to  advocate  and  proiecute  the  meafures  which 
have  originated  in  their  own  advice. 

Sch  2. — It  is  generally  reckoned  a  political  virtue  in  ftatefmen 
to  be  confiftent  with  thernfelves:  however  ignorant  of 
court  morality,  we  mould  be  apt  to  reckon  it  a  great  to- 
ken of  fortitude  if  great  men  would  reject  fyftems  which 
they  find  opprCiTive  :  for  confiftcncy  can  only  be  a  virtue 
where  we  have  been  right,  a  circumftance  which  cannot 
always  take  place  in  affairs  managed  by  men. 

Sch.  3- — Citizens,  therefore,  who  have  the  choice  of  public 
in  .:,  flvDuk!  weigh  the  advantages  and  difrdvantagesof  a 

rotation, 


]VfORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  389 

rotation,  and  fee  which  way  the  complexion  of  the  times 
and  the  public  good  of  the  (late  incline. 

Government  afiumes  a  form  when  its  inrYitutions 
aim  at  a  public  good,  and  when  the  will  and  power  for 
the  attainment  and  prefervation  of  that  end  are  under 
public  direction  •,  for  then  there  is  a  fociety,  from  the 
nature  of  which  reciprocal  rights  and  obligations  flow, 
and  a  political  union  is  constituted. 

The  ejjential  form  of  all  governments  we  therefore 
place  in  the  transfer  of  the  will  and  power  of  all  the 
members  of  a  fociety :  all  governments  either  acknow- 
ledge or  prefuppofe  fuch  a  transfer ;  and  the  citizens 
of  all  ftates  either  glory  in  this  transfer  as  their  birth- 
right, or  acquiefce  in  the  fuppohtion  of  its  having 
taken  place. 

Sch.  1. — The  doctrine  of  divine  right  ftill  has  its  abettors  in 
feveral  parts  of  Europe,  among  proteftants  as  well  as 
among  others,  and  may  be  considered  as  a  relic  of  politi- 
cal fu  perdition. 

Sch.  2. — So  much  is  certain,  that  government  is  neceffary  for 
human  happinefs,  and  thus  far  dependent  on  the  will  of 
God,  as  it  is  inftituted  and  adminiftered  in  confiftency 
with  the  dictates  of  natural  law,  and  is  confequently  con- 
ducive to  the  advancement  of  human  happinefs. 

The  different  forms  of  government  refult  from  the 
different  modifications  of  the  moral  perfon,  veiled  with 
the  will  and  power  of  the  civil  fociety. 

We  mufl  beware  not  to  confound  with  the  forms 
the  different  qualities  of  government,  refulting  from  the 
modifications  of  the  will  and  power  transferred,  which 
may  be  with  various  limitations,  or  without  any  at  all. 

Governments,  according  to  their  qualities,  are  either 
defpotical,  or  limited.  Limited  governments  admit  of 
a  variety  of  degrees. 

The 


>$qO  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  qualities  of  governments  are  not  eftentially  con- 
necled  with  their  particular  forms:  defpotifm  may- 
reign  in  democracies  as  well  as  in  ariftocracies  and 
monarchies :  one  government  may  be  more  energetic, 
another  more  weak :  in  one  may  be  exercifed  the 
greateft  rigour,  in  another  lenity  and  mildnefs. 

The  forms  of  government  are  either  fimple  or  mixt. 

The  fimple  forms  are  the  monarchical^  ariftocratical 
and  democratical. 

The  monarchical,  where  an  individual  per  [on  is  vett- 
ed with  the  will  and  power  of  the  ftate. 

The  ariftocratical,  where  a  certain  clafs  of  citizens 
are  vefted  with  the  right  of  government. 

The  democratical,  where  the  citizens  exercife  the 
government  by  certain  public  officers  appointed  by 
their  fuffrages.  Such  were  the  ancient  republics  of 
Greece,  and  fome  of  thefe  are  to  be  met  with  among 
the  cantons  of  Switzerland. 

The  mixt  forms  of  government  may  refult  from  the 
combination  of  all  three,  or  of  two  of  the  fimple  forms. 
Tims  the  kingdom  of  Great-Britain  conftfts  of  the 
king,  of  the  houfe  of  lords,  and  of  the  houfe  of  com- 
mons. 

Sch. — There  are  other  ftates  of  Europe  and  of  Afia  which  may 
be  adduced  as  examples  of  mixt  monarchies  of  the  two 
forms,  the  monarchical  and  the  ariftocratical ;  as,  Ger- 
many, Poland,  &c. 

Reprefentative  governments  are,  where  the  mo- 
narchical, the  ariftocratical  and  democratical  powers  are 
diftributed.  Inftances  of  thefe  we  have  in  the  general 
government  of  the  United  States,  and  alfo  in  almoft 
ail  the  individual  governments  of  thofe  ftates.    With 

refpecl 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  39 1 

refpedl:  to  the  former,  the  office  of  prefident  is  fimilar 
to  that  of  the  king  ;  the  fenate  correfpond  with  the 
houfe  of  lords,  and  the  houfe  of  reprefentatives  has 
the  refemblance  of  the  houfe  of  commons  •,  with  this 
difference,  that  as  there  is  no  hereditary  prerogative  in 
either  of  the  former  branches  of  the  American  govern  - 
ment,  but  all  their  dignity  proceeds  from  the  fufTrages 
of  a  free  and  independent  people  ;  fo  the  third  branch 
is  not  the  nominal,  but  the  true  reprefentative  body 
of  the  people ;  becaufe,  chofen  by  biennial  general 
elections,  they  immediately  depend  upon  the  ballots  of 
the  freeholders. 


CHAPTER  X. 

Qf  the  powers  of government ,  and  the  dtftribation  of  them 
in  mixt  governments. 


A 


.LL  the  rights  of  fovereignty  in  a  ftate  have  re- 
ference either  to  the  right  to  make  laws  for  the  pur- 
pofes  and  exigencies  of  its  government — to  the  right 
to  apply  thofe  laws  to  particular  cafes  and  perfbns,  or  to 
the  right  to  put  them  and  the  decisions  in  confequence 
of  them  into  execution. 

Thefe  three  diftincl:  rights  have  obtained  the  name 
of  the  three  powers  of  government,  the  kgijlaiivey  the 
judicial^  and  the  executive. 

In  defpotical  governments  and  in  ftricT:  monarchies, 
as  in  RuMia,  Pruffia,  &c.  thefe  powers  are  infeparabiy 
connecled  with  and  refide  in  the  individual  perfon  who 
is  at  the  head  of  the  government.  The  monarch  is 
the  lawgiver;  he  appoint-  the  judges,  whofe  decifion 

ultimately 


392  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ultimately  depends  upon  his  ratification;  and  he  is 
iinally  the  fole  moral  caufe  that  puts  the  laws  and  thofe 
decifions  in  confequence  of  them  which  meet  his  ap- 
probation, into  execution. 

The  confequence  is,  that  his  will  and  pleafure  is  the 
fupreme  law  of  the  land,  upon  which  the  liberty,  life 
and  property  of  the  citizen  depend. 

Though  in  limited  monarchies,  or  in  ariftocratic 
governments  of  the  ftrict  kind,  thefe  rights  are  gene- 
rally limited  and  determined  by  exprefs  or  fuppofed 
fundamental  laws,  yet  there  is  little  fecurity  for  the 
liberty  of  the  citizens,  fince  the  interpretation  of  thofe 
laws,  the  decifions  in  confequence  thereof,  and  the  ex- 
ecution of  fuch  decifions,  are  in  one  perfon,  or  in  a 
particular  fet  of  perfons,  who  might  find  it  convenient 
to  have  an  intereft  different  from  that  of  the  people. 

In  mixt  governments,  thefe  powers  are  not  only  de- 
termined and  defined  by  fundamental  laws  and  confti- 
tutions,  but  they  are  diftributed  among  feveral  branches 
of  the  government,  and  thus  certain  checks  are  pro- 
vided upon  one  another,  fo  that  thefe  powers  are 
lodged,  in  diflincl  bodies  of  men,  as  independent  of  one 
another  as  the  conftitution  directs  and  ordains. 

The  distribution  of  the  powers  of  government  ad- 
mits of  various  modifications,  which  are  beft  learnt 
trom  the  conftitutions  of  different  countries. 

In  the  government  of  the  United  States,  the  legi- 
flative  power  is  lodged  in  a  houfe  of  reprefentatives, 
in  a  fenate,  and  in  the  executive,  who  has,  under  cer- 
tain reiiriclions,  a  negative'upon  all  bills  which  he  does 
not  approve,  but,  ex  officio,  gives  fanction  of  law  to 
all  approved  bills  by  the  great  feal  and  his  fignature. 

The 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  393 

The  judiciary  is  an  authority  independent  both  of 
the  legislative  and  the  executive,  except  that  the  per- 
ions  exercifing  it  derive  their  appointment  from  thofe 
two  branches. 

The  executive,  befides  giving  fandfcion  to  all  laws 
which  have  their  constitutional  quality,  appoints,  with 
the  confent  of  the  fenate,  all  officers  of  government, 
and  exercifes  the  interior  rights  of  fovereignty,  &c. 

However,  left  the  executive  abufe  this  power  of 
eminent  fovereignty  which  invefts  him  with  the  right 
to  fanction  public  laws  and  put  a  negative  on  bills  pre- 
fented,  provifion  is  made,  by  which  bills  may  become 
laws  without  his  confent,  to  wit,  when  two  thirds  of  the 
members  perfift  in  their  determination,  &c. 


CHAPTER  XL 

Of  the  fundamental  law  of  the  ftate,  and  the  public 
meetings  of  the  people,  together  with  the  modes  of  de- 
liberation, 

1HE  fundamental  law  whereby  the  distribution 
and  exercife  of  the  fovereign  power  of  a  ftate  is  regu- 
lated, and  its  mode  of  government  in  all  its  parts  or- 
ganized, is  ftiled  the  confiitution  of  the  ftate. 

Since  the  powers  of  a  ftate  are  indifTolubly  connected 
with  the  will  of  its  citizens,  in  regard  of  its  flrft  caufe 
and  origin,  it  is  evident,  that  the  civil  fociety,  in  its 
collective  or  reprefentative  capacity,  has  the  exclufive 
right  to  make  or  to  alter  its  conftitution. 

E  e  e  When 


394  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.. 

When  the  members  of  civil  fociety,  in  their  collective 
or  reprefentative  capacity,  meet  for  extraordinary  pub- 
lic tranfa&ions,  which  relate  to  the  fundamental  law  of 
the.  ftate,  they  are  faid  to  meet  in  convention. 

The  civil  fociety  is  in  its  collective  capacity ',  when, 
on  general  notice  being  given,  its  members  meet  in 
perfon.  Of  fuch  as  do  not  meet,  a  tacit  confent  is 
prefumed  to  all  that  has  been  agreed  upon  by  the  ma- 
jority met. 

Sch.  i. — In  ancient  republics,  which  were  frequently  confined 
to  cities,  with  a  fmall  territory  circumjacent,  the  meetings 
of  the  people  were  of  the  collective  kind;  at  leaft  fuch 
cities  took  the  lead,  if  they  did  not  afTume  the  right  of 
being  the  fole  conftituents  of  the  popular  aflemblies. 

Sch.  2. — As  iuch  cities  and  the  limited  territories  around  them 
had  formed  republican  governments,  a  mi  (taken  notion 
has  taken  place,  that  republican  governments  were  only 
calculated  for  fmall  ftates,  but  entirely  incompetent  to 
the  exigencies  of  large  empires. 

Sch.  3. — Since  the  invention  of  the  art  of  printing,  the  means 
of  information  have  been  multiplied,  and  the  communi- 
cation of  fentiments  rendered  ealy  through  an  extent  of 
territory  that  would  have  been  impracticable  in  former 
times. 

Sch.  4. — It  is  on  this  account  that,  notwithftanding  many 
abufes,  the  liberty  of  the  prefs  muft  be  confidered  a  pub- 
lic bleflins!'. 

Befides  thefe  great  advantages,  we  ought  to  confider 
the  reprefentative  capacity  of  the  people  as  a  vaft  im- 
provement in  the  art  of  government  •>  as,  by  means 
thereof,  the  moft  extenfive  countries  may  be  wonder- 
fully concentrated,  and  their  public  concerns  fubmitted 
to  the  collected  wifdom  of  thofe  who  are  confidered  as 
the  wifeft  and  beft  men  of  the  flate,  becaufe  they  arc 
chofen  by  and  from  the  general  mafs  of  the  citizens. 

Sch.  1. — Happy  that  flate  in  which  citizens  have  franchifes  fo 

eminently 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  395 

eminently  great,  that  the  government  is  founded  in  their 
own  choice,  and  that  frequent  elections  of  their  repre- 
fentatives  and  officers  of  government  put  it  in  their  power 
to  correal  the  evil  effects  of  a  miftaken  choice:  but  only 
happy  and  likely  to  continue  fo,  if  they  endeavour  to 
keep  elections,  the  fountain  of  public  power,  pure  and 
nndefiled;  fo  that  the  queflion  is,  who  is  the  man  bell 
qualified  for  the  poft — not  the  man  of  party  or  connec- 
tions ! 
St//.  2. — Is  it  necefiary  to  invite  free  citizens  to  a  careful  ufe 
of  thefe  great  and  ineflimable  rights  ?  Is  it  pardonable  to 
neglect  them?  Should  a  free  citizen,  as  long  as  he  can 
exercife  this  right,  neglect  any  opportunity  to  do  it  freely, 
impartially,  unbiafled  by  party  zeal,  and  firmly  determin- 
ed to  take  the  fide  of  the  virtuous  and  honeft  candidate? 

ScL  3. — If  the  fountain  is  not  pure,  what  can  we  expect  of  the 
rivulets  proceeding  from  it? 

When  perfons,  chofen  by  a  majority  of  voters  who 
have  duly  met  in  their  collective  capacity,  afiemble  for 
tht  difpatch  of  the  public  concerns  of  the  ftate,  they 
are  called  the  reprefentatives  of  the  people :  what  is 
done  by  them,  or  by  a  majority  of  them,  is  reckoned 
to  be  done  by  the  whole  people  in  their  reprefentative 
capacity,  and  is  confequently  binding  on  the  whole 
ftate. 

If  the  constitution  determines  what  particular  num- 
ber of  perfons  may  proceed  to  public  bufinefs,  that 
number  is  called  a  quorum. 

When,  upon  due  notification,  a  quorum  has  met, 
they  may  proceed  to  bufinefs. 

In  reprefentative  or  republican  governments,  as  well 
as  in  ariftocracies,  if  any  thing  is  determined,  it  will  be 
by  unanimous  confent  or  by  a  majority. 

Where  unanimous  confent  is  necefiary,  hardly  any 
thing  can  be  concluded,  at  lcaft  the  felicity  of  the  fo- 
ci etv 


396  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ciety  is  to  the  utmofr.  precarious :  this  is  the  cafe  with 

the  government  of  Poland. 

Sc/i. — Though  necefTary  unanimity  in  public  proceedings  ge- 
nerally defeats  all  attempts  to  do  what  is  advantageous  for 
the  people,  yet  fuch  unanimity  is  the  moft  eligible  defi- 
rleratum  in  all  cafes  where  evil  is  to  be  dreaded  from  the 
exercife  of  public  powers  intruded  to  the  hands  of  frail 
men. 

The  greateft  excellence  of  the  Britiih  laws  confifts  in  this 
particular,  that  no  accufed  perfon  can  be  condemned 
except  by  the  unanimous  confent  of  his  peers.  The  trial 
by  jury  and  the  liberty  of  the  prefs  are  therefore  juftly 
reckoned  prerogatives  of  free  citizens,  worthy  to  be  hand- 
ed down  unimpaired  to  the  lateft  pofterity. 

It  is  therefore  wifely  provided  in  the  conftitutions 
of  governments,  that  a  majority  determine. 

In  a  monarchy,  all  depends  upon  the  directions  of 
the  monarch. 

ScJl — It  is  to  be  obferred,  that  the  titles  king,  empercr,  8cc.  an 
not  perfeflly  fynont7nous  with  the  term  monarch  :  there  are 
kings  and  emperors  who  are  reftricled  by  conftitutions 
and  laws,  and  far  from  being  monarchs;  for  inflance, 
the  king  of  Great-Britain,  the  emperor  of  Germany. — 
Kuiiia  and  Pruffia  are,  what  France  formerly  was,  mo- 
narchies of  the  ftrift  kind. 

Confederated  flates  are  fuch  as  are  'united  together, 
by  mutual  confent,  for  the  purpofe  of  mutual  defence, 
forming  a  common  intereft  in  conducting  fuch  de- 
fence, in  cafe  any  of  the  confederation  mould  fuffer  an 
aggrelTion  •,  for  inflance,  the  cantons  of  Switzerland, 
and  the  United  States  of  North-America  before  the 
adoption  of  the  new  conftitution. 

It  is  by  this  conftitution  that  the  United  States  are 
confolidated  into  one  general  government,  fo  that  the 
individual  flates  retain  all  thofe  rights  of  fovcreignty 
which  relate  to  their  internal  government,  whilft  the 

rights 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  397 

rights  of  national  fovereignty  are  transferred  to  the 
government  of  the  union.  ♦ 

Governments  are  varioufly  limited,  by  compact,  by 
exprefs  or  fuppofed  conftitutions. 

Thofe  which  are  not  limited  by  fundamental  laws 
are  limited  by  nature-,  for  fovereignty  flows  from  the 
right  of  government,  and  the  public  good  is  the  ulti- 
rnate  end  of  this  right -,  therefore,  any  right  aflumed  and 
exercifed  contrary  to  public  good,  is  inconftftent  with 
the  law  of  nature,  the  dignity  of  man,  and  the  majeftic 
will  of  God. 

Defpotifm  is  confequently  repugnant  to  the  principles 
of  natural  law,  a  monftrous  abufe  of  power  in  what- 
ever government  it  may  takie  place. 

We  mall  wave  the  queftion,  Which  form  of  govern- 
ment is  beft  calculated  for  the  advancement  of  public 
happinefs  ?  becaufe  it  is  obvious,  that  cuftoms  beget 
habits,  and  that  what  has  become  habitual  feems  moft 
natural,  and  of  confequence  muft  be  moft  pleafing.  As 
a  father  is  fondeft  of  his  own  children,  fo  it  is  natural 
that  a  perfon  is  beft  pleafed  with  his  own  country  and 
its  government-,  and  in  either  of  thefe  cafes  arguments 
have  little  weight. 

But,  that  writers  on  morality  continue  to  fancy  a 
difference  of  character  naturally  more  fit  for  this  or 
that  fort  of  government,  is  juftly  matter  of  furprife; 
for,  human  nature  cannot  change,  and  that  needs  muft 
be  belt,  which  beft  advances  man's  improvement  in 
wifdom,  goodnefs  and  happinefs.  Let  it  be  obferved, 
that  governments  intended  for  the  regulation  of  hu- 
man conduct:  muft  be  limited — that  of  the  limited  go- 
vernments, the  mixt  are  moft  fuitable  to  the  moral  na- 
ture 


|8  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

hire  of  roaiij  and  more  favourable  to  liberty  than  any 
fimple  form — that  thofe  citizens  are  free  indeed,  who 
have  both  the  direct  and  the  indirect  choice  of  their 
rulers — that  free  citizens  will  continue  to  enjoy  this 
bleiiing,  and  will  doubtlefs  deliver  it  as  an  indefeafable 
patrimony  to  their  pofterity,  who,  it  is  to  be  hoped, 
will  be  careful  to  make  a  wife  and  good  ufe  of  their 
ineftimable  rights,  in  order  to  tranfmit  them  from  ge- 
neration to  generation,  inviolate  and  unimpaired. 

Much  depends  upon  a  juft-  and  wife  adminiftration : 
a  government  well  adminiftered  may  and  ought  to  be 
a  public  bleffing :  but  to  fecure  this  effect,  great  care, 
prudence,  moderation,  watchfulnefs,  firmnefs,  perfeve- 
rance,  &c.  are  required  on  the  part  of  the  rulers. 
Things  which  have  but  a  remote  influence  on  public 
happinefs  muff  not  be  neglected  :  the  duties  of  huma- 
nity ought  to  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  mofr.  faithful 
performance  of  the  public  duties  of  their  refpeclive 
ffations  :  what  may  tend  to  prevent  or  to  relieve  po- 
verty and  diffrefs — what  may  render  domeftic  life  juft 
and  happy — what  may  ferve  to  diffufe  a  fpirit  of  indus- 
try and  ceconomy  throughout  all  orders  and  conditions 
of  the  citizens — what  may  lead  to  the  promotion  of  the 
caufe  of  virtue,  and  ferve  as  incentives  to  a  faithful  dis- 
charge of  the  duties  to  God,  to  themfelves  and  to  their 
fellow  citizens, — ought  to  be  amOngft  the  firft  concerns 
of  a  government  towards  the  people ;  becaufe,  for 
thefa  ends  the  Sovereign  is  veiled  with  Such  ample,  jfuch 
important  rights  over  the  community. 

The  education  of  youth,  that  great  and  important 
object  of  the  lefs  Societies,  calls  for  the  moii  felicitous 
care  on  the  part  of  the  fathers  of  countries,  and  ought 

to 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2QQ 

to  engage  their  attention  more  than  the  difciplining  of 
citizens  for  the  eventual  defence  of  the  country. 

It  is  to  government,  whatever  its  form  may  be,  that 
citizens  have  a  right  to  look  up  for  relief  and  redrcfs, 
for  juftice,  protection  and  public  happinefs. 

Whatever  the  form  of  government  may  be,  fo  much 
is  certain,  that  its  power  to  do  good  is  unlimited.  Thofe 
who  exercife  that  right  to  this  end  deferve  the  name  of 
great  and  good  men ;,  fuch  are  fathers  of  their  country, 
and  a  public  bleifing. 

In  conflltuting  and  eftablifhing  the  limits  of  govern- 
ment and  the  fubfequent  administration  thereof,  fcvo 
extremes  mull  be  avoided : — If  too  much  power  be 
lodged  in  any  particular  branch  of  government,  parti- 
cularly in  the  executive,  it  may  materially  affect  the 
liberty  of  the  people  -,  if  too  little,  the  internal  peace 
of  the  ftate,  its  fafety,  external  fecurity  and  refpectabi- 
lity  abroad,  mult,  become  unliable  and  precarious. 

Much,  therefore,  is  requifite,  indeed  more  than  hu- 
man wiidom  can  forefee,  for  fecuring  permanent  gooci- 
nefs  in  a  government,  however  well  eftabliihed. — 
Standing  armies  are  fo  far  from  being  a  mean  for  public 
happinefs,  even  in  the  hands  of  the  bell  governors, 
that  in  fome  cafes  they  may  be  considered  as  the  bane 
of  civil  happinefs,  and  in  other  refpects  bear  the  com- 
plexion of  a  necefFary  political  evil,  as,  like  all  publi- 
cans in  a  ftate,  they  muft  fupply  the  want  of  public 
virtue  on  the  part  of  the  citizens. 

If  citizens  would  be  faithful  to  their  public  obliga- 
tions, if  they  would  not  often  place  their  private  in- 
tereft  in  the  counteracting  public  good,  if  they  would 
ftudy  public  honefty  more  than  is  generally  the  Cafe, — • 


400  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  government  would  not  have  caufe  to  create  an  hoft 
of  dependents,  and  the  public  would  not  be  peftered 
with  the  irkfome  attendance  of  inquifitorial  vifitants, 
who  might  be  more  ufefully  employed. 

We  conclude  with  this  obfervation,  that  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  have  caufe  to  glory  in  their  free 
constitutions :  if  they  are  fupine  in  making  the  beft, 
that  is  to  fay,  a  virtuous  ufe  of  their  rights,  if  they  are 
dilatory  or  neglectful  in  the  performance  of  all  thofe 
duties  which  the  public  good  requires,  the  leaft  that 
can  be  faid  is^  that  they  fin  againft  themfelves — a  fin 
which,  if  not  the  moft  unpardonable,  is  certainly  the 
mof!:  unnatural. 


PART 


PART     III. 


Of  the  univerfal  Law  of  Nations. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Of  the  univerfal  principles  of  the  law  of  nations  and  the 
general  rights  of  national  independence, 

A  HERE  are  ftates  which  have  in  themfelves  that 
fovereignty  by  which  they  provide  for  their  refpecta- 
bility  and  external  fecurity,  and  correct  or  repel  in- 
croachments  and  injuries  which  might  be  meditated 
or  attempted  againft  their  fafety  by  other  civil  focieties : 
—There  are  others  again,  which  make  their  external 
fecurity  a  common  intereft  with  fome  other  ftates,  by- 
way of  confederation-,  whilft  there  are  alfo  fuch  as 
aflbciate  for  that  purpofe,  under  a  common  General 
government.  In  the  firft  cafe,  the  national  concerns 
of  the  people  are  directed  by  the  immediate  govern- 
ment of  the  ftate ;  in  the  fecond,  the  rights  of  external, 
fovereignty  are  exercifed  by  an  afTembly  of  the  confe- 
derated bodies  politic ;  in  the  Iftft,  the  national  fove- 
reignty is  lodged  in  a  general  government. 

Sd. — In  the  firft  cafe,  the  ftate  itfelf  is  a  nation;  as,  France 
Ruffia,  Sweden,  Venice,  Genoa,  &c.  In  the  fecond,  the 
confederation  bears  the  character  of  the  nation  ;  as  the 
States  General  of  the  Seven  United  Provinces  of  the  Ne- 
therlands, and  the  Helvetic  body,  or  the  afTembly  of  the 
cantons  of  Switzerland,  &c.  In  the  laft,  the  general  go- 
vernment reprefents  the  nation  and  tranfacb  the  national 
F  f  f  affairs 


402  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

affairs  of  thofe  ftates  which  have  formed  the  political 
union  ;  for  inftance,  the  German,  empire,  Great-Britain, 
and  the  general  government  of  the  United  States  of  North- 
America. 

A  (late,  or  a  confederation  or  an  anociation  of  ftates 
vefted  with  the  external  fovereignty  requisite  for  felf- 
defence,  have  place  among  the  nations  of  the  earth. 

A  nation  is  therefore  iimply  defined  to  be  a  ftate 
externally  or  abfolutely  independent ;  that  is  to  fay,  not 
fubjccl  to  the  authority,  controul,  or  government  of 
any  other  body  politic. 

Sch.  i. — It  has  been  already  obferved,  that  the  external  or  ab- 
folute  independence  of  dates  conftitutes  their  national 
,chara6ter.  Nations  may  be  different  in  many  refpects, 
for  inftance,  in  that  of  the  form  or  the  quality  of  govern- 
ment, of  the  extent  and  fituation  of  territory,  and  of 
.  various, other  relations;  but  all  fuch  things  relate  to  their 
political  character  foiely,  and  do  not  in  the  leaf!  affect 
their  national  independence. 

Sen.  2. — Hiftory  furnifh.es  us  with  inflances  of  nations  which 
have  loft  their  national  character.  There  are  ftates  which, 
for  the  fake  of  finding  greater  fecurity  in  a  confederation 
or  in  an  aifociation,  have  transferred  their  national  right: 
and  we  have  recent  inftances  of  ftates  which  havefhakert 
off  their  former  dependence  and  made  themfelves  abfo- 
lutely  independent. 

Sc/i.  3.- — Nations,  in  fhort,  have  their  changes  and  viciflitudes, 
which  are  obvious  evidences  of  the  fupreme  government 
of  Divine  Providence  over  the  affairs  of  the  children  of 
men.  They  have  their  rife,  progrefs,  full  growth, — -be- 
come ftationarv, — decline  and  fall  into  ruin.  Witnefs  the 
Affyrian,  the  Perfian  and  the  Greek  monarchies;  witnefs 
the  mighty  Roman  empire,  &c. 

Since  abfoiute  or  national  independence  excludes  all 
idea  of  fubjection  or  fubordination  it  follows,  that  no 
inferiority  orfuperiority  can  take  place  among  nations. 

From  this  it  immediately  follows,  that  nations  have 

no 


moral  philosophy;  402 

no  perfect  affirmative  right  in  one  another  •,  that  is  to 
fay,  they  are  not  in  a  focial,  but  in  a  natural  ftate. 

The  natural  ftate  of  nations  is  abfolute  when  they 
are  confidered  in  themfelves,  but  becomes  hypothetical 
when  they  are  confidered  under  certain  circumftances. 

Nations,  contemplated  in  their  abfolute  natural  ftate, 
have  equal  rights,  becaufe  they  have  the  fame  nature, 
and  are  equally  independent  of  any  authority  on  earth. 

From  this  it  follows,  that  when  the  circumftances 
of  nations  differ,  their  rights  may  differ  •,  but  when 
they  are  under  the  fame  circumftances,  their  hypo- 
thetical natural  rights  will  be  the  fame. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  nations  live  ina  ftate  of  abfo- 
lute equality,  or  in  a  ftate  of  natural  liberty. 

Sch. — What  is  permitted  in  one  is  alfo  permitted  in  another; 
each  nation  may  do  what  it  pleafes,  provided  it  commits 
no  injury  to  another,  or  breaks  not  through  a  public 
engagement,  or  does  not  commit  what  among  nations  is 
reckoned  injurious. 

No  laws,  therefore,  will  apply  to  the  affairs  of  na- 
tions but  thofe  which  flow  from  the  nature  of  abfolute 
independence,  or  fuch  as  they  confent  to  by  conven- 
tional agreement,  or  thofe  which  reft  upon  the  cuftom^ 
and  ufages  followed  by  civilized  nations.  Cuftoms 
among  nations  may  be  confidered  as  rules  for  national 
conduct,  which  have  the  force  of  conventions  refult- 
ing  from  tacit  or  conftructive  confent. 

Sch.  i. — Hence  we  may  fee  the  propriety  of  the  diftinftion 
of  the  law  of  nations  into  natural  and  cufotnary.  It  is 
true,  authors  have  added-  a  third  kind  of  national  law, 
which  they  call  conventional ;  but  that  diftinction  may  be 
confidered  as  unneceflary,  fince  both  the  natural  and  the 
cuftomary  laws  confpire  in  regulating  the  conduct  of 
nations,  with  regard  to  the  treaties  or  conventions  which 
£ubfift  or  are  fuppofed  to  iubfift  between  them. 

Scki  . 


404  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sch.  2. — However,  as  it  is  not  our  defign  to  enter  into  the 
irkfome  and  extenfive  field  of  national  affairs,  as  they 
are  de  faflo  conduced  by  the  nations  of  the  earth,  and  as 
we  confine  ourfelves  to  thofe  urtiverfal  natural  principles 
which  fliew  what  nations  ought  to  do;  we  fhall  wave  an 
explanation  of  the  various  conventions  which  have,  or 
are  fuppofed  to  have  taken  place  between  them,  and 
attend  folely  to  what  is  called  the  immutable  and  univerfal 
natural  law  of  nations. 

Since  nations  are  by  their  nature  absolutely  inde- 
pendent of  any  controul,  it  follows,  that  they  may 
direct  this  their  independence  to  their  own  perfection 
as  they  think  proper;  that  is  to  fay,  they  may  claim 
the  right  of  equality  as  their  own  by  nature* 

A  nation,  therefore,  that  is  difturbed  in  the  exer- 
cife  of  its  natural  right  of  equality,  is  injured. 

We  may  confequently  Jay  down  as  the  fundamental 
laWy  by  which  all  national  concerns  are  to  be  regulat- 
ed, this  proportion:  nations  must   act  so  that 

THEY  COMMIT  NOTHING  WHEREBY  THE  RIGHT  OF 
THE  NATIONAL  EQUALITY  OF  OTHERS  IS  DISTURBED 
OR   INFRINGED. 

Sch.  i. — Actions  by  which  the  natural  right  of  equality  is 
infringed,  amount  to  national  injuries,  and  are  juft  caufes 
for  national  defence  and  war. 

Sch.  i. — Actions  by  which  the  natural  equality  is  deftroyed, 
deprive  a  ftate  of  its  national  character  and  dignity. 

Sch.  3.— -Such  actions  may  take  place  either  from  choice  or 
neceflity.  The  former  is  the  cafe  if  ftates  enter  into  a 
national  confederation  with  other  ftates,  or  form  a  na- 
tional union  under  a  general  government;  the  latter  is 
generally  the  effect  of  conqueft. 

The  right  of  natural  equality  to  which  a  nation  is 
entitled  by  nature,  implies  all  other  rights  with  which 
it  is  or  may  be  vetted  by  lawful  acquifition ;  becaufe 
the  latter  are  lawful  property,  and  it  is  a  hypothetical 

natural 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  405 

natural  right  that  the  lawful  acquirer  or  poiTeflbr 
mould  have  the  exclufive  right  of  his  acquisitions 
and  poflefilons. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  the  fundamental  law  of  nations 
refts  immediately  upon  the  two  principles  of  perfect 
laws,  which,  as  has  been  heretofore  explained,  com- 
mand men  to  give  every  one  his  own,  and  carefully  to 
abftain  from  doing  an  injury  to  any  perfon  whatever. 

Sch. — Behold  the  two  infallible  criteria  by  which  the  conduct, 
the  conventions  and  cuftoms  of  nations  are  to  be  eftimat- 
ed!  The  fame  univerfal  principles  which  direct  the  ac- 
tions of  individuals,  are  the  bafis  and  foundation  of  politi- 
cal and  national  reflitude,  the  greatejl  glory  to  which  flates 
or  nations  can  or  ought  to  afpire. 

As  it  is  a  fundamental  law,  according  to  which  na- 
tions muft  regulate  their  conduct  with  refpect  to  one 
another,  that  they  mould  give  every  one  its  own,  and 
abftain  from  committing  injuries  \  it  is  necefTary,  that 
nations  mould  know  one  another ;  for  without  this 
knowledge,  thefe  duties  cannot  be  fatisfied. 

The  important  queftion  therefore  obtrudes  itfelf, 
Who  is  the  nation  ? 

In  order  to  determine  this  queftion  with  precifion, 
it  is  neceflary  that  we  diftinguim  certain  fituations  and 
circumftances,  which  have  reference  to  the  political  and 
internal  character  of  nations. 

If  refpect  is  had  to  their  original  and  eflential  na- 
tional fovereignty,  we  anfwer,  the  people  are  the  na- 
tion, the  fource  and  the  fum  of  all  national  power  and 
fovereignty. 

But  if  the  people  are  under  a  regular  national  go- 
vernment, we  anfwer,  the  government,  whatever 
its  form  or  quality  may  be,  is  the  nation^  and  exchtfively 

vefted 


406  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

1  eft  ed  with  the  national  rights  of  fiver  eignty,  fo  far  thaf 
?w  aft  can  be  confidered  as  national,  which  cannot  be  con- 
templated as  an  atlion  of  which  the  national  governmetit 
is  in  fome  manner  or  other  the  moral  caufe.     Vide  page 
84  and  85. 

Sch. — Let  it  be  obferved,  that  in  a  treatife  on  the  law  of  na- 
tions, all  public  rights  and  obligations  are  taken  as  im- 
mediately affecting  the  national  rulers  or  governors:  fo 
that  in  this  treatife  ive  take  the  rulers  or  the  government  for  ike 
71  at  ion. 

However,  if  the  government  and  the  people  are  fo 
far  at  variance  that  a  majority  have  declared  againft  the 
former,  an  anfwer  to  the  before  mentioned  queftion  is 
difficult.  If  other  nations  cannot  fufpend  a  determi- 
nation on  this  point,  which  they  ought  to  do,  if  polTi- 
ble,  in  order  to  keep  themfelves  fafe  and  to  avoid  all 
interference  with  the  internal  affairs  of  a  nation,  then 
thev  ought  to  confider  the  ruling  power  as  the  na- 
tion-, becaufe  it  mud  be  fuppofed  that  thofe  who  rule 
are  fupported  by  the  majority  of  the  people,  in  whom 
the  fupreme  power  is  originally  founded. 

Sch.  1. — However  juft  this  manner  of  reafoning  may  be,  and 
however  much  it  would  conduce  to  the  happinefs  of  man- 
kind, if  nations  would  refpecl  it  fo  far  as  to  obferve  that 
forbearance  which  national  duties  as  well  as  the  duties  of 
humanity  impofe  upon  them;  ftill  the  fad  experience  of 
all  ages  has  evinced,  that  this  important  queftion  con- 
cerning national  conduct  towards  a  neighbouring  nation 
when  fallen  into  a  ftate  of  commotion,  has  never  had  a 
fair  difcuffion,  or  even  a  hearing,  before  the  tribunal  of 
reafon,  but  always,  like  the  Gordian  knot,  has  been  de- 
cided by  the  fword,  the  ultima  ratio  regum. 

Sch.  2. — If  natural  governments  have  their  powers  from  the 
people,  it  is  a  ilrange  phenomenon  indeed  to  fee  this 
power  exercifed  to  their  deftruction,  by  the  very  hand 
that  ought  to  protect  their  rights,  their  liberties,  their  lives 
and  their  property  !     To  fee  a  nation  at  variance  with 

itfclf 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  407 

itfelf  is  a  pitiful  afpect,  and  its  concomitant  circumflan- 
ces  and  effects  are  horrid  and  dreadful. 

Sch.  3. — It  is  therefore  a  matter  of  furpriie,  that  national  go- 
vernments fo  far  forget  their  rights  and  duties  as  to  make 
nfe  of  that  power  which  is  given  them  for  the  protection 
of  their  refpectire  nations,  to  augment  the  calamities  of 
another  nation,  by  unjuft  interference  in  what  are  its  own 
concerns. 

Sch.  4. — Were  it  not  a  fact  often  eftablifhed  by  experience,  we 
fhould  hardly  think  it  poflible  for  a  people,  in  fuch  ca- 
fes, to  fuffer  their  rulers  to  abufe  the  delegated  powers  by 
applying  them  to  fuch  horrid  purpofes.  Strange,  that  2 
people  can  be  fo  far  intoxicated  as  to  bring  the  treafure 
of  the  nation  and  the  blood  of  their  fellow  citizens  fa- 
crifices  at  the  fhrine  of  inhuman  ambition  and  unnatural 
injuftice,  for  the  deflruction  of  the  deareft  rights  of  hu- 
manity ! 

Sell.  5. — This  queftion  is  important  with  refpect  to  the  internal 
good  government  of  the  ftate  or  nation,  and  deferves  the 
moft  ferious  confideration  both  of  the  rulers  and  ruled, 
that  each  party  be  faithful  in  the  performance  of  their 
refpective  public  duties.  Paffion  indeed  will  not  give  a 
rational  decilion  :  the  democrat  and  the  ariftocrat  of  the 
prefent  day  are  pre-determined  not  to  agree.  But  unpre- 
judiced reafon  willingly  declares  for  government,  as  long 
as  the  conftitution  is  the  invariable  rule  for  conducting 
its  adminiftration,  and  as  long  as  the  rights  of  the  people 
continue  to  be  held  facred  and  inviolate. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  duties  of  nations  in  general. 


T, 


HERE  is  no  doubt  but  nations,  that  is,   the  ru- 
lers of  ftates  and  nations,  are  moft  facred iv  bound  to 
the  performance  of  all  thofe  natural  duties  which  re- 
fult  from  the  nature  of  civil  focieties  veiled  with  na- 
tional 


408  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

tional  independence  •,  for  they  are  bound  to  regulate 
their  conduct  in  perfect  conformity  to  the  precepts 
and  prohibitions  of  the  natural  law. 

Since  all  natural  duties  may  be  diftinguilhed  into 
commiilive  and  omiffive,  into  perfect  and  imperfect, 
and  into  duties  to  God,  to  ourfelves  and  to  others, 
it  follows,  that  the  duties  incumbent  upon  the  rulers 
of  ftates  and  nations  are  either  commiflive  or  omif- 
five, perfect  or  imperfect,  duties  they  owe  to  God,  to 
themfelves,  and  to  other  nations. 

Sch.  i. — The  duties  which  nations  or  ftates,  that  is,  their  go- 
vernments, owe  to  God,  concern  the  caufe  of  religion 
and  public  worfhip. 

Sch.  2. — The  duties  which  they  owe  themfelves  are  either  of 
a  political  or  national  nature,  or  both  alike.  The  firfl 
have  reference  to  thofe  public  obligations  under  which 
rulers  are  to  promote  the  internal  happinefs  of  a  nation; 
the  fecond  relate  to  its  external  fecurity ;  the  laft  com- 
prehend all  that  concerns  both  internal  and  external  fe- 
curitv;  for  inftance,  laws  for  promoting  the  internal 
peace  and  preventing  injuries  again  ft  foreigners;  like- 
wife,  the  placing  of  citizens  in  a  proper  ftate  of  defence 
for  quelling  an  infurreclion,  as  well  as  for  preventing  or 
repelling  an  invafion.  Hence  we  difcover  the  propriety 
of  referving  the  fubje<5t  of  the  political  duties  of  the  rulers 
of  ftates  for  the  law  of  nations,  becaufe  a  repetition  of 
the  fame  duties  may  be  avoided  thereby,  and  thofe  which 
are  folely  national  are  brought  to  their  proper  place. 

Sch.  3. — The  duties  which  nations  owe  one  another  folely 
concern  national  governments,  and  conftitute  what  in  the 
fubftance  of  the  term  is  called  the  laiv  of  nations. 

The  nature  of  things  requires,  that  a  material  dif- 
ference be  obferved  with  refpect  to  the  political  and 
national  duties  of  the  public  rulers,  as  fuch,  and  thofe 
which  are  incumbent  on  them  as  individuals,  or  as 
members  of  any  of  the  lefTer  focieties. 

This 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  4O9 

This  diftinction  is  more  efpecially  neceflary,  becaufe 
men  in  an  elevated  public  ftation  forget  that  they  are 
tinder  the  fame  obligations  to  perform  their  duties  to 
God,  to  their  families,  <kc.  as  devoutly  and  fincerely  as 
the  meaner!  of  their  fubjects  are  held  to  perform  theirs. 

Before  the  tribunal  of  God,  and  in  the  forum  of  na- 
ture, emperors,  kings  and  nobles  are  but  men  •,  there 
is  no  diftinction  but  this,  that  they  will  be  judged  accord- 
ing to  the  faithfulnefs  with  which  they  have  performed 
more  extenfive  duties  than  fall  to  the  lot  of  other  men. 
Their  Ration  is  high,  but  there  is  no  real  caufe  to  envy 
it,  becaufe  their  duty  and  their  refponfibility  are  great. 
To  whom  much  is  given,  of  him  much  will  be  required,. 

This  thought,  and  the  incontrovertible  experience 
that  kings  die  like  other  men,  feem  to  be  fufficient 
caufes  why  they  mould  fortify  their  breafts  againft  the. 
infmuating  poifon  of  flattery. 

Referring,  therefore,  the  rulers  of  the  earth,  in  their 
perfonal  capacity,  to  the  beft  fyftem  of  ethics — the  fa- 
cred  precepts  of  the  Bible, — we  proceed  to  treat  of  their 
public  duties,  or  that  line  of  public  conduct:  which  they 
ought  to  obferve  in  the  adminiftration  of  the  powers 
entrufted  to  them  for  the  good  of  mankind. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  duties  of  the  rulers  of  ftates  and  nations  with  re- 
fpeft  to  religion  and  public  worfhip. 

Q 

OINv^E  religion  is  the  glory  of  human  nature,  and 
the  duty  to  glorify  God  incumbent  on  all  men,  it  fol- 

Goff  lows. 


4IO  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

lows,  that  the  rulers  of  ftates  and  nations  ought  to 
direct  the  public  powers  entrufted  to  their  care  for  the 
promotion  of  all  that  has  a  beneficial  and  necerTary  in- 
fluence on  the  advancement  of  the  caufe  of  vital  reli- 
gion, of  piety  and  virtue,  whereby  the  citizens  may  be 
incited  to  take  motives  for  their  moral  actions  from  the 
holy  ways  and  perfections  of  God,  fo  that  the  whole 
nation  may  be  united  in  a  fincere  defire  to  glorify  their 
Creator,  the  Supreme  Ruler  and  Governor  of  the  uni- 
verfe. 

As  God  cannot  be  glorified  if  we  take  not  motives 
for  our  conduct  from  the  perfections  of  the  Deity,  it 
follows,  that  the  rulers  of  ftates  and  nations  mud  them- 
felves  be  actuated  with  an  indefatigable  defire  to  conduct 
their  public  administration  of  government  in  conformi- 
ty to  the  ways  and  perfections  of  the  Moft  High. 

Thus  the  nations  of  the  earth  will  be  led  in  the  beft 

and  moft  forcible  manner  to  glorify  God,  if  their  rulers 

ht  them  the  auguft  and  confpicuous  example. 

Sck.  i. — Directions  which  are  not  necefiary  for  promoting  the 
glory  of  God  can  feldom  have  a  beneficial  influence  on  the 
caufe  of  piety  and  virtue,  and  are  unbecoming  a  wife  and 
good  government:  the  leaft  that  can  be  faid  of  them  is, 

too  * 

that  they  are  an  idle  ftretch  of  public  authority. 

Sch.  2. — Such  as  militate  againft  the  caufe  of  vital  religion, 
virtue  and  true  piety,  are  oppofed  to  the  manifestation  of 
the  glory  of  God,  and  an  abufe  of  fovereignty  as  wanton 
as  it  is  reprehenfible. 

Sch.  3. — How  careful,  therefore,  mould  governments  be,  that 
their  public  proceedings  may  be  no  obftacle  to  fo  great 
and  good  a  caufe  !  How  folicitous,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  do  all  in  their  power  for  its  protection  and  advance- 
ment! 

Governments  act  contrary  to  their  public  duties, 
-when  they  apply  violent  means,  or  refort  to  other 

unlawful 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  411 

unlawful  methods  for  hindering  any  of  their  citizens 
in  the  free  enjoyment  of  that  religion  which  they  think 
belt,  calculated  for  promoting  the  glory  of  God  and 
their  own  happinefs :  for,  that  government  certainly 
does  not  glorify  God  which  affumes  a  power  to  judge 
the  confciences  of  men,  and  thus  impioufly  ufurps  what 
is  the  fole  right  of  God.  He,  the  More.  High,  who 
will  not  give  his  glory  to  another,  cannot  be  glorified  by 
ads  of  public  injuftice  and  violent  opprerTion.  Such 
proceedings  in  rulers  cannot  be  juftified  on  any  account-, 
for,  befides  the  juft  mentioned  weighty  arguments, 
they  openly  revolt  againft  the  very  nature  and  fcope  of 
civil  fociety  :  neither  is  any  fociety  naturally  lawful, 
if  the  members  thereof  are  deprived  of  their  indefeafa- 
ble  natural  rights  of  conducting  themfelves  as  free  and 
moral  agents,  refponfible  in  all  their  actions  to  their 
Maker.  No  lawful  fociety  requires  a  facrince  of  that 
nature;  and  any  fociety  which  requires  it,  is  unnatural 
and  more  than  tyrannical. 

It  is  therefore  an  indifpenfible  duty  which  the  go- 
vernors of  ftates  and  nations  owe  to  God,  that  they 
protect  the  citizens  in  the  undifiurbed,  enjoyment  of 
their  religion. 

It  is  a  queftion  varioufly  agitated  among  authors  on 
the  law  of  nations,  how  far  that  protection  extends, 
with  refpect  to  the  free  exercife  of  public  worfhip — 
whether  one,  two  or  three  religious  profeflions  are  ex- 
clufively  entitled  to  that  privilege  in  preference  and 
perhaps  to  the  prejudice  of  all  others  ?     , 

Here  is  pre-fuppofed,  which  eafily  flows  from  the 
nature  of  things,  that  a  certain  day  ought  to  be  fet  apart 
for  public  worfhip— a  day  of  reft,  where  each  citizen  is 
under  public  obligation  to  abftain  from  labour  or  *di- 

verfions, 


412  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

verfions,  whereby  the  public  worftiip  may  be  inter- 
rupted or  difturbed. 

Sch.  i. — The  firft  day  of  the  week  has  continued  to  be  this 
public  day  among  all  the  profeflbrs  of  Chriftianity  from 
the  refurrection  of*  Chrifl  to  the  prefent  time.  The 
French  only  have  of  late  broke  through  that  general  con- 
formity, altering  times  and  feafons  with  an  enthufiafm 
equal  to  that  with  which  they  changed  their  old  form  of 
government.  It  is  to  be  hoped,  that,  when  that  nation; 
is  left  to  think  for  themfelves,  they  will  return  from  the; 
extravagance  of  irreligion,  and  fee  the  vaft  difference  be- 
tween true  religion  and  ftupid  fuperftition,  which  for  % 
long  time  has  darkened  their  horizon,  fo  that  it  is  no 
wonder  they  cannot  fee  the  light  of  real  truth  and  tafte 
the  fweets  of  pure,  heaven-born  religion. 

Sck.  2. — The  Jews  adhere  to  the  feventh  day  of  the  week  as  a 
day  of  reft,  fet  apart  by  the  Creator,  to  be  kept  holy  by 
attending  to  the  concerns  of  their  fouls  and  eternity. 

If,  then,  in  a  Chriitian  country,  that  is,  in  a  ftate  or 
nation  where  the  majority  of  the  citizens  profefs  Chrif- 
tianity, the  various  feels  and  profefTions  of  that  religion 
refpeclively  attend  public  worihip  after  that  mode 
which  each  of  them  think  beft,  they  certainly  will  not 
interfere  with  refpedi:  to  time,  as  this  is  the  fame  among 
all  denominations  of  Chriftians :  neither  can  any  inter- 
ference take  place  in  the  exercife  of  public  worfhip, 
iince,  in  truth,  this  becomes  the  more  public  in  pro- 
portion to  the  numbers  which  participate  thereof,  and 
then  deferves  to  be  called  national,  when  no  citizens  are 
excluded  from  the  exercife  of  folemn  worfhip  who  can 
porTibly  be  partakers  thereof. 

To  give  any  particular  perfuafion  the  exclufive  right 
of  public  worfhip  in  preference  and  to  the  prejudice  of 
others  who  have  adopted  a  different  mode,  in  cafes 
where  no  interference  with  public  worfhip  or  public 
good  takes  place,  is  fo  far  from  being  neceflary  or  na- 
turally 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  413 

turaily  lawful,  that,  on  the  contrarv,  it  is  a  wanton 
abufe  of  power,  and  an  error  the  more  fatal,  as  it  has 
the  fanclion  of  the  majority  of  the  Rate  or  nation  for 
its  fupport. 

Sch. — Eftabliftiments,  as  they  are  to  be  met  with  in  the  Euro- 
pean and  Aiiatic  countries,  as  they  are  generally  managed, 
muft  be  confidered  as  relics  of  political  fuperftition,  or 
as  meafures  which  the  blind  enthufiafm  and  party  zeal  of 
fuperftitious  ignorance  and  bigotted  violence  have  pro- 
voked as  means  neceftary  to  curb  the  power  and  influence 
of  a  party  inimical  to  public  good,  or  to  defend  the  na- 
tion againft  foreign  machinations  and  intrigues  fubver- 
five  of  its  government. 

Whilft  we  lament  that  religious  eftablifhments  have 
ever  taken  place,  we  cannot  but  rejoice  that  the  United 
States  of  North-America,  and  the  happy  concord 
among  the  citizens  thereof,  exhibit  a  confpicuous  ar- 
gument againft  all  exclufive  rights  unfriendly  to  any 
profefTor  of  religion  whatever. — Yes,  as  a  country 
whereof  the  generality  of  the  inhabitants  are  Chriftians 
of  fome  denomination  or  other,  the  Chriftian  fabbath  is 
the  eftablifhed  day  for  public  reft  and  for  public  worfhip. 
On  this  day,  all  denominations  of  Chriftians  worfhip 
publicly,  refort  to  their  houfes  of  worfhip,  approach 
the  throne  of  the  Eternal,  each  in  that  mode  which 
appears  to  them  beft.  Our  ftreets  on  the  public  days 
of  worfhip  reprefent  (and  may  they  ever  continue  fo  to 
do ! )  the  beautiful  fight  of  brethren  dwelling  in  unity. 

Sch. — The  Jew  celebrates  his  own  fabbath,  and  labours  under 
no  inconvenience  except  that  which  arifes  from  the  nature 
of  the  civil  ftate-— he  muft  abftain  from  work  out  of  doors 
on  the  Chriftian  fabbath,  whilft  his  own  is  deftitute  of  the 
fanction  of  the  laws  of  the  land  as  a  day  of  reft. 

Where  eftablifhments  have  taken  place,  and  an  in- 
equality has  been  introduced  among  citizens,  unfriendly 

to 


414  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  their  civil  liberty,  it  is  the  duty  of  rulers  to  do  their 
utmoft  that  unneceilary  burdens  may  be  done  away,  and 
that  laws  of  fuch  a  nature  may  be  either  abrogated,  or 
reftricted  in  their  operation  and  effects :  for  of  religion 
it  may  be  faid  what  Chrift  anfvvered  before  Pilate — My 
kingdom  is  not  of  this  world. 

As  little  as  it  is  confident  with  the  principles  of  na- 
ture to  opprefs,  or  unneceffarily  to  reftrict  citizens  with 
refpect  to  the  exercife  of  their  religion,  fo  little  can  it 
be  right,  that  a  nation  may  exile  a  number  of  citizens 
who  diflent  from  what  abufe  has  introduced  as  the  na- 
tional religion  of  the  land.  It  is  a  great  queftion,  whe- 
ther any  crime  or  mifdemeanor  in  a  citizen  can  deferve 
a  punifh merit  tantamount  to  the  deprivation  of  his  do- 
mocile,  of  his  country — to  his  being  torn  from  his 
dearer!:  connections  ? — However  this  queftion  may  be 
ultimately  determined,  it  certainly  cannot  be  a  crime  to 
follow  the  dictates  of  our  own  confcience  in  things  which 
are  not  repugnant  to  public  good. 

Soh. — Should  the  ftrange  and  felfifh  ipfe  dixit  of  enthufiafts  or 
hypocrites  have  fuch  an  effect  with  rulers  of  nations,  as 
that,  to  fatisfy  their  pride  or  intereft,  the  liberty  of  the 
meek  and  peaceable  citizen  mufl  be  made  a  facrifice,  the 
mo  ft  ufeful  and  mod  faithful  members  of  fociely  banilhed 
their  native  country? 
Glaring  as  the  abfurdity  of  fuch  conduct  may  be,  (till  it  has 
been  purfued  and  applauded.  The  Hugeuots  were  not 
Ion*  iince  a  fatal  in  (lance  of  this  tyrannical  abufe  of 
power;  and  France  has  loft  in  them  more  than  all  her  fo- 
reign conquefts  have  been  able  to  compenfate. 

From  what  has  been  hitherto  explained,  it  follows, 
that  the  different  profefTions  of  religions  in  a  ftate  are 
naturally  entitled  to  more  than  is  exprefTed  by  the  term 
general  toleration.  As  citizens,  they  are  entitled  to  the 
enjoyment  of  all  rights  which  are  confident  with  the 

public 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  415 

public  good,  and  cannot  without  injury  be  confidered 

as  outcaits  and  nuifances,  who  are  merely  fufFered  to 

enjoy  rights  to  which  they  have  no  lawful  claim. 

Sck. — There  is  no  doubt  but  that  thoufands  would  look  upoa 
toleration  as  a  great  bleflinor  •  whilft  there  are  manv  who 
would  fain  facrifice  every  thing  to  efcape  the  fangs  of  fpi- 
ritual  tyranny  and  oppreflion,  and  to  be  fufFered  to  exile 
themfelves  in  order  to  keep  their  confidences  undeflled. 

We  return  from  irkfome  political  cafuiftry  to  the 
general  duties  which  the  rulers  of  dates  and  nations 
owe  towards  the  Deity.  Their  authority  is  given  them 
for  the  fole  purpofe  of  promoting  the  happinefs  of  the 
people:  they  cannot,  therefore,  remain  unconcerned, 
whether  the  minds  of  the  people  are  or  are  not  duly 
imprefled  with  reverence  for  the  glory  and  majefty  of 
the  Supreme  Ruler  of  nations:  they  ought,  as  far  as 
it  is  phyfically  and  morally  pofTible,  to  employ  their 
authority  in  the  purfuit  of  all  proper  and  juft  means  for 
imprefTing  the  minds  of  all  with  a  lively  fenfe  of  the 
necefTity  of  obeying  the  laws  of  God  in  truth  and  in 
iincerity. 

Thofe  things  which  are  phyfically  pofTible  in  the 
hands  of  government  for  rendering  the  performance 
of  duties  due  to  the  Deity  general  among  the  citizens 
of  ftates  or  nations,  are,  on  the  one  hand,  the  en- 
couragement  of  fcienc'e,  and  the  extending  the  aid  of 
government  to  fuch  inftitutions  of  learning  as  ferve  as 
general  means  for  improving  the  minds  of  the  people 
in  true  knowledge,  which  leads  to  a  conviction  that  it 
is  neceflary  to  fear  and  to  obey  God — a  conviction 
without  which  no  fervice  can  be  fincere,  no  worfhip 
acceptable :  on  the  other  hand,  a  difpofition  manifefted 
in  the  public  proceedings  of  government,  to  favour 
and  patronize  the  virtuous  and  upright  of  every  per- 

fuaiion, 


41 6  •      MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

fuafion,  and  an  earned  defire  to  recommend  the  caufe 
of  religion,  of  virtue,  philanthropy  and  piety,  by  their 
ownxonfpicuous  examples. 

The  power  of  governments  is  very  great — that  of 
doing  good  has  no  bounds :  it  will  therefore  be  object- 
ed, that  more  things  are  phyfically  poffible  for  enforcing 
the  performance  of  duties  due  to  the  Lord  of  the 
univerfe.  It  is  true,  compulfory  means  are  phyfically 
poffible,  and  in  many  countries  have  unfortunately 
been  employed:  oppreflions  and  cruelties  have  taken 
place,  which  are  finking  monuments  of  the  unfltnefs 
of  men  to  rule  confcience,  of  their  aptnefs  to  pervert 
the  caufe  of  God  and  religion,  and  of  their  pronenefs 
to  be  feduced  by  a  fpirit  of  fanaticifm,  fuperftition  or 
flubborn  infidelity. 

Let  it  fraud  as  an  incontrovertible  political  maxim, 
that  God  has  never  entrusted  to  men  his  caufe — that  no 
means,  however  well  intended  or  qualified,  are  morally 
poffible,  or  juft  and  lawful,  which  in  themfelves  are  in- 
confiftent  with  the  idea  of  religion,  repugnant  to  the 
dictates  of  reafon,  or  contradictory  to  the  firft  princi- 
ples of  natural  laws. 

How  mould  government  have  an  authority  which 
men  cannot  and  which  God  will  not  grant  ?  Rulers 
of  ftates  and  nations,  who  know  any  thing  concerning 
their  duty  to  God,  do  not  arrogate,  impiouily  arrogate 
to  themfelves  rights  which  are  the  only  prerogative  of 
the  great  Judge  of  heaven  and  earth. 

They  mav  employ  their  public  authority  for  pre- 
venting and  forbidding  notorious  prophanenefs,  blaf- 
phemy,  and  other  offences  of  a  horrid  and  abominable 
nature,  by  making  them  cognizable  in  the  municipal 
laws  of  the  land. 

Let 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  417 

Let  no  perfon  object  to  this  as  an  encroachment 
upon  the  confciences  of  men  •,  for,  blafphemy  and  fome 
other  acts  of  prophanenefs  are  actions  fo  abominable 
in  their  nature,  fo  deftructive  in  their  tendency,  that 
the  government,  independent  of  its  being  a  duty  to 
God,  would  not  do  jufticeto  the  nation,  nor  act  con- 
fidently with  the  public  good,  if  it  mould  be  remifs  in 
retraining  the  licentioumefs  of  the  unruly  and  wicked, 
by  punifhments  adequate  to  the  enormity  of  their  of- 
fences. 

Since  perfons  who  can  be  guilty  of  blafphemy  and 
abominable  prophanenefs  ceafe  to  couduct  themfelves 
as  men,  no  injuftice  is  committed  when  they  are  arrived 
at  that  pitch  of  wickednefs  and  folly,  if  restrictions 
are  impofed  upon  them  for  fecuring  the  tranquility  of 
the  date. 

Upon  the  whole,  actions  of  a  wicked  nature  and 
dedructive  tendency  cannot  be  treated  as  a  matter  of 
confcience;  nor  have  thofe  who  have  diverted  them- 
felves of  all  fenfe  of  moral  confcience,  and  bid  defiance 
to  common  decency,  any  claim  to  its  facred  rights. 

Sch. — However  juft  and  right  it  is  that  rulers  fet  their  face 
againft  any  thing  which  is  unfavourable  to  the  canfe  of 
religion,  and  punifh  offences  of  a  notorioufly  heinous  na- 
ture, ftill  great  care  is  neceflary  that  juftice  be  not  per- 
verted and  fuffered  to  degenerate  into  cruelty  and  perfe- 
ction. Truth  hath  been  more  than  once  cried  down  as 
blafphemy  :  virtue  and  innocence  cannot  always  fee  lire 
us  againft  the  ftiafts  of  flander  and  defamation.  Govern- 
ments have  to  take  cognizance  of  overt-adts,  which  are 
contradictory  to  public  good  :  it  does  not  become  them, 
to  be  partizans  with  refpeft  to  particular  modes  of  wor- 
ship, nor  is  it  fuitable  to  their  ftate  to  fet  up  inquifitorial 
authority. 

The  rulers  of  dates  or  nations  ought  to  be  fenfible,' 

that  they  are  accountable  to  God  for  all  they  do  in 

Hhk  their 


41  3  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

their  public  capacity — that  righleoufnefs  exalteth  a  na- 
tion, and  thatyfo  is  the  reproach  of  any  people. 

As  it  is  a  public  duty  of  the  ruler*  of  ftates  and  na- 
tions to  hinder  all  that  is  incompatible  with  public 
good,  it  is  evident,  that  government  has  not  only  a 
juft  right,  but  is  in  duty  bound  to  check  the  progrefs 
of  doctrines  which  are  in  a  direct:  manner  oppofed  to 
the  piefervation  of  that  defirable  object. 

Set). — If,  for  inftance,  perfons  fbould  preach  the  lawfulness 
of,  or  practife  promifcuous  concubinage;  if  they  ihould 
teach,  that  it  is  not  right  to  fubmit  to  government,  either 
becaufe  it  is  faid  that  Chrift  has  made  us  free,  or  becaufe 
the  perfons  adminiilering  government  differ  with  refpect 
to  religious  fentiments  and  external  mode  of  worfhip,  &c, 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  duties  which  ftates  or  nations  owe  themf elves* 

X  HE  duties  which  nations  owe  to  themfelves  flow- 
in  a  manner  fo  immediately  from  the  firft  principle  of 
natural  law,  that  for  the  idea  of  man  we  have  only  to 
fubftitute  that  public  infeparable  relation  which  fubfifts 
between  public  rulers  and  the  ftates  or  nations  over 
which  they  prefide,  and  draw  this  general  analogical 
conclufion  :  c  The  rulers  of  nations  owe  thofe  duties  in 
their  kind  towards  the  ftates  or  nations  under  their 
controul,  which  individual  men  owe  to  themfelves.' 

At  this  rate,  the  flrft  duty  of  the  rulers  of  ftates  and 
nations  will  be,  that  they  truly  love  their  people,  by 
doing  all  in  their  power  to  render  their  ftate  as  happy 

as 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  4T9 

f»  poflible.     So  that  the  fum  of  all  public  duties  is  the 
advancement  of  the  intereft  of  the  {late  or  nation. 

It  is  therefore  an  important  duty,  that  the  rulers 
icarn  to  know  what  is  really  interesting  to  the  nation, 
and  carefully  diftinguifh  realities  from  the  falfe  appear- 
ances of  national  greatnefs  or  fplendour. 

The  perfection  of  a  nation  is  very  extensive,  com- 
plicate and  intricate :  the  care  of  the  rulers  of  a  nation 
mult  be  extended  to  the  perfection  of  the  fouls,  the 
bodies,  the  external  flate  and  the  character  of  citizens, 
and  more  efpecially  to  the  prefervation  of  the  national 
Independence. 

Befides  the  protection  of  the  caufe  and  the  encourage- 
ment of  a  faithful  performance  of  the  duties  of  piety  and 
virtue  on  the  part  of  ali  orders  and  conditions  of  citizens, 
the  rulers  ought  to  furnim  them  with  opportunities  and 
means  whereby  their  underftandings  may  be  improved, 
that  they  may  obtain  knowledge  in  all  things  which  may 
influence  their  domeftic  or  political  happinefs — that 
they  may  be  relieved  from  and  fortified  againft  confufion 
and  error,  particularly  with  refpect  to  what  is  good  or 
bad,  right  or  wrong — that  they  may  be  enabled  to  dif- 
tinguifh  things  of  great  ufefuinefs  from  thofe  which 
are  of  lefs  utility,  and  from  fuch  as  are  dangerous,  fin- 
fill,  improper  or  wicked. 

They  mufr.  endeavour  to  give  the  will  of  the  citizens 
the  bert  directions  for  the  purfuit  of  what  is  really 
good  and  virtuous :  for  this  ctnd,  the  governors  of 
ttates  and  nations  have  the  right  to  make  and  put  in 
execution  wholeibme  laws,  that  the  good  and  faithful 
citizens  may  be  protected  and  rewarded  on  the  one 
hand,  and  on  the  other  wicked  perfons  deterred  from 
doino:  evil. 

It 


4-20  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  a  public  duty  of  the  rulers  of  ftates  and  nations, 
that  they  ufe  the  authority  given  them  for  the  great 
purpofes  of  countenancing  and  promoting  all  that  mav 
render  the  people  wife,  difcreet  and  virtuous,  and  of 
prohibiting  whatever  has  a  contrary  effect  or  a  perni- 
cious tendency. 

As  inftitutions  of  learning  have  generally  a  falutary 
efTecl  in  making  men  wife  and  good — behold  the  im- 
portant public  duties  of  national  rulers  to  order  that 
fuch  inftitutions  may  be  fet  on  foot  and  well  conducted ! 

Since  there  is  nothing  which  has  a  more  powerful 
influence  upon  the  human  mind  than  the  hope  of  im- 
mortality, the  rewards  and  punimments  of  another 
life;  it  is  evident,  that  it  is  a  very  important  duty  of 
rulers  to  hold  forth,  in  all  their  public  proceedings, 
their  fenfibility  of  their  own  accountablenefs  before 
God,  fo  that  the  citizens  may  be  properly  actuated  by 
the  force  of  fo  great  and  good  an  example. 

The  love  which  the  rulers  of  nations  ought  to  ex- 
ercife  towards  their  people,  implies  the  mofl:  tender 
care  for  the  prefervation  of  their  lives  and  health,  and 
the  attainment  of  all  things  necefTary  and  convenient 
for  promoting  thefe  great  purpofes. 

All  things  then  necefTary  for  the  fupport  of  life,  for 
the  prefervation  of  health,  and  for  augmenting  natural 
wealth,  are  national  duties.  Rulers  are  to  encourage 
the  arts,  agriculture  and  commerce — to  reward  the  in- 
duftrious — to  provide  for  the  poor  and  needy — to  have 
a  care  that  the  whole  body  politic  may  be  cemented  to- 
gether by  mutual  affiftance,  and  to  order  things  fo  that 
a  harmonious  co-operation  may  pervade  all  clafTes  and 
occupations  of  the  people,  that  they  give  one  another 

that 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  42  I 

that  fupport  and  vigour  which  constitute  the  political 
life  and  happinefs  of  a  ftate. 

The  whole  nation  in  particular  calls  for  the  ftricteft 
attention  on  the  part  of  their  rulers,  to  the  great  duty 
of  political  felf-prefervation. 

The  life  of  a  body  politic  or  a  ftate  conftfts  in  its 
political  union  •,  that  of  a  nation  comprehends,  befides 
that  union,  all  the  rights  of  abfolute  independence. 

As  the  rulers  of  dates  are  in  duty  bound  to  fecure 
the  community  againft  infurrections  and  diforder  from 
within,  fo  thofe  of  nations  have  moreover  to  be  careful 
that  the  independence  of  the  nation  or  any  part  thereof 
be  not  infringed,  encroached  upon  or  deftroyed.  The 
lofs  of  independence  is  the  political  annihilation  of  a 
nation. 

Whatever  clafties  with  the  independence  of  a  nation 
puts  it  in  a  ftate  of  neceftity,  which  may  be  abfolute, 
extreme,  or  refpective.     Vide  page  141. 

In  either  of  thefe  ftates,  the  rulers  are  in  duty  bound 
to  ufe  all  poiTible  means  to  avert  the  danger  and  pre- 
fer ve  the  independence  of  the  nation. 

Sck. — Hence  the  rights  of  defence  and  war  with  which  rulers 
are  inverted  by  nature  in  cafes  of  neceflity. 

Should  rulers  find  no  other  remedy  left  to  preferve 
the  independence  of  the  nation  than  to  confent  to  a 
difmemberment  of  the  body  politic,  by  giving  up  a 
fortification,  a  town,  a  province,  &c.  the  ftate  of  ne- 
ceftity not  only  juftifies,  but  alfo  lays  the  indifpenfible 
duty  upon  them  to  confent  to  fuch  difmemberment. 
But  to  alienate  provinces  or  places  on  any  other  ac- 
count is  a  ftretch  of  power  and  a  mo  ft  unnatural  and 
flagrant  act  of  injuftice. 

As 


,%2l  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

As  national  felf-prefervation  centers  in  national  in- 
dependence, it  follows,  that  the  rulers  of  a  nation  arc 
in  duty  bound  to  be  careful  that  the  natural  right  of 
abfolute  equality  be  not  infulted  or  infringed  by  any 
other  nation  whatever. 

Sch.  i. — It  is  therefore  of  fome  importance  to  know  to  what 
length  government  has  a  right  to  go  in  moderation  and 
forbearance,  with  refpect  to  infolent  treatment  on  the  part 
of  other  nations, — fince,  by  exceeding  the  juft  meafure 
which  prudence  and  other  circumftances  dictate,  the  na- 
tifc£  may  be  injured  by  its  own  government. 

Sch.  %.—  x  There  there  is  not  perfect  equality  among  nations, 
independence  is  but  nominal,  or  to  the  utmoft  precarious. 

This  leads  to  a  confederation  of  the  duties  of  na- 
tional rulers  concerning  the  character  and  refpectability 
of  the  nation. 

By  the  character  and  refpeclability  of  a  nation  we 
understand  the  favourable  opinion  of  other  nations 
concerning  the  wifdom  and  energy  of  its  government, 
and  the  riches,  ftrength,  refources,  means  of  defence, 
&c.  of  the  ftate,  but  more  particularly  the  valour  and 
patriotifm  of  the  citizens. 

A  nation  governed  by  wifdom,  where  the  public 
rulers  refpect  the  rights  of  other  nations,  and  are  tena- 
cious in  the  maintenance  of  their  own — where  agricul- 
ture and  manufactures  flourim — where  arts  and  fciences 
are  cultivated — where  love  of  virtue  and  order  prevail 
— where  a  fpirit  of  patriotifm  pervades  all  orders  and 
conditions  of  men — where  the  means  of  defence  are 
provided,  and  the  citizens  are  able  and  willing  to  make 
life  of  them — where  the  public  revenue  is  properly  ap- 
plied,— that  people  {lands  fair  to  be  beloved  at  home 
and  refpected  abroad,  and  will  doubtlefs  conciliate  the 
good  will  of  all  other  nations. 

We 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  423 

We  only  add,  that,  as  the  manners  and  tafte  of  a 
nation  have  a  vaft  influence  on  its  profperity,  it  will  be 
an  important  duty  on  the  part  of  government  to  en- 
deavour to  give  them  the  moft  falutary  direction,  by 
doing  all  in  their  power  to  inftil  in  the  minds  of  the 
people  a  lively  {tnk  of  true  honour. 

Sch. — Since  the  mod  eflentiai  duties  which  nations  owe  them- 
felves  have  been  attended  to  under  the  head  of  politics, 
it  may  be  deemed  unnecefiary  to  enlarge  here  on  any  fur- 
ther explanation  of  them. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Of  the  duties  which  nations  owe  one  another. 


s 


I N  C  E  the  duties  which  nations  owe  one  another 
flow  from  the  law  of  nature,  it  follows,  that  they  may 
be  diftinguifhed  into  duties  of  humanity  and  of  necef- 

fity. 

By  the  duties  of  humanity  nations  are  bound  to  con- 

fider  one  another  as  focieties  of  fellow  men — as  fo  many 

communities  of  the  univerfal  fociety  of  the  human 

race,  placed  under  the  government  of  the  Moft  High, 

and  individually  as  well  as  collectively  bound  to  obey 

his  holy  will,  in  rendering  one  another  as  happy  as 

pofTible.     National  rulers,  confidered  in  this  light,  are 

bound  to  befriend  other  nations — to  alleviate  their  dif- 

trefTes— to  cultivate  peace  as  long  as  pofTible,  and,  in 

cafes  of  necefiary  defence  or  war,  to  exercife  humanity, 

forbearance  and  moderation. 

Sch. — How  defirable  and  happy  would  be  the  ftate  of  the  hu- 
man race,  if  the  duties  of  humanity,  friendship,  good 

neighbourhood 


424  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.' 

neighbourhood  and  benevolence  were  generally  and  fin- 
cerely  exercifed  amongft  national  governments ! — How 
fatal  is  it  for  the  happinefs  of  mankind,  that  jealoufy,  dif- 
truft,  rivalfhip,  ambition,  luft  of  power  and  dominion, 
take  place  of  that  general  benevolence  and  brotherly 
affection  which  would  enfure  more  univerfal  and  perma- 
nent happinefs  than  all  treaties  of  commerce,  amity  or 
alliance  ever  will  afford  ! 

However,  as  this  amiable  union  of  intereft  and  af- 
fection between  national  governments  feems  to  remain 
among  the  pi  a  defideria  of  the  philofopher  and  philan- 
thropic,— the  time  not  being  yet  come  for  nations  to 
embrace  one  another  as  brethren,  which  they  really  are 
as  fellow  inhabitants  of  the  earth,  fellow  members  of 
the  univerfal  kingdom  of  the  Moft  High,  who  gra- 
ciously difpenfes  his  providential  mercies  over  all  the 
nations  of  the  earth, — it  remains  for  the  law  of  nations 
to  take  into  consideration  the  perfect  duties  which  they 
owe  towards  one  another. 

The  moft  general  duties  of  necefilty,  under  which 
all  others  of  a  fpecific  nature,  arifing  from  particular 
relations  and  circumftances  incident  to  national  affairs, 
may  be  brought,  are  the  following : — 

No  nation  muft  injure  another,  by  either  actually  or 
implicitly  endangering  its  fecurity. 

Nations  muft  give  one  another  their  own  •,  that  is  to 
fav,  they  muft  be  careful  not  to  interfere  in  the  rights 
of  each  other,  efpecially  the  natural  right  of  equality. 

A  nation  that  has  become  guilty  o^  injuring  another 
muft  make  reparation,  left  it  give  juft  caufe  for  defence 
and  war,  and  thereby  endanger  its  own  fecurity. 

A  nation  muft  never  refort  to  defence  or  war  without 
a  juft  caufe:    when  either  becomes  necefiary,    care 

mould 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  425 

mould  be  had  that  it  be  conducted  with  equity,  and 
not  continued  beyond  the  limits  of  natural  juftice ;  that 
is  to  fay,  hoftilities  mull  ceafe  as  foon  as  reparation  can 
be  obtained  and  national  fecurity  re-eftablifhed. 

Nations  are  bound  to  (land  faithfully  to  their  public 
engagements,  and  Strictly  to  obferve  the  ftipulations  of 
the  treaties  which  fubfift  between  them. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the  natural  rights  of  nations. 


N. 


ATIONS,  as  fuch,  enjoy  natural  rights,  which 
are  either  abfolute  or  hypothetical. 

The  abfolute  natural  rights  of  nations  flow  from 
their  nature,  considered  in  themfelves  -,  that  is  to  fay, 
from  the  idea  of  national  independence. 

Their  hypothetical  natural  rights  refult  from  that 
national  independence  considered  under  certain  circum- 
stances \  for  inStance,  a  nation  has  a  right  to  prohibit 
the  exportation  of  raw  materials  out  of  the  country-— 
to  permit  the  currency  of  foreign  coin,  &c. 

The  abfolute  natural  rights  of  nations  might  be  dif- 
tinguifhed  into  various  claries,  and  thefe  again  fpecified 
to  a  considerable  extent,  if  it  were  our  intention  to 
enter  into  a  minute  detail  of  them. 

But  the  general  ideas  explanative  of  all  the  particu- 
lars requifite  for  fpecific  information  on  this  fubject, 
having  been  already  explained,  when  we  treated  of 
civil  fociety,  the  nature,  different  forms  and  qualities 

I  i  i  of 


420  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  governments,  the  diftribution  of  the  exercife  of  po- 
Jitical  and  national  fovereignty, — it  may  fuffice  to  ob- 
serve here,  that  all  the  abfolute  natural  rights  of  nations 
center  in  the  free  exercife  of  all  the  rights  of  fovereign- 
ty neceffary  for  their  own  internal  government,  together 
with  the  right  of  abfolute  equality  and  national  inde- 
pendence, fo  that  no  power  on  earth,  no  nation,  nay, 
no  combination  of  nations,  has  any  fhadow  of  right  to 
interfere  with  either  the  one  or  the  other. 

Ssh.  i. — Nations  have  confequently  the  abfolute  natural  right 
to  change  their  government,  conftitution  and  laws  as  they 
pleafe;  and  other  nations  interfering,  under  any  pretence 
whatever,  act  contrary  to  the  abfolute  natural  right  of 
nations. 

■Sch.  2. — The  republic  of  France  and  the  kingdom  of  Poland 
exhibit  fcenes  of  horror  and  injuflice,  and  fliow  how 
little  the  great  ones  of  the  earth  refpedt  the  laws  of  nature 
and  of  nature's  God. 

The  hypothetical  natural  rights  of  nations  are  ftill 
more  multifarious,  according  to  the  great  variety  of 
circumftances  differently  affecting  national  governments 
and  national  affairs. 

The  moft  notable  circumftances  which  introduce 
great  and  confequential  modifications  into  national  af- 
fairs, are,  on  the  one  hand,  a  ftate  of  peace  and  public 
fecurity  •,  and,  on  the  other,  a  ftate  of  war  and  public 
kifecurity. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  the  natural  rights  of  public  fecurity  and  peace. 

A  HE  hypothetical  natural  rights  of  public  fecurity 
and  peace  reft  upon  the  right  of  abfolute  equality :  for 

one 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  4^7 

one  nation  commits  no  injury  againft  another  by 
enjoying  either  of  thofe  rights  •,  consequently  it  cannot 
meet  with  any  disturbance  by  virtue  of  any  right 
founded  in  nature.  Hence  we  conclude,  that  a  nation 
has  a  natural  right  to  live  in  fecurity  and  peace,  when 
it  fufters  no  disturbance  from  and  keeps  itfelf  clear  of 
committing  injury  againSt  others. 

Since  rights  to  the  attainment  of  lawful  ends  imply 
the  right  to  make  ufe  of  all  thofe  means  which  are  ne- 
ceSfery  for  thofe  ends,  it  follows,  that  nations  have  a 
natural  right  to  make  ufe  of  all  lawful  means  for  the 
prefervation  of  fecurity  and  peace. 

To  determine  the  fpeciflc  rights  of  fecurity  and 
peace,  attention  muft  be  had  to  the  particular  com- 
plexion and  fituation  of  national  affairs: — The  whole 
of  the  enquiry  turns  upon  thefe  two  considerations  : 
whether,  at  the  prefent  time  and  under  the  prefent  cir- 
cumstances, certain  public  proceedings  of  a  nation  are 
means  necefTary  for  its  fecurity  and  peace ;  and  whe- 
ther thofe  public  proceedings  are  lawfuL 

Sck. — For  inftance,  if  a  nation  erects  fortifications,  augments 
its  navy,  recruits  its  array,  and  puts  itfelf  in  a  rcfpeft- 
able  State  of  defence,  the  queftion  will  be,  Are  thefe 
proceedings  meant  for  war;  is  a  rupture  to  be  dreaded; 
or  does  that  nation  provide  for  its  own  fafety  ? 

No  nation  lawfully  provides  for  its  fafety  that  arro- 
gates to  itfelf  a  controul,  right  or  power  over  another 
independent  State-,  becaufe  the  right  of  equality  is  in- 
fringed, a  national  injury  takes  place,  and  that  nation 
gives  the  other  a  juSt  caufe  for  defence  and  war. 

No  nation  can  lawfully  provide  for  its  fafety  by  com- 
pelling the  afliStance  of  another ;  for  fuch  a  conduct 
would  be  arrogating  a  right  over  an  independent  nation- 
No 


42$  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY".' 

No  nation  may  march  through  the  territory  of  ano- 
ther without  its  confent  •,  for  fuch  a  conduct  would  be 
ufurpation  and  arrogation  of  right  over  another  nation. 
Sch.  i. — The  territorial  fo  vereignty  of  a  nation  is  co-extenfive 

with  its  independence  and  dominions. 
Sch.  2. — 'The  republic  of  Genoa  has  bravely  maintained  that 
independence,  and  thereby  efcaped  the  greateft  public 
calamities,  which  have  been  brought  on  other  Hates  by 
the  lawlefs  arrogation  of  right  on  the  part  of  the  formid- 
able combination  of  the  European  powers  that  has  been 
occalioned  by  the  prefent  revolution  in  France. 

Nations  are  all  independent  ftates,  and  poflefled  of 
equal  rights ;  no  natural  precedency  can,  therefore, 
take  place,  except  that  which  refults  from  the  order 
of  nature:  according  to  this,  nations  have  their  be- 
ginning, arrive  to  the  zenith  of  national  glory,  de- 
cline and  vanifh  away.  Some  are  as  it  were  born 
when  others  become  extinct.  If  then  nature  mould 
be  the  guide  to  determine  rank,  it  would  follow,  that 
that  nation  is  entitled  to  precedency  which  is  of  the 
jnoft  ancient  origin. 

Sch. — As  among  individuals,  fo  amongft  nations,  it  is  not 
venerable  age  always,  nor  even  virtue  and  wifdom,  but 
power,  riches  and  fplendour  that  determine  rank  and 
precedency. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Of  the  natural  rights  of  defence* 

JTTL  Nation  is  injured  and  in  a  ftate  of  infecurity  when 
another  either  mews  an  inclination  to  infringe  its 
rights,  or  actually  diflurbs  it  in  the  enjoyment  of  its 

national 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,  4^9 

national  independence  *,  for  abfolute  independence,  the 
right  of  equality,  and  all  other  acquired  rights,  confti- 
tute  what  nations  may  exclusively  claim  as  their  own. 

Since  a  disturbance  in  what  is  a  nation's  own,  by 
the  national  interference  of  another,  is  a  national  injury, 
it  follows,  that  in  fuch  cafes  a  nation  has  the  natural 
right  of  compulsion,  reparation,  defence  and  war  againft 
any  other  that  becomes  guilty  of  committing  a  distur- 
bance,1, an  injury,  a  damage,  or  any  act  of  intended  or 
actual  aggreSlion. 

When  nations  make  ufe  of  violent  means  to  avert 
a  public  injury,  they  exercife  the  natural  right  of  the 
aggreSTed  againft  the  aggreflbr,  and  refort  to  what  is 
called  national  defence. 

Since  national  defence  is  frequently  attended  with 
great  rifks  and  lories  on  the  part  of  the  lawful  defender ; 
and  Since  the  happieft  defence  brings  great  calamities 
on  an  inconceivable  number  of  individuals,  and  often 
on  the  mod  innocent  citizens  of  both  the  contending 
nations ;  it  follows,  that  the  rulers  of  nations  mould 
do  all  in  their  power  to  prevent  an  aggrejfion ;  that  is  to 
fay,  to  prevent  a  national  injury^  by  uflng  efficacious 
means,  lawful  in  themfelves,  but  not  violent  in  their 
nature  or  confequences,  for  the  purpofe  of  inducing 
other  nations  not  to  entertain  adefire  or  to  manifest  an 
inclination  to  become  an  aggreflbr.     Vide  p.  1 89. 

Nations  have  a  right  to  prevent  national  injuries,  by 
obferving  a  juft  conduct  towards  others,  and  by  putting 
themfelves  in  a  proper  State  of  defence. 

National  defence  cannot  be  juft  when  it  is  not  found- 
ed in  a  juft  caufe  or  conducted  in  a  lawful  manner. 

Nothing 


430  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.* 

Nothing  can  be  a  juft  caufe  for  national  defence,  e^r* 
cept  a  national  injury,  either  actual  or  impending. 

Nothing,  with  refpect  to  nations,  can  be  confidered 
public  or  national,  except  what  has  reference  to  the 
national  government. 

We  diftinguifh  national  injuries  into  direct  and  in- 
direct, and  into  immediate  and  mediate. 

Injuries  which  proceed  from  or  are  fanctioned  by 
government  are  dlreR,  and  ipfo  fatto  national,  if  they 
are  levelled  againft  the  government  of  another :  thofe 
which  depend  upon  the  agency  of  private  perfons  are 
indirefty  and  may  become  national  when  the  govern- 
ment ex  poft  fafto  approves  of  them,  or,  upon  repre- 
fentations  made  and  fatisfaction  required  by  the  injured 
government,  fuffers  fuch  reprefentations  to  remain  un- 
noticed, or  withholds  that  fatisfaction  which  is  due. 

Thofe  injuries  which  are  committed  againft  the  na- 
tional government  are  faid  to  be  immediate^  and  are  in 
themfelves  national,  if,  as  has  juft  been  remarked,  thev 
come  from  government,  or  have  its  fanction ;  but  fuch 
as  are  done  to  the  private  citizens  of  a  nation,  whether 
directly  by  government  or  indirectly  by  individual  per- 
fons, are  called  mediate ',  and  become  national  wheh  re- 
prefentations from  the  government  of  the  injured  citi- 
zens are  flighted,  and  fatisfaction,  which  is  due,  with-' 
held  on  the  part  of  the  rulers  of  that  nation  from  which 
the  injury  has  proceeded,  whether  it  be  by  acts  of  their 
own  or  by  fuch  as  bear  their  fanction,  or  by  the  private 
agency  of  citizens  under  their  controul. 

Thus,  even  injuries  committed  by  Grangers  become 
national  when  they  are  countenanced  by  a  national  go- 
vernment. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


43  l 


Sch.  i . — From  this  diftindtion  flow  the  following  maxims  of 
national  rights : 
The  fovereign  ought  to'redrefs  the  injuries  of  the  ftate  and 

protect  its  citizens. 
He  ought  not  to  fuffer  his  people  to  offend  other  national 
governments  or  their  citizensf 

The  faults  of  individuals  are  not  immediately  imputable  to 
the  rulers  of  nations. 

Governments  that  approve  or  ratify  the  aetions  of  their  ci- 
tizens againft  other  nations,  become  the  moral  caufe  of 
fuch  injuries,  and  confequently  aggreflbrs. 

An  offended  nation  that  has  the  private  perfon  who  has 
been  guilty  of  national  offence  in  its  power,  has  a  right 
to  compel  reparation  on  the  part  of  fuch  offender. 

National  governments  offend  others  if,  upon  reprefentation, 
they  refufe  juftice,  and  make  it  a  practice  to  connive  at 
the  robberies  and  plunders  committed  by  thofe  under 
their  authority. 

Vide  Vatel,  B.  ii.  chap.  6. 

Sch.  2. — There  are  no  principles  flowing  from  nature  which 
warrant  what  in  the  proper  fenfe  of  the  term  is  called 
revenge  amongft  nations.  Natural  juftice  extends  not 
farther  than  fatisfaction  and  fecurity.  Nations  acknow- 
ledge no  fuperior  tribunal  on  earth:  the  inflicting  of 
punifhment  is,  therefore,  an  unwarrantable  ufurpation 
of  power,  which  may  entitle  a  people  to  the  exercife  of 
national  ferocity,  Gothic  barbarity,  but  not  to  a  national 
right. 

Among  national  rulers,  the  fame  diftinction  holds 
good  between  a  breach  of  duty  and  between  injuries, 
which  takes  place  in  the  tranfactions  of  individuals  : 
want  of  refpecl  to  a  prince  is  therefore  very  far  from 
being  in  itfelf  a  national  injury.  It  may,  in  fome  in- 
ftances,  juftify  a  fimilar  behaviour,  a  certain  indifference 
and  coldnefs;  but  cannot  juftify  violent  meafures,  war 
and  bloodfhed,  wherein  thoufands  of  innocent  pcrfons 
become  involved.     Vide  p.  178,  ttt. 

There 


432  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY 

There  is  a  great  variety  of  national  injuries  -,  for  na-     ' 

tions  may  have  a  variety  of  things  and  rights  which 

are  their  own-,  and  there  are  inconceivable  actions, 

modes  and  ways  in  which  difturbances  may  take  place. 

Sck, — Perhaps  all  national  injuries  might  be  referred  to  thefe 
three  heads:  injuries  againft  perfons,  property  and  rights. 

As  nations  are  bound  to  abftain  from  all  injuries,  it 
follows,  that  they  are  facredly  bound  to  make  repara- 
tion, either  by  reftitution  or  fatisfaction. 

The  damages  refulting  from  national  injuries  may 
be  cafual  direct  and  indirect.     Vide  p.  185  and  186. 

When  a  nation  caufes  direct  damages  againft  another, 
the  latter  has  not  the  right  of  punifhment,  but  the 
right  of  requiring  particular  fecurity  againft  future  ma- 
chinations of  unnatural  malevolence*,  for,  as  has  been 
faid,  puniihment  is  contradictory  to  national  indepen- 
dence. 

Damages  may  be  alfo  diftinguifhed  into  great  and 
fmall,  with  refpect  to  the  effects  •,  but  in  themfelves  the 
internal  immorality  of  a  national  injury  is  to  be  efti- 
mated  by  the  ftandard  of  the  important  right  of  abfolute 
independence,  which  by  every  injurious  act  is  infringed. 

The  right  of  defence  implies  a  right  to  compel 
reparation ;  for  nations  have  a  right  to  avert  as  well  as 
to  repel  injuries.     lridep.  186. 

Nations,  however,  cannot  be  forced  to  exercife  any 
of  thefe  rights ;  for,  as  independent  bodies  politic,  they 
may  make  fuch  ufes  of  what  is  their  own  as  they  think 
proper. 

They  may  therefore  forbear  to  exercife,  or  even 
remit  their  right  of  defence,  by  a  public  declaration 
of  amneftv. 

Sch, 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  4^j 

ScL — It  is  a  queftion  of  another  nature,  whether,  in  fome 
cafes,  fuch  forbearance  comports  with  prudence  and  the 
duties  which  nations  owe  themfelves,  or  confifts  with 
that  humanity  which  one  nation  iliould  feel  for  the  fuf- 
ferings  and  fafety  of  another, 

"Whether  a  nation  chufes  to  remit  or  to  exercife  its 
right  of  defence,  no  third  nation  is  thereby  injured. 

In  the  profecution  of  the  right  of  defence,  a  neutral 
power  may  be  hurt  by  acts  of  the  profecutor-,  but  the 
injury  of  that  hurt  muft  be  charged  to  the  injurer. 

Sc/i. — What  has  been  obferved  with  refpect  to  the  beginning 
of  acts  of  violence  among  individuals,  perfectly  holds 
good  with  regard  to  national  governments;  that  is  to  fav, 
not  the  nation  which  commences  acts  of  hoftility,  bur. 
that  which  has  provoked  them  is  the  injurer,  the  aggref- 
for.      Vije  p.  187. 

Nations  have  but  a  limited  right  of  reparation  and 
defence :  no  more  violence  is  lawful  than  that  which 
is  fufficient  to  afford  fatisfaction  and  fecurity ;  neither 
are  acts  of  hoftility  entitled  to  any  further  continuance  5 
for  in  either  of  thefe  cafes  compuliion  and  defence 
would  be  deftitute  of  a  juft  caufe ;  the  defender  would 
confequently  become  guilty  of  an  aggreflion,  and  give 
the  original  aggreflbr  a  juft  right  for  defence,  as  far  as 
the  limits  of  a  juft  and  lawful  defence  are  exceeded. 
Vide  p.  187 — 192. 

Since  thefe  important  rights  depend  upon  a  juft 
caufe  for  their  exercife,  it  is  evident,  that  national  rulers 
ought  to  be  well  convinced  of  this  particular;  for  vio- 
lent meafures  among  nations  are  fo  dreadful  and  exten- 
sive in  their  effedfcs,  fo  complicated  in  their  nature,  that 
it  exceeds  the  power  of  conception  to  form  any  idea  of 
the  calamities  which  involve  the  lives,  the  rights,  the 
property,  the  domeftic  and  individual  comforts  of  In- 

K  k  k  numerable 


434  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

numerable  perfons  of  fuch  contending  nations.  The 
practice  of  engaging  unjuftly,  or  for  a  flight  offence,  in 
public  meafures  of  national  defence,  cannot  but  be  in- 
finitely heinous  and  criminal,  both  in  the  fight  of  God 
and  of  men. 

Sch.  i.— It  is  true,  rulers  of  nations  and  their  minifters  may 
do  infinitely  more  good  than  other  men,  becaufe  they  en- 
joy uncontroulable  powers  and  innumerable  opportuni- 
ties for  rendering  nations  happy :  but  it  is  alfo  true,  that 
the  temptations  to  make  an  improper  ufe  of  thofe  powers 
are  fo  many  and  fo  great,  that  the  fituation  of  fuch  men 
calls  more  for  pity  than  for  envy.  The  human  foul  re- 
volts at  the  fight  of  the  facrifices  which  are  daily  making  at 
the  fhrine  of  infatiable  and  boundlefs  ambition: — The 
hiftoric  page  exhibits  more  monfters  and  deftroyers  of 
mankind,  than  fathers  of  their  country,  gods  on  earth! 
Let  us  draw  a  veil  over  the  imperfections  of  men,  and  take 
a  leiTon  for  prudence  and  moderation,  which  beft  fait 
high  ftations  in  life,  and  conftitute  thegreateft  fplendour. 
and  glory  of  national  governments. 

Scfrt  2. — When  we  examine  the  dreadful  combination  of  pow- 
ers in  the  eaftern  hemifphere,  unnaturally  formed  for  what 
they  ftile  mutual  defence,  we  cannot  help  lamenting,  that 
among  the  reafons  are  mentioned,  humanity,  the  caufe 
of  order,  of  good  government,  of  morality,  of  religion, 
&c.  as  if  objects  of  this  nature  required  fuch  means  of 
violence,  or  could  in  any  fhape  juftify  unlawful  inter- 
ference in  what  is  an  independent  nation's  own  right. 

.Sch.  3. — The  unnatural  contempt  of  religion  on  the  part  of 
that  devoted  nation  which  has  been  the  object  of  their 
perfecution  may,  on  the  other  hand,  be  confidered  as  a 
temporary  mean  of  defence  againft  the  power  of  fuper- 
ftition,  and  that  ftrange  mode  of  fupporting  or  preaching 
up  morality;  but  a  profecution  of  fuch  ftrange  fenti- 
ments  muft  and  will  be  a  caufe  for  endlefs  feuds  and  ani- 
mosities, which  finally  end  in  diflblution.  A  nation 
without  religion,  what  is  it?  What  is  a  people,  warlike 
and  great,  that  declares  againft  it? 

-&7z.  4. — With  refpect  to  fuafory,  probable  or  pretended  caufes 
for  defence,  vide  p.  190  and  191. 

National 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  43£ 

National  defence  may  be  juft  with  refpect  to  its 
eaufe  or  caufes,  and  frill  unjuft  with  regard  to  th^ 
mode  in  which  it  is  conducted. 

Sch.  i. — A  defence  deftitute  of  a  juft  caufe  can  never  be  juft» 
though  it  be  conducted  in  the  bed  poffible  manner;  for 
in  itfelf  it  is  an  injury,  and  a  lawlefs  aggreflion. 

Sck*  i. — The  prefent  conteft  between  the  combined  powers 
and  France  exhibits,  on  the  part  of  the  former,  with  few 
exceptions,  infhnces  of  regularly  conducted  defence, 
whilft  the  latter  have  frequently  tranfgrefTed;  witnefs  the 
mode  in  which  they  forced  the  fpeedy  furrender  of  polls 
and  garrifons. 

A  juft  defence  muft  be  carried  on,  fo  that  the  means 
be  lawful  and  lawfully  ufed-,  for  nothing  can  be  juft 
that  is  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  natural  laws. 

Nations  may  not  make  ufe  of  anamination,  poifon- 
ing  or  perjury  \  means  which  in  themfelves  defeat  all 
poftibility  of  fecurity.     Vide  p.  193. 

All  other  means  for  repelling  an  invaflon,  compel- 
ling reparation,  or  guarding  againft  aggreflion,  are 
lawful,  if  ufed  with  as  much  humanity  as  poffible, 
and  not  further  than  the  right  of  defence  extends. 

$ck.  1. — Among  the  lawful  means  of  defence  are  reckoned  fol- 
diersand  otScers;  a  regular,  well  difciplined  militia:  they 
are  inftruments  in  the  hands  of  the  national  rulers  to  ex- 
ecute the  public  will  of  the  national  fovereignty.  This 
ftate  is  lawful  on  the  part  of  the  ruled;  nay,  their  duty, 
their  birth-right,  and  their  greatefi;  glory,  when  they  are 
employed  for  the  defence  of  their  country;  but  men  who 
are  inftruments  of  ambition,  who  are  fent  upon  conqueft, 
or  given  to  hire,  who  fight  for  no  object  but  their  pay, — 
how  degrading  their  condition!  how  little  comporting 
with  the  dignity  of  human  nature!  and  how  inconfiftent 
with  a  lawful  exercife  of  rights  in  perfons! 
We  wave  entering  into  the  minutiae  of  fubfidies,  auxiliaries, 
&c.  becaufe  nations  have  fuffered  their  affairs  to  become 
preternatural;  affairs  which  muft  be  fupported  by  reme- 
dies of  the  fame  (lamp  and  nature. 


436  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sch.  2. — There  are  other  means  for  national  defence  of  an 
inanimate  nature,  which  are  always  and  in  themfelves 
means  for  defence  and  war;  as,  arms  of  all  kinds;  gun- 
powder, with  its  ingredients,  and  tools  and  implements  ne^- 
cefTary  for  carrying  on  expeditions,  for  {landing  a  fiege, 
or  profecuting  effectually  the  operation  of  defence.  Add 
to  thefe,  fhips  of  war  and  the  materials  for  building  and 
equipping  them,  tents,  foldiers'  cloth,  fortifications,  &c. 

Sch.  3. — Likewife,  provifions  of  all  kinds,  live-flock,  horfes, 
&c.  though  they  are  reckoned  innocent  in  peace,  may, 
■under  circumftanees,  become  means  of  defence  and  war: 
when  by  the  one  an  army  is  fupported,  by  the  other  it 
ii  enabled  to  take  the  field.  When  a  place  is  blockaded 
or  beiieged,  live-ftock  and  provifions  enable  the  defen- 
ders to  hold  out.  Other  things,  as,  waggons,  horfes,  &c. 
ferve  to  facilitate  the  movements  and  various  operations 
of  defence  and  war. 

There  are  cafes  where  a  nation  comes  under  a  ftate 
of  abfolute  or  extreme  necefTity, — where  the  outrageous 
behaviour  of  an  aggreffor  or  invader  renders  neceffary 
the  ufe  of  means  for  defence,  which  in  no  other  ftate 
would  be  lawful. 

This  leads  to  a  confederation  of  the  nature  of  the 
laws  of  retaliation,  of  retortion,  and  of  reprifals,  and 
the  objects  of  them. 

By  retaliation  we  underftand  public   proceedings, 

whereby  an  unreafonable  and  outrageous  aggreflbr  is 

made  to  fufFer  exactly  fo  much  evil  as  he  has  done. 

Sch.  1. — If  an  ao-g-refTor  burns  towns,  vvantonlv  maltreats  and 
so  >  '        .  r    . 

unjuflly  detains  the  perfons,  or  deftroys  the  lives  of  ci- 
tizens, facrifices  their  property,  &c. 

Sch.  2. — Thefe  are  cafes  where  the  injurer  tranfgrefTes  the  law 
of  nature,  and  a  queition  arifes,  whether  unlawful  pro- 
ceedings of  one  nation  jultify  another  to  proceed  to 
public  acts  of  injuftice? 

Sch.  3. — The  principles  of  natural  juftice  declare  againft  this 
mode  of  defence,  except  in  cafes  of  abfolute  neceffity,  of 
which  the  common  faying  holds  good,  mcejjityhas  no  law* 

There 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY,.  437 

There  is  a  pollibiiity  for  a  nation  to  do  itfelf  juftice, 
by  exerciftng  the  right  of  reparation,  in  feizing  on  the 
things  that  belong  to  the  injurious  nation,  and  retain- 
ing them  until  jure  fatisfaction  is  made. 

Likewife,  the  aggrefled  nation  may  take  from  the 
nation  guilty  of  aggremon  thofe  privileges  which  it 
enjoys  in  the  dominions  of  the  former. 

The  law  of  retortion  entitles  a  national  fovereign  to 
treat  the  fubjedts  of  another  in  the  fame  manner  as  the 
latter  treats  the  citizens  of  the  former. 

Reprifals  are  ufed  between  nation  and  nation  to  do 
juftice  to  themfelves,  when  they  cannot  otherwife  ob^ 
tain  it.  If  a  nation  takes  pofTemon  of  what  belongs  to 
another,  or  refufes  to  pay  a  debt,  repair  an  injury,  &c. 
the  other  may  feize  and  apply  to  its  own  ufe  any  thing 
that  belongs  to  the  nation  thus  afrgreflihg,  and  may 
proceed  in  this  manner  till  it  has  obtained  full  com- 
penfatlon  for  intercft  and  damage  •,  or  it  may  retain  the 
property  fo  feized  as  a  pledge  till  ample  fatisfaclion  has 
been  made. 

Sch.  i. — Effects  feized  mull  be  preferved  while  there  is  any 
hope  of  obtaining  fatisfaction  or  juftice. 
As  foon  as  that  hope  is  loft,  they  are  confifcated,  and  then 
the  reprifals  are  accomplished.  This  takes  place  upon  a 
rupture  between  nations  and  the  commencement  of  hof- 
tilities. 

Sch.  2. — Reprifals  are  only  allowed  by  the  law  of  nations  upon 
a  caufe  that  is  evidently  juft,  or  for  a  debt  that  is  extreme- 
ly clear. 
No  force  can  be  lawfully  applied  by  a  nation,  without 
knowing  whether  the  other  is  or  is  not  difpofed  to  do  it 
juftice. 

ScA.  3. — Room  is  likewife  left  for  reprifals  where  an  adverfary 
refufes  the  means  of  bringing  the  right  to  proof,  or  art- 
fully evades  it, 

The 


43*  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  objects  of  reprifals  are  either  the  public  pro- 
perty of  the  nation,  or  that  which  belongs  to  the  pri- 
vate citizens  thereof. 

An  exception  muft  be  made  as  to  things  which  arc 
a  depofit  trufted  to  the  public  faith  -,  for  the  confi- 
dence placed  in  the  public  faith  of  a  nation  ought  to 
be  refpecled  even  in  cafe  of  an  open  war. 

Government  ought  to  indemnify  its  citizens  who 
fuffer  by  reprifals. 

The  fovereign  alone  can  order  reprifals. 

Reprifals  cannot  be  lawfully  granted  in  favour  of 
foreigners  *,  for  a  nation  has  no  right  to  fet  itfelf  up  as 
a  judge  between  other  nations. 

If  private  perfons  have  given  room  for  juft  reprifals, 
they  ought  to  be  compelled  by  their  governments  to 
recompence  thofe  on  whom  fuch  reprifals  are  made. 

Juftice  is  denied  by  a  refufal  to  hear  complaints — by 
not  admitting  fubjecls  to  eftablifh  their  rights  before 
the  ordinary  tribunals — by  affecled  delays — by  a  judg- 
ment manifeftly  partial  and  unjuft,  8rc. 

Nations  may  detain  the  citizens  of  one  another  by 
way  of  reprifals,  and  not  releafe  them  until  fatisfaclion 
is  received.  Reprifals  of  this  kind  extend  not  to  life  or 
corporal  pain  *,  for  fuch  proceedings  are  the  efFedls  of 
retaliation,  and  only  allowable  in  a  ftate  of  abfolute 
neceflity. 

When  a  nation  makes  juft  reprifals,  it  profecutes  its 
own  right,  commits  no  national  injury,  and  gives  not 
a  juft  caufe  for  war.  Vide  Vatel — Law  of  Nat.  B.  ii. 
chap.  1 8. 

CHAPTER 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  439 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Of  public  war. 


v, 


IOLENT  public  defence  is  fo  nearly  allied  to 
public  war,  that  nothing  more  is  required  to  conftitute 
the  latter  than  for  the  former  to  become  reciprocal. 

Public  war,  therefore,  may  be  defined  to  be  that  ftate 
where  national  rulers  reciprocally  refort  to  the  exercife 
of  what  really  is,  or  is  deemed  the  right  of  public 
defence :  it  is  that  ftate  in  which  nations  commit  vio- 
lence againft  one  another,  determined  to  repel  force  by 
force,  in  the  name  and  by  the  order  of  the  public 
power. 

Public  peace,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  defirable  ftate 
of  nations,  where  no  reciprocal  injuries  have  taken 
place — where  no  nation  is  looked  upon  as  an  aggrefibr, 
and  where  every  one  abftains  from  acts  of  violence. 

$ch. — For  further  elucidations  on  this  fubjecT:,  vide  p.  196 — 
199,  with  this  exception,  that  what  there  applies  to  the 
conduct  of  individual  perfons,  is  to  be  taken  in  reference 
to  nations  and  national  rulers. 

Nations  have  a  natural  right  of  making  war,  if  there 
is  no  other  remedy  left  for  repelling  an  unjuft  aggref- 
fion  •,  that  is  to  fay,  if  they  cannot  without  it  enjoy  peace 
and  fecurity ;  for  the  natural  rights  of  a  nation  cannot 
be  defeated  by  the  lawlefs  reflftance  of  an  aggrerTor :  if 
this  were  the  cafe,  there  would  be  no  moral  poftibility 
for  government  to  direel  what  is  a  nation's  own  to  the 
attainment  and  advancement  of  its  public  happinefs :  a 
tame  fubmiftion  on  the  part  of  rulers  of  nations  would 

confequentlv 


440  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

confequently  be  a  conduct  contradictory  to  the  firfl 
principle  of  the  law  of  nature.  Hence  it  follows,  that 
it  is  fo  far  from  being  naturally  unlawful  for  nations, 
under  fuch  circumftances,  to  make  war,  that,  on  the 
contrary,  it  is  their  public  duty  fo  to  do,  whenever  ano- 
ther nation  unjuftly  and  malicioufiy  difturbs  the  free 
enjoyment  and  lawful  exercife  of  their  natural  right  of 
abfolute  eciuality. 

It  is  evident  from  the  nature  of  national  indepen- 
dence, and  the  natural  relation  of  nations,  by  which 
they  are  focieties  of  fellow  men,  fellow  citizens  of  the 
world,  that  each  mould  enjoy  its  own,  undifturbed  by 
any  power  or  authority  on  earth  ;  that  is  to  fay,  live 
in  peace  and  fecurity.  The  right,  therefore,  which  a 
nation  has  for  the  enjoyment  of  public  peace  and  fecu- 
rity, is  abfolutely  natural  and  infeparable  from  the 
national  fovereignty  of  ftates. 

But  it  is  otherwife  with  refpect  to  the  rights  of  vio- 
lent defence  and  war;  they  pre-fuppofe  fome  facts  or 
public  acts  on  the  part  of  other  nations,  to  wit,  inter- 
ference or  diiturbance  in  thofe  things  which  are  at  the 
free  difpofa!  of  a  nation  for  the  ends  of  its  political  ex- 
igence, profperity  and  independence.  The  natural  fcate 
of  nations,  therefore,  is  not  a  ftate  of  war,  but  a  mate 
of  peace.     Vide  p.  199  and  200. 

From  the  nature  of  the  rights  of  peace  and  of  war 
it  is  evident,  that  no  right  of  public  war  can  take  place 
without  previous  difturbance,  of  which  a  national  go- 
vernment is  in  fome  mode  or  other  the  moral  caufe; 
for,  where  there  is  not  a  national  injury  either  actual  or 
impending,  there  can  be  no  room  for  the  public  exercife 
of  the  rights  of  compulfion,  reparation  or  defence. 

That 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  441 

That  war  is  juft  which  has  a  juft  caufe  and  is  juftly 
conducted :  public  war,  on  the  contrary,  is  unjuft  ^  when, 
it  is  deftitute  of  a  juft  caufe,  conducted  in  an  unjuft 
manner,  or  protracted  to  an  unlawful  extent. 

A  war  which  really  proceeds  from  a  juft  caufe,  that 
is,  from  a  national  injury  and  disturbance,  may  become 
unjuft  with  rgfpect  to  the  mode,  manner  and  extent  of 
its  being  conducted. 

An  unjuft  war  may  be  juftly  conducted;  that  is,  the 

proper  mode  and  manner  preferved  which  comport 

with  the  limited  and  reftricted  rights  of  compulfion 

and  violent  defence,  or  are  fanctioned  by  the  cuftoms 

and  practices  of  the  civilized  nations  of  the  earth  •,  but 

being  founded  on  an  unjuft  caufe,  can  never  become 

juft. 

Sch. — What  has  juft  been  faid  of  the  various  caufes  of  defence, 
and  what  is  remarked  of  wars  deftitute  of  juft  or  refting 
upon  fuafory  caufes,  in  the  feveral  fcholia  at  the  bottom, 
of  page  200  and  in  the  beginning  of  page  201,  is  fully 
applicable  to  the  public  wars  of  nations. 

Acts  of  aggreftion  ought  to  be  very  well  afcertained, 

left  nations  become  guilty  of  inexpreftible  mifchief — of 

tranfgreffion  againft  the  dictates  of  natural  law — of  re- 
ts O 

bellion  againft  God., 

As  foon  as  acts  of  mutual  violence  or  hoftility  are 
begun,  or  war  is  declared,  the  nations  at  war,  that  is, 
the  aggrefTor  as  well  as  the  aggreffed,  are  ftiled  hojliis 
enemies, 

Sch.  1. — Hoflile  enemies  muft  be  diftinguifhed  from  thofethat 

bear  us  ill  will. 
Sch.  2.— That  nations  are  not  hoftile  enemies  is  not  a  fuffkient 

proof  that  they  are  friends  and  well  winters. 
Sch.  3. — There  is  no  fuch  thing  amongft  nations  as  natural 

enemies;  for  if  their  territories,  their  commerce,  &t\  tH 
J,  1  1  fa 


44^  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY". 

fo  fituated  that  interference,  or  what  is  called  rivalj/rip, 
mav  eafiiv  take  place,  there  is  no  caufe  why  they  fhould 
injure  or  hate  one  another;  on  tSe  contrary,  filch  fitua- 
tions  are  forcible  reafons  why  they  ihould  cultivate  a  good 
iiiulerfUnding,  harmony  and  peace. 

Acts  of  hoftility  mould  always  be  preceded  by  a 
formal  declaration  of  war ;  becaufe,  national  wars  teem 
with  innumerable  calamities,  in  which  private  perfons, 
even  the  citizens  of  neutral  powers,  are  involved : — r 
Befides,  according  to  the  principles  of  nature,  violence 
cannot  be  lawfully  made  ufe  of,  till  other  means  have 
been  found  ineffectual  for  preventing  an  open  rupture. 

The  diflinction  of  war  itato  defennve  and  offenfivc, 
has  reference  to  the  caufe  as  well  as  to  the  operations 
of  a  war. — For  further  particulars  concerning  this 
different  relation — for  fatisfying  the  enquiry,  whether 
an  offenfive  war  may  be  jvtft?  and  for  determining 
concerning  the  changes  of  operations,  vide  p.  201  and 
202,  together  with  the  fcholia  I,  2  and  3  of  the  lad 
mentioned  page. 

How  nations  are  bound  to  cultivate  peace  as  long 
as  poflible ;  when  and  under  what  circumftances  they 
mould  make  refiftance  •,  how  and  by  what  means  they 
ought  to  endeavour  to  gain  the  good  will  of  a  nation  that 
is  not  favourably  inclined;  what  care  and  prudence  are 
nece/Iarv,  that  preparations  for  putting  themfelves  into 
a  proper  ftate  of  defence  or  that  forming  alliances  pro- 
voke not  acts  of  aggrefiion,  upon  the  principle  of  an 
intended  or  impending  injury,  fo  that  no  pretext  may 
be  given  for  exercinng  the  right  of  defence, — may  be 
collected  from  what  has  been  explained  heretofore,  un- 
der the  chapter  of  the  rights  of  defence  and  of  war, 
particularly  pages  202  and  203,  with  the  two  fubfe- 
quent  fcbolia,  which  begin  page  204. 

The 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  44J 

The  rights  of  war  are  naturally  limited  by  the  rights 
of  reparation  and  fecurity. 

A  nation  at  war  with  another  has  a  right  to  make  ufe  of 
all  things  which  are  natural,  direct  and  necerTary  means 
for  the  fecurity  of  national  felicity  and  independence. 
That  right  extends  to  all  manner  of  violence  by  which 
the  power  of  the  enemy  may  be  weakened,  the  adver- 
sary rendered  unable  to  make  further  refrftahce,  and  in- 
duced to  confent  to  equitable  terms  of  peace-,  except, 
as  has  already  been  obferved,  acts  of  violence  unnatural 
in  themfelves,  as,  poifoning,  aftafiinatiqn  and  perjury  : 
for  it  is  a  nation's  natural  right  to  enjoy  its  own,  un- 
diflurbed  by  another,  and  to  live  in  a  ftate  of  external 
fecurity.  As  long  as  a  hoftile  enemy  is  able  to  carry 
on  thz  war  with  vigour,  he  will  continue  his  refinance, 
and  that  fecurity  cannot  be  expecled;  but  when  de- 
prived of  the  means,  when  weakened  to  that  extreme 
that  he  cannot  profecute  his  views  with  vigour,  he  will 
confent  to  terms  ot  pacification,  and  the  nation  which 
has  been  the  cbjccT;  of  profecution  will  enjoy  that  peace 
and  fecurity  without  which  a  community  cannot  be 
happy. 

All  violent  meafures,  though  they  be  naturally  law- 
ful in  themfelves,  become  unlawful  when  they  are  not 
necerTary  for  obtaining  jute  reparation  and  full  fecurity. 

With  refpecl  to  the  perfons  and  things  which  natu- 
rally come  under  the  right  cf  war,  the  cufiomary  law  of 
nationsdeterrnir.es  hi  detail,  and  extends  that  right  to 
all  perfons  and  to1  all  public  and  private  property  of  the 
enemy :  but  the  principles  of  natural  law  determine  ac- 
cording to  this  maxim,  thai  it  is  neither  wife  nor  lawful 
to  make  ufe  of  means  which  are  not  abfolutely  and  dire 51  ly 
necejfary  for  obtaining  a  lawful  endy  particularly  in  cafes 

wl 


444  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

where  fuch  means  are  grievous  in  their  operation,  and. 
where  they  affett  the  innocent  as  well  as  the  guilty. 

Upon  the  flrength  of  thefe  principles  we  make  a  dis- 
tinction between  perfons  and  things  which  come  under 
the  right  of  war  in  a  direct  and  in  an  indirect  manner. 

Perfons  and  things  which  come  under  the  right  of 
war  in  a  direct  manner  are, — perfons  in  arms,  belong- 
ing to  the  army  and  public  force  of  the  enemy •,  war- 
like (lores,  ammunition,  magazines,  fortifications,  fhips 
of  war,  &c.  in  a  word,  all  things  which  are  the  principal 
among  thofe  that  the  cuftom  of  nations  has  (lamped 
with  the  appellation  of  contraband  goods. 

Things  of  an  enemy  thus  coming  directly  under  tliQ 

right  of  war,  are  liable  to  feizure  and  appropriation, 

and,  if  thefe  expedients  are  impoffible  or  inconvenient, 

even  to  defrruction. 

Sck.—- Such  as  are  the  property  of  fubjects  of  neutrrJ  powers 
are  liable  to  feizure,  and,  upon  adjudication  confonant  to 
the  cuftomary  laws  of  nations,  may  be  appropriated. 

How  far  the  right  of  war  affects  the  life  of  perfons 
who  bear  arms  or  are  part  of  the  enemy's  active  force, 
cannot  be  determined  with  preciiion,  unlefs  we  diftiri- 
guim  the  various  ftages  and  other  circumftances  at- 
tending the  operations  of  War. 

In  an  engagement,  that  is  to  fay,  in  that  ftate  where 
enemies  actually  contend  for  victory,  the  right  of  war 
extends  to  the  life  of  perfons  in  arms,  if  there  is  no 
other  mean  to  obtain  fecurity  and  to  fatisfy  the  duty 
of  felf-prefervation ;  for  during  that  period  the  parties 
are  h\  a  Mate  of  abfolute  or  extreme  neceflity. 

When  victory  is  obtained,  and  perfons  furrender 
thcmfelves,  the  right  of  war  dees  net  extend  to  life, 

if 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  445 

if  fecurity  can  be  obtained  by  confining  the  conquered 
as  prifoners. 

Perfons  who  do  no'  bear  arms,  do  not  come  directly 
under  the  right  of  war;  their  lives  ought  to  be  (pared, 
and  their  perfons  protected :  but  they  may  be  fecured, 
either  by  imprifonment  or  by  oath  of  temporary  alle- 
giance, as  the  fecurity  of  the  aclverfary  renders  the  one 
or  the  other  necefiary.  To  treat  women  and  children, 
aged  perfons,  &c.  with  fe  verity,  or  unneceilarily  to 
moleft  them,  is  confequentiy  naturally  unjuft  and  bar- 
barous. 

Private  property,  or  public  buildings  and  public 
records,  are  entitled  to  protection,  if  a  contrary  pro- 
cedure is  not  abfolutely  neceilary  for  profecuting  the 
war  or  enjoying  fecurity. 

Nations  who  take  no  part  in  the  war  of  belligerent 
powers,  and  favour  no  party  more  than  another,  ab- 
ftaining  from  all  interference,  except  that  they  equally 
tender  their  good  offices  for  a  reconciliation,  are  {tiled 
neutral  power  s^  and  as  fuch  are  entitled  to  the  right  of 
neutrality,  which  extends  to  the  government  as  well  as 
to  the  people  under  its  controul,  and  entitles  them  to 
the  free  enjoyment  of  their  independency  and  of  their 
lawful  occupations,  commerce,  &c. 

As  long  as  a  neutral  nation  and  its  citizens  obferve 
ftricl  neutrality,  fo  long  their  perfons  and  property  do 
not  come  under  the  right  of  war. 

Neutral  powers  have  a  right  to  protect  their  citizens 
in  the  enjoyment  of  the  right  of  neutrality:  they  are 
in  duty  bound  to  enjoin  on  them  a  forbearance  from 
acts  of  partiality,  whereby  either  of  the  belligerent 
parties  may  be  injured :  they  ought  to  prohibit  the  fup- 
plying  either  party  with  contraband  goods,  &c. 

Provifions 


44^  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Provisions  carried  by  the  fubjedls  of  a  neutral  power 
to  a  place  befieged  or  blockaded,  forfeit  the  right  of 
neutrality;  and  fuch  goods,  perhaps  the  vefiels  alfo, 
become  juftly  liable  to  feizure  and  confifcation  by  the 
power  that  carries  on  the  fiege  or  has  inftituted  the 
blockade. 

Neutral  powers  may  involve  themfeives  in  war  when 
their  governments  favour  one  party  more  than  another, 
without  a  juft  and  preponderating  caufe. 

Nations  which  are  bound  by  alliances  previous  to  a 
rupture  between  belligerent  powers,  cannot  be  compel- 
led to  break  through  their  public  engagements  :  they 
confequently  remain  neutral,  if  they  do  not  exceed  the 
clear  and  pointed  ftipulations  of  fuch  previous  treaties. 


CHAPTER  X. 

Of  the  rights  of  the  victor. 

Y  viSiory  we  underftand  that  ftate  between  con- 
tending forces,  wherein  one  party  is  fo  far  reduced  as  to 
be  incapable  of  making  farther  refiftance. 

When  engagements  are  decifive,  they  will  end  in  the 
victory  of  the  fortunate  party,  who,  as  victor,  has  cer- 
tain rights  over  the  vanquished  in  his  power-,  which 
rights,  though  in  themfeives  the  natural  refult  of  war, 
may  with  propriety,  and  for  the  fake  of  perfpicuity,  be 
called  the  rights  of  the  viclor. 

In  order  to  determine  the  rights  of  the  viclor,  a  dif- 
tinction  is  to  be  obferved  between  temporary  and  final 
vitlory :  the  former  ends  particular  engagements,  and 

in 


moral  philosophy:.'  447 

in  the  courfe  of  a  war  is  often  changing  fides-,  but  the 
latter  puts  an  end  to  the  farther  profecution  of  acts  of 
hoftility,  and  generally  induces  both  parties  to  make 
peace. 

The  rights  of  a  victor  during  and  after  an  engage- 
ment do  not  extend  to  the  lives  of  the  vanquifhed  in 
his  power,  if  in  any  poffible  mode  he  can  put  himfelf 
in  a  ftate  of  fecurity :  for  farther  effufion  of  blood  would 
be  deftitute  of  a  juft  caufe. 

The  victor  may  keep  the  vanquimed  prifoners -,  he 
may  confine,  enlarge  or  parole  them,  as  his  own  fafety 
requires  or  admits. 

Prifoners  ought,  therefore,  to  be  protected  againft 
abufe  and  unneceflary  rigour,  and  fupplied  with  provi- 
fions :  humanity  requires  their  fituation  to  be  made  as 
eafy  as  poftible,  confident  with  the  fafety  of  the  victor. 

The  victor  has  the  right  to  fecure  himfelf  againft  all 
thofe  perfons  of  his  adverfary  who  have  not  borne 
arms ;  as,  infants,  women,  aged  perfons,  &C. 

In  cafe  of  final  victory,  the  victor  has  all  thofe  rights 
again  ft  his  adverfary,  both  with  refpect  to  perfons  and 
things,  which  flow  from  and  are  warranted  by-  the 
rights  of  reparation,  defence  and  fecurity. 

If  thefe  rights  are  fatisfied,  and  the  national  injuries 
ceafe — if  the  damages  are  repaired,  and  the  victor  en- 
joys fecurity, — there  is  no  longer  a  juft  caufe  for  war: 
farther  hoftilities  confequently  become  naturally  unlaw- 
ful, and  the  victor  ought  to  confent  to  equitable  terms 
of  peace:  becaufe,  it  is  the  nature  of  a  juft  war  to  be 
abfolutely  neceflary  for  the  enjoyment  of  fecurity  and 
peace-,  and  the  fcope  of  lawful  proceedings  is,  that 
thereby  thefe  deferable  ends  may  be  obtained  and  fe- 
cured. 


448  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

3d. — Other  things  concerning  the  facilitating  meafures.  for 
moderating  the  calamities  of  war,  and  for  propofing  terms 
of  capitulations  and  pacifications — for  concluding  truces 
and  armiftices — fcr  complaining  againft  outrages^  accord- 
ing to  the  cuftoms  of  nations,  &c.  by  trumpeters,  flags  of 
truce,  &c.  come  properly  under  the  cuuomary  law  of  na* 
tions,  and  are  not  eflential  to  the  i  abject  of  this  treatife. 


CHAPTER  XL 

Of  national  intercourfe. 


1  ROM  the  natural  rights  and  duties  of  nations  to 
one  another  hitherto  explained,  it  is  evident,  that  na- 
tions are  often  under  a  neceflity  to  tranfacl:  public  affairs 
with  one  another :  there  ought,  therefore,  to  be  perfect 
liberty  for  each  nation  to  lay  before  others  its  requefts, 
complaints,  and  other  public  concerns  for  its  own  pros- 
perity and  fecurity. 

This  natural  libertv,  which  is  efTential  to  the  ftate  of 
abfolute  equality,  is  filled  the  right  of  national  inter courfe. 

As  it  is  inconvenient  for  national  governments  to 
meet  together,  and  impoilible  for  the  mafs  of  the  peo- 
ple to  hold  fuch  an  intercourfe,  it  appears,  that  the 
only  mean  left  is,  that  perfons  be  publicly  delegated, 
and  fent  to  tranfacl:  the  public  bufinefs  of  the  nation 
with  the  government  of  the  other. 

Since  perfons  (ti\t  for  managing  the  public  affairs  of 
a  nation  with  the  government  of  another  bear  the  ge- 
neral name  of  legates ,  it  follows,  that  the  rights  to 
fend  and  to  receive  legates  are  exclufive  rights  of  na- 
tional fovereignty,  which,  in  times  of  internal  peace,  is 
always  lodged  in  the  national  government,    but  often 

becomes 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  44.9 

becomes  doubtful,  when  a  revolution  is  taking  place, 

and  the  national  controul  afTumed  by  one  part  of  the 

people  and  contended  by  the  other. 

Sck. — In  cafes  of  unavoidable  neceflity,  the  ruling  party  may 
be  confidered  as  the  perfons  who  exercife  national  fove- 
reignty. 

When  a  legate  is  fent  by  one  nation,  it  becomes  a 
duty  on  the  part  of  that  to  which  he  is  fent  to  receive 
him. 

The  perfon  of  a  legate  is  facred  and  inviolable  •,  for 
he  tranfacts  the  concerns  of  an  independent  nation,  is 
its  public  minifter,  and  in  fome  way  or  other  its  repre- 
fentative. 

The  inviolability  of  a  legate  chiefly  imports  liberty 
of  fpeech,  fecurity  of  perfon,  and  the  particular  privi- 
lege of  not  being  amenable  to  the  laws  of  the  land. 

Thefe  public  rights  of  a  legate  flow  from  the  prin- 
ciples of  nature,  and  from  the  very  nature  of  the  public 
bufinefs  of  nations,  both  with  refpecl  to  the  one  which 
fends  him,  and  that  to  which  he  is  fent:  becaufe,  the 
public  concerns  of  nations  involve  obligations  fo  high 
and  important,  that  in  cafes  of  collifion  inferior  obliga- 
tions muft  give  way. 

If  a  legate  behaves  improperly  or  injurioufly  to  the 

nation  to  which  he  is  fent,  fuch  nation  has  no  right  to 

puniih  him,  but  can  defire  his  recall  and  demand  fatii- 

faction  from  his  principal. 

ScL — In  cafe  of  abfolute  neceflity,  the  principles  of  nature 
warrant  the  imprifonment  or  fafe-keeping  of  an  injurious 
legate;  for  in  that  ftate  a  nation  has  a  right  to  fecure  itfelf 
even  againft  the  nation  which  fent  him. 

If  a  nation  refufes  compliance  with  the  juft  demands 
gf  another  concerning  the  infults  or  other  injuries  of 

M  m  m  its 


450  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

its  public  minifter,  the  latter  has  a  right  to  confider 

fuch  refufal  as  an  injury  directly  proceeding  from  the 

government  which  fuch  injurious  delegate  reprefents. 

Sck. — The  treatment  of  delegates  and  their  behaviour  may 
consequently  become  means  for  involving  nations  in  vio- 
lent meafures  of  defence  and  war. 

The  privileges  of  a  delegate  being  fo  great,  his  mif- 
fion  and  reception  fo  important,  and  the  bufinefs  itfelf 
intruded  to  him  of  national  confequence  -,  it  is  evident, 
that  no  perfon  can  have  a  jufh  claim  to  the  character  of 
a  legate,  who  is  not  furnifhed  with  and  who  does  not 
produce  fufficient  documents,  which  accredit  and  teftify 
his  public  miflion.  Such  documents  have  obtained  the 
name  of  credentials.  Legates  mult  therefore  have  fuf- 
ficient credentials,  and  produce  them,  before  they  have 
any  right  to  the  privileges  which  appertain  to  a  public 
minifter  at  the  court  of  a  fovereign  nation. 

The  cuftomory  law  of  nations  has  introduced  various 
and  different  characters,  and  applies  different  appella- 
tions expreflive  of  them,  to  public  minifters,  who,  as 
fuch,  have  equal  rights  with  refpect  to  the  object  of  their 
million,  which  is  the  management  of  the  public  concerns 
of  their  principals ;  but,  according  to  thofe  diftinctions, 
they  have  a  different  rank  among  the  public  minifters 
of  other  nations  at  courts  where  they  refide. 

St-L  i. — Legates,  according  to  thefediftin&ions,  are  filled  am- 
bajj'adors,.  minifters,  envoys,  charges  des  affairs,  re.Jidents,  &c. 

ScL  2. — Confuls  have  to  attend  to  the  commercial  interefls  of 
the  people :  they  are  confequently  public  perfons  ap- 
pointed and  fent  by  government ;  but  as  they  do  not  tranf- 
act  the  affairs  of  national  fovereignty,  they,  as  public  per- 
fons, are  entitled  to  certain  rights  and  privileges,  but  not 
to  the  inviolability  of  legates. 

CHAPTER 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  45  I 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Of  the  hypothetical  natural  rights  of  nations  with  refpett 

to  treaties. 


N. 


ATIONS  enjoying  abfolute  independence  have 
naturally  no  other  affirmative  rights  in  one  another, 
than  thofe  which  are  of  imperfect  obligation.  All  their 
natural  perfect  rights  are  negative  -,  they  muft  not  injure 
one  another,  and  are  bound  to  give  every  one  its  own. 
If,  therefore,  they  would  obtain  perfect  affirmative 
rights  in  one  another,  they  muft  do  it  by  Lawful  acqui- 
fition,  founded  on  a  juft  title  and  refulting  from  a  lawful 
mode,  by  which  rights  in  things  or  in  perfons  may  be 
acquired. 

There  being  three  modes  of  lawful  acquiiition,  to 
wit,  by  forfeiture,  law,  and  pact ;  it  follows,  that  na- 
tions have  perfect  affirmative  rights  in  one  another,  ei- 
ther when  injuries  and  damages  are  committed,  or  when 
their  right  of  equality  is  infringed-,  or  they  obtain  fuch 
rights  by  the  dictates  of  natural  law,  if  a  contrary  con- 
duct would  prove  to  be  an  injury  and  caufe  damages: 
for  inftance;  if  a  nation,  fired  by  ambition,  attacks 
without  caufe,  folely  from  motives  of  aggrandifement 
and  conqueft,  a  neighbouring  power,  there  is  fofficient 
caufe  for  a  nation  to  confult  its  own  fafety,  and  to  in/iff. 
on  the  treipafler's  forbearance;  and,  in  cafe  fuch  claim 
of  right  is  flighted,  it  has  the  further  right  to  join  and 
aftift  its  neighbour,  and  to  make  a  common  caufe  with 
him  again  ft  that  nation,  which  muft  beconfidered  as  a 
common  enemy,  nay,  as  an  enemy  to  mankind. 


452  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

«SV//.— The  rights  of  forfeiture  and  law  are  the  foundation  of 
the  rights  of  defence  and  war. 

But  a  milder  and  more  humane  mode  by  which  a 
nation  may  acquire  perfect  affirmative  rights  in  another, 
is  the  mode  of  acquisition  by  pact. 

Pads  among  nations  are  ftiled  treaties. 

Treaties  are  concluded  by  the  national  fovereigns, 
or  by  means  of  public  perfons,  fpecifically  veiled  with 
mandatary  powers  given  for  fuch  a  purpofe. 

Treaties  comprehend  promife,  confent,  acceptance,, 
transfer. 

In  treaties,  the  promife  and  confent  muft  be  both 
lav/ful  and  fair ;  the  acceptance  and  transfer  explicit  and 
well  ascertained:  no  ambiguities  mould  find  place;  no 
ftrefs  mould  be  laid  upon  certain  modes  of  leaving  room 
for  different  interpretation  and  difputes  concerning  the 
cafus  foderis.  Proceedings  of  this  nature  mould  be  far 
from  the  rulers,  and  are  derogatory  to  the  dignity  of 
nations. 

In  all  things  where  an  actual  collifion  takes  place, 
prior  treaties  fuperiede  thofe  of  fubfequent  date. 

Sen.  i. — It  is  a  great  queftion,  whether  treaties  are  for  the  ad- 
vancement of  the  happinefs  of  mankind,  or  for  the  good 
of  a  nation? 

Sen.  i. — -To  determine  this  queftion,  we  have  to  obferve  two 
things:  firfi:,  that  nations,  upon  the  ftrength  of  the  duties 
of  humanity,  owe  one  another  friendship,  afTiftance  and 
mutual  good  offices;  and  that  felf-intereft  will  forcibly 
prompt  rulers  to  Sincerity  as  much  as  can  be  expected  or 
is  commonly  experienced  from  them :  fecondly,  that  by 
each  treaty,  nations  part  with  feme  rights  of  abfolute  in- 
dependence. 

Sch.  3.— -Perhaps  it  may  be  objefted,  that  they  gain  more  by 
having;  a  perfect  claim,  founded  on  the  Strength  of  treaties, 
than  if  they  were  ftill  vefled  with  thofe  rights  of  abfolute 

independence. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  453 

independence.  In  treating  of  politics,  we  afTerted,  that 
the  citizen  is  in  a  far  more  eligible  condition,  than  the  in- 
dividual who  has  not  parted  with  any  of  his  abfolute  na- 
tural rights;  becaufe,  the  whole  ftrength  of  the  flate  is 
his  protection,  and  the  will  of  the  community  his  guide; 
his  intereft  is  fecured  in  the  participation  of  the  public 
good,  fanftioned  by  the  public  laws  of  the  land.  But, 
What  can  a  weak  nation  expect,  when  it  has  to  cope  with 
a  powerful  ftate  with  which  it  was  on  friendly  terms,  but 
which  proves  to  be  infincere  and  perfidious?  How  often 
have  treaties  been  explained  away,  evaded,  broke!  How 
often  have  they  been  the  means  of  laying  a  foundation  for 
a  new  war!  How  liable  are  their  operations  to  caufe 
ruptures  between  the  parties,  or  between  either  of  them 
with  its  neighbour ! 

Sc/i.  4. — Let  us  therefore  conclude,  that  nothing  but  neceffity 
fhould  induce  nations  to  enter  into  treaties.  Happy  thofe 
nations  which,  like  the  Chinefe,  can  keep  themfelves  un- 
fhackled  !  Happy  thofe  which,  as  they  cannot  avoid  fol- 
lowing the  cuftoms  generally  adopted,  confine  themfelves 
to  treaties  of  amity  and  commerce!  In  times  of  com- 
motion among  the  nations  of  the  earth,  they  can  maintain 
the  character  of  fathers  of  their  people,  fecnring  to  them 
the  rights  of  peace  and  neutrality:  they  bid  fair  for  being 
refpe£ted  as  neutral  powers,  as  they  are  not  bound  to  al- 
low one  party  that  which  by  folemn  ftipulations  they 
mu ft  refufe  the  other. 

Sc/i.  5. — Inftances  of  the  difficulties  under  which  nations  may 
be  placed  upon  the  rupture  of  other  ftates,  we  have  ex- 
perienced amongft  ourfelves,  in  the  prefent  conteft  be- 
tween the  powers  of  Europe  and  the  firft  ally  and  friend 
of  the  United  States  of  North-America. 

When  treaties  are  concluded,  they  ought  faithfully 
to  be  obferved:  nothing  is  more  pernicious  to  the 
common  good  of  mankind,  nothing  more  diforaceful 
to  a  nation,  than  the  guilt  and  well- merited  imputation 
cf  perfidy. 

Perfidy  amongft  nations  is  a  national  injury,  and  is 
a  juft  caufe  for  defence  and  war, 

Ruptures 


454  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Ruptures  between  nations  may  be,  on  the  part  of  the 
injured  defender,  a  jufl  caufe  to  break  through  all  for- 
mer flipulations  with  the  enemy,  provided  they  are  not 
in  their  nature  a  kind  of  public  truft,  which,  both  with 
refpedt  to  national  governments  and  their  citizens,  mould 
be  kept  inviolate : — Still,  all  engagements  which  nations 
at  war  have  entered  into  during  the  courfe  of  fuch  war, 
whether  by  themfelves  or  by  perfons  delegated  for  that 
purpofe,  or  by  certain  officers,  who,  by  virtue  of  their 
trull  and  commiffion,  have  the  power  to  flipulate  in 
name  of  the  national  fovereign, — ought  to  be  perform- 
ed moil  faithfully,  and  with  the  flricTeft  punctuality 
and  exactnefs  :  for,  an  enemy  cannot  forfeit  a  right  that 
was  given  him  as  fuch,  by  profecuting  acts  of  hoflility 
and  violence ;  and,  as  fuch  engagements  are  necefTary 
to  mitigate  the  horrors  and  calamities  of  war,  a  party 
that  proves  perfidious  in  fuch  cafe  muft  be  considered 
as  a  monfler  in  human  fhape,  as  an  enemy  to  humanity. 

Sch. — We  may  here  advert  to  truces  and  armiftices  necefTary 
for  acts  of  humanity;  as,  burying  the  dead,  concerting 
meafures  for  reconciliation  and  peace,  &c. 

Nations  form  treaties  by  mandataries,  flrictly  and 
fpeciflcally  qualified  for  pledging  the  faith  of  the  fo- 
vereign. 

He  who  claims  the  right  of  a  mandatary  mufl  mew 
fpecific  powers  from  the  national  government. 

The  fovereign  is  bound  to  all  that  is  lawfully  flipu- 
lated  by  his  mandatary. 

Officers  of  government,  particularly  thofe  of  the  ar- 
my and  navy,  are  veiled  with  powers  which  involve 
the  right  of  mandatary  trufls  :  for  inftance,  a  general 

treating 


moral  philosophy  455 

treating  for  fupplies,  officers  entrufted  with  the  com- 
mand of  fortifications,  &c.  Their  engagements  are 
public,  becaufe,  without  fuch  a  power  they  could  not 
ferve  their  country. 

Treaties  ceafe  in  a  manner  iimilar  to  that  in  which 
pacts  terminate.  Vide  the  latter  part  of  chap.  viii.  part 
2,  of  this  tread fe. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Of  the  territory  and  jurifdiclion  of  nations. 


N. 


ATIONS  inhabit  a  part  of  the  globe,  they  con- 
fequently  potfefs  a  territory. 

Nations  may  acquire  territory  by  occupancy,  by 
conqueft  upon  the  principle  of  forfeiture  and  law,  or 
by  treaties. 

The  territory  of  a  nation  may  be  enlarged  by  ac- 
ceflion,  according  to  the  principles  formerly  laid  down 
with  refpect  to  the  various  modes  of  acquiiition  of 
property,  or  right  in  things. 

As  far  as  a  nation's  territory  extends,  fo  far  extends 
its  jurifdiclion;  for,  not  to  have  jurifdiclion  in  its  own 
territory  would  amount  to  a  dependency  inconfiftent 
with  the  right  of  equality. 

Upon  the  fame  principles,  national  jurifdiclion  ex- 
tends to  thofe  things  in  which  a  nation  has  the  right 
of  commonrv ;  as,  the  open  fea,  &c. 

The 


456  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY^ 

The  cuftomary  law  of  nations  allows  a  maritime 
ftate  jurifdiclion  to  the  diftance  of  three  leagues  from 
fhore,  and  over  bays,  rivers  and  harbours,  where  a  free 
paffage  can  be  hindered  by  the  batteries  erecled  on 
their  refpective  mores,  or  the  exclufive  right  main- 
tained by  means'  of  neighbouring  fortifications. 


/ 


